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August 10, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE S 10503 
cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 
330, and his colleagues on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. It was through 
their special effort that the bill was 
reported out of that committee for full 
Senate consideration. I would also like 
to express my' appreciation to the 
other 31 cosponsors of the bill for 
their support. 
It was on June 28, 1984, that I intro-
duced Senate Joint Resolution 330 on 
behalf of nearly 1.5 million Americans 
who have a condition that is relatively 
unknown. Approximately 125,000 
people join their ranks each year. 
These individuals are ostomates. They 
have in common an "ostomy," a type 
of surgery required when a person has 
lost the normal function of the bowel 
or bladder, due to birth defect, disease, 
injury, or other disorder. Such oper-
ations include colostomy, ileostomy, 
and urostomy. Ostomates are of all 
ages, and represent every race, occupa-
tion, and ethnic background. They do 
return to normal living and communi-
ty responsibility, but not without first 
overcoming the trauma associated 
with this radical surgery. 
Public awareness and education ef-
forts can help. Mutual aid and support 
groups can also be of great assistance 
to ostomates and their families. The 
first local ostomy association Was 
formed in 1949, and in 1962 the United 
Ostomy Association was established. 
This association, with over 625 chap-
ters—three in the State of Hawaii— 
and international affiliation, is dedi-
cated to helping every ostomy patient 
return to normal living through 
mutual support, education in proper 
ostomy care, exchange of ideas, assist-
ance in improving ostomy equipment 
and supplies, advancement of knowl-
edge of gastrointestinal diseases, and 
public education about ostomy. 
The Visiting Program is the most 
important activity of the United 
Ostomy Association. The volunteer 
members of local chapters, composed 
primarily of ostomates, provide preop-
erative preparation and support as 
well as postsurgical followthrough on 
a person-to-person basis. These trained 
and certified members are carefully se-
lected to visit a new patient in the hos-
pital or at their home, ijpon request 
and with the consent of the surgeon. 
As one member of a team whose task 
is to return the patient to health and 
activity, the visitor provides help 
which cannot be duplicated. To a new 
patient, a successful ostomate symbol-
izes good outcome. 
At regular monthly meetings, open 
to anyone who is interested, members 
can exchange practical and personal 
experiences, see ostomy equipment 
displayed, and hear speakers. Through 
the Visiting Program and chapter 
meetings, thousands of people have re-
turned to active and productive lives 
by adjusting to their new way of life. 
Without greater public understand-
ing of this type of surgery, the fear of 
those about to undergo the surgery 
and of family members and loved ones 
who are so important to the rehabili-
tation process tends to increase. For 
the reasons I have stated, together 
with Senator GRASSLEY and other con-
cerned cosponsors of the measure, I 
urge the adoption of Senate Joint Res-
olution 330. 
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, 
today we are considering a resolution, 
which has already passed in the House 
of Representatives, designating this 
month, August 1984, as "Ostomy 
Awareness Month"; 1.5 million people 
have undergone an ostomy due to the 
loss of the normal function of their 
bowel or bladder. Fortunately, all of 
these people are able to resume their 
previous lifestyles after the surgery. 
The United Ostomy Association has 
50,000 members whom the association 
counsels through the trauma of sur-
gery and the readjustment that is nec-
essary after surgery. Not only does the 
association help ostomates, but they 
also assist the families and friends in 
gaining understanding and support for 
their friend or family member. 
Many well-known people have had 
one of the three types of ostomies, a 
colostomy, an urostomy or an ileosto-
my, and have become spokespersons 
for ostomates. We can do our part too 
by designating this month as "Ostomy 
Awareness Month" and thereby pro-
moting the education of the American 
population and commending the 
people who have had an ostomy and 
continue to live as they had before the 
surgery. I urge you to support this im-
portant resolution. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
joint resolution is open to amendment. 
If there be no amendment to be pro-
posed, the question is on the engross-
ment and the third reading of the 
joint resolution. 
The joint resolution was ordered to 
be engrossed for a third reading and 
was read the third time. 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President. I ask 
unanimous consent that the pending 
measure be laid aside and the Senate 
turn to the consideration of House 
Joint Resolution 587, Calendar Order 
No. 1132. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
joint resolution will be stated by title. 
The assistant legislative clerk read 
as follows: 
A joint resolution (H J. Res. 587) designat-
ing the month of August 1984 as "Ostomy 
Awareness Month." 
There being no objection, the Senate 
proceeded to the consideration of the 
joint resolution. 
Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. President, 
inasmuch as the language of the 
House joint resolution is exactly the 
same as that of the Senate Joint Reso-
lution 330, I rise in full support of the 
measure and ask for its immediate pas-
sage. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
joint resolution is before the Senate 
and open to amendment. If there be 
no amendment to be offered, the ques-
tion is on the third reading and pas-
sage of the joint resolution. 
The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 587) 
was ordered to a third reading, was 
read the third time, and passed. 
The preamble was agreed to. 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I moi e 
to reconsider the vote by which the 
joint resolution was passed. 
Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. President, I 
move to lay that motion on the table. 
The motion to lay on the table was 
agreed to. 
Mr. BAKER. "Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that Senate Joint 
Resolution 330 be indefinitely post-
poned. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. 
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND 
COSMETIC ACT AMENDMENT 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, could I 
inquire next of the minority leader if 
it is possible for him to clear for action 
by unanimous consent Calendar Order 
No. 1115, S. 2926, the drug bill. 
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, 
reserving the right to object, and I 
shall not' object, I wish to address 
myself for one moment to the minori-
ty leader. 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I am ad 
vised now that it may take a few addi-
tional moments to get that in shape. 
I withdraw my request of the minor-
ity leader. 
Mr. President, I believe now that the 
earlier matter may be cleared. 
Let me renew my inquiry of the mi-
nority leader. 
I wish now to go to Calendar No. 
1115, S. 2926, if the minority leader 
can clear that. 
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the 
matter has been cleared on this side, 
and there is no objection. 
Mr. BAKER. I thank the minority 
leader. 
Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay 
before the Senate Calendar Order No 
1115, S. 2926. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
bill will be stated by title. 
The assistant legislative clerk read 
as follows: 
A bill (S. 2926) to amend the Federal 
Pood. Drug, and Cosmetic Act to revise the 
procedures for new drug applications, to 
amend title 35. United States Code, to au-
thorize the extention of the patents for cer-
tain regulated products, and for other put 
poses. 
There being no objection, the Senate 
proceeded to consider the bill. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, we have 
before us the most important pharma-
ceutical legislation to come before 
Congress in many years. This bill. S. 
2926, is the final version of S. 2748. 
the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act 6f 1984. 
This is a groundbreaking compromise 
in the public interest. It reconciles the 
opposing, competitive interests of two 
segments of the pharmaceutical indus-
try -which have often stymied each 
other's attempts to improve the law. 
The research-based drug industry ob-
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tains an extension of patents for new 
drug discoveries to compensate them 
for the time spent off-market in Food 
and Drug Administration review. The 
generic drug industry gets the ability 
to bring generic copies of off-patent 
drugs to market as soon as the patent 
expires, without the needless redupli-
cation of studies and tests already in 
FDA's files. 
The public receives the best of both 
worlds—cheaper drugs today and 
better drugs tomorow. The prolifera-
tion of new generics for some of the 
most important drugs on the market 
will save consumers an estimated $1 
billion or more over the next decade. 
The added patent life will restore to 
our domestic drug companies some of 
the incentive for innovation which has 
weakened as Federal pre-market ap-
proval requirements have become 
more expensive and time-consuming. 
That incentive will produce both the 
investment and commitment to re-
seach and development that will again 
place the United States in unques-
tioned leadership in the field. And it 
will generate an increase in the 
number of important new drugs, 
among the most vital causes for this 
century's dramatic increase in the 
length and quality of life. 
Now, those who have been following 
this bill know this is a vastly simpli-
fied account of the bill and its effect. 
It is involved and is carefully balanced 
at a number of points in ways only 
lawyers could have devised. But it is a 
good bill, one which I have heartily 
endorsed and promoted in the Senate. 
It is backed by a wide range of organi-
zations including the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers' Association, the AFL-
CIO and numerous individual unions, 
the American Association of Retired 
Persons, and the National Council of 
Senior Citizens. 
As you are probably also aware, sev-
eral research-based pharmaceutical 
companies have felt that the compro-
mise embodied in S. 2748 was not ade-
quate and have pressed for changes in 
the bill. During the past 3 months I 
have met with many of these compa-
nies to discuss their concerns as has 
Congressman HENRY WAXMAN, the 
bill's House sponsor, and indeed as 
have many members of my committee. 
While I believe S. 2748 enjoys over-
whelming support in the Senate, it has 
certainly been my belief that it is pref-
erable to accommodate requests for 
changes which do not disturb balances 
essential to the bill. 
As the time remaining during this 
session has decreased, discussions over 
these concerns have intensified. 
Hoping that I could catalyze a final 
agreement among the interested par-
ties, we met Tuesday and Wednesday 
and conducted many hours of intense 
negotiation. We discussed and placed 
on the table issues relating both to the 
abbreviated new drug application 
<ANDA) and patent portions of the 
bill. 
IGRESSIONAL RECORD — SEN 
Further negotiations ensued yester-
day with Congressman WAXMAN, the 
House sponsor, in an attempt to devel-
op a final position which would be sat-
isfactory to everyone. I am pleased to 
report that these negotiations bore 
fruit and that a compromise set of 
amendments has been incorporated 
into this new bill and into the techni-
cal amendment I am proposing today. 
The bill, S. 2926, as amended has 
drawn the support of almost all of the 
companies opposing S. 2748, and has 
been accepted by Congressman 
WAXMAN and by the administration. 
Before continuing my remarks, let 
me acknowledge the good offices of 
the many people who assisted in these 
negotiations, especially Mr. Joe Wil-
liams, president of Warner-Lambert 
and chairman of the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association; Mr. Jack 
Stafford, chief executive officer of 
American Home Products; Mr. Bill 
Haddad, president of the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Industry Association; 
Mr. William Greif, vice president of 
Bristol Myers; and Mr. William Ryan 
assistant general counsel of Johnson 
& Johnson. Above all, I express my ap-
preciation for the flexibility and lead-
ership of Chairman WAXMAN. We have 
enjoyed a close and amicable working 
relationship during the progress of 
this legislation through the Congress. 
The elements of the compromise are: 
There is to be a prospective 5-year 
waiting period for filing of ANDA's 
following approval by FDA of a new 
chemical entity new drug application 
[NDA3. For all other NDA's involving 
new clinical tests, there will be a 3-
year period during which no ANDA 
approval may be made effective. This 
protects products whose development 
has taken much time and money in 
FDA testing and review, but which 
have little for no patent life left when 
they are finally allowed on the 
market. 
Further, the 10-year ANDA morato-
rium for products approved between 
January 1.1982, and the date of enact-
ment is supplemented by a similar pro-
vision for 2 years for non-new-chemi-
cal-entity drugs. 
The period of time during which an 
abbreviated new drug application is 
not to be made effective, during the 
pendency of a patent challenge under 
the statute, is extended from 18 to 30 
months from the date of submission of 
an ANDA application containing bioe-
quivalency data. This increases the 
likelihood that the litigation will be 
concluded within the time period 
during which ANDA's are not allowed. 
, Some of the complicated current re-
strictions on the nature of patents 
which can be extended are removed, 
with the provision that one patent on 
a product, not necessarily the first, 
can be extended but that total exclu-
sive market life of the product cannot 
exceed 14 years. 
The authority of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services to deny a 
petition for filing an ANDA for a prod-
\TE August 10, 1984 
uct not exactly similar to the original 
drug will be expanded to include cases 
where the proposed generic is a com-
bination drug, one of whose active in-
gredients is different from those of 
the original combination drug. This 
will make sure that FDA retains the 
authority to prevent drugs from 
coming to market without proper tests 
to establish the unforeseen interac-
tions that substituted active ingredi-
ents may have on each other. 
The concern was raised that FDA 
might be forced under the bill to ap-
prove an ANDA, even if FDA had 
started proceedings to remove the 
original drug from the market but had 
not completed the process. Language 
was adopted which would remedy this 
loophole. 
The treatment of animal drugs con-
tained in S. 2748 is deleted in this bill. 
I would also like to address a com-
ment to one issue which arose during 
the discussion of the bill. The Patent 
Commissioner has expressed concern 
that he is required to verify the con-
tents of applications for patent exten-
sion. This was not intended, and a 
wording change in the bill clarifies 
that he may rely wholly on the re-
quired information as represented by 
the applicant. 
Mr. President, the United States 
waits for this bill. 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
express my strong endorsement of S. 
2926, the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. 
This important compromise measure 
builds upon legislation which was re-
ported by the Judiciary Committee 
and passed by the Senate in the 97th 
Congress. I was a cosponsor of that 
bill and its successors, and I am 
pleased to join the distinguished chair-
man of the Labor and Human Re-
sources Committee, Senator ORRIN 
HATCH, in cosponsoring this measure. 
Mr. President, patent term restora-
tion makes eminently good sense and 
is fair to business and consumers alike. 
It encourages inventiveness by making 
the patent term a real and useful one. 
This bill adds an additional feature re-
lating to approval procedures for 
drugs coming off patent, which will 
expedite the availability of generic 
drugs. This is a balanced package 
which addresses legitimate needs in a 
reasonable manner. 
Mr. President, after a long delay, we 
are finally able to bring this important 
legislation before the Senate. I want 
to commend Senator HATCH for his 
persistence in this matter. I also want 
to express my congratulations to rep-
resentatives of the various interested 
groups who worked together to resolve 
their differences so that the public in-
terest would be served. Although, as 
with any compromise, everyone did 
not get everything that he wanted, 
this package represents a fair balance 
of interests. 
I urge my colleagues to support S. 
2926 so that we can enact patent term 
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restoration and ANDA provisions 
without further delay. 
AMENDMENT 110. 3 7 0 7 
(Purpose: To make certain technical 
changes to the bills) 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President. I now 
send to the desk a technical amend-
ment to S. 2926 on behalf of myself 
and the other cosponsors and Senator 
METZENBAUM. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
amendment will be stated. 
The legislative clerk read as follows: 
The Senator from Utah [Mr. HATCH], for 
himself and Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. DECON-
CINI, Mrs. HAWKINS. Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. 
DENTON, and Mr. THURMOND proposes 
amendment numbered 3707. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President. I ask 
unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. 
The amendment is as follows: 
Clause (iii) of section 505(JX4MD) of the 
Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as 
added by section 101(a) of the biU. is amend-
ed by striking out "(or supplement to an ap-
plication )M and "(or supplement thereto)", 
and by inserting after "approved under sub-
section (b)" the following "and which con-
tains reports of new clinical investigations (other than bioavailability studies) spon-
sored by the applicant". 
Clause (iv) of section 505(JX4)(D) of the 
Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act. as 
added by section 101(a) of the bill, redesig-
nated as clause (v). and the following new 
clause (iv) is Inserted immediately after 
clause (iii): 
"(iv) If a supplement to an application ap-
proved under subsection (b) includes reports 
of new clinical investigations (other than 
bioavailability studies) sponsored by the ap-
plicant and is approved after the date of en-
actment of this subsection, the Secretary 
may not make the approval of an applica-
tion submitted under this subsection which 
Tefers to the drug for which such supple-
ment was submitted effective before the ex-
piration of three years from the date of the 
approval of the supplement under subsec-
tion (b). 
Clause (iii) of section 505(c)(3XD) of the 
Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act. as 
added by section 101(b) of the bill, is amend-
ed by striking out "(or supplement to an ap-
plication)" and "(or supplement thereto)" 
and by inserting after "approved under sub-
section (b)" the following "and which con-
tains reports of new clinical investigations (other than bioavailability studies) spon-
sored by the applicant". 
Clause (iv) of section 505(c)(3XD) of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as 
added by section 101(b) of the bill, is redes-
ignated as clause (v), and the following new 
clause (iv) is inserted immediately after 
clause (iii); 
"(iv) If a supplement to an application ap-
proved under subsection (b) includes reports 
of new clincial investigations (other than 
bioavailability studies) sponsored by the ap-
plicant and is approved after the date of en-
actment of this subsection, the Secretary 
may not make the approval of an applica-
tion submitted under this subsection which 
refers to the drug for which such supple-
ment was submitted effective before the ex^ 
piration of three years from the date of the 
approval of the supplement under subsec-
tion (b). 
Subsection (1) of section 505 of the Feder-
al Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as added 
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by section 104 of the bill, Is amended by 
striking out, beginning with ", including", 
all matter through "financial information". 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, the 
amendment clarifies the data release 
provision and the 3-year moratorium 
for ANDA's [Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications]. It would protect only 
those new drug applications which in-
volve new clinical investigations. 
The effect on changes to existing 
NDA's would be to restrict coverage to 
only those alterations, like some 
changes in strength, indications, and 
so forth, which require considerable 
time and expense in FDA required 
clinical testing. 
Mr. President, I move that the 
amendment be adopted. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If 
there be no further debate, the ques-
tion is on agreeing to the amendment 
of the Senator from Utah. 
The amendment (No. 3707) was 
agTeedto. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move 
to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to. 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move 
to lay that motion on the table. 
The motion to lay on the table was 
agreed to. 
AMENDMENT NO. S708 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President,-at this 
time, I submit an amendment on 
behalf of Senator THURMOND and ask 
for its immediate consideration. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
amendment will be stated. 
The legislative clerk read as follows: 
The Senator from Utah [Mr. HATCH] for 
Mr. THURMOND proposes an amendment 
numbered 3708. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that the reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered. ^  
The amendment is as follows: -
At the end of the bill insert the following 
new title: 
TITLE — 
Src. - . (a) Title 35 of the United States 
Code is amended by adding immediately fol-
lowing section 155 the following new sec-
tion: M8155A. Patent extension. 
"(a) Notwithstanding section 154 of this 
title, the term of any patent which encom-
passes within its scope a composition of 
matter which is a new drug product, if such 
new drug product is subject to the labeling 
requirements for oral hypoglycemic drugs 
of the sulfonylurea class as promulgated by 
the Food and Drug Administration in' its 
final rule on March 22. 1984 (FR Doc. 84-
9640) and was approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration for marketing after 
promulgation of such final rule and prior to 
the date of enactment of this law, shall be 
extended until April 21,1992. 
"(b) The patentee or licensee or author-
ized representative of any patent described 
in such subsection (a) shall, within ninety 
days after the date of enactment of such 
subsection, notify the Commissioner of Pat-
ents and Trademarks of the number of any 
patent so extended. On receipt of such 
notice, the Commissioner shall confirm such 
extension by placing a notice thereof in the 
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official file of such patent and publishing an 
appropriate notice of such extension in the 
Official Gazette of the Patent and Trade-
mark Office.". 
(b) The table of sections for chapter 14 of 
title 35, United States Code is amended by 
adding after the item relating to section 155 
the following new item: 
"155A. Patent extension.". 
Section 25(a) of the bill, as redesignated, 
is amended by striking out "9 and 10" and 
inserting in lieu thereof "9,10, and 24". 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I would 
like to share with my colleagues a 
statement by Senator THURMOND on 
this amendment. 
This amendment passed the Senate with-
out objection on June 29 as an amendment 
to 8. 1538. It would provide limited patent 
extension for certain oral diabetic drugs. 
Such relief is necessary because the FDA 
unduly delayed final approval for these 
drugs while it developed class labeling. This 
would restore some of the patent life lost 
because of the government's undue delay. 
Mr. President, it is my understand-
ing that Members of the House are 
willing to take this amendment, as 
well, so we are adding it to this bill. 
Mr. METZENBAUM. Will the 
manger of the bill be good enough just 
to repeat what this amendment is? 
This is not the Thurmond textile 
amendment? 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, this has 
nothing to do with textiles. This is an 
amendment that provides limited 
patent extensions for certain oral dia-
betic drugs. Such relief is necessary 
because the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration unduly delayed final approval 
for these drugs while it developed 
class labeling. This would restore some 
of the patent life lost because of the 
Government's undue delay. 
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, 
I have to say to my colleague from 
Utah that this amendment is not 
agreeable at all. I have jiot heard of 
this amendment before. This is the 
first time I have heard about a patent 
extension with respect to diabetic 
drugs. We have many patent exten-
sions proposed. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, if the 
Senator will yield for just a moment. 
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, 
I have to advise my colleague that al-
though apparently one of my staff 
members saw fit to clear it, it does not 
reflect my views. But if he did so, I am 
not going to renege on that under-
standing. I withdraw my objection. 
Mr. HATCH. I appreciate the distin-
guished Senator from Ohio doing that. 
I might add that this is part of the 
package that has been considered and 
accepted by, I believe, Representatives 
in the House and the Senate. I under-
stood that it had been cleared. I appre-
ciate that kindness on the part of the 
distinguished Senator from Ohio. 
Mr. METZENBAUM. Is the Senator 
finished with the amendment? 
Mr. HATCH. I have not moved the 
amendment yet. 
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Mr, METZENBAUM. I would like to 
be heard on the bill when the Senator 
from Utah is finished. 
Mr. HATCH. I am not quite through 
yet. 
Mr. President, I move the amend-
ment. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is 
there further debate on the amend-
ment? If not, the question is on agree-
ing to the amendment of the Senator 
from Utah £Mr. HATCH]. 
The amendment (No. 3708) was 
agreed to. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I move 
to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to. 
Mr. BAKER. I move to lay that 
motion on the table. 
The motion to lay on the table was 
agreed to. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I yield 
the floor to the distinguished Senator 
from Ohio. 
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, 
I spent the last couple of days on this 
bill, and I am frank to admit that I 
have grave misgivings about it. I have 
misgivings about it because it provides 
the Senate with the horns of a di]em-
ma. 
One part of the bill provides a good 
legislative approach to the use of ge-
neric drugs, and it breaks some new 
ground in that area. I support the con-
cept of the use of generic drugs. I 
think it helps senior citizens as well as 
all people in our society if you can buy 
drugs that are not merely by reason of 
their name and the advertising but 
based upon the content. 
But there is another part of the bill 
that gives me great concern; that is 
that portion of the bill that provides 
for an extension of patents under vari-
ous and sundry circumstances. 
I have seen a proliferation of legisla-
tion in this session of Congress calling 
for the extension of patents. Some 
brilliant lawyer or lobbyist came to 
the conclusion that if we went to the 
Congress we could get patents ex-
tended beyond their usual 17-year 
term. So we have seen bills having to 
do with pharmaceuticals and chemi-
cals, and agriculture chemicals, specif-
ic drugs, various and sundry drugs, 
some described rather generally, and 
in each instance there was a strong 
case made, "Well, the FDA delayed it 
' or whatever and there should be an 
extension." 
This bill is not specific in that re-
spect. It provides for a more general 
extension of patents. In that respect, I 
have grave reservations about it. 
Then there are provisions of this bill 
that provide for specific extensions. 
And each day of extension, it should 
be pointed out. costs the American 
consumers literally hundreds of thou-
sands, and in some instances millions, 
of dollars. When I attempted to deter-
mine how much the extension rights 
for the patent extensions provided in 
this bill were worth, I was unable to 
get a figure. Nobody can say whether 
it was $1 billion, $2 billion, $5 billion, 
or $50 billion. I am frank to admit I do 
not know the amount. But I know that 
it is a large amount and the drug com-
panies will clap with enthusiasm and 
excitement when this bill becomes law. 
Then there is another provision in 
this bill that breaks even further more 
new ground, and that is it is a totally 
new concept. It provides that the 
FDA, upon approval of a drug, may 
grant exclusivity, exclusive rights to 
use that drug for 5 years. Then if you 
read it closely enough, you will learn it 
really is not 5 years, it is closer to 6 
years because of the date and the 
manner in which it is written. 
Well, that was enough and that was 
sufficient reason to be concerned 
about the passage of this legislation. 
But then we learned just in the last 
few minutes that the language of the 
S-year exclusive marketing provision 
which the FDA can give may also, in 
some way, detour or detract from the 
right of generic drug manufacturers 
and perhaps others as well to chal-
lenge the patent during that period. 
I have received an iron-clad assur-
ance from the man primarily responsi-
ble for the passage of this legislation, 
the distinguished and well-respected 
Congressperson from California 
HENRY WAXMAN, who said if this is a 
problem, he will see to it that it is 
taken care of in the House. I want at 
this point to say very publicly that one 
of the reasons that I have withdrawn 
any objection to this bill is because of 
the distinguished record that the Con-
gressperson from California, Congress-
man WAXMAN, has had and the confi-
dence that I have in his legislative ap-
proach. 
I still have reservations. I still have 
concerns. I will not oppose this legisla-
tion. I am not at all certain that the 
Senate, when it passes it this evening, 
will be doing the right thing, but I will 
not stand in the way of the passage. 
There are some fine groups, generic 
groups, retired senior citizens .groups, 
Congress Watch, other groups of that 
kind, consumer groups, who have indi-
cated their support. I hope they are 
right. I hope they are not making a 
mistake. I hope that they have not 
given away too much of the ball game 
to the big drug manufacturers of this 
country, and only time will tell wheth-
er or not I am right 
On one other subject, there are 
many people asking what this bill is 
all about; what it means; how do you 
interpret it. Let me say. for one, that I 
interpret it in only one manner. 
Nobody can change the language of 
the legislation. It speaks for itself. So 
notwithstanding anybody who may 
feel that they can interpret the lan-
jruage of this legislation in one way or 
another, I want the courts to under-
stand that the legislation speaks for 
itself and the -interpretation which 
anyone may make on the floor does 
not really add anything to that inter-
pretation. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I cannot 
overstate the importance of this bill. 
It will revolutionize the drug industry 
and the drug market. It is a boon to 
both consumers and producers, and I 
know of no group which opposes it as 
amended. 
The support is bipartisan, and it is 
overwhelming. 
Mr. President, I cannot tell you how 
much the distinguished Member of 
Congress, Congressman WAXMAN, has 
done to help bring this bill about. 
Without his tireless, unrelenting lead-
ership, I do not know that we would 
ever have had this bill. And there has 
been a lot of work here in the Senate, 
and especially in the Labor and 
Human Resources Committee, as well. 
I was pleased to join in the effort 
with Congressman WAXMAN in this bi-
partisan effort. 
I want to thank the people in indus-
try, the consumer groups, the people 
in the generic pharmaceutical indus-
try, the people in the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association, and all of 
those who have worked with us. I want 
to thank the Senator from Ohio. I 
would like to thank the distinguished 
Member of Congress, Congressman 
WAXMAN. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
bill having been read the third time, 
the question is, Shall the bill pass? 
The bill (S. 2926) was passed, as 
amended as follows: 
8.2926 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That this 
Act may be cited as the "Drug Price Compe-
tition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984". 
TITLE I-ABBREVIATED NEW DRUG 
APPLICATIONS 
SKC. 101. Section 505 of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 UJS.C. 355) is 
amended by redesignating subsection (j) as 
subsection (k) and inserting after subsection 
U) the following: 
"(j)U) Any person may file with the Sec-
retary an abbreviated application for the 
approval of a new drug. 
"(2XA> An abbreviated application for a 
new drug shall contain— 
"(i) information to show that the condi-
tions of use prescribed, recommended, or 
suggested in the labeling proposed for the 
new drug have been previously approved for 
a drug listed under paragraph (6) (herein-
after in this subsection referred to as a 
'listed drug'); 
"(iiXI) if the listed drug referred to in 
clause (!) has only one active ingredient, in-
formation to show that the active ingredi-
ent of the new drug is the same as that of 
the listed drug, 
'•(II) if the listed drug referred to in 
clause (i) has more than one active ingredi-
ent, information to show that the active in-
gredients of the new drug are the same as 
those of the listed drug, or 
"(III) if the listed drug referred to in 
clause (i) has more than one active ingredi-
ent and if one of the active ingredients of 
the new drug is different and the applica-
tion is filed pursuant to the approval of a 
petition filed under subparagraph (C). infor-
mation to show that the other active ingre-
dients of the new drug are the same as the 
active ingredients of the listed drug, infor-
mation to show that the different active in-
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product development protocol was initially 
submitted under section 515(f)(5) and 
ending on the date the protocol was de-
clared completed under section 515(f)(6). 
"(4) A period determined under any of the 
preceding paragraphs is subject to the fol-
lowing limitations: 
4,(A) If the patent involved was issued 
after the date of the enactment of this sec-
tion, the period of extension determined on 
the basis of the regulatory review period de-
termined under any such paragraph may 
not exceed five years. 
"(B) If the patent involved was issued 
before the date of the enactment of this sec-
tion and— 
"(i) no request for an exemption described 
in paragraph (1KB) was submitted. 
"(ii) no major health or environmental ef-
fects test described in paragraph (2) was ini-
tiated and no petition for a regulation or ap-
plication for registration described in such 
paragraph wa* submitted, or 
* <u*> id* tusae^X tAvesugaiu/ft described in 
paragraph <'*> was begun or product devel-
opment protocol described in such para-
graph was submitted. 
before such date for the approved product 
the period of extension determined on the 
basis of the regulatory review period deter-
mined under any such paragraph may not 
exceed five years. 
"(C) If the patent involved was issued 
before the date of the enactment of this sec-
tion and if an action described in subpara-
graph (b) was taken before the date of the 
enactment of this section with respect to 
the approved product and the commercial 
marketing or use of the product has not 
been approved before such date, the period 
of extension determined on the basis of the 
regulatory review period determined under 
such paragraph may not exceed two years. 
"(h) The Commissioner may establish 
such fees as the Commissioner determines 
appropriate to cover the costs to the Office 
of receiving and acting upon applications 
under this section.". 
(b) The analysis for chapter 14 of title 35 
of the United States Code is amended by 
adding at the end thereof the following: 
"156. Extension of patent term/'. 
SEX:. 202. Section 271 of title 35, United 
States Code is amended by adding at the 
end the following: 
"(e)(1) It shall not be an act of infringe-
ment to make, use, or sell a patented inven-
tion (other than a new animal drug or vet-
erinary biological product (as those terms 
are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) 
solely for uses reasonably related to the de-
velopment and submission of information 
under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs. 
"(2) It shall be an act of infringement to 
submit an application under section 505(j) 
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use 
of which is claimed in a patent, if the pur-
pose of such submission is to obtain approv-
al under such Act to engage in the commeri-
cal manufacture, use, or sale of a drug 
claimed in a patent or the use of which is 
claimed in a patent before the expiration of 
such patent. 
"(3) In any action for patent infringement 
brought under this section, no injunctive or 
other relief may be granted which would-
prohibit the making, using, or selling of a 
patented invention under the paragraph (1). 
"(4) For an act of infringement described 
in paragraph (2>— 
"(A) the court shall order the effective 
date of any approval of the drug involved in 
the infringement to be a date which is not 
earlier than the date of the expiration of 
the patent which has been infringed, 
"(B) injunctive relief may be granted 
against an infringer to prevent the commer-
cial manufacture, use, or sale of an ap-
proved drug, and 
"(C) damages or other monetary relief 
may be awarded against an infringer only if 
ther has been commerical manufacture, use, 
or sale of an approved drug. 
The remedies prescribed by subparagraphs 
(A). (B). and (C) are the only remedies 
which may be granted by a.court for an act 
of infringement described in paragraph (2), 
except that a court may award attorney fees 
under section 285.". 
SEC. 203. Section 282 of title 35, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end the following: "Invalidity of the exten-
sion of a patent term or any portion thereof 
under section 156 of this title because of the 
material failure— 
"(1) by the applicant for the extension, or 
"(2) by the Commissioner, 
to comply with the requirements of such 
section shall be a defense in any action in-
volving the infringement of a patent during 
the period of the extension of its term and 
shall be pleaded. A due diligence determina-
tion under section 156(d)(2) is not subject to 
review in such an action.*'. 
TITLE III-SEPARABILITY CLAUSE 
SEC. 301. If any provision of this Act is de-
clared unconstitutional or the applicability 
thereof to any person or circumstances is 
held invalid, the constitutionality of the re-
mainder of this Act and the applicability 
thereof to other persons and circumstances 
shall not be affected thereby. 
TITLE IV-MISCELLANEOUS PATENT 
EXTENSIONS 
SEC. 401. (a) Title 35 of the United States 
Code is amended by adding immediately fol-
lowing section 155 the following new sec-
tion: 
"8155A. Patent extension. 
"(a) Notwithstanding section 154 of this 
title, the term of any patent which encom-
passes within its scope a composition of 
matter which is a new drug product, if such 
new drug product is subject to the labeling 
requirements for oral hypoglycemic drugs 
of the sulfonylurea class as promulgated by 
the Food and Drug Administration in its 
final rule of March 22. 1984 (FR Doc. 84-
9640) and was approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration for marketing after 
promulgation of such final rule and prior to 
the date of enactment of this law, shall be 
extended until April 21.1992. 
"(b) The patentee or licensee or author-
ized representative of any patent described 
in such subsection (a) shall, within ninety 
days after the date of enactment of such 
subsection, notify the Commissipner of Pat-
ents and Trademarks of the number of any 
patent so extended. On receipt of such 
notice, the Commissioner shall confirm such 
extension by placing a notice thereof in the 
official file of such patent and publishing an 
appropriate notice of such extension in the 
Official Gazette of the Patent and Trade-
mark Office.". 
(b) The table of sections for chapter 14 of 
title 35. United States Oode is amended by 
adding after the item relating to section 155 
the following new item: 
"155A. Patent extension.". 
SEC. 402. Section 25(a) of the bill, as redes-
ignated, is amended by striking out "9 and 
10" and inserting in lieu thereof "9. 10, and 
24". 
Mr. METZENBAUM addressed the 
Chair. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Ohio is recognized. 
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President. 
I would like the RECORD to reflect the 
fact that the Senator from Ohio voted 
in the negative. 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move 
to reconsider the vote by which the 
bill was passed. 
Mr. HATCH. I move to lay that 
motion on the table. 
The motion to lay on the table was 
agreed to. 
Mr. DECONCINI. I would like to 
engage in a colloquy with my friend, 
Senator HATCH. I understand that S. 
2926. as amended, statutorily codifies 
FDA's current regulation and practice 
with reference to standards for the re-
lease of trade secret, confidential com-
mercial and financial information con-
tained in NDA files, is that correct? 
Mr. HATCH. Tea, the bill carries 
over from the existing regulation the 
provision that information is releas-
able—if other requirements are met— 
unless extraordinary circumstances 
are shown. Under current practice, 
which will be the practice under this 
bill, extraordinary circumstances are 
present for example when the infor-
mation is trade secret or confidential 
commercial or financial information. 
As one specific example, release would 
not be permitted if the information 
has never been previously released and 
would support the application of a 
competitor for approval before a for-
eign regulatory agency. As another ex-
ample, safety and efficacy data con-
tained in an application that was not 
approved will not be released if the 
data retains possible commercial, com-
petitive value. In short, the provision 
retains the applicability of the (b)(4) 
exemption under the Freedom of In-
formation Act. 
Mr. DECONCINI. That is my under-
standing also. 
Mr. BAKER addressed the Chair. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
majority leader is recognized. 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I wish 
to express my appreciation to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Utah for 
work well done. The work was long, 
hard, and done diligently. There were 
moments even as recently as 30 min-
utes ago when I thought it would be 
impossible for him to get this bill 
cleared for passage before we go out. 
But he did. 
I think that is remarkable. I extend 
to the Senator my heartiest congratu-
lations for doing so. 
Mr. President, I thank the minority 
leader for his willingness to consider 
this matter, and the Senator from 
Ohio for agreeing to go forward with-
out objection. 
There is one other point, Mr. Presi-
dent, that I would like to make. The 
distinguished Senator from South 
Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], is not here. 
He is necessarily absent from the floor 
at this point. He had originally 
planned to offer a textile amendment 
to this bill. He feels very keenly about 
that. Many Members know of the 
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great interest he has in that, and the 
dedication that he has for the pur-
poses to be served. But the Senator 
from South Carolina in his character-
istically generous way agreed not to 
offer that amendment in order to fa-
cilitate the passage of this bill. 
I wish to acknowledge that at the 
conclusion of this &ECORD. 
Mr. President, as well I am told that 
in addition to myself, the distin-
guished Senator from Ohio IMr. METZ-
ENBAUM], had indicated to the Presi-
dent pro tempore that in his absence 
we would offer that amendment. We 
were released from the obligation. I 
thank the Senator for doing so. 
Senator GORTON, and others, had in-
dicated their objection. They all were 
withdrawn. I thank all Members for 
making it possible.for us to proceed in 
this manner at this time. 
Mr. HATCH addressed the Chair. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Utah is recognized. 
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President. I would 
express my gratitude to the distin-
guished majority and minority leaders 
of this great body, and for the coop-
eration they have given to me and to 
other Members to try to get this bill 
passed this evening. It is historic. It is 
important. 
I want to personally express my per-
sonal gratitude to both of them, and 
to everybody else who has worked to 
make this possible. 
FEDERAL BOAT SAFETY ACT 
AMENDMENT 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I have 
discussed this with the minority 
leader. He is aware of the request I am 
about to make. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Senate now turn to the 
consideration of Calendar No. 571, 
H.R. 2163. the Boat Safety Act. and 
that it be considered under the follow-
ing time agreement: 
That 30 minutes of total debate, to 
be equally divided between the chair-
man of the Finance committee and the 
ranking minority member, or their 
designees; that the committee report-
ed amendment in the nature of a sub-
stitute be withdrawn; and that only 
one amendment be in order, to be of-
fered by the Senator from Kansas 
[Mr. DOLE] and the Senator from New 
Jersey [Mr. BRADLEY], which is the 
text of the Enterprise zone amend-
ment which was agreed to in H.R. 
4170; 
And that the agreement be in the 
usual form. 
Mr. President, I further ask unani-
mous consent that following final pas-
sage of H.R. 2163, it be in order for the 
chairman of the Finance committee or 
his designee to amend the title of H.R. 
163 appropriately. 
Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
minority leader is recognized. 
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am 
sorry to have to object in regard to 
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this matter. But we have not been able 
to clear such a time agreement with 
only the amendment by Mr. DOLE to 
be offered. There are Senators on this 
side of the aisle, I believe, who have 
amendments on the enterprise zone 
itself, and we have been attempting to 
clear the bill. We are trying to deter-
mine the nature of other possible 
amendments as well. But on behalf of 
the other Senators on this side of the 
aisle, I regrettably would have to 
object at this time. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objec-
tion is heard. 
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I now 
have a list of items that I would like to 
take up. May I say to the minority 
leader that it is a considerable list, 
running to more than one page. Per-
haps I could run through them, and 
he might be in a position then to tell 
me whether he could clear all or any 
part of these matters that would expe-
dite that consideration. 
I would propose, Mr. President, to 
indefinitely postpone Calendar Order 
1117; pass Calendar No. 1118; indefi-
nitely postponed Calendar No. 1119; 
Pass Calendar Nos. 1120, 1121, and 
1122; to indefinitely postpone Calen-
dar No. 1123. to pass Calendar Nos. 
1124. 1125. 1126/1127, and 1128; to in-
definitely postpone Calendar No. 1129; 
to pass Calendar Nos. 1130, 1133, 1134, 
1135, 1136. 1137, 1138. 1139, 1140, 1141, 
1143. 1146.1147, and 1148; and, finally, 
to pass Calendar No. 1150. 
Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
minority leader is recognized. 
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have no 
objection to proceeding with the cal-
endar orders mentioned by the distin-
guished majority leader. 
NATIONAL SPINA BIFIDA MONTH 
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 275) 
to designate the month of October 
1984, as "National Spina Bifida 
Month", was considered, ordered to be 
engrossed for third reading, read the 
third time, and passed. 
The preamble was agreed to. 
The joint resolution, and the pream-
ble, are as follows: 
S J. RES. 275 
Whereas spina bifida is a birth defect in 
the spinal column which occurs in one of 
every one thousand births in the United 
States; 
Whereas spina bifida is the most common 
crippler of newborns, resulting when one or 
more bones in the back (vertebrae) fail to 
close completely during prenatal develop-
ment; 
Whereas while the cause of spina bifida is 
not known, it appears to be the result of 
multiple environmental and genetic factors; 
Whereas although most of the March of 
Dimes and Easter Seal poster children have 
spina bifida, many people have not heard of 
the defect; 
Whereas only a few cities in the United 
States have proper care centers and special-
ized professionals that can provide the most 
effective, aggressive treatment for children 
and adults with sfcina bifida; 
Whereas an increase in the national 
awareness of the problem of spina bifida 
LTE S10513 
may stimulate the interest and concern of 
the American people, which may lead, in 
turn, to increased research and eventually 
to the discovery of a cure for spina bifida. 
Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled. That the month of 
October 1984 is designated "National Spina 
Bifida Month", and the President is author-
ized and requested to issue a proclamation 
calling upon the people of the United States 
to observe that month with appropriate 
ceremonies and activities. 
MYASTHENIA GRAVIS 
AWARENESS WEEK 
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 295) 
to provide for the designation of the 
week of October 14, through October 
20, 1984, as "Myasthenia Gravis 
Awareness Week", was considered, or-
dered to be engrossed for third read-
ing, read the third time, and passed. 
The preamble was agreed to. 
The joint resolution, and the pream-
ble, areas follows: 
- SJ. RES. 295 
Whereas the incidence and prevalence of 
myasthenia gravis presents a significant 
health problem in the United States; 
Whereas myasthenia gravis is a severe 
neuromuscular disorder, characterized by 
weakness of the voluntary muscles of the 
body; 
Whereas an estimated one hundred thou-
sand to two hundred thousand diagnosed. 
and over one hundred thousand undiag-
nosed, Americans of both sexes, and all 
races and ages, are afflicted with the dis-
ease; 
Whereas the Nation faces a continuing 
need to support innovative research into the 
causes, treatment, and cure of myasthenia 
gravis; and 
Whereas it is appropriate to focus the Na-
tion's attention upon the problem of myas-
thenia gravis: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives of the United States of America 
in Congress assembled, That the week of 
October 14, through October 20, 1984. is 
designated as "Myasthenia Gravis Aware-
ness Week" and the President of the United 
States is authorized and requested to issue a 
proclamation calling upon all Government 
agencies and the people of the United 
States to observe the week with appropriate 
programs, ceremonies and activities. 
NATIONAL DIABETES MONTH 
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 299) 
to designate November 1984, as "Na-
tional Diabetes Month/' was consid-
ered, ordered to be engrossed for third 
reading, read the third time, and 
passed. 
The preamble was agreed to. 
The joint resolution, and the pream-
ble, are as follows: 
S J. Res. 299 
Whereas diabetes kills more than all other 
diseases except cancer and cardiovascular 
diseases; 
Whereas eleven million Americans suffer 
from.diabetes and five million seven hun-
dred thousand of such Americans are not 
aware of their illness; 
Whereas $10,100,000,000 annually are 
used for health care costs, disability pay-
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Mr. ENGMAN. I don't have any vote. You have one, so you are 
one up on me. [General laughter.] 
Senator HAWKINS. DO you consider the provision permitting the 
generic manufacturers to begin testing prior to the expiration of 
the patent a critical amendment which goes to the heart of this 
compromise? 
Mr. ENGMAN. That was an issue that was initially put to us in 
January of this year, and at that time the board made a decision 
that that was one of the tradeoffs that we were prepared to give up 
to achieve other purposes of this legislation. 
Senator HAWKINS. Thank you very much for your participation 
on this panel. 
I will now call the third panel. Mr. Verne Willaman, a member 
of Johnson & Johnson's executive committee, accompanied by Mr. 
Stafford and Mr. Lerner. 
The third panel consists of three witnesses for whom we have the 
highest regard. Mr. Verne Willaman, a member of the executive 
committee and Johnson & Johnson, heads all of Johnson & John-
son's pharmaceutical divisions. He will be testifying on behalf of 10 
pharmaceutical companies which have identified provisions of the 
bill which they feel pose problems and require correction. 
He will be accompanied by Mr. John Stafford, president of Amer-
ican Home Products, and Mr. Irwin Lerner, president and CEO of 
Hoffman-LaRoche. 
Mr. Willaman, welcome, and please begin. 
STATEMENT OF VERNE WILLAMAN, MEMBER, EXECUTIVE COM-
MITTEE, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN R. 
STAFFORD, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS, AND 
IRWIN LERNER, PRESIDENT/CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, 
HOFFMAN-LAROCHE, INC. 
Mr. WILLAMAN. Thank you, Senator Hawkins. 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee 
to discuss S. 2748. You have already introduced the other people at 
the table. Let me also just begin by naming the other companies in 
our group: Bristol-Myers, Carter-Wallace, Merck, Norwich Eaton 
Pharmaceuticals—a Procter & Gamble company—Schering-Plough 
Corp., Squibb Corp., and Stuart Pharmaceuticals, a division of ICI 
Americas. 
These companies have much in common. We are all committed 
to pharmaceutical research and development. We represent about 
half of the private pharmaceutical research and development in-
vestment in this country, an investment which over the years has 
propelled our country into the world technological leadership posi-
tion. 
In today's costly health care environment, prescription drugs, to 
quote a recent study, are the "least expensive form of medical ther-
apy and greatly reduce health care costs" by cutting back the need 
for surgery and hospitalization. The medicines we discover and de-
velop in our laboratories are absolutely essential to continued med-
ical progress in this century and beyond. In human terms, the 
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Our companies have been responsible for some of the most signif-
icant pharmaceutical breakthroughs of the last several decades. We 
recognize that each time we begin to develop a new drug we are 
undertaking a multimillion-dollar investment A large amount of 
our research never culminates in a marketed product because 
there are many uncertainties associated with medical research. On 
average, the cost of developing a new medicine in this country is 
now in the $70 to $85 million range, taking an average of 7 to 10 
years and often longer to complete all the rigorous scientific proto-
cols and secure FDA approval. Incentives provided by the patent 
system are the cornerstone of pharmaceutical research and devel-
opment. 
For many years, the patent system has not worked for our indus-
try as it was intended. By the time new drugs are cleared by FDA, 
they have far less than 17 years of patent life. For example, FDA 
reported that of 205 drug products approved between 1962 and 
1978, 51, or a quarter, had little or no patent life at the time of 
approval. We have long believed that this is a situation that merits 
remedy by the Congress, and indeed, efforts in this direction have 
b*en made in past years. 
At the same time, Senator Hatch recently identified the need to 
resolve the question of how FDA approves generic versions of post-
1962 drugs. A workable system must be established for approving 
these generics and for assuring their safety, effectiveness, and qual-
ity. But the legislation must not have the unintended effect of dis-
couraging original research. 
We fully support the objectives of the legislation that has been 
introduced. And furthermore, we would like to commend the com-
mittee for holding hearings on this important piece of legislation. 
The leadership on this issue, and advocacy of drug export legisla-
tion is an example of the kind of leadership necessary in the health 
care field. Expanding drug exports will encourage American tech-
nology and job opportunities. Unfortunately, the ANDA/patent 
term proposal in its current form will have the opposite effect. 
Senator Hawkins, while we support the objectives of S. 2748, we 
are convinced that amendments are necessary. The amendments 
we are proposing are designed to achieve a fair balance between 
streamlining the generic drug approval process, while, at the same 
time, assuring patent protection for pioneer medicines. Efforts to 
stimulate research leading to important new therapies merit at 
least as much consideration as accelerating the approval process 
for generic copies. 
This bill raises many difficult patent issues. Yesterday, at a hear-
ing before a House Judiciary Subcommittee, Patent Commissioner 
Gerald Mossinghoff identified some of these issues. He said they 
pose such a major obstacle that despite his fervent support for 
patent term restoration for pharmaceuticals, he and the Patent 
Office oppose enactment of this legislation in its present form. Also 
at yesterday's hearing, Prof. Norman Dorsen, a recognized expert 
in constitutional law, noted that at least one central provision of 
this legislation raises serious constitutional questions. In light of 
this testimony, it is our viow that hearings be held before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee. 
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Additionally, Commissioner Novitch testified this morning that 
FDA believes that additional changes need to be made to this bill. 
Senator Hawkins, we do have a common constituent—the Ameri-
can consumer. Consumers should not only have access to safe and 
effective generic drugs. They also should have the lifesaving bene-
fits of the innovative therapies discovered in our laboratories. 
These objectives can be achieved by addressing the concerns of the 
Patent Office and the FDA, which are the same concerns that we 
have identified. 
We are concerned that this legislation, as drafted, would have 
the effect of reorienting FDA priorities toward approval of generic 
drugs and answering freedom of information inquiries rather than 
focusing, as it should, we believe, on important new therapies for 
American patients. 
Our written testimony describes the specific amendments we are 
seeking. I would like to summarize them for you. In keeping with 
the committee's jurisdiction, I will focus on health and regulatory 
problems raised by the legislation. 
Our first public health concern is that the bill, in its current 
form, could restrict FDA's ability to assure that all drugs are 
shown, before marketing, to be safe and effective. For most generic 
copies, FDA would be precluded from requesting information 
beyond the limited information specifically set forth in the bill. For 
these drugs, FDA has no authority to reject an application on the 
grounds that the copied drug ha* not been shown to be safe or ef-
fective. 
We strongly feel that FDA should have clear authority to assure 
the safety and effectiveness of every drug on the market. We, 
therefore, favor an amendment that would make this FDA author-
ity explicit. 
Another major concern relates to the public disclosure of safety 
and effectiveness data contained in the new drug applications for 
pioneer drugs. Such data represents a huge research investment by 
the originating firm. This legislation, if enacted in its present form, 
would permit public disclosure of all safety and effectiveness data, 
and information about a drug as soon as it becomes eligible for an 
ANDA. 
These proprietary data retain commercial value for the pioneer-
ing drug firm in the worldwide marketplace. They are of signifi-
cant value to competitors abroad, and their release would erode the 
U.S. technological leadership. The data are particularly valuable in 
countries that do not provide adequate patent protection. We be-
lieve that this provision, unless amended, would have serious ad-
verse effcjcte on this Nation's pharmaceutical leaderRhip. 
Earlier this year, Senator Hatch made efforts to amend the Free-
dom of Information Act, and drove home the usefulness of U.S.-p-o-
duced technical data. It is these same technical data that would be 
made available to foreign competitors under S. 2748. And, as I have 
already noted, the disclosure provision would add to FDA's already 
enormous burden under the Freedom of Information Act. It is diffi-
cult to see how the public benefits by having FDA resources divert-
ed to giving foreign competitors valuable research information at 
the expense of approving drug applications. 
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Our next concern relates to the transition provisions in S. 2748. 
As drafted, it permits marketing exclusivity for 10 years only for 
new active ingredients first approved between January 1, 1982, and 
the date the bill is enacted. We believe this transition provision is 
too limited in scope. It does not apply to new uses for the drug, new 
dosage forms or innovative formulations, all of which require full 
new drug applications. Those innovations frequently are as impor-
tant and contribute as much to public health as the active ingredi-
ents covered under the provision. Yet companies that invested in 
these important areas would be penalized by their exclusion from 
the transition provisions. 
A second part of this concern relates to the 4-year period of mar-
keting exclusivity for unpatentable active ingredients approved 
after the bill becomes effective. As FDA has made clear in previous 
testimony, this period is needed to evaluate patient experience 
with a new therapy in the first few years after its introduction. 
This experience often provides new insights into the drug's safety 
profile and appropriate use. As with the other transition period, 
this provision should be broadened to include all new drug approv-
als for products that are not patentable. 
Senator Hawkins, we understand that concern also has been ex-
pressed about two other health-related issues. One is the many new 
burdens that this bill imposes on FDA which, among other things, 
would also involve the agency in patent matters for the first time. 
And Commissioner Novitch talked about that, this morning. The 
second concern relates to the reversal of FDA's longstanding policy 
concerning combination drugs. We share these concerns with Dr. 
Novitch and urge that your committee consider them. 
To conclude, Senator Hawkins, our 10 companies support the leg-
^, ialative objectives of S. 2748. But the problems we have raised here 
today and in our more detailed written comments must be resolved 
to afford maximum public health protection, as well as to continue 
research incentives for the pharmaceutical industry. 
U.S. pharmaceutical companies always have been preeminent in 
developing and disseminating lifesaving and life-extending pharma-
ceutical products. But recent statistics indicate this leadership is 
declining. The U.S. share of world pharmaceutical research and de-
velopment expenditures has fallen from more than 30 percent 
before I960, to less than 15 percent today. The number of new 
drugs entering clinical trials and owned by U.S. firms has steadily 
dropped in the past 20 years. 
Further, the percentage of world pharmaceutical production oc-
curring in the United States has fallen from 50 percent in 1962 to 
30 percent in 1968, to 27 percent in 1978. From 1955 to 1962, an 
average of 46 new drugs were introduced each year in the United 
States. Today, the average is 17. 
I recite these figures to demonstrate that the pace of America's 
drug innovation is slowing. Our leadership is in jeopardy^ Our 
amendments could help reverse this trend. 
Congress not only must provide a better generic approval system, 
it also must provide meaningful incentives for pioneering pharma-
ceutical research in this country. We urge you to incorporate our 
changes into this complex legislation so that a bill can emerge that 
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truly accomplishes all of its objectives, and that will benefit our 
mutual constituent, the American consumer. 
We stand ready to work with you, the committee, your staff and 
others in the Senate to enact such legislation. 
Thank you, Senator Hawkins. We would be pleased to answer questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Willaman follows:] 
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In this country, bethanidine and dcbrisoquine have not been approved for 
marketing. Although propranolol is available, it has not been approved for the 
treatment of hy|H»rtension. Applications for approval of these drug* for hyper-
tension were submitted to our Food and Drug Administration (FDA) many 
vears ago. Dcbrisoquine was disapproved. Bethanidine and propranolol for 
hypertension have not been acted on as yet. Reasons given for delay have in-
cluded, primarily, lack of sufficient evidence of therapeutic benefit. It is possible, 
however, that if Kuropean trials were admitted as evidence propranolol could 
be approved for such treatment. Until r.ow, foreign trails could not be used to 
support a new drug application. 
The withholding of approval of useful new drugs in the cardiovascular field 
has been glaringly appan nt for at least ten years. Such negativity does not 
seem,to exist in all sections of the FDA. Especially, it is not seen at the administra-
tive level. The fault seems to lie in the individual reviewing officer who is either 
unable or unwilling to arrive at a fair judgment of the benefit-risk ratio of a new 
drug. This reluctance results in endless delay and procrastination. 
Of course, the public must be protected against toxicity, so far as this is possible. 
We also must be certain that the effectiveness of a new drug has i>een adequately 
•demonstrated. Once this information has been obtained, however, a decision 
to approve or disapprove the new drug should be carried out as expeditiously 
as possible. If the FDA reviewing officers are unable to do this then they should be 
circumvented by another mechanism. One suggestion is to utilize review com-
mittees of outside consultants. The latter can be selected in such a way as to 
obviate criticism as to possible conflict of interest. Such review committees could 
begin by considering cardiovascular drugs that have been under consideration 
without decision for three vears or longer. At a time when the drug treatment of 
hypertension has assumed great importance, our colleagues from Britain are 
telling us that we are falling behind. Patients are being deprived of such apparently 
useful drugs as debrisoquine and bethanidine, and propranolol has not yet received 
official approval as an antihypertensive agent. If the British physicians have 
access to these drugs, then American physicians should have them also. 
STATEMENT BY J. RICHARD CROUT, M.D., DIRECTOR, BuREAr OF DRUGS, FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OP 
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before your 
Subcommittee to discuss the "drug lag'* from the viewpoint of the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). 
Let me begin by stating that there is no question that a "drug lag" exists in 
the United States in the sense that a significant number of drugs marketed in 
foreign countries are not available here. In testimony presented to thi* Subcom-
mittee on August 16, 1974. Commissioner Schmidt indicated that 307 now chemi-
cal entities were marketed in the United States between 1064) and 1073. In the 
same period 590 additional drugs, not available in the United State*, were mar-
keted in either England.. France, Germany, Italy, or Japan. Thu* of all the drugs 
introduced somewhere in the world during that period, only alx»ut one third 
appeared in the United States. I would like to submit a copy of our August 16, 
1974. testimony for the record. 
I might add that the United States is not unique in this regard. Xo country 
in this survey (which i* ha*ed on data collected by Paul de linen, Inr.> had more 
than 48 |iercent of the drugs i»-#t available in the United State* and Kngland has 
only 32 percent available. (K the*e .100 drugs marketed overseas, only 106 are of 
sufficient interest to inanuf icturers for them to have submitted a:» IND in the 
United State*, and only 124 of these IXD's are currently active. The important 
is*ue i* therefore not the numl>er of new drugs marketed in thi* country hut 
whether any are of thera|»eutie importance, given the many valuable drugs 
•already available in the t'nited State*. 
In the testimony of August 10, 1074. we presented a listing of every new 
chemical entity approved in the United States from 1950 through 1073. We 
furthermore classified each of th'k*c drugs as to whether it was an important 
therat>cutic gain (e.g., new treatment for a disease not adequately tn-atcd pre-
viously), a modest therapeutic gain <<*.g., somewhat greater effect iveti:*** or lesser 
*ide effects in relation to available therapy at the time) or no therui>eutic gain 
over other dru^s available at the time of introduction. An important conclusion 
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from this analysis is that drugs representing modest or important therapeutic 
gains have bi»eii introduced into the United States at a relatively constant rate 
since the mid-1950V. There has been a marked decline in the rate'of introduction 
of new chemical entities in general ever since the peak year of 1959, but this decline 
has been limited, for all practical purposes, to those agents offering little or no 
therapeutic advantage over already marketed product*. 
In the August 16 testimony we also indicated that we had gone over every 
drug li*ted bv Mr. Paul de Haen or Dr. William Wardell as possibly important 
and marketed overseas, and we promise a status report on all such drugs for which 
an IND had ever l>een submitted in the United States. Ihis listing is now avail-
able. Our conclusion from study of this list is that there are not therapeutic 
breakthroughs currently marketed overseas for which an acceptable alternative 
therapy docs not exist* in the United States. There are, however, a number of 
drugs on the list which represent modest therapeutic gains in the sense that they 
may have somewhat greater effectiveness, fewer side effects, or convenience 
gains over available alternative therapies in this country. 
I would like then to place the "drug lag" in persjiective, as we see it. We do not 
dispute in any way the fact that a large numl>er of pharmaceuticals marketed 
in countries outside of the United States are not available here. Indeed, we point 
to that fact as evidence that the high standards for safety and effectiveness 
mandated by the Congress and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are 
being carried out vigorously and honorably. On the other hand, there are selected 
drugs, which api>car to offer modest advantages over currently available therapies, 
Inking marketed in many foreign countries earlier than occurs in the United States. 
In some case.*, but fortunately a relatively few, drugs still marketed overseas 
have been withdrawn from study in the united States for reasons of safety, 
usually animal toxicity. These examples were cited by Dr. Henry E. Simmons, 
former Director of the Bureau of Drugs, in his testimony before the Subcommittee 
on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business on February 5, 1973. 
In the vast majority of instances, however, the delay of introduction in the United 
Stares is related to the time required to conduct controlled clinical trials in sup-
port of safety and effectiveness and to conduct the extensive Phase III testing 
we deem necessary to permit the drug to be released, with full and proper labeling, 
for general use. 
There is, therefore, a societal cost for strong effectiveness and labeling require-
ments in that drugs are introduced more slowly into this country than certain 
other countries. It is important that we maintain balance and perspective on this 
problem so that the overall net effect is beneficial to the health of the American 
public. Wc strongly believe that this is the case now. The "drug lag" is, therefore, 
:i real phenomenon and worth continuing attention: but when viewed in perspec-
tive, it must be appreciated that it does not involve any drugs which are important 
therapeutic gains and is an expected consequence of high regulatory standards. 
It is relatively easy to understand why the "drug lag" exists. Most new drugs 
today are developed by large multi-national pharmaceutical firms which can pick 
and choose the nation* in which they wish to do clinical research. The countries 
of the world vary greatly in their regulatory requirements, and very few in fact 
have anything comparable to our own iftD process which regulate? clinical 
researchon new drugs. Drug firms can thus engage in early testing of new drugs 
far more easily in Germany, France, Italy, and Switzerland, for example, than 
they can in the United Kingdom, Sweden/ Canada, or the United States. 
Similarly, they can test marketing opportunities in a variety of countries before 
making the decision to go through the regulatory process in the United States. 
In the case of drugs which appear very promising from the start, an IND is 
usually submitted in the United States* before the drug is marketed elsewhere, 
and, indeed, there are a number of important drugs currently under investigation 
in the U.S. which may be marketed here ahead of, or simultaneously with, their 
appearance in other countries. These are the drugs which, by and large, are in 
thr class of important gains. 
At this time, I would like to make several points in regard to the "drug lag" 
issues as it relates to public policy: 
1. It is important to recognize*that regulatory requirements are an important 
influence on the availability of new drugs in this country. This Is an inevitable 
result of th<* exacting standards s-t by the law for the effectiveness nnd safety of 
new drugs. In a complex technological society such as ours, it is essential that we 
exercise public control over the new drugs proposed a<* therapeutic agents for the 
treatment of disease. We believe there is basic societal agreement on this point. 
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While some may call for repeal of the Kef auvcr-H arris Amendments of 1902, 
such calls are in fact not widespread nor very powerful. We do not perceive these 
Amendments as being fundamentally threatened and hope that the perception of 
the Congress is likewise. 
2. We must also recognize that our goal in the United States is a therapeutic 
armamentarium which is composed in totality of drugs which are safe and 
effective. We must have a single standard for all drugs, including those marketed 
in the years before the effectiveness requirement was adopted. We believe the 
United States Is well ahead of all other countries in the world in meeting this overall 
gnal. The Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as passed by the Congress and 
administered by the Food and Drug Administration, has been a pioneering 
venture in drug regulation for the world. The law has required, quite properly, 
the removal of ineffective drugs as will as the approval of those new drugs which 
are safe and effective. The United States is the leading nation of the world, not 
the lagging nation, in achieving a comprehensive approach to a// drugs and a 
single high standard for every drug on the market. 
3. We must recognize that the laws of this country presume that every new 
drug is a health gain in the sense that its benefits must exceed its risks. If a drug 
meets appropriate standards it should be approved, and if it fails to meet these 
standards it should be disapproved. For some time, the Agency hns been under 
criticism by the medical profession and the drug indnstrv for its alleged failure 
to approve drugs which are available in other countries. To the extent that this 
failure* of timely approval is due to administrative delays in the FDA, the Agency 
hns reappraised its way of doing things. We believe we have done this honorably 
in the past several years with resulting important gains in internal procedures 
and the quality of decisions. But, to the extent that the "drug lag" results from 
the failure of the industry to provide data of appropriate quality, or the failure 
of investigators to conduct adequate well-controlled trials, then then* is little th<* 
FDA can do to correct the situation. The quality of the data in support of safety 
and effectiveness is now, and always has been, the central issue in determining 
whether a drug meets appropriate standards. 
4. We must also recognize that the deep societal question to which the "drug 
lag*' issue relates is the benetit-risk question. Of basic concern is the degree of 
risk our society is willing to take in ordvr to have an ever increasing supply of 
new drug therapies. We point out that the FDA role in this matter is primarily a judicial one. We evaluate carefully the data presented to us, li>ten to physicians, 
scientists and consumers, and then make decisions. Those decisions must be made 
in accordance with legal standards laid down by the Congress. Those who wi*h to 
influence our decisionmaking must therefore follow the same ground rules we arc 
required to follow if they wish to be persuasive. Those who want us to net solely on 
the basis of testimonial evidence thus can never be satisfied with FDA decisions. 
At the other extreme, those who would essentially exclude all new drugs except 
important breakthroughs, cannot be satisfied either. While I respect this kind 
of basic conservatism in medical practice and indeed taught that philosophy 
during my years in university life, we mast recognize that the law as written by 
Congress is not intended to constrain the supply of new drugs in this country to 
the minimum essential drugs needed for a parsimonious style of medical practice. 
It is intended to permit the marketing of all drugs which meet appropriate stand-
ards of safety ana effectiveness. 
In regard to this is*ue of benefit-risk judgments, I would like to remind the 
Subcommittee of a point made by Commissioner Schmidt in his testimony before 
this Subcommittee on September 25, 1974. This testimony said, "By'fai the 
greatest pressure that the Bureau of Drugs of the Food and Drug Administration 
receives with respect to the new drug approval process is that brought to bear 
through Congressional hearings. In all of our history, we are unable to find one 
instance where a Congressional hearing investigated the failure of FDA to approve 
a new drug. The occasion on which hearings have been held to criticize approval 
of a new drug have l>ecn so frequent in the past ten years that we have not even 
attempted to count them. 
"At both the staff level and managerial level, the mi> age conveyed by this 
situation could not be clearer. Whenever a difficult or controversial"issue*is re-
solved by approval, the Agency and th'» individuals involved- will l>e publicly 
'investigated. Whenever it i* resolved by disapproval, no inquiry will be made. 
The < ongressional pressure for negative action is therefore intense, and ever 
increasing." 
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Mr. Chairman, in considering th<% factors which influence l>cni»<it-ri^ k decision* 
in regard to new drugs 1 would seek your considered and sensitive appraisal of 
this double standard in oversight function which has lieon applied to the Agency 
ever since the passage of the Kef an ver-ll arris Amendments. It is essential tiuit 
every regulatory agency, including the FDA, !*• held accountable for its decisions, 
but such accountability mu>t be sought for «// decisions. Only in this way can 
the Agency maintain over the long term the balance, strength, and per>peeti%e 
required to administer the law in the even-handed manner as intended by Congress. 
The health issues involved are too important for as to seek any uther course. 
Appendixes follow. 
Arpr.Nuix A 
YKAttLY INTKODVCTION OF NKW DRUG rUODfCTS, W50-73 
The data in these lists are derived from FDA files and from the publications 
of Paul lie llaen. FDA l>elieves that the list represents the most accurate data 
available to date, but there may be a small number of errors remaining, particu-
larly in the 19f>0's. Like the lists of pjiul de llaen, these lists contian drug products 
that are new salts or esters of previously marketed drugs(N). New dosage forms, 
etc, are not generally included unless they involves a new salt or ester. In some 
cases a drttg available for many years was tirst approved in the 19">0*s, in which 
case it is listed (e.g. acetaminophen, 1950). 
In evaluating the degree of therapeutic gain arising from the availability of a 
therapuetic gain deemed to have been offered by the drug at the time of its 
introduction, considering available therapeutic alternatives at the time, without 
reference to subsequent experience or current status. Thus, certain drugs no 
longer marketed may be designated as representing important gains. Our 
criteria were: 
A. Important Therapeutic Gain.—Drug may provide effective therapy or 
diagnosis (by virtue of greatly increased efficacy or safety) for a disease not*ade-
quately treated or diagnosed by any marketed drug, or provide markedly 
improved treatment of a dfsease through improved efficacy or safety (including 
decreased abuse potential). 
B. Modest Therapeutic Gain.—Drug has a modest, but real advantage over other 
available marketed drugs; e.g., somewhat greater effectiveness, decreased adverse 
reactions, less frequent dosing in situations where frequent dosage is a problem, 
etc. 
These evaluations are tentative, pending further study which is in progress. 
Ratings given here are, for the most part, by Bureau of Drugs personnel, and 
are being refined through consultation with authorities in various fields. We are 
aware that many specific ratings will be controversial, but we believe that the 
present ratings are useful beginnings, In any case, the ratings are available for 
criticism and comment and it is possible for any analyst to develop his own lists 
of important, modest, and no-gain drugs. 
1950 
Drug name: Rating 
Acetaminophen 
Acetoxan ; 
Alkavervir A 
Amphetamine P04 dibasic ( N ) . . 
Bipncnamine HC1 B 
Corticotropin A 
Cortisone acetate A— 
Cyclamate sodium B 
Dicyclomine HC1 -
Dimethyl tubocurarine CI (N) 
Disodium tetrathiodiglycolatc 
Kthyl biscoumacctale 
Khellin 
Levarartcrenol bitartrate.. B 
Mercumatilin 
Methafurylene Br (N) 
Methafurylene fumarnte (N) . 
Met hunt lieline Br , . 
Mcthdihuinc hydrochloride 
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CRS Main File Copy 
The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New Drugs 
Martin M. Daman and William M. WtrdaU 
/ " The effective patent life for new chemical entity drugi has fallen $harply 
I in recent years as a result of an increase in ths clinical testing period, 
\ later starting of clinical testing after the patent application, and qulcher issue of patents, f 
In a racant atatamant of eonoara about tha atata of 
domaitlc industrial innovation, tha Praaidant 
racommandad strengthening tha patant syetem (J). 
That atatamant impUad that tha hiitorical role of 
Ctent protaetion aa a major atimulua for innovation d weakened. To datarmina tha extent to which tha 
problem affaeta pharmaoeuUcala, thia papar as* 
amlnaa tha atata of patant protaetion afforded naw 
drugs, 
Tha Patant Act of 1886 waa adoptad bacauaa of a 
parcalvad naad to encourage innovation by 
aliminating tha reluctance to diacloaa an invention. 
At incantiva for disclosure, tha Patant Act grantad 
tha invantor a 17-year exclusive right to hia invan-
tion. Aa tha innovativa prooaaa became unoartain, 
lengthy, and expenaive, patant protaetion acquired 
avan graatar importance. 
In tha research-based prescription phar-
macautical Industry, patanta play an important rola. 
Approximately one out of 10,000 compounds initial-
ly examined aurvivee tha intanee scrutiny and 
demonstrate* tha potential to justify marketing. 
Tha Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association 
surveyed its member companies in 1962,1967, and 
1970 asking for "an eetlmata of the number of 
chemicals, compounds, mixtures, filtrates, or other 
substances obtained, prepared, extracted or isolated 
for a medical research purpose, and subjected to 
biological tests or screens," Thia included material 
obtained from outside tha company. Tha eetimatee 
ware 144,669 for 1962,176.760 for 1967 and 126,060 
for 1970. averaging 148,798 items ieeted per year. 
Our studies showed that an average of 16.8 New 
Chemical Entities (NCEs) ware introduced annually 
from 1962 to 1978. Using these average*, tha ratio 
Dr. E l a a u It M AOOOCMU b U M DoporUMat of Pfconoacowty 
aad Toikolofjr. Uai rwtity of RacbtiUr School of ModkiM aad 
DoatUtry. Dr. WardoU It aa AsoodaU Profotaor of Pkar* 
•Mcekfy. Toxicology and of Modktoa. sad DtracUr of U M 
Cantor for U M 8todjr of Dreg DOVOIOOBMSU tt U M UaJveratty of 
RoeoMtor School of ModJdaa aad DoaUatry. H« It abo CaaJa* 
muk of U M CommKtot oa Oevoraawnt Attain of U M Awrkaa 
Sockty f» CMakal Paana«oology aod Tkorttpostles. . 
of chemicals taated par year to NCEs introduced par 
year is 9726:1. 
Bringing that eingle drug to market haa bean 
aatlmatad to coat 864 million in 1976 dollars (*). 
Bacauaa of thia uncertainty and high coat, patant 
protaetion is a neeeeaary incantiva for tha infuaion 
of capital to atimulate research and development 
Since drugs are technically easy to copy, tha patant 
provides tha primary protaetion against imitation 
and competition. 
Another form of protaetion against competition 
— one probably not Intended by Congreea ia af-
forded by tha regulatory system of tha Food and 
Drug Administration. The expense involved in see-
ing a naw drug through tha demanding system of 
regulatory review to demonstrate eafety and ef-
ficacy creates a substantial barrier to entry into tha 
industry. 
However, while certain aspects of tha regulatory 
process may offer some protaetion against competi-
tion, other aspects reduce the duration of patant 
protection that ia of commercial value to the original 
patent holder. Most drug patanta are filed whan 
biological activity ia first observed (&4). Since thia 
occurs long before tha drug receives regulatory ap-
proval for marketing, tha "effective" patant life will 
be reduced considerably from Its nominal period of 
17 years. We will now examine the axtant of thia 
reduction, and ita change with time. 
Time Trend In Effective Patant Ufa (EPU 
Effective Petent life (EPU ia defined ea the 
period of patent protection remaining for a drug at 
the time of U.S. NDA approval (I.e., the time from 
NDA approval to expiration of the patent). Recant 
studies 1&5,6) show that EPL has declined eubetan-
tially over the peat 16 to 20 year* Thia trend Is 
generally attributed to the concomitant Increase in 
the time required for human investigation and NDA 
approval (&6). To examine this hypothesis, wa need 
to analyze the time trends in both EPL and tha 
period from the start of clinical Investigation to UA 
NDA approval 
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Mtthod* — Tht analysis it based on til patented 
Btw chtmictl tntltltt (NCEe) rtcaiving NDA ap-
proval from 1966 through 1979 (a). Tht information 
Bttdtd to dtUnnint EPL indudsd dattt of tht itart 
of clinical Utting in tht U.S., NDA approval and 
ptttnt application and iatut (©). 
Data wtrt available for nearly all variabltt from 
1966 throuch 1979 id 
8ourctt for tht ptttnt dttt indudtd tht ptttnt 
consultant Louia Loaman, SmithKlint Corporation, 
dirtct turvtyt of individual pharmactutical eonv 
paniee, and varoJut reference touroat, including 
Ckomtcal AbitneU and Official Oaiotu of tha U.S. 
PaUnt OffUa, For mulU-tourct drugt (la., tht taint 
drug marktttd undar dlfftrtnt brand namtt by dlf-
ftrtnt eompanitt) only tht drag of tht original pt-
ttnt bolder waa indudtd in the averages. Of tU 191 
NCEa approved from 1966 through 1979,168 had 
patents. The data from thoet 166 drugs were need 
to calculate EPL. 
.x-Of tht three typee of drug patents (new com-
pound, medical use, and ehtmical process), a ptttnt 
on tht new compound provides the moot reliable 
protection. To calculate EPL, wt used tht earliest 
compound patent listed for a drug. If no compound 
patent existed, wt used the earliest patent, 
-ttftrdltrfs of type. 
DtU art grouped according to year of NDA ap-
proval. For each variable (e.g., time from start of 
clinical testing to NDA approval), tht time dif-
ference was calculated for each drug, and those dif-
ferences averaged for all drugs approved during 
that year. The averages wtrt plotted and tht rtw 
plots smoothed (Figures 1 and 8) according to tht 
"moving median of three" technique of Tukey (7). 
Drugi UtUd boforo 19S& Ungtk of eUnical (n-
vottigation pha§§ — Tht IND filing dates assigned 
retrospectively to drugs in clinical trial before 
August 1962 do not represent the start of clinical 
testing in tht U.S. (d). . 
Thus, tht true period of clinical investigation for 
pre-1963 drugt began earlier than the date 
represented by retrospective IND filings. Of the 168 
patented NCEa approved from 1966 through 1979, 
43 had been assigned retrospective IND filing dates. 
We were able to obtain the date of first VS. clinical 
testing in man in tht US. for 21 of tht 43 retrospec-
tive filing dattt. From this information, we have 
derived a standard value of 24 months to apply as a 
correction to the remaining 22 drugs for which this 
information was unobtainable («). 
BfftcUvo Patont Ltf§ - Figure 1. displays tht 
relationship between the patent and drug develop-
ment processes, showing the times of NDA ap-
proval and the start of clinical testing in relation to 
the time of patent issue. The data are plotted 
according to year of NDA approval EPL, the time 
from NDA approval to patent expiration, can be 
read directly from the right-hand ordinate. As 
shown in the Figure, EPL for pharmaceuticals was 
Flgert VNDA opproval (ovwogod 0 ; smeotfee? f 
o*d9t*rtofcU*tc*lU$t(*g(*t»ngid CX'amootW —A 
oomcud for wtroijwcft'i* IND flUngt, on piotud t* reis-
tion to patont tone. Smoothing mo* don* by Tukty'i 
"moving modtan of tam" tockniquo (7). 
consJdsrabry lets than 17 years, tvtn at tht beginn-
ing of the 14-year study period. It declined from 18.6 
years in 1966 to 9.6 years in 1979, a decrease of 4.1 
years. 
Tlmt from itart of U.S. clinical tnvosttgatton to 
NDA approval — Figure 1 also shows tht pattern 
(after smoothing (7)) of the period from the start of 
clinical Utting to NDA approval during tht 14 
years from 1966 to 1979. During the 12-year period 
from 1968 to 1979, EPL dropped by 4.0 years, from 
13.6 years to 9.6 years (/). The time from the start of 
U.S. clinical testing to NDA approval increased by 
1.4 years (It., from 6.9 to 8.3 years) from 1968 to 
1979, acconnting for 60% of ths decrease in EPL {gi 
Thus the increase in the period from the start of 
clinical totting to NDA approval accounted for only 
slightly more than half of the decline in EPL. 
Therefore, we need to examine the components of 
EPL in more detail to determine where the re-
mainder of its decline occurred. 
Effective Potent Ufe and tht Drug 
Drug Development Procttt 
From our data (presented later in this paper) wt 
know that the sequence of events in the process of 
drug development is generally as shown in Figure 2. 
Hie sequence begins with the filing of e potent ap-
plication during the preclinical phase, and continues 
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~7" / 
Flgtrt 2/ Bfftttivt Pottnt Lift (BPU U a function of tht 
fifmtaf of tht pottnt oppUcotton, tht ptndtncy ptriod, ond 
tht duration o/ fat cUnieoi ond rtgutotory period, at wtU 
t i tAt 11-yoorptriod of pottnt protection. Tht ptndtncy 
ptriod it tht timt from paUnt oppUeotion to pottnt is***. 
with tht atari of clinical tatting, pttant issos, NDA 
approval, and finally pattnt aspiration. 
From thia pattarn and Figurt 2, wt att that EPL 
(La., tht ptriod from NDA approval to pattnt tx-
piration) It a function of tht timing of tht ptttnt ap-
plication, tht ptndtncy ptriod, and tht duration of 
tht clinical and rtgulttory ptriodt, aa wall at tht 
17-yaar ptriod of pattnt protection. 
Thus, in addition to itt dtptndtnct on tht dura* 
Uon of tht clinical and rtgulttory ptriodt, EPL 
dtptndt on two othtr important factor*. It 
dtcrtataa if clinical tatting it btgun latar in rtlation 
to tht pttant application, and convartaly will in* 
ertttt if tht pttant ptndtncy ptriod Ineraaaaa. Tht 
final EPL dtptndt on tht algtbraic turn of tht 
changtt in tht cornponanta, 
Tht changtt that occurrtd la tht two additional 
eomponantt of EPL art ahown in Figurt 9. For tht 
yttrt 1968 and 1979, tht two yttrt t»*t rtprtttn 
Utivt of tht gtnaral trtnd during tht study ptriod, 
tht timt from ptttnt application to tht start of VJB. 
clinical tatting incrtaatd 0.5 yttrt (accounting for 
13% of tht dtcrttat in EPL). Tht timt from aarliatt 
pattnt application to pattnt itsut Utcrttttd 1.1 
yttrt (accounting for 27% of tht dtcrtttt in EPL) 
ihl Coupltd with tht 2.4 ytar incrtatt in tht ptriod 
from tht ttart of clinical tatting to NDA approval, 
thttt changas account for tht antlrt 4.0 ytar 
dtcrtttt in EPL from 1968-1979. (i) 
DIteuttlon/Conclutlona 
EPL was 18.6 yttrt at tht htginning of our study 
ptriod, 1966. This is oonsidarably Itts than tht 
17-year nominal ptriod of ptttnt prottction. At timt 
progressed, EPL fell furthar. This trtnd it tlmilar to 
that reported by othtr invtstigators 1,3,5,$. Tht 
dtcrtttt ovtr timt hts gtnerally betn tttributtd en-
tirely to an increoee in tht timt bttwatn tht begin-
ning of clinical tatting and NDA approval (5,5), 
although Statman tuggttta that thia may bt 
rttpontiblt for only part of tht dtcrtttt (61. 
Our tnalytls thows that in tht sptdfic tamplt of 
NCEs analyzed, almott half of tht dtclint in EPL 
wat cauttd by two tdditiontl ftctors: An incrtatt in 
tht timt bttwatn pattnt filing tnd clinical tatting 
Yt*a or it* tmow. 
Ftf«rt HAvtrogtd ond tmoothtd volutt for NDA op-
provoi, ttort ofcUnkot totting, ondpotont oppUeotion on 
plottod im motion to pottnt ittuo. 7*- tymbolt ond 
tmootking Oft dtfintd ot in Figurt J, mtn tht oddition of 
oorUttt pottnt fUing (outrogtd G; tmootktd — • -V ond 
ttort of ctinicoi totting, unoorrtettd for rttrotpoctivt IND 
fiUngtO.'-l-
and a reduction in thtjptndancy ptriod. It should bt 
noted, aa attn in tht Figures, that tht ralativt coo* 
tribuUon of tach of tht thrtt eomponantt dtptndt 
to soma extant on tht yeare compared. 
For tht 12-year ptriod from 1968 to 1979, tht 
declining EPL can bt txplaintd by two trends. Tha 
clinical/rtgulttory ptriod Incrtaatd (with all of tht 
incrttat bting in tht clinical ptriod), and mora of tht 
clinical/rtgulttory ptriod fail within tht ptriod of 
Silent protection (i.e., afttr tht dttt of pattnt sut). TTiie lattar trtnd wat ctutad by quickar itsut 
of tht ptttnt by tht Pttant Offica (thtrtby starting 
tht pattnt clock aoontr in tht drug dtvtlopmtnt 
procttt), and by latar ttarting of tht clinical tasting. 
It should bt daarly undarttood that tht "start of 
clinical tatting" bting dttcribtd in thit analysis is 
clinical tasting In tht U.S. onJy. Although appro*-
imataly half of tha drugi approved in tht U.S. 
originttt tbrotd UOj, and a tignificant fraction of 
U.S.-originttad NCEt art now alto firtt tattad 
dinictily abroad {8,91, this study is limited to tht 
U.S. component of tht dVug dtvtlopmtnt procttt. 
Although t dtcrtttt in tht ptndtncy ptriod 
rttultt in aarlltr ittut of ptttntt, it contributtt to 
tht trotion of EPL by placing a grttttr proportion 
of tht clinical/regulatory procttt within tht ptriod 
of pttant prottction. 
It is not dear why U.S. clinical tasting la starting 
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latar in tha drug dtvalopmant precast raaitiva to tha 
data of patant application, although ona possibla 
ration it tha incraata in prsclinical data rt> 
qulrsmants prior to first human tatting. Ralattd fac-
tors, such as complianca with tha Good Laboratory 
Prtctict (OLP) rtgulations, could also rtouirt mora 
time. Another possibility is that mora prolonged in-
itial clinical tatting it baing dona ovarsaas — aithar 
by U.8. firms, or baeausa a graatar proportion of 
furlegn-originstad drugs art getting U.S. INDs now 
than prtviously, aithar by licsnsing to U.S. firms, or 
through foraign-ownsd sponsoring firms. Further 
raflnamant of tha data into tubsata for aalf-
originatad and licanaad drugs of VS. and fortign-
ownad firms will anabla ua to axamint tha Utttr 
poaaibllity. 
Thus it is daar that tha dadina in EPL is a rasult 
of factors in both tht drug dtvalopmant and patant 
procasaas. Taking tha preclinical and clinical com-
pontntt togtthar, a poaslbU 73% (2.9 yaars) of tha 
dadina in EPL batwaan 1968 and 1979 was a* 
eounttd for by an ixtcraas? in eompontnts infiutnead 
by tha IND-NDA regulations, with tha ramaindar of 
tha dadina infiutnead by tha Patant Offiea. 
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Footnotes 
(a) la this study wt dtflnt NCEt as compounds of 
moloculax structurt not prtviously marketed in tht 
UA, excluding ntw salts or eaters, vaccines, an-
tigens, antlsera, immunogiotyo% surgied products, 
and diagnostic agaata. 
(b) For NCEs with INDs fOtd afttr 1I6S. wt ustd tht 
dsU of IND filing si tht start d clinical totting in 
tht U.&. Tht 30-day waiting poriod required tinet 
August 1670 has s eonttrvstivt influtnot on our 
ttttlng d tht hypothesis. As dtaeribtd ltttr. for 
NCEs thst prtctdtd tht 1963 IND retirement, wt 
osod tht actual data of first human administration 
in tha U.&, where avaJQablt. 
(e) All data art oomplttt for NCEstpproved from 1966 
• to 1979. txctpt for tht following. Data on start d 
dinkal tatting art bastd on 61% (13 d 16) d 
patsntad NCEs for 1977. and 69% (11 of 16) for 
1976. Two drugi wort excluded from tht pendency 
tvtragtt baeausa thtir ptndtndat wtrt taxeeaive 
eompartd to all othtr drugs approvtd during tht 
samt yaart (La^  1978 and 1979). 
(d) Tha final IND regulation* (Procadurd and Inter* 
prttivt ReguUUons, Ntw Drugs for Investigational 
Use) printed in tha Ftdemi Rtgitfr of January 6, 
1963 rtquirad all drug sponsors to submit com-
platad INDs by Junt 9,1963 for all drugs in dinkal 
trials as d August 10, 1962. Approximately 1100 
drugs wtrt assigntd 1963 (Lt^ retroepectivel IND 
filing dtttt during tht initid poriod. 
(t) Tht valut of 24 months was obtained by cakultting 
tht mttn d tht svaiiabk valuta after eliminating 
two outlier drugs. 
(f) Tht gtritra! trends over the study period art better 
represented by comparing 1979 with 1966 rather 
than with 1966. This is shown more dearly in Figure 
9. 
(g) This period is made up d two components, tht IND 
phase and tht NDA phase, whkh wt have tismintd 
in detail in othtr publkatkms (9,9). For tht sptdfic 
set of drugs used In this paper, the mean valut of tht 
period from NDA submission to spproval was 2.4 
years from 1966 to 1972, and 12 yttrs from 1973 to 
1979. Tht period of clinical testing Increased from a 
mean of 3.3 years in 1966-1972. to a moan d 44 
yttrs in 1973-1979. 
(h) She used tht date of aarliatt pattat f & ^ Oscfediag 
data of foreign claims priority) ss an indicator d tha 
company's initid active interest in tht NCE. 
0) Tht dotted Una to Figure 3 represents tht start d 
dinkal tasting, uncorrected for retrospective IND 
filings. Faillnf to correct for tht retrospective IND 
filings would substantially underestimate tha 
period d dinkal tatting and regulatory review (by 
more than one year from 1966 to 1970*. Thus, tht 
uncorrected estimate d tht increase in tht 
dinieal/rtgulatory period would be artifactually 
high by that amount This could account for the ap-
parent agreement previous authors observed b^e-
tween the decline in EPL and the increese in 
clinical/regulatory time for tht period 1966 to 1976 
(J). 
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March 18, 1981 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Members of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil 
Liberties and the Administration of Justice 
FROM: Bruce Lehman, Chief Counsel, 
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and 
the Administration of Justice 
SUBJECT: The Patent Term Restoration Issue 
You may have been contacted recently by persons seeking 
your cosponsorship of H.R. 1937, relating to patent 
term restoration. 
You or your staff may find the enclosed article from 
Research Management Magazine helpful in independently 
evaluating the issue. 
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RcprintBd1 wuh psrmbiioA from 
1981. 
The Decline in Effective Patent Life of New Drugs 
Martin M. Daman and William M. Wardall 
The effective patent life for new chemical entity drug* hat fatten sharply 
In recent yean as a remit of an increase in the clinical testing period, 
later starting of clinical testing after the patent application, and quicker issue of patents, 
In a ractnt ttatamant of concarn about tha statt of 
domtsUc industrial innovation* tha Prasidant 
rtcommandtd strengthening the patent system (J). 
That statement implied that the historical role of 
Gtent protection as a major stimulus for Innovation d weakened. To determine tht extent to which tht 
problem effects pharmaceuticals, this paper ex* 
. amines tha state of patent protection afforded new 
drugs. 
Tht Patent Act of 1838 was adopted because of a 
perceived need to encourage innovation by 
eliminating the reluctance to disclost an invention. 
As incentive for disclosure, tht Patent Act granted 
tht inventor a 17-year exclusive right to his Inven-
tion. At tha innovative process became uncertain, 
lengthy, and expensive, patent protection acquired 
even greater importance. 
In tht research-based prescription phar-
maceutical industry, patents play an important role. 
Approximately one out of 10,000 compounds initial-
ly examined survives the intense scrutiny and 
demonstrates the potential to justify marketing. 
(The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers* Association 
surveyed Ite member companies in 1962, 1967, and 
1970 asking for *'an estimate of tha numbar of 
chemicals, compounds, mixtures, filtrates, or other 
substances obtained, prepared, extracted or Isolated 
for a medical research purpose, and subjected to 
biological tests or screens." This included material 
obtained from outside the company. The estimates 
ware 144,559 for 1962.176,760 for 1967 and 126.060 
for 1970, averaging 148,793 items tasted par ymr. 
(Our studies showed thst an average of 15.3 New 
Chemical Entities (NCEs) were introduced annually 
from 1962 to 1978. Using these averages, the ratio 
Dr. Clam** b a* AatorlaU \m tha Dttartmmt ef Pharmacology 
•ad Teakotofy. University of Rochtttar School of Madkina and 
Dantlatry. Dr. W.nfcU it •» AtsocUU ProftMor ef Phar-
**cology. ToBlrology sad of Mtdiriiw. and Diroctor ef Ida 
Ctftiar for tot Stod> of Drug DavatopmoM. al tha Uoivtrslty of 
"•chatter School of MHfcUt e»4 Dentistry. Ht b aloe Choir* 
Je» of tho Commitu* on Ceveromtot Affaire of too America* 
•eclety for Omkel Pharmecolefy a«d Theraoeotka. 
of chemicals tasted par year to NCEs introducad par 
year ia 9725:1.) 
Bringing that tingle drug te market hae been 
estimated to coat 854 million in 1976 dollars (*). 
Because of this uncertainty and high cost, patent 
protection It t necessary incentive for the infusion 
of capital to stimulate research and development 
Since drugs art technically easy to copy, the patent 
provides the primary protection egalnst imitation 
and competition. 
Another form of protection against competition 
— one probably not Intended by Congress is af-
forded by the regulatory system of the Pood and 
Drug Administration. The expense involved in see-
ing a new drug through tht demanding system of 
regulatory review to demonstrate safety and ef-
ficacy creates a substantial barrier to entry into the 
Industry. 
However, while certain aspects of the regulatory 
process may offer some protection against competi-
tion, other aspects reduce the duration of patent 
protection that is of commercial value to the original 
patent holder. Most drug petents are filed when 
biological activity la first observed (&4). Since this 
occurs long before the drug receives regulatory ap-
proval for marketing, the "effective" patent life will 
be roducad considarebly from Its nominal period of 
17 years. We will now examine the extent of this 
reduction, end its change with time. 
Time Trend In Effective Patent Ufe (EPL) 
Effective Patent Ufa (EPLJ ia denned na tha 
period of patent protection remaining for a drug at 
the time of U.S. NDA approval (t.e^ the time from 
NDA approval to expiration of the patent). Recent 
studies iXS.6) show that EPL has declined substan* 
tlally over tht past 15 to 20 years. This trend it 
generally attributed to the concomitant increase in 
the time required for human investigation and NDA 
approval (J,5). To examine this hypothesis, we need 
to analyse the time trends in both EPL and tha 
period from tha start of clinical investigation to U.S. 
NDA approval 
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Methods - The analysis is based on all patented 
oew chemical entitles (NCEs) receiving NDA ap-
proval from 1966 through 1979 (a). The information 
needed to determine EPL Included dates of the start 
of clinical testing in tht U.S., NDA approval, and 
patent application and issue (6). 
Data were available for nearly all variables from 
1960 through 1979 (e). 
Sources for the .patent data included the patent 
consultant Louis Let man, SmithKline Corporation, 
direct surveys of individual pharmaceutical com-
panies, snd varoius reference sources, including 
Chemical Abstracts and Official Gatette of the U.S. 
Patent Office. For multi-source drugs (I.e., the same 
drug marketed under different brand names by dif-
ferent companies) only the drug of the original pa-
tent holder was included in the averages. Of all 191 
NCEs approved from 1966 through 1979, 168 had 
*J patents. The data from those 168 drugs were used 
to calculate EPL. 
rmraigmfiYtiET — 7 - 7 -
-Datrarrgio«iped according to year of NDA ap-
proval For each variable (e.g.. time from start of 
clinical testing to NDA approval), the time dif-
ference waa calculated for each drug, and thoao dif-
ferences averaged for all drugs approved during 
that you. The averages were plotted and the raw 
plots smoothed (Figures 1 and 3) according to the 
"moving median of three" technique of Tukey (7). 
Drugi tested before 1961 Length of clinical in-
Mitigation phase — The IND filing dates assigned 
retrospectively to drugs in clinical trial before 
August 1962 do not represent the start of clinical 
testing in the U.S. (</). 
Thus, the true period of clinical investigation for 
pre-1963 drugs began earlier than the date 
represented by retrospective IND filings. Of the 168 
patented NCEs approved from 1966 through 1979, 
43 had been assigned retrospective IND filing dates. 
%/ We were able to obtain the date of first U.S. clinical 
testing In man in the U.S. for 21 of the 43 retrospec-
tive filing dates. From this information, we have 
derived a standard value of 24 months to apply aa a 
correction to the remaining 22 drugs for which this 
informstion wss unobtainable (#). 
Effective Patent Life — Figure 1 displays the 
relationship between the patent and drug develop-
ment processes, showing the times of NDA ap-
proval and the start of clinical testing in relation to 
the time of petent fosue. The daU are plotted 
according to year of NDA approval. EPL, the time 
from NDA approval to patent expiration, can be 
read directly from the right-hand ordinate. As 
shown In the Figure, EPL for pharmaceuticals waa 
nan or MO* neeeom. 
FJgurt VNDA approval (outraged 0; smoothed } 
one'start ofclinicol tes ting (outraged O,' smoothed———I 
corrected for retrospective IND filings, are plotted in rela-
tion to patent issue. Smoothing wot don* by Tukey's 
"moving median of three** technique fTJL 
,/considerably less than 17 years, even at the beginn-
ing of the 14-year atudy period. It declined from 13.6 
years in 1966 to 9.6 years in 1979, a decrease of 4.1 
years. 
Time from ttart of U.S. clinical investigation to 
NDA approval — Figure 1 also shows the pattern 
(after smoothing (7)) of the period from the start of 
clinical testing to NDA approval during the 14 
years from 1966 to 1979. During the 12-year period 
from 1968 to 1979, EPL dropped by 4.0 years, from 
13.5 years to 9.5 years (/). Th»t{m»frAm th»«t«rtnf 
U.S. clinical testing to NDA approval increased by 
2.4 yiuira ll.e.. from S 9 tn A 3 y r . ) f™„» lOftA >^  
1979. accounting for 6Qfr nf thr rirrrtate in EPL (§1 
Thus the increase in the period from the start of 
clinical testing to NDA approval accounted for only 
slightly more than half of the decline in EPL. 
Therefore, we need to examine the components of 
EPL in more detail to determine where the re-
mainder of its decline occurred. 
Effective Patent Ufa and the 
Drug Development Process 
From our data (presented later in this paper) we 
know that the aequence of events in the process of 
drug development Is generally as shown io Figure 2. 
The sequence begins with the filing of a patent ap-
plication during the preclinical phase, and continue* 
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Flgere If JE/Zwdt* Pafeat Zi^ # f E W U e /nfKlie* o/ tae 
timing of the potent application, the pendency period, ond 
the duration of rat clinicol ond regulatory period, as well 
as the 17-yeer period of potent protection. 'The pendency 
period is the time from potent application to potent tune. 
with the atari of clinical testing, patent issue, NDA 
approval, and finally patent expiration. 
From thia pattern and Figure 2, wt tea that EPL 
4L#M the period from NDA approval to patent ex-
piration) Is a function of the timing of the patent ap-
plication, the pendency period, and the duration of 
the clinical and regulatory period*, aa wall aa the 
17-year period of patent protection. 
Thua, in addition to ita dependence on the dura* 
Uoo of the clinical and regulatory periods, EPL 
depends on two other important factor*. It 
decrease* if clinical tasting la begun later in relation 
to the patent application, and conversely will in-
crease if the patent pendency period increase*. The 
final EPL depend* on the algebraic aum of the 
change* in the components. 
The change* that occurred in the two additional 
component* of EPL are ahown in Figure S. For the 
yaara 1968 and 1979, the two year* moat represen-
tative of the general trend during the study period, 
the time from patent application to the atart of U.S. 
clinical testing increased10.6jMri (accounting for 
}3% of the decrease in EP1A The time from garliast 
patent application to patent isiua rlmrrtmnod 1.1 
t w i littountlni for 27* of the decrease in EPL) 
(A). Coupled with the 2.4 year increase in the period 
from the atari of clinical testing to NDA approval, 
these changea account for the entire 4.0 year 
decrease in EPL from 19681979. (i) 
Discussion/Conclusions 
EPL waa 13.6 years at the beginning of our study 
period, 1966. Thia is considerably leaa than the 
17-year nominal period of patent protection. Aa time 
progressed, EPL fell further. This trend is similar to 
(hat reported by other investigators ($5,6). The 
decrease over time has generally been attributed en-
tirely to en increase in the time between the begin-
ning of clinical testing and NDA approval (&5). 
^though Stetman suggests that r'is may be 
r
*tponsible for only pert of the decrease (6). 
Our analyih ihnwi that in the apcrlfic sample of 
WCE* .n«1y»»H «1m*«» K»lf nf th. A~Unm in E P L 
»§• cauirrl hy t wn arlrlit Innal far torn AD ioueaasJa 
the tim* h»rw—n naunt filing and clinical testing, 
Figure VAvenged end smoothed values for NDA op* 
pro vol stort of clinical testing, end potent application ore 
plotted in relation to potent issue. The symbols ond 
smoothing ore defined m$ in Figure I uAth the addition of 
eoriiest potent filing (averaged © ; smoothed — • —) ond 
stort ofcUnlceJ testing, u.icorrected for retrospective IHD 
filing*<---l 
and a reduction in tha tendency period. It ahould be 
noted, aa aeen in the Figures, that the relative con-
tribution of each of the three componenta depends 
to pome extent on the years compared. 
For the 12-year period from 1968 to 1979, the 
declining EPL can be explained by two trends. The 
clinic al/regulatory period increased (with aU of the 
increese being in the clinical period), and more of the 
clinical/regulatory period fell within the period of 
patent protection (i.e., after the data of patent 
iaaue). Thia latter trend was caused by quicker issue 
of the patent by the Patent Office (thereby starting 
the patent clock sooner in the drug development 
process), and by later starting of the clinical testing. 
It should be clearly understood that the "start of 
clinical testing" being described in this analysis is 
clinical testing in the U.S. only. Although approx- e< 
Imately half of the drugs approved in the U.S. 
originate abroad (70), and a significant fraction of 
U.S.-originated NCEa are now also first tested 
clinically ebroed (fi.9), this study is limited to the 
U.S. component of the drug development process. 
Although a decrease in the pendency period 
results In earlier issue of patents, it contributes to 
the erosion of EPL by piecing a greater proportion 
of the clinical/regulatory process within the period 
of patent protection. 
It is not clear why U.S. clinical testing b starting 
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later In the drug development process realtlve to the 
date of patent application, although one possible 
reason fa the increase In preclinical data re-
quirements prior to first human testing. Related fac-
tors, such as compliance with the Good Laboratory 
Practice (OLP) regulations, could also require mora 
time. Another possibility (a that more prolonged in-
itial clinical testing is being dona overseas — either 
by U.S. Arms, or because a greater proportion of 
foriegn-orlginated drugs art getting U.S. INDs now 
than previously, either by licensing to U.S. firms, or 
through foreign-owned sponsoring firms. Further 
J refinement of the data Into subsets for self-
originated and licensed drugs of U.S. and foreign-
owned firms will enable us to examine the latter 
possibility. 
Thus it Is dear that the decline In EPL la a reault 
of factors in both the drug development and patent 
processes. Taking the preclinical and clinical com-
ponents together, a. pnsalbla 73% (2.9 veers) of the 
j decline in EPL between 1968 and 1979 was ac; 
counted for bv en Increase in components influenced 
by tht IND'-NHA regulations, with the remainder of 
thff flftfllnft influrnrftri hy tht Pitrnt. fiffirn 
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Footnotea 
(a) In this study we define NCEs as compounds of 
molecular structure not previously ma/kated In the 
U.S.. excluding new salts or esters, vaccines, an-
tlgtna, antiatra, immunogloblns, surgical products, 
and diagnostic agents. 
(b) For NCEs with INDs filad after 1963. we ussd the 
date of IND filing as the start of clinical testing in 
the U.S. The 30-day waiting period required tinea 
Auguat 1970 haa a conservedve influence on our 
testing of the hypothesis. As described later, for 
NCEs that preceded the 1963 IND requirement, we 
used the actual <1ate of first human administration 
in the U.S.. where availably 
j (c) AU daU are Complete for NCEs approved from 1966 
to 1979. except for the following. DaU on start of 
clinicsl toting are based on 61% (13 of 16) ot 
patented NCEs for 1977, end 69% (11 of, 16) for 
1978. Two druga were excluded from the pendency 
overages becsuse their pendencies were excessive 
compared to all other drugs approved during the 
same years (I.e., 1978 and 1979). 
(d) The Final IND regulations (Procedural and Inter* 
Cretive Regulations, New Drugs for Investigational lee) printed in the Ftdtrat RtgitUr of January 8, 
1963 required all drug sponsors to submit com-
pleted INDs by June 9.1963 for all drugs in clinical 
trials as of Auguat 10, 1962. Approximately 1100 
drugs were assigned 1963 (I.e.. retrospective) IND 
filing dates during the initial period. 
(e) The value of 24 months was obtained by calculating 
the mean of the available values after eliminating 
two outlier drugs. 
• (0 The general trends over the study period are better 
represented by comparing 1979 with 1966 rather 
than with 1966. This is shown more dearly In Figure 
(g) This period le mode up of two components, the IND 
{mass and the ND A phase, which we have examined n detail in other publications (819). For the specific 
set of drugs used in this paper, the mean value of the 
period from NDA submission to approval was 2.4 
years from 1966 to 1972, kid 2.2 years from 1973 to 
1979. The period of clinicsl testing increased from s 
mean of 3.3 yeara in 1966-1972, to e mean of 4.8 
years in 19731979. 
(h) We used the date of earliest patent flUng (including 
date of foreign claims priority) as an Indicator of the 
company's Initial active Interest in the NCE. 
U) The dotted line In Figure 3 represents the start of 
clinical testing, uncorrected for retrospective IND 
Tilings. Falling to correct for the retrospective IND 
filings would substantially underestimate the 
period of clinical testing and regulatory review (by 
v/more then one year from 1966 to 1970). Thus, the 
uncorrected estimate of the increase la the 
clinical/regulatory period would be ertifactually 
high by that amount. This could account for the ap-
parent agreement previous authors observed be-
tween the decline in EPL end the Increase in 
clinical/regulatory time for the period 1966 to 1976 
U). 
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M'lTM'ORAKDWST I71T7IRIMIUM WT l l f ^ l f s I H V U I 1 U A . A M I %\M.1A ornci; or nit vt.-KtrAnv 
t o i The Assistant Secretary for Health "ATt! •*,. -
through* js/nis • --^HLL. B7$ 
mow t Director 
Center for Disease Control 
• — . • 
suajnert Attached Action rfeaorandtn to Secretary, CtD*'9 on Federal tele in 
Vaccine-Associated Disability - ACTIO:; 
In follov-up of discussions with you and your staff concerning the 
rapidly fount inf. loplleatlona of vaccine-associated disability end 
at your request, the attached action cerorendio for Secretary David 
Hatheva la offered for your review and action. 
fACTS 
largely beeaust of court opinlonr dranatlzing the inherent risk* of 
vaccines and vaecine-assocletcd disability, patterns of immunization 
yrogracalng by State and local her.lth agencies and vaccination orac-
" ticca of private cedlcal professionals are beine rodlfled. Called-
for warnings of Inherent risks in vaccines are lifcely to al*ra 
potential vneelne recipients and result in diminished insunlsa'.lea 
program effectiveness. Kaeufacturer liability for vacelae-rssociatcd 
disability, retularly assigned by courts, threatens a predictable 
vaccine supply—especially of oral polio vaccine—and diminishes the 
chances of significant independent manufacturer-sponsored research 
and devolopoent of new biologies. % 
the action tteeorendua for the Secretary recocnends legislation' 
copovoring the Pepartrent to nssuw. responsibility in Managing 
clalcts of vaccine-associated disability. This is base J on th* 
concept that Federal licencing of biologies, nationally rrcorremled 
for use In tlie publie interest, irpor.es a reasonable duty on the 
fcnvernitent to support perr.ons scrieunly injured AS a result et 
risks inherent in vaccines rccorneiulud and t.lten for both personal 
and couaunlty protection. 
jEfflpcncpxTyos, * 
I t io reroznem'ed that the nennramhin l»c forwarded to the Secretary 
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The Assis tant Secretary for Health 
.vaccine rec ip ien t s by canufncturcrs . and n.vmf.ncturcr p o l i c i e s an 
fr>pHnuJup production and d i s t r i b u t i o n of hi o l e i c s arc r . t i l l in 
{emulation* A decision oa the f tccrctarv 's par t to pursue l e g i s -
l a t i on for pvblic !u-:naj;cr.cnt of vaccine-n^r.ociatcc! c!ir.;:bility \:oitld 
r e l i eve the apprehension and anxiety of public heal th and ced i ca l 
professionals and of b io logies producers 
David J , 5y.ccr f K.D. 
Assistontj^inxcon Ccnc-ral 
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THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT 
\l 
AUGUST 15 (legislative day, AUGUST 11), 1986.—Ordered to be printed 
£*• 
Mr. DANFORTH, from the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, submitted the following 
REPORT 
[To accompany S. 2760] 
together with 
ADDITIONAL AND MINORITY VIEWS 
The Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
having considered an original bill (S. 2760) to regulate interstate 
commerce by providing for a uniform product liability law, and for 
other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the 
bill do pass. 
PURPOSE OF THE BILL 
This original bill, S. 2760, as reported, preempts state law to 
impose major reforms of product liability law in the United States. 
The present system in the United States for resolving product li-
ability disputes and compensating those injured by defective prod-
ucts is costly, slow, inequitable, and unpredictable. It does not ben-
efit manufacturers, product sellers, or injured persons. The sys-
tem's high transaction costs, which exceed the compensation paid 
to victims, are passed on to consumers; moreover, the unpredict-
ability, uncertainties, and inefficiencies of the system have been 
linked to the increasing cost and unavailability of liability insur-
ance. Because of the serious burden on interstate commerce cre-
ated by these product liability problems, federal legislation is 
needed. 
S. 2760, as reported, addresses these problems by making a 
number of significant reforms that are applicable in all product li-
62-986 O 
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ability actions in State and Federal courts. These reforms, which 
include the establishment of an expedited settlement system with 
incentives for parties to settle claims quickly, will reduce transac-
tion costs and provide greater certainty as to the rights and respor. 
sibilities of all those involved in product liability disputes. 
BACKGROUND AND NEED 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, product liability has been a matter left to stnt< 
law, but today the morass of product liability law is a problem of 
national concern that requires Congressional action. The system of 
compensating people injured by defective products is costly, slow, 
inequitable, and unpredictable. It hurts business and consumers as 
well as our competitive position in world markets. 
Many consumers who are injured by defective products and de 
serve compensation are unable to recover damages or must wait 
years for recovery. They are caught up with manufacturers and 
product sellers in a product liability litigation system that ha.* 
often been characterized as a legal lottery, a system in which iden-
tical cases can produce startlingly different results. Moreover, in-
jured victims with the severest injuries tend to receive far less 
than their actual economic losses, while those with minor injuries 
are overcompensated. 
The inefficiency and unpredictability of the product liability 
system have been linked to the increasing cost and unavailability 
of liability insurance. An increasing number of companies, whether 
they make such products are sporting goods, textile manufacturing 
equipment, machine tools, medical devices or vaccines, cannot buy 
adequate insurance coverage. Some have had their insurance can-
celled or have experienced reduced coverage with increased deduc 
tibles at higher prices. Others cannot obtain coverage at any price. 
Thus, the present system has an adverse impact on plaintiffs and 
defendants, manufacturers, product sellers and consumers. The in-
dividual states cannot fully address the problems of the product li-
ability system. Reform at the Federal level is urgently needed. 
The Present Product Liability System: Costly, Slow, Inequitable, and 
Unpredictable 
1. Costs 
The present product liability system's transaction costs—the 
costs of litigation, court costs, and attorney's fees—are enormous. 
Today, plaintiff and defense lawyers collect almost as much from 
the system as injured victims do; most of the money paid out by 
manufacturers never reaches the victims at all.1 
The inefficiency of the present system has been noted often,2 and 
has most recently been demonstrated by preliminary studv results 
released July 29, 1986, by the Rand Institute for Civil" Justice, 
which show that the annual overall transaction costs of the U.S. 
tort system exceed compensation to plaintiffs. The Rand study 
1
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found that in 1985, net compensation totaled $13 to $15 billion, but 
the transaction costs—including plaintiffs attorney's fees, defense 
legal fees, public expenditures and the time of the litigants—were 
between $15 billion and $19 billion.3 
The pattern in product liability cases, alone, is consistent with 
these findings. According to calculations derived from a compre-
hensive 1977 survey of 24,452 closed claims conducted by the Insur-
ance Service Office (ISO), for every dollar paid to claimants, insur-
ers paid an average of 42 cents in defense costs.4 Moreover, for 
every dollar awarded to a claimant, he or she typically pays a con-
tingent fee of 33 cents in legal costs and therefore receives about 67 
cents. Thus, on this basis (adding the average defense cost to the 
contingent fee) one can estimate that the product liability tort liti-
gation system appears to cost more in litigation and transaction 
costs than the net recovery received by the claimant. 
Not only do these transaction costs exceed compensation, but 
they have risen dramatically in recent years. According to a 1986 
study by economists at New York University, the tort system's ad-
ministrative or transaction cost—the amount spent to adjust and 
litigate claims made by injured parties—has been rising rapidly 
since 1983.5 This study notes: 
These increases portend trouble ahead if they are not 
checked. If current rates of growth continue, we can 
exoect that by 1990 we will be spending between $31 and 
$38 billion per year simply administering the tort system.6 
With respect to general liability insurance, including product li-
ability, ISO recently reported that the total legal defense expenses 
incurred in 1984 were $2.7 billion, and that the proportion of gener-
al liability costs incurred by insurers that are consumed by legal 
defense costs has nearly tripled between 1960 and 1984. Most of 
this growth has occurred recently: the defense costs per dollar paid 
to claimants doubled in the last decade.7 
Ordinarily, legal defense costs for product liability claims are 
paid by insurers; however, because defense costs have escalated so 
rapidly, the insurance industry has proposed to change the com-
mercial general liability form to include some defense costs within 
the aggregate limits of the policy. Such a change would only in-
crease the burden of product liability litigation on manufacturers 
and product sellers, as well as consumers, to whom these costs will 
ultimately be passed on. 
Neither plaintiffs nor defendants benefit from the rapidly in-
creasing and excessive costs of the present system for resolving 
product liability disputes. 
i. Delay 
A second problem with the present product liability system is 
delay. This is particularly a concern for seriously injured victims, 
who are often in desperate financial straits and must wait years to 
be compensated while litigation drags on. 
One survey has shown that 36 percent of bodily injury losses in 
product liability cases are not paid until at least 4 years after the 
first report, and that it takes 5 years to pay the claim with the av-
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erage dollar amount of loss. This study also found that "larger 
claims tend to take much longer to close than smaller ones/'8 
Another, more recent insurance industry study found that the 
victims of the severest injuries have to wait the longest. This study 
found that in cases in which payment exceeded $100,000, 21.6 per-
cent of claimants waited more than five years for payment. Only 
2.1 percent were paid less than a year after they reported their 
injury, and 62.6 percent took more than three years to be paid • 
The chart below shows the results of this study, which compared 
earlier data from 1975. (The 1975 figures are in parentheses.) 
Claims over $100,000 
Number of years between date claim reported to insurer and date claim dosed Number of daimants 
Percent of 
claimants 
Percent o* \ U 
pdyw.ii 
1 year of less 4 (5) 2.1 (4.6) 1.6 (43> 
Over 1 year to 2 years 21 (17) 11.1 (157) 10.9 (151. 
Over 2 years to 3 years 46 (27) 24.2 (25.0) 23.0 (23 5) 
Over 3 years to 4 years 41 (17) 21.6 (15.7) 18.5 (19*; 
Over 4 years to 5 years 37 (27) 19 5 (25.0) 26.8 (20 7= 
Over 5 years to 10 years 41 (15) 21.6 (13.9) 19.2 (16<; 
The comparison with the 1975 data shows that the problem of 
delay has actually worsened. In 1975, 54.6 percent of claimants 
took more than three years to be paid; five years later that number 
had risen to 62.7 percent. 
Such delays plague even the many product liability cases which 
are settled before trial. One plaintiffs attorney has explained that 
even though most cases are settled, "most settlement negotiations 
get serious only a week or so before trial is scheduled to begin." 
The pattern has become so dependable that "each week the [law-
yer's] firm projects cash flow by estimating the settlement value of 
the cases set for trial the following week."10 
Delay also can result in undercompensation of victims. Because 
many victims of injury—particularly those with the most severe in-
juries—have inadequate resources to pay for their medical and re-
habilitation expenses, they are forced to settle for less than their 
full losses in order to get some payment because they cannot afford 
to wait longer without compensation.11 Studies have shown that 
when rehabilitation has to be delayed, victims do not recover as 
fully as they do when the problem is treated promptly.12 
3. Inequitable compensation 
Not only does the present product liability system generate ex-
cessive costs and delays; it is unable to compensate fairly injured 
victims in proportion to their losses. Numerous studies have found 
that the tort system grossly overpays people with small losses, 
while underpaying people with the most serious losses. 
This disturbing pattern was revealed as early as 1983 by a Co-
lumbia University report on auto accidents, and the findings of this 
report have been independently confirmed in the years since by 
more than a dozen detailed studies.13 More recently, the 1977 ISO 
product liability study found that injured plaintiffs with losses be-
tween $1 and $1,000 received, on the average, 859 percent of their 
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losses, while those with losses of over $1 million received, on the 
average, 15 percent of their losses {before paying their attorney's 
fees).14 In general, the study found, compensation exceeded eco-
nomic loss when losses were below $100,000, and then dropped dra-
matically below economic loss when the claimant's loss exceeded 
$100,000.15 
A 1980 insurance industry study of the largest product liability 
claims confirmed that the most severely injured victims do not 
even receive full compensation for their pain and suffering. For 
every dollar of past and future economic loss, the tort system paid 
claimants $1.22, but if the standard 33 percent attorney's contin-
gent fee is deducted, these claimants were left with only about 81 
cents for every dollar of loss.16 
Other studies have shown that people with lower incomes and 
lower educational levels recover far less than their middle class 
counterparts because they have less access to attorneys, cannot 
afford to wait as long to recover, and often are not good wit-
nesses.17 
Reform of the product liability system is essential to assure that 
those who are injured by defective products are fairly compensated 
in proportion to their losses. 
i Unpredictability 
The excessive costs, delays, and inequities of the product liability 
system are exacerbated by the inherent uncertainties and unpre-
dictability of the system. Indeed, the present product liability 
system has been characterized as a latter, in which "[lawyers' tal-
ents, plaintiffs' demeanor, defendants' grit, and the idiosyncrasies 
of jury composition combine to hand similar victims altogether dis-
similar results."18 
As Professor Jeffrey O'Connell has explained in testimony before 
the Committee: 
If you are badly injured in our society by a product and 
you go to the highly skilled lawyer . . . in all honesty [the 
lawyer] cannot tell you what you will be paid, when you 
will be paid, or indeed if you will be paid.19 
The present system's uncertainty is a problem for both manufac-
turers and consumers injured by defective products. Defendants 
need greater certainty as to the scope of their liability under the 
law. Plaintiffs need faster, more certain recovery that fully com-
pensates them for their real losses. 
The inherent uncertainty of the system has been linked by com-
mentators to the diversity of legal standards applied in different ju-
risdictions and the doctrinal mixture of contract and tort law ap-
plied in product liability cases.20 In addition, it has been linked to 
expanding doctrines of liability,21 the difficulties in establishing 
causation and fault, as well as the difficulties in translating nonpe-
cuniary loss (pain and suffering) into pecuniary terms.22 
The uncertainties and unpredictability of the system affect set-
tlements as well as judgments. Settlement negotiations are sabo-
taged by the lack of clear standards. With respect to punitive 
damage claims, for example, uncertainties about liability standards 
make it difficult for manufacturers to negotiate sensibly.23 
'&&&KMm*m# 
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The burden on American productivity and commerce 
The present product liability litigation system has become an 
enormous burden an American productivity and commerce. It de-
prives consumers of needed products, limits job opportunities, ar.d 
weakens our competitive position in world markets. 
This burden has been increased by what some have described as 
a "litigation explosion".24 The number of product liability case* 
filed in federal district courts has increased from 1,579 in 1974 to 
13,554 in 1985, a 758 percent increase.25 No corresponding figure ii 
available from state courts, which do not maintain separate statis-
tics on product liability claims, but overall civil caseloads have 
been rising there as well.26 
The impact of increasing product liability litigation has been fell 
by manufacturers for more than a decade, and it has been linked to 
the present crisis with respect to the unavailability and unafford 
ability of liability insurance. This crisis has been extensively docu 
mented in the press,27 and the Committee has held several hear 
ings on the problem.28 At those hearings, witnesses testified that 
the insurance crisis stems in part from cyclical fluctuations in the 
insurance industry, but many witnesses also cited as contributing 
factors growing litigation and claim costs; they linked the insur-
ance problem to the inherent unpredictability of the tort litigation 
system, as well as the increasing difficulty of predicting potential 
losses due to expanding concepts of liability. 
It has been suggested that the business cycle of the insurance in-
dustry and industry practices are entirely to blame for current un 
affordability and unavailability problems. This ignores the increase 
in the overall costs of the tort litigation system—an increase which 
has been felt as much by self-insurers as well as by those who pur-
chase liability insurance. For example, the City of New York, 
which is self-insured, has recorded total tort judgments and settle-
ments of more than $100 million for almost every year since 1981, 
although they never approached that level before. Moreover, the 
dollar value of New York City's average personal injury settlement 
rose from $7,127 in 1977 to $31,740 in 1985, an increase of 345 per-
cent.29 
While insurance prices appear likely to stabilize eventually, ana-
lysts have concluded that unless the underlying tort system's costs 
are reduced, they will do so at a very high level. "Prices will doubt-
less plateau at some point and at some level, but if current trends 
continue, it seems clear that this will occur at a height that will 
institutionalize the price shock that will have occurred in the 
meantime/' 3 0 Numerous studies of the present insurance crisis 
have independently reached the same conclusion: the rising cost of 
the tort system is a fundamental cause of the crisis.31 
But the insurance crisis is only one element of the burden im-
posed on American productivity and commerce by the product li-
ability litigation system and the overall tort system. The adverse 
impact of this burden is felt in many ways, and it is not only a 
matter of obtaining insurance coverage. Much of the cost of the 
product liability system is borne today directly by manufacturers 
and product sellers, because there has been a long, continuing 
trend toward self-insurance among American businesses. In those 
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policy limits have been shrinking. 
The expense of litigating claims diverts resources from produc-
tive efforts. Similarly, excessive management time is diverted from 
production to assessment of legal claims, and the uncertainties of 
the system deter the development of new products or product im-
provements. Clearly, the result is not in the best interest of manu-
facturers or consumers. 
Moreover, faced with the costs and uncertainties of the present 
system, manufacturers may eliminate a particular product line or 
terminate operations altogether if the costs of product liability ex-
posure become too burdensome.32 One survey of the impact of 
product liability on machinery industries found that 13.5 percent of 
the companies had dropped product lines, while 11.5 percent had 
decided not to develop a particular new product.33 One example il-
luminates the problem: 
In Virginia, William Perry, an engineer, set up a compa-
ny to design and build hand and foot controls for cars and 
vans. Perry's son had been crippled in a motorcycle acci-
dent, and the father was appalled when he saw the devices 
available to handicapped drivers. His company has never 
been sued, but he recently stopped selling his product 
nonetheless: his liability insurance premiums went up over 
1,000% in one year. Says Perry, "I would have continued 
this business even at a loss if I could have got a decent 
premium " 34 
Many other examples have been brought to the attention of the 
Committee, as well. Puritan-Bennett of Overland Park, Kansas, a 
leading U.S. manufacturer of hospital equipment, stopped making 
anesthesia gas machines in 1984 because of rising liability risks. 
These life-saving machines were once made by half a dozen compa-
nies; now the only producers are two foreign-owned firms.35 
Moreover, concerns about product liability appear to be a major 
contributor to the dramatic decline in the number of manufactur-
ers of vaccines, which has been accompanied by sharply rising 
prices. During the 1960's, there were eight manufacturers of the 
combined vaccine that is used to immunize children against dipth-
eria, whooping cough, and tetanus. Today, only one remains, and 
the cost of the vaccine has skyrocketed. The price per shot was 45 
cents in 1982; no it is $11.40, and most of the increases goes into a 
fund against lawsuits.36 In the 1960's there were three manufac-
turers or oral polio vaccine; now there is one.37 "If present trends 
are any indication," one writer has concluded, "it appears that the 
tort system's vagaries will ultimately drive mass immunization pro-
grams out of the private sector altogether.38 
The general aviation industry is another sector of the economy 
that has been adversely affected by the product liability system. In 
1985, insurance premiums averaged $70,000 per airplane, despite 
the general aviation industry's best safety record in years. These 
costs have had a devastating effect on sales—and on jobs. In 1979, 
more than 17,000 general aviation aircraft were sold by United 
States Manufacturers. In 1985, such sales has dropped by nearly 90 
percent. As a result, tens of thousands of workers have been laid 
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off, and unemployment in the industry is now over 50 percent. 
Among only the seven largest manufacturers of general aviation 
aircraft, employment dropped from 40,000 in 1980 to 13,500 in 
June, 1986.39 
The adverse effects of the product liability system have carried 
over into international trade. American manufacturers and prod-
uct sellers generally pay product liability insurance rates which 
are 20 time higher than those in Europe.40 This disparity is attrib-
utable in large part to the uncertainties and costs of the American 
tort litigation system.41 As a result of this disparity, American 
manufacturers and product sellers may be at a competitive disad-
vantage in both foreign and domestic markets. Insurers generally do 
not discount premiums where a manufacturer exports it goods, be-
cause there is always the possibility that a product-related suit will 
be brought in the United States. Thus, each U.S. product shipped 
abroad contains an insurance cost element greater than that of a 
foreign competitor.42 With respect to domestic markets, the effect 
of the current uncertainties in product liability law is similar. The 
price of imported products can be lower because product liability 
insurance rates for those products are lower.43 
The limitations of State efforts at reform 
In 1978, the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liabil-
ity, after conducting an 18-month study of the problem, issued a 
report which suggested that a model product liability act be drafted 
with the idea that reforms of the system would be enacted at the 
Federal level.44 A final version of this model law, known as the 
Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA), was published on October 
31, 1979.45 
However, UPLA, which ultimately was offered as a model State 
law, has not been adopted in full in any State. Over 30 States have 
adopted some form of product liability statute, and others have en-
acted more general tort reform measures.46 The States' efforts 
have been helpful and are to be encouraged; however, those efforts 
at State law reform have not resolved the overall problems of the 
product liability tort litigation system. Most State statutes are not 
comprehensive and fail to address all the key issues that arise in 
product liability litigation. Even if an individual State adopted a 
comprehensive product liability statute so that its own law was 
clear and predictable, the legal rules would still vary from State to 
State. 
Individual States cannot address the problems of the product li-
ability system effectively, because reform within one State does 
little to resolve the tort litigation problems facing those who deal 
in an interstate market. Products are manufactured, sold, used, 
and insured in a nationwide market. Data show that most product* 
manufactured in a given State are consumed or used outside that 
State.41 As a result, manufacturers and product sellers may be in-
volved in product liability actions governed by the law of any State 
in which they do business. An attempt by any one State to reform 
the system cannot relieve the overall burden imposed on interstate 
commerce.48 In New York State, the Governor's Advisory Commis-
sion on Liability Insurance recently reached the same conclusion* 
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL AND SUMMARY 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
COMMITTEE OK SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 
Washington, B.C., November 26, 1980. 
Hon. DON FUQUA, 
Chairman, Committee on Science and Technology, 
UJS. Howe of Representatives, 
Washington, D.U. 
DEAB MR. CHAIRMAN : As you know, on June 19,21 and July 11,1979, 
the Science, Research and Technology Subcommittee of the Science 
and Technology Committee held a series of oversight hearings on 
"The FDA's Process for Approving New Drugs." Those hearings were 
a continuation of an important effort in this area, begun by the Hon. 
James H. Scheuer, former chairman of the Subcommittee on Domestic 
and International Scientific Planning Analysis and Cooperation. The 
speed with which Food and Drug Administration approves new drugs 
for marketing in the U.S. today nas become a frequent target of criti-
cism not only by drug manufacturers seeking to market the drugs but 
also by physicians wanting to use drugs which they know have been 
available in other technically advanced countries for months to years. 
Consumers are also concerned about this process with patients gener-
ally wanting the early benefits of new therapeutic advances, but some 
consumers are more concerned about being protected against possible 
unforseen side effects of drugs. 
I am pleased to submit to you this document based on the Subcom-
mittee's oversight hearings and on the considerable effort of the Gen-
eral Accounting Office. 
In general, the Subcommittee hearings confirmed earlier impressions 
that there is, for certain categories of drugs, a "drug lag" within the 
United States as compared with some other technically advantaged 
countries. Examples of major, but not exclusive, factors for delays 
encountered in the availability of therapeutically important new 
chemical entities revolve about FDA's drug approval process and in-
clude: (1) internal management problems witnin the FDA, (2) com-
plexity and extensiveness of FDA's guidelines and regulations, and j8) adversarial relationships between FDA and the pharmaceutical 
industry. The cumulative effect of these and other factors have re-
sulted in well-documented drug availability delays. This has had an 
impact not only upon the overall wellness of the United States popula-
tion but also upon the ability and willingness of drug manufacturers 
to invest in innovative approaches for the treatment of human 
diseases. A number of recommendations were made by hearing 
witnesses that would facilitate the FDA drug approval process while 
still insuring the safety of patients and the public and tne efficacy of 
new prescription drugs introduced into the market place. 
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As a consequence of these findings, the Subcommittee intends to 
continue to exercise oversight on the scientific base and its application 
in FDA, the drug approval process and related guidelines and 
regulations. 
With the cooperation in this endeavor of the FDA, other Congres-
sional Committees, and outside experts, the Subcommittee believes that 
shortcomings in FDA's drug approval process can be remedied and 
the availability of therapeutic advances to the public can be 
maximized. 
Sincerely, 
GEORGE E. BROWN, Jr. ; 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, 
Research and Technology. 
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6. DRUGS FOR 0*HER DISEASES 
A number of other drugs could have made significant improve-
ments in therapeutics if they had been available earlier in the U.S. 
Bromocryptine (Parlodel) was approved almost 8 years earlier in 
Switzerland than its approval in the United States in June 1978. It was 
approved in the United Kingdom in 1976. Bromocryptine is used to 
treat an endocrine disorder of the uterus and breast (prolactin in-
hibition) , Parkinson's disease (a nervous system disease common in 
older people), and acormegaly (an endocrine system disease with a 
particular affect on the bones). FDA classifies it as an important 
therapeutic gain for the temporary relief of amenorrhea and 
galactorrhea. 
Cyproterone, was approved 6 years ago in Germany and is used in 
the treatment of sexual hyperactivity and precocious puberty. It is 
not approved in the United States. 
According to the FDA cyproterone acetate is a potent progesta-
tional agent of potential significance being investigated for various 
indications including benign prostatic hypertrophy, sexual hyper-
activity, sexual deviance, and central nervous system effects. IND's 
were submitted by five sponsors during 1968, 1978, 1974. Clinical 
trials are currently in progress in phases I and II, with the major 
research being conducted by individual investigators under research 
IND's. An alternative progestin available in the United States for 
the endocrinologic indications only is medroxyprogesterone acetate 
(Depo-Provera). Cyproterone has been used abroad as an anti-an-
ctrogen for sexual offenders. Two IND's for this use were submitted 
by individual research investigators in 1978. A drug useful in the 
treatment of sexual criminals would be an important therapeutic 
advance, but major questions of safety and efficacy for this use remain 
to be clarified according to FDA. 
Somatotropin (Asellacrin) is a drug FDA classified as important 
(A). This drug, which is used to promote growth in children with 
short stature due to a deficiency of pituitary growth hormone, was 
approved on July 80,1976, about 15 months after an NDA was sub-
mitted to FDA. Somatotropin was approved for use in Sweden in 1971 
and in the United Kingdom and Switzerland in 1972. 
Bretyliwn toeylate is an adrenergic blocker. 
Buptvacaine hydrochloride (Marcaine) is a longer-acting local anes-
thetic agent licensed by Sterling Drue from a Swedish firm. That 
agent had been marketed in Europe at least since 1967, in the United 
Kingdom since 1968. After extensive clinical trials sponsored by us in 
the United States, an NDA was filed with FDA in August, 1970; ap-
proval was granted in October, 1972 (26 months later). 
Levodopa is an anti-Parkinson agent. 
Baclofen (Lioresal), a muscle relaxant was introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 1972 and approved in the United States in Octo-
ber 1977. It represents a modest therapeutic gain (B) according to 
FDA. 
Danazol (Danocrine) is a gonadotropin. An NDA was filed with the 
FDA on December 18, 1978 for use in endometriosis, a clinical dis-
order of women for which no satisfactory medical treatment previ-
ously existed. Approval was received on June 21,1976, a little more 
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than 80 months later. A submission was made in the United Kingdom 
on December 27,1978 and the Republic of Ireland on January 23,1974. 
The non-domestic submissions contained only data, obtained from 
studies in the United States, the same data submitted to the FDA. 
Approval was granted in the United Kingdom on June 6,1974 (a few 
days longer than 6 months after submission): approval was granted 
in Ireland on May 24,1974 (4 months after submission). 
A supplemental application was Hied with the FDA on March 6, 
1978 for an additional indication, fibrocystic breast disease, already 
approved in the United Kingdom and Ireland. Action on this submis-
sion was still pending at the FDA 16 months later, 
Dumovruiin (DDAVP), an antidiuretic (B), as introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 1976 out not approved in the United States until 
1978. 
Calcitonin is a blood calcium regulator. 
Dimethyl nUfowide (DMbO) can be derived from lignin, the cement 
substances of trees or can be made from a number of organic chem-
icals. Although the chemical history of DMSO goes back to 1866, 
promise of this chemical in the medical sciences was shown in 1959 
with tho demonstration of its protective effective on red blood cells 
and other tissues from freezing damage and later with its ability 
to serve as a "carrier" drug in conveying other substances through 
the skin and muoous membranes. 
In early clinical studies, dimethyl sulfoxide was shown to relieve 
pain, reduce swelling, slow the growth of bacteria, improve blood 
supply, soften scar tissue, enhance the effectiveness of other pharma-
cologic agents, serve as a diuretic, and act as a muscle relaxant 
The first report on the use of dimethyl sulfoxide as a pharmacolog-
ic agent was writen in 1968 and published February 1, 1964. The 
first IND to study DMSO clinically in the United States was sub-
mitted on October 26,1963. Three NDA's on DMSO were submitted 
to the FDA in 1966. All were turned down. A fourth NDA was sub-
mitted in 1970. It was also turned down by the FDA, in spite of 
mounting evidence in the scientific and medical literature of the 
potential pharmacological importance of DMSO. 
According to Stanley Jacob: 
Of major importance is the fact that DMSO has been 
shown to be of value, not only in diseases for which there is 
other known treatment, but in a number of illnesses for 
which no other effective or low risk treatment is known, such 
as the painful ulcers of the fingers in patients with sclero-
derma. . • • 
The value of DMSO in other illnesses for which effective 
pharmacologic treatment does not presently exist, includes 
severe abacterial prostatitis, Dupuytren's contracture, sub-
cutaneous scarring from cobalt irradiation, keloids, Pey-
ronie's disease and potentially in otherwise "irreversible" 
iniury to the brain and spinal cord.... 
Dimethyl sulfoxide is a useful adjunct in the treatment 
of rheumatoid arthritis, degenerative arthritis and gouty 
arthritis. It primarily will relieve pain, but will also reduce 
inflammation and increase joint mobility. Due to its effec-
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tiveness in the treatment of arthritis, Americans by the 
thousands are flocking to nations such as Mexico to receive 
The effectiveness of DMSO has been demonstrated by com-
parative studies, by "double blind" studies, and by the din- -
ical impression type of evaluations in man.. . . (and) 
A broader spectrum of primary pharmacology and clini-
cal benefit, both actual and potential, has been described in 
the scientific literature for DMSO than for any other sub-
stance with [which I am familiar. 
In spite of the mounting evidence of the clinical importance of 
DMSO, it is only prescriptive in the U.S. for interstitial, evstitis 
(humans) and for acute musculoskeletal problems in large and small 
animals. DMSO is prescriptive in Canada for scleroderma, in Great 
Britain and Ireland for shingles when mixed with IDU, and in Ger-
many, Austria and Switzerland for a ranjje of disorders for topical 
administration. It is also widely prescriptive in South America and 
has been prescriptive in the U.S.S.R. since 1971. An NDA sub-
mitted to the FDA in 1977 on DMSO for scleroderma is currently 
in an administrative limbo. 
In spite of much scientific literature to the contrary, FDA continues 
to indicate that there is insufficient toxicological information avail-
able on DMSO and that the definitive double-masked study on this 
drug has yet to be done. 
Dinoproetone (Prostin E 2), a prostaglandin was introduced in the 
United Kingdom in 1972. It is used for elective abortion, evacuation of 
uterine contents in fetal death and the management of benign hydra-
tidiform mole. FDA classifies the drug as a modest therapeutic ad-
vance (B) and did not approve it in the United States until August 
1977. 
Medrowyprooeeterone acetate (Depo-Provera), an injectable contra-
ceptive agent, has been approved in Tiany countries around the world. 
Its NDA for that use has been under consideration by the FDA for 
over 12 years (since Feb. 1987). Depo-Provera has now been marketed 
for contraception in over 60 countries and has been used safely for over 
6 million woman-years. But on March 7,1978 FDA ruled it was non 
approvable in the United States. The reasons why FDA haa not ap-
proved Depo-Provera have been the subject of another series of con-
gressional hearings conducted by the Select Committee on Population. 
("The Depo-Provera Debate", hearings before the Select Committee 
on Population, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, second 
session, August 8, 9, and 10,1978, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington: 1978). 
Depo-Provera represents an approved indication lag. In 1972, FDA 
approved this drug for adjunctive therapy and ralliative treatment of 
certain types of inoperable cancer of the uterus. 
Metri&mid* (Amipaque) is a breakthrough radiodiagnoetic agent 
licensed by Sterling Drug from a Norwegian firm. An NDA was filed 
with the FDA on December 27,1976; approval was granted on Au-
gust 22, 1978 (20 months later). That agent had been marketed in 
Scandinavian countries since 1974 and was approved for marketing 
in the United Kingdom in April 1977 (it is marketed there by the 
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Norwegian firm). In France, Sterling made a submission on Au-
gust 22,1977 and received approval in February 2,1978 (5V6 months 
later). 
Rifampin is an antituberculosis drug. 
Trimethoprim is an antibacterial agent. 
Vidarabine (VIRA-A) an antiviral, was approved by the FDA in 
November 1976 but only as an ophthalmic ointment It is classified as 
an important therapeutic gain (A) for the treatment of herpes kerato-
conjunctivitis. 
The subcommittee finds that the numerous examples of important 
or significant drugs which have been delayed and in some cases not yet 
approved leave no doubt that U.S. patients have suffered a number of 
significant therapeutic losses. FDA appears to raise safety issues on 
many drugs which have been in use lor years in advanced countries 
without any problems. These are countries which also are reported to 
have good port-marketing surveillance programs in operation. 
One is lend to the realization that, if the most up to date advances are 
not available in the United States, there will be a therapeutic defi-
ciency relative to other advanced countries which have these therapies. 
It follows that some patients denied this benefit will die or suffer 
unneoessarily. This automatically results in a diminution in tihe quality 
of life and the health care of those who are ill. 
The United States prescription drug laws were designed to protect 
citizens bv preventing general public access to new drugs which could 
result in harm to the recipient, if unsupervised. It must be remembered 
that all drugs have serious potential side effects and all drugs are 
capable of serious harm if misused or abused. Therefore, safety is rela-, 
tive and both patients and regulators must assume some risk. Levels 
of public expectations and regulatory goals must be modified to appre-
ciate the necessary balancing of benefits and risks in advancing new 
and effective drug therapies. 
D. THE NEED FOR A VARIETY OF DRUGS 
Although many disease areas have numerous drugs available for 
their treatment, the subcommittee recognized the need for a variety 
of drugs for optimum treatment. Drugs not being available simply 
reduce a physician's and patient's option for the most beneficial treat-
ment for the illness. Discussing sodium valproate, Dr. Farrendelli 
stated: 
Even with the 15 anticonvulsants available in the United 
States at this time, only about 50 percent of epilepsy patients 
could achieve complete control of their seizures. Another 30 
percent oould achieve partial control and the remaining 20 
percent little or no control. More drugs are needed to control 
seizures in the 50 percent of the epilepsy population for whom 
presently available therapy doses not provide complete 
control. 
Dr. Zipes summed it up as follows: 
It is as naive to think that one antiarrhythmic drug will be 
effective for patiente. as it is to think that one antibiotic will 
cure all infections. Therefore, physicians need to be able to 
choose from a wide selection of antiarrhythmic agents that 
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have widely different electrophysiologic properties. No ideal 
universally effective antiarrythmic agent exists. If it did, such 
questions as to whom to treat and with what drug would not 
occur. Different causes of an arryhthmia may allow a drug to 
be effective in one patient but not in another* 
Virtually all the available antiarrhythmic agents have sig-
nificant side effects that may vary from patient to patient 
One may produce crippling diarrhea in one patient, and be 
tolerated without any problems in another. Clinicians must 
oontinue to evaluate the benefit-to-risk ratio of any drug and 
be able to select an effective drug that does not produce side 
effects for any given patient To do this, there must be a wide 
spectrum from which to choose. 
Few if any drugs are effective in all patients. In fact, most drugs 
are effective in only 30 to 75 percent of the patients. Even seemingly 
unimportant drugs may help a few people and for those few people 
they are very important. 
The subcommittee concludes that the U.S. drug lag has an adverse 
impact on medical treatment and hence health care in the United 
States. 
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DTP aupplv was threatened in 1984 when two major suppliers of DTP threatened to 
withdraw from the market and production lots did not meet Quality control stand-
ards. The reports I have seen indicate that current problems related to the supply of 
vaccines are due tc a number of factors including concentration of production in a 
small number of manufacturers, limited stockpiling of vaccines and commercial 
companies' participation in the relatively small market for vaccine products. 
A third and final factor that threatens the supply of childhood vaccines in our 
country is the product liability crisis in the area of vaccines. There are a number of 
factors that need to be carefully evaluated before we make any changes here. First, 
we need to review how much the current rise in product liability insurance is due to 
the fluctuating market for insurance. Since 1984, the insurance market has ewung 
from a buyers market to a sellers market Premium rates have increased by 800 
percent and more. Second, we also need to review the impact our Nation's court 
system, specificity our tort system, has had on the cost and availability of product 
liability insurance. 3 
I look forward to working with you Mr. Chairman and the other members of the / V 
subcommittee in finding the answers to these major issues and moving ahead with - -"*• 
the proper legislation to ensure that we continue to have the necessary vaccines at ' •; f! 
an affordable price. ^ 
Mr. WAXMAN. Our first panel of witnesses is comprised of vari- f 
ous health organizations that have long been interested in And in-
volved in childhood immunizations and vaccine compensation. Dr. 
Martin Smith is president of the American Academy of Pediatrics. 
Malinda Carter is a community health nurse here on behalf of the 
American Nurses9 Association. William Foege is president of the 
American Public Health Association. Dr. Roy Schwarz is assistant 
vice president of the American Medical Association. And Dr. Ro-
berta Coffin is commissioner of health for the State of Vermont 
and is appearing here today as a representative of the Association 
of State and Territorial Health Officers. 
I would like to have you please come forward. We want to wel-
come each of you to our hearing this morning. Your prepared state-
ments will be made part of the record in full. What we would like 
to ask each of you to do is to summarize your statement in no more 
than 5 minutes. I am going to have to be very strict in terms of the 
5-minute rule, in order to keep with the schedule that we have 
planned for today. We will start with Dr. Smith. 
STATEMENTS OF MARTIN H. SMITH, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN 
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS; MALINDA CARTER, BOARD OF DI-
RECTORS, AMERICAN NURSES9 ASSOCIATION; WILLIAM H. 
FOEGE, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION; 
M. ROY SCHWARZ, ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION; AND ROBERTA COFFIN, ON 
BEHALF OF ASSOCIATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL 
HEALTH OFFICERS 
Dr. SMITH. Thank you Mr. Chairman, I am Dr. Martin H. Smith, 
president of the American Academy of Pediatrics, here today to 
speak for the academy relative to H.R. 5184, the National Child-
hood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. 
Mr. Chairman, the academy, first of all, wishes to commend you 
for providing leadership in this area at a time when leadership is 
so urgently needed. We also would like to acknowledge the leader-
ship of Mr. Madigan and Mr. Tauke on this issue as well. We ap-
plaud your initiative in working with the interested parties to de-
velop H.R. 5184 and putting it forth as a viable means of resolving 
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the difficult crisis situation that we are facing with respect to our 
ability to immunise our children against preventable disease. 
The crisis has not gone away; it's only shifted from one of supply 
to one of affordability. While the remaining three producers of our 
childhood vaccines nave stayed in the marketplace, the costs of 
these products have soared. It is the young parents of our patients 
who carry this heavy financial burden. For example, the producers 
of DTP vaccines have tacked an additional $8 charge per shot as a 
set-aside for their potential liability problems. This means that 
young parents—and for the most part out of their own pockets-
are funding an $80 million liability reserve fund. This is more than 
we spend as a nation on our entire childhood immunization pro-
gram. 
During the past 2 years particularly, we have had a series of 
crises of supply and cost ana vet somehow the public and the pri-
vate immunization programs have continued. Both the public and 
private programs have been strained and this cannot continue. 
I have already made reference to the tremendous escalation in 
costs that has gone on during the past few years and particularly 
during the past 2 rears. In other public statements the academy 
has called repeated attention to the wide disparity in costs to the 
private sector of medicine as compared to the costs in the public 
sector. It is very evident that at the present time the private sector 
is being forced to bear the largest part of the burden of liability 
costs. It will inevitably follow that if this disparity continues, many 
patients will be forced to the public sector for their immunizations 
when they have been accustomed in the past to receiving them 
from their own physicians. 
The public sector is not capable at the present time of handling 
this increased load. It has insufficient funding as well as insuffi-
cient personnel to manage a large new influx of patients. We recog-
nize the reason for such a wide disparity in costs between the pri-
vate and public sectors of medicine. The Government is able to pur-
chase vaccines still on their old contracts. When these contracts 
expire early next year, the Congress must expect that huge in-
creases will also occur in the costs for all vaccines in the public 
sector. 
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, vaccines are not 
like other consumer products and must be treated differently from 
all other products. Their use is mandated by every State in the 
union and they are already heavily regulated by the Federal Gov-
ernment The traditional tort system has not served children well 
in this limited instance and in fact has contributed to this critical 
public health problem. 
The facts are that the number of producers has dwindled, the 
costs of vaccines have risen dramatically, and research efforts for 
new and improved vaccines have been chilled. Parents wait for 
years for the resolution of law suits while the immediate needs of 
their child are compromised. A few eventually win settlements; 
many others do not While we fully recognize the important role 
the courts play in protecting our children from negligent acts, we 
commend you for developing legislation which provides for a fair 
balance between simple and quick compensation and the tort 
system. You have preserved a parent's right to determine the best 
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course for their child and you have expedited tlu, process so that 
the child's needs can be met in an appropriate manner. 
We are convinced that there are two steps that can reverse the 
continually increasing costs of vaccines and the increasing crisis at-
mosphere surrounding vaccine liability: 
First, Congress can push the research and field testing of an im-
proved pertussis vaccine and can see to it that this occurs by incor-
porating these demands into legislation. 
Second, Congress can move forward with a compensation legisla-
tion that provides for a prompt and reasonable compensation for 
all justified claims resulting from vaccine injury. 
H.R. 5184 addresses these issues in a fair, compassionate and fis-
cally responsible manner. We clearly recognize the compromises 
that must be made. We do have some specific suggestions for modi-
fications in our written statement and look forward to working 
with the committee on the resolution of these issues. 
Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Smith. We will look at 
the suggestions that you have in your prepared statement for some 
modifications. 
Dr. SMITH. All right 
Mr. WAXMAN. We appreciate your testimony. 
[Testimony resumes on p. 139.] 
[The prepared statement of Dr. Smith follows:] 
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ttSTZNOIT 
Presented by: 
ftartla I. Sella, H.O., P.a.a.P. 
Z an Dr. Hartin H. Saith, Praaldant of tha Aaerican 
Academy of Pediatrlee, hara today to apeak for tha Aaerican 
Acadeay of Pediatrlee ralatlva to H.R. 5184, tha National 
Childhood Vaccina Injury Act of 1986. 
Mr. Chairman, flrat of all tha Acadeay vlahaa to coaaend 
you for providing tha laadarahip in thia araa at a tlaa whan 
laadarahip la ao urgantly naadad. Ha applaud your initiatlva 
in working with intaraatad partlaa to davalop H.R. 5184 and 
putting it forth aa a viable aaana of raaolvlng tha crlaia 
situation va ara facing with raapact to our ability to laaunlae 
our childran agalnat pravantabla dlaeaaa. 
Mr. Chairman, laat auaaar va vltnaaaad apot ahortagaa of 
tha partuaala vaccina. This experience daaonatratas that in 
tha abaanca of protactiva legislation our national iaaunizatlon 
prograa la extremely fragila indaad. Lot aa point out tha 
axparlanca of othar countries when partuaala laaunltatlon 
dacllnadt 
o Tha laaunltatlon rata in England fall froa 79 pareant 
in 1973 to 31 parcant in 1978. Beginning in 1977 thare waa a 
large outbreak of whooping cough, with an epideaie of 102,500 
reported partuaala cases. Between 1977 and 1980 36 partuaala 
related deathe vara reported, aa vara SOOO hoapltal admissions 
due to the dlaeaaa. These figures aay be far too low since 
pertussis caaea and partuaala deaths are underreported and 
often Misdiagnosed. 
- I 
^ 
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o In Japan* following two daatha thought to ba aaao-
elatad with vaccina adainlatratlon, tha iaaunitation rata 
dacllnad to batvaan 30 and 40 pareant aftar 197S. In tha 
Kid-1970a only 200-400 caaaa and flva or fawar daatha aaaoci-
atad with partuaaia wara raportod.annually in Japan; in 1980, 
13,105 partuaaia caaaa and 41 daatha wara rap©rtad. 1/ 
o In Swadan, tha highaat nuabar of raportad caaaa of 
partuaaia batwaan 1968-1976 waa 2,747, and tha avaraga waa auch 
lowar. Howavar, in 1979, tha govamaant atoppad routlna vacci-
nation, and vaceina waa not avallabia at all. Partuaaia eaaaa 
ainea roaa to 9,778 eaaaa in 1983. Anothar paak la axpactad in 
1986-67. 
For tha aoaant tha crlaia hap ahlftad from ona of aupply 
to ona of affordabillty. Whila tha raaalning thraa producara 
of our childhood vacelnaa hava atayad in tha aarkatplaca, tha 
coata of thaaa producta hava aoarad. Tha producara of DTP 
vaccina hava tackad on an additional $8 charga par ahot as a 
aat-aaida for thalr potantial liability problaaa. Thla aaana 
that young paranta ara funding an $80 aillion liability raaarva 
fund (and for tha aoat part ara paying for it out of thalr own 
pockata). Thia la aora than wa apand aa a nation on our antlra 
1/ Sinea 1981, tha Japanaaa hava baan uaing aavaral dif-
farant acallular vacelnaa. It la thalr praetlca to atart 
iaaunizatlon latar than in tha U. 3., aoaatlaaa aa lata aa 
24 aontha of aga. Liaitad afficacy data of thaaa vacelnaa 
ara avallabia. 
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childhood Immunisation program! Wo faar that as a rosult of 
prlco Increases many patlonts will bo forcod into public 
clinics for thoir immunizations. At present, tho public stctor 
is not capablo of handling this lneroasod load, sinco it has 
insufficient funding and porsonnsl to manage a largo now Influx 
of patlonta. 
Because of tho wldo disparity in costs of tho vaccina to 
tho prlvato and public soctors of medicine, it is ovldont that 
at tho prosont timo tho prlvato soetor is bolng forcod to boar 
tho largost part of tho burdon of liability coots. This 
discrepancy in coats botwoon tho prlvato and tho public soctors 
of modiclno is duo to tho ability of government to purchase 
vaccines in bulk under relatively old contracts, which expire 
•arly next yoar. Thus, the Congress must anticipate a huge 
increases in the costs for all vaccines in tho public sector in 
tho near future. 
Mr. Chairman, the Academy believes that the crisis 
atmosphere surrounding childhood vaccinas can bo reversed only 
through enactment of legislation containing throe key features. 
First, the research and field testing of an improved 
pertussis vaccine must be given the highest priority by 
government. 
Second, a simple, nonadversarial no-fault system providing 
prompt and reasonable resolution of justified claims resulting 
from vaccine injury must bo established, thus insuring simple 
justice for children. 
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Third, tha product• liability rulaa applicable to 
childhood vaccinas must be changed in order to provide greater 
predictability of loases to manufacturers. 
Mr. Chairman, legislation supported by the Acsdemy in the 
paat has concentrated on the flrat two points. We now 
recognise, baaed on the crista occurring the past two years, 
that tort reform alao la an eaaential part of a permanent 
solution. While we acknowledge the important role the courts 
play in protecting our children from negligent acts, we commend 
you for developing legislation which provides for tort reform, 
as well as a fair compensation system. Vaccinae are not like 
other consumer products and it la appropriate that they be 
treated differently under products liability law. Immunisation 
is mandated by every atate in the Union and childhood vaccinae 
are heavily regulated by the Federal Government. The 
traditional tort ayatern haa not served children well in this 
limited instance and in fact has contributed to this critical 
public health problem. The facta are that directly as a result 
of producte liability problema, the number of producers haa 
dwindled, the costs of vaccinae have rieen dramatically, and 
reaearch efforts for new and Improved vaccinae have been 
chilled. Parents wait for yeara for the resolution of lawsuits 
while the Immediate needs of their children are compromised. A 
few eventually win lawsuits and aome gain settlements; many 
others do not. 
Mr. Chairman, the Academy believes that R.R. S184 
addreeees the three issues outlined briefly above in a fair, 
compaaslonate and fiscally responsible manner, and we are 
supportive of the thruat of this legislation. We do have 
comments about some specific provisions of the bill and offer 
euggested revisions for your consideration in the sttached 
Appendix. 
Mr. Chairman, we applaud your and Mr. Madlgan'a ef forte— 
and thoae of other members of this Subcommittee—directed 
toward preservation and enhancement of thla nation'a childhood 
vaccination program, and the establishment of a fair and just 
compensation program for injured victims. Thank you for your 
leaderahlp and your concern for children. 
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M E K O R X N D U M DZPARTKEHT OP HEALTH AND HHHAN SERVICES 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
POOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH 
DATS: September 11, 1989 
TROK: Director 
Division of Neuropharmacological Drug Products, HFD-120 
SUBJECT: Interpreting' Post-marketing Surveillance Information en 
Halcion. 
TO: Members, Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee 
I. The Halcion Question Delineated: 
Halcion, the most commonly prescribed domestic hypnotic drug 
product, has long been the object of recurring waves of adverse 
publicity concerning its alleged potential to cause a unique 
profile of adverse 'behavioral1 events. Actually, the adverse 
behavioral events1 attributed to Halcion (e.g., excessive sedation, 
intoxication, bizarre behavior, paradoxical excitement, delirium, 
psychosis, amnesia, dissociative states, agitation, anxiety, 
depression, dependence and withdrawal reactions, seizure, even 
death, etc.) are also reported in association with the use of other 
benzodiazepine and non-benzodiazepine sedative/hypnotic drugs 
(e.g., barbiturates, non-BBs). What is unusual about Halcion is 
the large and sustained volume of reports of already 'labeled1 
events that continue to be received now some 7 years after its 
initial introduction into our domestic armamentarium. 
Does this volume of reports represent a 'signal1 that Halcion is 
an especially dangerous drug, perhaps one too dangerous to remain 
on the market as has been implied by some of the drug's more 
extreme critics? Obviously, after careful review, the agency does 
not think that it does; to the contrary, despite the volume of 
reports, we remain convinced that Halcion is a safe and effective 
hypnotic drug product. 
Nevertheless, given the adverse publicity and the anxiety that has 
been raised among the laity, it seems prudent to have a group of 
independent experts review the facts about Halcion and discuss 
1
 Importantly, these racovard phenomena ere not adverse risks nevly 
discovered through the agency's post-marketing surveillance system. The events 
enumerated were recognized as pocencUl or known risks of Halcion prior to i*s 
domestic marketing and vere identified, and repeatedly cited, in Halcion s 
prescription product labeling at the time of its initial marketing. 
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t h e i r p o s s i b l e in terpreta t ions , candidly, in an open publ ic forum. 
Thus, we have cone t o the Committee. 
I I . Purposes , TJsms aixd Limitations of the Agency fs Post-Marketing 
Voluntary Reporting System: 
Analyses based on data derived from FDA's voluntary spontaneous 
report ing post-marketing survei l lance system w i l l play a prominent 
r o l e in the Committee's del iberations on Halcion on September 22, 
1989. Understanding how our post-marketing adverse event reporting 
system works and what can and cannot be done with the data i t 
generates i s a necessary prerequis i te t o d iscuss ion of these 
ana lyses . This memorandum i s writ ten t o provide some basic 
i n s i g h t s in to the strengths and weaknesses of the system. 2 
To begin, in considering the resul t s of these analyses , Committee 
members should be mindful that FDA's voluntary spontaneous 
reporting s u r v e i l l a n c e system i s primarily intended to s ignal the 
presence of previous ly unappreciated drug assoc iated adverse 
event s . 3 
C r i t i c a l l y , the voluntary reporting system i s not capable of 
determining the actual incidence of s p e c i f i c adverse events , and 
consequently, i t i s not capable of generating r e l i a b l e est imates 
cf the r e l a t i v e r i s k of various drug products to cause part i cu lar 
types of adverse events . 4 
2
 The accompanying memorandum by Dr. Charles Anello, Deputy Director cf che 
Office of Epidemiology and Bioscacisticst which conveys zhe reporting raze daza 
and discusses our analyses of Halcion, provides addizional dezails abouz zhe 
system. Appendix I of zhis memorandum also provides addizional information. 
3
 The need for posz-marketing surveillance arises because even zhe most 
elaborate and extensive of new drug developmenz and teszing programs cannoz 
reliably identify drug induced events zhaz occur 1) ac low incidence [e.g., less 
Chan 1 in 300 co 500 exposures], 2) only or primarily wichin unique subgroups 
of che populacion chac were not adequacely represenzed in che drug development 
clinical ceszing program, or 3) only or primarily in associazion wizh condizions 
of use not syscemacically evaluaced during pre-marketing clinical cescing [e.g.. 
in associaclon wich a particular type of concomitant drug therapy or illness]. 
4
 This stacemenc refleccs currenc FDA policy abouc che legicimace uses of 
daca derived from che agency's post-marketing voluntary spontaneous reporting 
system. In fact, when releasing information gathered in the system under Freedom 
of Information, Che Division of Epidemiology and Surveillance routinely encloses 
a 'flier' which warns about potential misuses of daca derived from post-marketing 
spontaneous voluntary reports. (See Appendix I) 
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The spontaneous reporting system cannot determine incidence2 
because 1) the nunber of reports accumulated by the system bear a 
very uncertain re la t ionsh ip to the number of adverse events 
a c t u a l l y occurring and 2) the s i z e of the population at r i sk ( i . e . , 
the number of indiv iduals exposed to drug and, therefore , at r i sk 
t o s u f f e r an adverse drug induced event during the interva l for 
which reports are being accumulated), i s unknown. 
To e labora te , counts of reports of adverse drug experience are not 
counts of drug induced injury. A report of a drug associated event 
i s in almost every case only a speculat ion that a causal l inkage 
e x i s t s between the occurrence of the event and the administration 
of the drug. Admittedly,, in many cases , the speculat ion i s 
s e n s i b l e , l o g i c a l , and reasonably supported by the circumstances 
in which the event occurred. Nonetheless, the linkage remains a 
specu la t ion based on a post hoc, ergo propter hoc l og i c 6. As 
Alvan Fe ins te in long ago pointed out, t h i s form of argument i s most 
persuas ive when the event observed i s v i r t u a l l y unheard of in the 
absence of drug treatment ( e . g . , Fe inste in gave the example of the 
p a t i e n t who grows feathers on h i s arm after taking a new drug). 
However, when the putat ive drug induced adverse event occurs 
commonly and spontaneously ( i . e . , in the absence of drug exposure) 
in the t a r g e t ^patient population, the v a l i d i t y of the post hoc, 
Incidence is a measure of the rate at vhlch new cases of a particular 
type (i.e., individuals developing a particular disease or experiencing a 
specific class of an adverse event) emerge from the population of individuals 
'at risk.' Typically, incidence is expressed in terns of new cases per 
individuals 'at risk' over some convenient interval of time. The calculation 
of incidence for a particular reporting interval, therefore, requires: 1) a 
counc of all new cases occurring, 2) a count of all individuals in the population 
who were at risk for becoaing cases, and 3) the actual duration of time for which 
each individual counted at risk was actually at risk. Using this information, 
an incidence estimate, expressed as cases or events per person-time, can be 
calculated. Often, however, because information about each individual's actual 
duration at risk is often unknown, a surrogate incidence estimate, based on the 
ratio of new cases to all individuals at risk (for any duration of exposure) 
during the interval of interest is employed. 
• In some cases, a reporter may have additional evidence to support the 
hypothesis chat the observed event is drug induced. Rechallenge of the patient 
who has recovered from a reversible adverse event is an example of a subject own 
control, 'n' of one, experiment co assess the question of event causality. For 
obvious reasons (risk, lack of clinical importance, etc.), rechallenge is not 
common, however. It is ordinarily reserved for situations where the drug product 
is unique in its therapeutic potential and especially important to the management 
of the patient's condition. 
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•rgo propter hoc argument i s i t s e l f arguable. 
Such a concern i s especially relevant to the interpretation of 
untoward behavioral and/or psychiatric disturbances that are 
reported after a drug i s used in a patient who may be especially 
prone to exhibit the alleged drug induced behavior in the absence 
of ^ drug treatment. For example, disturbed sleep i s often the 
i n i t i a l s ign of major psychiatric i l l n e s s . If the prescriber and 
patient are not aware of this poss ibi l i ty , the emergence of a full 
blown psychiatric i l lnes s or syndrome may be incorrectly attributed 
to the hypnotic that was prescribed to treat the i n i t i a l signs of 
the i l l n e s s 7. 
In t h i s regard, i r is somewhat ironic that the recent wave of adverse 
publicity about Halcicn arose as the direct result of an alleged Halcien induced 
illness that might not truly be due to Haicion. Indeed, the particular case 
serves as a near perfect illustration of the misuse of post hoc ergo propter hoc 
logic by an uncritical and laregly inadequately informed lay media. 
Cindy Ehrlich, the prize winning author of a series of articles highly critical 
of Haicion that were published in California Magazine in the fall of 1988, 
unequivocally attributes a several month long episode (characterized by insomnia, 
agitation, depression, weight loss, suicidal thoughts, and paranoia) that she 
experienced to taking Haicion. Her opinion as to the cause of her illness was 
and continues to be given wide credence by the media (20-20, McSeil Lehrer, etc.) 
although the evidence to support her attribution is circumstantial, primarily 
tied to the fact that she became progressively more disturbed after Haicion was 
prescribed for her complaints of insomnia and anxiety. The possibility that her 
illness had already begun before she took Haicion was never seriously considered 
by Ms. Ehrlich or the media. In Ms. Ehrlich's view, her insomnia was a result 
of 'stress* (she was facing a publisher's deadline, she was concerned about her 
aging mother's housing, her young child's crying was waking her up at night, she 
had house guests etc.); everything else that subsequently happened was caused 
by the triazolam her therapist prescribed in response to her initial complaints 
of insomnia. Ms. Ehrlich's therapist, (who Ms. Ehrlich carefully tells us 
"..happens to be an M.D."), evidently did not consider Haicion to be the cause 
of Ms. Ehrlich's worsening clinical state. In fact, she presumably tho.ught the 
episode was some form of atypical anxiety because she treated Ms. Ehrlich, first 
with alprazolam and then, when her symptoms worsened, with thioridazine, albeit 
at a near homeopathic dose of lOmg, soon followed by a low dose (50mg) course 
of amitryptllne. One day, several months into her illness, Ms. Ehrlich, by then 
caking A different psychotherapeutic medicines, abruptly came to the conclusion 
that her difficulties were caused by Haicion and decided to skip her next dose 
of Haicion, although she continued to take the other 3 medication (i.e., Xanax. 
Mellaril and Elavil). By the very next day Ms. Ehrlich claims she felt mif not 
normal, at least 75% better, even without sleep.' Certainly, Ms. Ehrlich's 
illness might be a consequence of drug treatment (e.g., some of her complaints 
are consistent with the signs and symptoms of a treatment emergent benzodiazepine 
withdrawal reaction), but it is also possible that Ms. Ehrlich's illness was 
'spontaneous, Haicion being buc an innocent suspect unfairly indicted and 
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Thus, t h e proportion of spontaneously reported adverse events 
a c t u a l l y caused by drug i s invariably unknown. When an event i s 
both cornoon and predicted by the pharmacology of the drug, i t may 
seem q u i t e reasonable t o assume that most events of the type 
reported are caused by the drug, but, even in these circumstances, 
a s u b s t a n t i a l f ract ion of reports received may a c t u a l l y represent 
spontaneous events . • 
I r a i s e t h e i s sue of attr ibutable r i s k because a cons iderat ion of 
a drug's proper place in the armamentarium must consider not merely 
how o f t en i t s use i s associated with some untoward event , but the 
absolute number of cases actually induced by drug treatment. 
Herein l i e s the d i f f i c u l t y . The est imation of a t t r i b u t a b l e r i sk 
depends upon a knowledge of incidence which, as has been explained, 
cannot be determined from spontaneous adverse event reporxs. 
Unfortunately , the inherent l imi tat ions of the system are often 
ignored. I t i s not uncommon, for example, to see adverse event 
report ing ra te s 9 used as surrogates for the incidence of drug 
convicted chrough careless investigative reporting. 
From an epidemiological perspective, the issue can be thought of as one 
involving a determination of the 'etiologic fraction' or 'attributable risk. ' 
Etiologic fraction is defined as the proportion of all new cases detected in a 
given period that are attributable to the risk factor of interest. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate the etiologic fraction without 
knowledge of the incidence of the event in both the absence and the presence of 
the risk factor (l.e, drug exposure). 
9
 A reporting race for a specific drug related ADR is an estimate of the 
rate at which the agency receives reports of the ADR, the rate being 'adjusted' 
for the extent of the use of the drug. The adjustment employed relies on an 
indirect Index of drug use derived from the National Prescription Audit (NPA), 
a scientific sampling of chain and independent pharmacies conducted by a 
commercial drug information service. Typically, a reporting rate is expressed 
in terms of reports received per year per million scripts written. The number 
of scripts written, however, Is not a reliable means co estimate the size of the 
population from which adverse drug events emerge. Because 'scripts written,' 
only reflects the exposure of ambulatory domestic patients who obtain their drug 
from scripts filled at pharmacies, it is an inappropriate denominator for 
calculating reporting rates for events occurring 1) in hospitals or other 
institutions where a drug can be administered without a prescription being 
written or 2) in non-domestic settings. It is especially important to consider 
this fact when making a comparison between the reporting rates of different drug 
products for the same ADR. Clearly, if one drug is used more commonly in a 
hospital setting than the one with which it is being compared, the use of agency 
reporting rates may produce a systematically biased estimate of relative drug 
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induced injury . In fa irness , i f there were a way t o do the 
experimentr we would probably discover t h a t the post-marketing 
report ing rate for a given ADR-drug dyad •pred ic t s , • in the sense 
that s t a t i s t i c a l regress ion analysis pred ic t s , the actual incidence 
of the injury induced by the drug.10 However, without f u l l 
knowledge of a l l the factors affect ing report ing ra te , there i s no 
r e l i a b l e means t o ca lcu la te the absolute incidence of untoward 
events from information on reporting r a t e s , and, consequently, no 
way t o est imate the e t io log ic* frac t ion a t t r i b u t a b l e to a s p e c i f i c 
drug. 
Without knowledge of the e t i o l o g i c f rac t ion , there i s r e a l l y no 
f a i r way t o compare the r isk of two d i f f e r e n t drugs to cause a 
given ADR.. Admittedly, in theory at l e a s t , using the ra t io of the 
adverse event reporting rates of two products as an indicator of 
t h e i r r e l a t i v e r i sk t o cause a given ADR could be j u s t i f i e d i f the 
l inkage between adverse event incidence and reporting rate were 
i d e n t i c a l for a l l products compared. Thar i s , a reporting rare 
r a t i o would be proportional to r e l a t i v e r i s k i f the fract ion of 
events detected and the fract ion of detected events reported were 
i d e n t i c a l for a l l products compared. Even then, the reporting 
rate r a t i o s would not speak to the r e l a t i v e i n t r i n s i c r i sks of the 
products compared unless the products were being used in the same 
risk. Again, critically, a reporting rate is NOT an incidence. 
l0It is important to acknowledge that there is disagreement about the nature 
of the probable relationship between incidence and reporting rates. Some drug 
epidemiologists assert that only a very small fraction of adverse events observed 
are actually reported. If this is so, the incidence of a drug related event, 
cited in terns of individuals suffering an event per individuals at risk (i.e. . 
exposed to drug) would be expected to exceed the adverse reporting rate by an 
order of numerical magnitude or more. For example, the reporting rate for 
amnesia with Hale ion is about 6/10 • scripts per year; if we accept the argument 
that only 10% of observed events are reported, the actual incidence of amnesia 
would be 60 patients per million exposed per year. This estimate assumes that 
an average of one script is written per patient. If multiple scripts are 
written, the true incidence, at least as I have defined it. increases by a factor 
approximating the average number of scripts written per patient. On the other 
hand, still other factors tend to make the reporting rate numerically larger than 
the incidence. First, not every case reported as amnesia actually is one. 
Second, some proportion of the cases being reported in association with the use 
of Halcion are probably not caused by Halcion but by other etiologic agents 
(e.g., illness, concomitant drug use, alcohol, etc.). For additional discussicn 
of this point, see the section of this memorandum describing the findings of my 
review of a 101 sample of Amnesia reports. [Appendix 2]. 
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way i n the same population at e q u i - e f f e c t i v e doses . 1 1 
However, because factors 1 2 inf luencing report ing ra te s may NOT be 
the sane for a l l drug products, i t i s hazardous to use the ra t io 
of adverse event reporting rates of tvo drugs as an index of t h e i r 
r e l a t i v e capacity to cause a s p e c i f i c adverse event . 
Consequently, a reporting ra t io d i f f e r i n g from unity must always 
be t r e a t e d as a s igna l of a poss ib le problem, not proof of the 
e x i s t e n c e of one. 
This po in t deserves emphasis because our intra-agency use of 
comparisons based on the rat io of the report ing rates of Halcion 
to R e s t o r i l may seem i m p l i c i t l y to endorse, despi te our o f f i c i a l 
statements to the contrary, the r a t i o of post-marketing adverse 
event report ing rates as a va l id est imate of r e l a t i v e drug r i s k . 
Not a t a l l ! We use reporting rate r a t i o s to explore our large ADR 
databases for s i g n a l s of potent ia l problems. We have never 
advocated that such s i g n a l s be taken as compelling proof of a 
d i f f e r e n t i a l r i sk assoc iated with two drug products. This i s 
important t o bear in mind because those who obtain FDA documents 
under FOI are not always so carefu l . Indeed, even FDA s t a f f 
sometimes disregard the important d i s t i n c t i o n between r e l a t i v e r i sk 
and r e l a t i v e reporting r a t e s . 
In any c a s e , i t behooves us to bear in mind that the r a t i o of 
report ing ra te s serves only as a s ignal of a pos s ib l e problem, not 
as proof that one e x i s t s ! 
11
 The importance of spec i fy ing a comparison of r i sk at e q u i - e f f e c t i v e doses 
i s o f ten neg lec ted . The inequity of comparing the r i sks of one drug, 
administered a t a r e l a t i v e l y subtherapeutic dose, say a t an EDlQt with one being 
administered a t an £D90 should be obvious. 
12
 Any number of factors might a f f e c t reporting ra tes although I know of no 
systemat ic study of the quest ion. I t i s general ly assumed, however, that 
reporter motivat ion can be very important. So, too , l o g i c a l l y might be p u b l i c i t y 
and awareness of the p o s s i b i l i t y that a drug can cause a part i cu lar event. 
Experts i n the UK's CSM (personal communication) have offered t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y 
as an explanat ion for the sudden increase i n the frequency of reports l inking 
nomifensine and hemolytic anemia that occurred fo l lowing CSH warnings about the 
p o s s i b l e l inkage in 1984 and 1985, more than 7 years a f t e r nomifensine had been 
marketed i n the UK. Perhaps the most persuasive evidence documenting the 
ex i s t ence o f such factors i s the dramatic f a l l of adverse reaction reporting on 
a t y p i c a l drug i n the years fo l lowing i t s i n i t i a l marketing (vide i n f r a ) . 
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I I I . S p e c i f i c Caveats about the analyses presented vhich re ly on 
r a t i o s of Ealcion to Restor i l reporting r a t e s : 
Our i n t e r - d i v i s i o n a l Task Force13 recognized from the outse t of i t s 
e f f o r t s that i t had no means to extract absolute or r e l a t i v e 
incidence information from the post-marketing spontaneous reporting 
data base. 1 4 
.We recognized, however, that even i f ve could not t e s t the c r i t i c a l 
i m p l i c i t assumptions t o va l idate a reporting rate r a t i o a n a l y s i s , 
ve ought t o carry one out. Based on our knowledge that Restor i l 
was marketed only tvo years e a r l i e r than Halcion, ve e lecred to use 
i t f rather than Dalmane, which had f i r s t been marketed in 1970, 
more than a decade e a r l i e r , as the index for our comparison. 
Dalmane was a l so considered a bad choice for a comparison aceni 
because of i t s long act ing act ive metabol i te . 
In any event , we reasoned that i f we found the reporting rare 
r a t i o s t o be uni ty , the ent ire issue of Halcion*s a l leged excess 
r i sk would be reso lved . 
As i t turned out, our analys i s of the reporting rate r a t i o s found 
that over a l l years of t h e i r jo in t marketing, more adverse events 
were reported for Kalcion than for R e s t o r i l . Aware that the 
13
 In the fa.ll of 1988, the surge of publicity surrounding the publication 
of the Ehrlich articles led the agency to form a special task force, an inter-
divisional work group with representatives from the Divisions of 
Heuropharmacological Drug Products and the Division of Epideniology and 
Surveillance, co undertake a systematic review to determine if the charges being 
made about the alleged excessive risks of Halcion were valid ones. In pursuit 
of its charge, the task force commissioned a series of analyses, examining, for 
the first time, annual reporting trends for a series of ADR for both Halcion and 
Restoril from both direct and manufacturer sources. 
u
 Other sources can provide such estimates, at least in theory. In fact. 
UpJohn has conducted a prospective study employing a cohort formed from patients 
who filled prescriptions in a group of Canadian pharmacies for hypnotics. This 
study was generally negative, although it did identify an increased risk of 
amnesia with Halcion. Given our low estimates of the incidence of serious 
Halcion associated ADRs, however
 9 this is not especially surprising. If Halcion 
does pose a relatively greater risk than other hypnotics, it is for events that 
affect only a small proportion of those who use hypnotics. Consequently, the 
Canadian pharmacy study, because of its small size, and perhaps also because of 
the fact that 2/3's of the participants were repeat users, was probably incapable 
by design (i.e, it had inadequate power) of detecting sufficient numbers of these 
adverse events co gain an estimate of comparative risk. 
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interpretation of the analysis depended, in partr upon the 
assumption that both drugs were being prescribed in the sane 
manner, for the same use, and in the sane populations, ve attempted 
to determine i f s e l ec t ive prescribing-of Halicon by psychiatrists , 
or i t s se l ec t ive use in a uniquely vulnerable population, or the 
pattern of i t s actual usage might account for the results . We also 
examined the poss ib i l i ty that the relative zeal13 of Halcion's 
manufacturer for reporting adverse events might account for the 
differences in observed reporting rates for Halcion and Restoril . 
Each of these analyses failed to identify a factor that might 
explain Halcion's higher reporting rate, but failure to identify 
the presence of a source of systematic bias in an analysis does not 
preclude the existence of one. Our analyses of Kalcion and 
Rescoril entail comparisons betveen croups formed without benefit 
of randomization and must, therefore,* be treated with considerable 
caution. 
One good reason for exercising caution i s the fact, mentioned 
ear l ier , that factors other than absolute ADR incidence exist which 
strongly affect reporting ratios• Indeed, they are not simply 
theoret ical p o s s i b i l i t i e s but factors with a potency sufficient to 
cause more than ten fold fluctuations in the reporting rate for the 
same ADR for a given product over the course of i t s marketing 
history.1 8 
13
 Compared across all products, UpJohn, the sponsor of Halcion. tends to 
report twice as many adverse events per product as Sandoz, Restoril's sponsor. 
At one point, agency analysts thought this difference was important and adjusted 
our Halcion to Restoril reporting rate comparisons accordingly. Our special task 
force cocsiissioned an analysis of the subset of reports made by physicians 
directly to the agency to assess the validity of this adjustment. Ve reasoned 
that if a sponsor's behavior was affecting reporting rates, an analysis of direct 
reports would discover different ratios of reporting rates than would one based 
on manufacturer's reports. As it turned out, our analysis revealed that 
reporting rate ratios of direct to FDA adverse reporting rates for the two 
products roughly paralleled the ratios obtained from manufacturer derived reports 
for all ADRs examined, save deaths. 
18
 In general, reporting rates tend to be high in the first year or two 
following the introduction of at drug and then typically decrease over time, 
reaching some relatively stable asymptotic level of reporting several years after 
their introduction to the market. Because the pharmacological properties of 
a drug do not change over time, such changes in reporting rates must be explained 
by changing patterns of use (e.g., a better understanding within the medical 
community of how to use the drug or the use of the drug in a less vulnerable 
population) or a change in event ascertainment and/or reporting. 
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Restoril's pattern of reporting is more or less typical. During the 
first two years following its initial marketing in 1981, its 
overall ADR reporting rate, given in events per 105 scripts, 
averaged 24.1. From 1984 through 1987, the reporting rate 
stabilized in the range of 4.1 to 6.7 events per 108 scripts, about 
a 5 fold decrease in reporting rate from the period immediately 
following its introduction. Somewhat atypically, in 1988, the rate 
fell even further to 1.5 events per 10s scripts, but this may be an 
artifact of a change in the interval during which reports were 
accumulated. 
In any case, over time, without any known change in its pattern of 
use, the reporting ratio for adverse events for a hypnotic with a 
stable sales volume (approximately 5 million scripts have been 
written annually for Restoril since 1984) has fallen 15 fold! 
Surely, this historical trend in reporting rate persuasively 
documents that non-drug related factors strongly affect the number 
of reports received by the agency. 
In contrast, Halcion's historical pattern of reporting is somewhat 
atypical. Halcion's adverse event reporting rate has dropped only 
two fold between 1983 and 1988. Importantly, when our Inter-
divisional Task Force first examined the annual data in detail (at 
the end of 1988), the data through the end of 1987 suggested that, 
like Restoril, Halcion adverse event reporting rates were 
exhibiting a more typical progressive decrease (i.e., almost four 
fold over the interval from 1984 through 1987). 
Halcion had started off with an average reporting rate of 87.2 
events per 105 scripts during its first two years of marketing 
(1983, and 1984), a rate 3.62 times greater than that observed for 
Restoril during its first two years on the market.17 
In recent years, however, the gap in reporting rates between 
Halcion and Restoril has widened; the ratio of reporting rates for 
was 5.8 in 1987 and 27.3 in 1988. These reporting rate ratios are 
very unstable, showing wide year to year variation suggesting that 
they are poor indicators of the relative ability of the two drugs 
to cause adverse events. 
Nonetheless, despite the questionable validity of a reporting rate 
x7
 Comparing these cvo produces at comparable times early in their marketing 
history may be reasonable because Halcion has continued to suffer adverse 
publicity throughout its marketing history that Restoril has not. A concern is 
that adverse publicity might tend to increase event reporting rates. 
Incidentally, because the number of spontaneous adverse event reports being 
received by the agency have increased annually throughout this decade, such an 
approach is still weighted against Halcion vhich came on the market rso years 
later than Restoril. 
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ratio as an indicator of relative risk, the reporting ratio of 
Halcion to Restoril is consistent with an hypothesis that Kalcion 
is intrinsically a more troublesome drug than Restoril for a small 
proportion of the population using hypnotics. 
IV. The Agencyfs Halcion Strategy: 
Because Halcion appears to be a safe and effective drug for the 
vast majority of those who use it, and because we had reason to 
believe that several of Halcion*s more important ADRs were dose 
related, we were not initially disposed to take any immediate 
publicly visible steps in response to the wave of adverse publicity 
that occurred in the fall of 1988. In 1987, UpJohn and the agency 
had agreed that the recommended hypnotic adult and geriatric doses 
should be lowered l8 and Halcion1 s labeling had been revised to warn 
about the possible dose related nature of certain ADRs. A Dear Dr. 
letter had also been issued to call attention to the changes. 
Consequently, when we met with UpJohn in early 1989 to discuss 
plans tor intensifying our surveillance activities and to consider 
possible additional remedial actions, we were persuaded that it 
would be premature to take any additional steps until we had had 
an opportunity to review the effect of the 1987 labeling changes 
on 1988 adverse reporting rates. In light of these changes and the 
decreasing trend in reporting rate observed over the 1983 to 198 6 
interval, both the agency and UpJohn anticipated even further 
reductions in Halcion1s adverse reporting rate for 1988. 
As it has turned out, our expectations for a further decline in 
reporting rate in 1988 were not met. Our 1989 analysis of the 1988 
data shows that the reporting rate (41.6 per 10 scripts) was 
nearly double the rates observed in 1987 and 1986 (circa 20 per 10 
scripts). Of course, this unexpected shift in reporting rate for 
Halcion may well reflect the effects of a year of especially bad 
publicity. 9 For example, an increased fraction of events being 
detected (i.e., a prepared mind phenomena) and/or an increase in 
the fraction of detected events being reported (i.e., an increased 
11
 In 1987, 0.25ag, richer ch*n 0.5mg, was made the recommended dose for the 
typical adult; correspondingly, 0.125mg vas recommended for the geriatric 
patient. 
19
 UpJohn has some evidence to support this hypothesis which they will 
presumably present to the Committee. A study they commissioned found that m 
the 4 weeks following a 20-20 broadcast about Halcion, reporting of Halcion 
associated ADRs was nearly double what it was in the 4 weeks before the 
broadcast. According to UpJohn, interviews with those reporting these events 
revealed that the program was often credited with influencing the decision to 
make the report. 
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motivation to report) might be the result of increased adverse 
publicity. 
V. What We are asking of the Committee: 
First, ve would like to learn how the Committee's membership views 
the signal given by Halcion's reporting rate data. Again, we do 
not expect the Committee to be able to know precisely what the 
signal means, but we very much would like its reactions to the 
information. Risk assessment is always a matter of opinion that 
depends not only upon expertise and knowledge of 'facts, • but upon 
one's personal values and beliefs! 
Second, we would like to learn what the Committee believes we ought 
to do from a practical standpoint, if anything, about the reporting 
rate signal. 
As noted earlier, the comments of some of Halcion's more extreme 
critics imply that Halcion is 'too dangerous' to remain on the 
market. It seems appropriate to examine this suggestion directly. 
Can this position be given any credit at all? Obviously, the 
agency's actions indicate that we do not share this view which we 
consider extreme and alarmist; as I noted earlier, we believe that 
Halcion, for most users, is, despite the volume of reports being 
received, a safe and effective drug. However, some of our critics 
might argue that the agency's position is self-serving. Thus, it 
would be useful to learn how you, as independent experts from 
•outside' the agency, view the suggestion that Halcion is 'too 
dangerous' to remain on the market. 
Others, however, may hold a very different view, arguing that doing 
anything will only make matters worse, further distorting the 
reporting rate of Halcion. Is this a credible argument?. 
Certainly, the adverse events and untoward phenomena being reported 
in apparent excess to its market share are already enumerated ^  in 
Halcion's labeling; consequently, what is the point of calling 
further attention to them? Why attempt to manage the effects of 
adverse publicity with labeling changes? 
Of course, there is a broad middle ground between these two extreme 
positions. In fact, a spectrum of possible remedial actions are 
conceivable although it is impossible to know what effect they 
might have. Actions to be considered range from minor 
rearrangements of labeling to major publicity campaigns. 
One older proposal, once made for all benzodiazepines, that has 
resurfaced is the adoption of a patient package insert that would 
'sensitize' the user to the possibility that newly emerging 
symptoms might be drug related. 
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Certainly, we might provide the prescriber with additional guidance 
in those areas where we now believe we understand the genesis of 
ADRs better than we have in the past. For example, using Halcion 
on West to East flights where the time available for sleep is 
shortened might be cautioned against strongly. 
The Committee^ views on such options, and any of their own design, 
would be appreciated. 
We would also like to learn what the Committee thinks about putting 
information about reporting rates in the labeling. Should this ' 
information be presented? If so, how does one communicate what 
they are and what they mean to the practitioner and patient who may 
be unfamiliar with the technical complexities of the ratio? 
Finally, of course, we would like to hear your thoughts on the 
bread question of the nature of the risks that society must 
tolerate if it is to have potent drugs in its Armamentarium. 
VT. Summary 
The Committee is being asked to review an issue of considerable 
potential importance. Unfortunately, decisions must be made in the 
face of uncertainty about issues of fact that are critical elements 
in any rational analysis of the problem—specifically, knowledge 
of the absolute incidence, attributabia—risk anji relative risk of 
Halcion to cause behavioral ADRSj^^^^ y ^s' 
Paul Leber, M.D. 
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Abstract 
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the cause of acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), now infects more than a million pwpie in the 
United States and rn.tJicr.s more in other countries. The cases of AIDS 
reported thus far *re only the beginning of the expected toll, because the 
damage the virus inflicts on the immune system—and the resulting inability 
of the victim to fight off infections and cancers—may not be apparent until 
years after initial infection. The epidemic is growing every day, partly 
because persons who may not know they are infected are spreading the 
virus. HIV is spread in only a few ways: transmission by anal or vaginal 
intercourse, by intravenous (IV) drug use, and from mother to fetus or 
newborn infant now predominate. Infection occurs mostly in young adults, 
usually the healthiest segment of the population. 
A sizable proportion of those now infected will, in a few years, progress 
to severe disease and death. If the spread of the virus is not checked, the 
present epidemic could become a catastrophe. The Institute of Medicine-
National Academy of Sciences Committee on a National Strategy ior AIDS 
therefore proposes perhaps the most wide-ranging and intensive efforts ever 
made against an infectious disease. The situation demands both immediate 
action to stem the spread of infection and a long-term national commitment 
to produce a vaccine and therapeutic drugs. 
A massive, continuing campaign should begin immediately to increase 
awareness of v*ays in which persons can protect themselves against 
infection, such as using condoms, avoiding anal intercourse, and not sharing 
drug injection equipment. The campaign should empioy all the skills and 
1 
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tactics of education and media persuasion, and its message should be 
directed in language understandable to specific target groups, including 
homosexual men, intravenous drug users, sexually active heterosexuals 
(especially those who have had a number of partners), and adolescents. The 
committee estimates that by the end of the decade approximately $1 billion 
annually, much of it from federal sources, will be needed for education and 
other public health measures that it recommends, such as blood screening, 
voluntary confidential testing for infection, and increased efforts in the 
treatment and prevention of intravenous drug use. 
The other arm of the attack on the epidemic is research. The committee 
believes that a vaccine is not likely to be developed for at least five years and 
probably longer. One drug has recently shown benefits in the treatment of 
AIDS, but agents that are acceptably safe for possible long-term treatment 
and that effectively halt or cure the disease may also not be available for at 
least five years. The committee calls for extensive basic and applied 
biomedical investigations to better understand the disease and increase the 
likelihood of producing a safe and effective drug or vaccine as soon as 
possible. This program must involve both private industry and the public 
sector working together. Within the overall research effort there is a need for 
extensive epidemiologic investigations to assess the spread of infection and 
the efforts to control it. Finally, there is a need for considerable research on 
sexual behavior and drug use and factors that influence them. 
The committee believes that such a program of research will require at 
least $1 billion in public funds annually oy 1990 and a continuing 
commitment over many years. These funds must be newly appropriated, not 
money taken from other research, because the nation's general health efforts 
as well as those directed against HIV need continuing progress in basic 
biomedical science on a broad front. 
The increasing need for care of patients with AIDS and other HIV-
associated conditions, including those with AIDS-related complex and 
HIV-related dementia, poses new and often difficult problems. These 
problems will spread widely in the next few years from the populations now 
affected. The $2- billion yearly expenditure proposed for responding to the 
epidemic is a small fraction of the billions of dollars for care that the 
epidemic is sure to cost, especially if it is not rapidly curbed. The optimal 
organization of care has only begun to be studied in a few cities with the 
heaviest case loads, but some evidence is emerging to support community-
oriented care and minimal hospitalization. The provision of such care 
should be designed to guarantee equity cf access, and the mechanisms for 
more appropriately financing this care need further evaluation immediately 
in light of various problems now apparent. 
There are scientific and medical lesions to be learned about AIDS and 
HIV infection elsewhere in the world and compelling reasons for US. 
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involvement in efforts to control the disease worldwide. The committee 
believes that the United States should be a full participant in international 
efforts on the problem, both through the World Heaith Organization and 
through bilateral efforts. 
Federal agencies, notably the Centers for Disease Control, the National 
Institutes of Health, and the Food and Drug Administration, have contrib-
uted enormously to the rapid acquisition of knowledge about AIDS and HIV 
or to techniques to help in its control. They should continue their efforts, but 
greater involvement of the academic and private sectors should be encour-
aged. Continuing evaluation of many matters will be needed, including the 
spread of HIV, directions for research and development, the effectiveness of 
various efforts to promote risk-reducing behavior, and the appropriate level 
of national effort. There is also a need to mobilize existing resources and 
encourage interaction of the public and private sectors. To fill these needs— 
and also for informing the American public, Congress, and the executive 
branch—the committee proposes a National Commission on AIDS, created 
either as a presidential or joint presidential and congressional entity. The 
commission should act in an advisory capacity, because the need for 
integration of the nation's efforts is not presently such as to require central 
control that supplants the existing administrative structures. 
These and other of the committee's major recommendations are summa-
rized at the conclusion of Chapter 1, with detailed recommendations 
appearing at the ends of major sections within later chapters. 
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of the manufacturers) was deleted/' and a joint and several liability provision has been modified 
and now reflects legislation recently enacted in California. 
1 Kimmelman suggested that reform legislation is not needed to enhance international com-
petitiveness of U.S. industry. If product liability laws have forced manufacturing industries 
overseas, as many proponents of the bill claim, most products would be launched overseas 
before they are introduced here, the CFA lobbyist argued. However, he maintained that the 
Roussel-Uclaf oral abortifacient, RU-486, is the only example of a such a product. 
J CFA has looked for instances of "products that are marketed somewhere else before they 
are marketed here" and "only found one. . .and that's a special contraceptive in France/* 
Kimmelman said. CFA "can't seem to find others/' Instead, "what we have been seeing is more 
foreign manufacturers coming in and hiring American workers and manufacturing here under 
our liability rules/' he said. 
*> Commerce Department Secretary Robert Mosbacher testified that product liability concerns 
caused Genentech to cancel research into an AIDS vaccine. "The potential liability for that 
product was so great that [Genentech] abandoned their" research program, Mosbacher said. 
"That is, in my view, a tragedy for this country/' Genentech testified two years ago before the 
California legislature in support of a state bill to provide product liability protection for AIDS 
vaccine developers. The firm said the risk of product liability exposure was among the concerns 
that caused Genentech to drop its AIDS vaccine research project. 
1 Kasten remarked that when Merrell Dow withdrew the anti-emetic Bendectin from the mar-
ket, it had annual "sales of $20 mil/' but "legal and insurance costs of $18 mil." He 
added that the decision to withdraw Bendectin was made "despite the petition of 12,000 doctors, 
who said this product should remain on the market because they need it," 
1 Sen. Rockefeller (D-W,Va.), a cosponsor of the legislation, cited a 1990 Commerce Depart-
ment "Industrial Outlook" survey of U.S. industry, which found that the current product 
liability system competitively disadvantages "all" industries that rely on biotechnology. Affected 
products, he continued, include "pharmaceuticals, vaccines, medical devices, chemicals [and] 
pesticides:" 
- 0 -
© FDA AMD EUROPEAN COMMISSION DISCUSSING GMP MEMOTAWOOM OF UOT6RSTAWMM6 agreement that would — " ~ ~ " " "" apply to all 12 coun-
tries that are members of the European Community. Representatives from FDA and the Commission of the 
European Communities' Directorate General for the Internal Market and Industrial Affairs addressed the devel-
opment of the good manufacturing practices agreement at the Second Bilateral meeting held March 29-30 at 
FDA's headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. 
f A joint statement on the meeting says that the two groups agreed to "the initiation of 
activities toward the development of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Good 
Manufacturing Practices (GMPs)." According to FDA, the agency and the EC contingent con-
cluded that they ought to "start working more diligently" in trying to create such an agreement. 
One of the commission's highest priorities is to develop an inspection and enforcement system to 
ensure that all member countries are complying with GMP standards. 
The commission told FDA that it woufd discourage ft* member countries from 
negotiating arty new MOUs wfth other countries, but that existing agreements 
woufd remain In effect until the EC can develop one as a replacement. 
f FDA currently does not have any MOUs on GMPs with EC countries; however, the agency 
has such arrangements with Switzerland, Sweden and Canada. FDA and the EC commis-
sion's discussion also applied to MOUs for Good Laboratory Practices (GLPs). FDA has GLP 
© F-D-C Reports, Inc., 1990. Photocopyfng without permission Is strictly prohibited. See Page One. 
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© 7 ) pflfCES OF B,00fl MOST PRESCRIBED DRUGS UP 9.1% W 1888, Medi-Span repons in its "1989 Inflation y "~~~ " ' Report." The figure is in line with Bureau of 
Labor Statistics' Producer Price Index figures for the year that put prescription drug inflation at 9.7% ("The 
Pink Sheet'1 Jan. 22, p. 14). The PPI, however, is weighted for sales volume, while Medi-Span's data is not. 
f Of the 5,000 prescription drugs followed by the pharmaceutical tracking firm, Medi-Span 
reported that 2,595 had price changes during the year. The average price increase for only 
those items that had price changes is substantially higher, at 14.67*. 
Price increases for the top 200 (most prescribed) prescription drug products, 
however, were only 5.5%. The top 200 products include a total of 568 items 
(or pack stee*), for which 329 had price changes during the year. The average 
price hike for the 329 Items was 9.5%. 
f Medi-Span data on 10,000 hospital drug products indicate that prices changed for 4,931 of 
the products during the year. The average price change for the 10,000 items was 7.2%, 
while the average increase for the 4,931 products with price changes was 8.17a. 
t The firm's larger data base on approximately 59,000 prescription, OTC and drug sundries 
that were marketed throughout the year showed an overall price rise of 5%» Among those 
products, prices for single-source items rose 5.8%, while prices for multiple-source products rose 
4*7%, Medi-Span reported. 
- 0 - ' 
© S6MATE PRODUCT tUBHITV Bill WOUtP HAVE SUPPORT OF COMSOMEff FEDEBATfOW of America if "three or four" additional changes 
are made to the legislation, CFA Legislative Director Gene Kimmelman declared at an April 5 hearing before the 
Senate Commerce/Consumer Subcommittee, 
1 Responding to a comment by the bill's principal sponsor that S 1400 is a moderate and 
reasonable measure, Kimmelman testified: "I agree with what Sen* Kasten fR-Wis,] said 
about the changes in his bill. There have been a number of changes made" from the last bill 
referred' to the full Senate by the Commerce Committee. "We think that probably three or four 
more and we're there," he said. "We're not nearly so far apart as we used to be / ' 
One of the additional change* CFA advocates is deletion of the provision for a 
defense against punitive damages for firms whose products are approved or 
rated generally recognized as safe and effective by FDA. The group afso opposes 
the bill's provision^? amend the doctrine of joint and several liability. 
T .„ • The Wisconsin Republican commented that the modifications made to his legislation since 
the 99th Congress have "boxed in" consumer groups, who he suggested must eventually 
relent in their opposition to the bill. "Increasingly, we are going to have consumers recognize that 
we don't want to have impediments" to marketing quality products, Kasten said. At some point 
"the consumer organizations are no longer going to be able to front for the trial lawyers; they're 
going to have to be off on their own," he declared. At some point "we've got to separate that 
link, just as we have separated the lawyers [the American Bar Association now supports modi-
fied reform legislation] from the [AmcricanJ Trial Lawyers'1 Association, which continues to 
oppose the legislation in any form. "More and more, you're getting boxed in," he said. 
J Many changes have been made with the. approval of consumer advocates, the senator 
pointed out. For example, he noted* "ail limits on damages have now been removed, an 
expedited claims system has been added.. .compliance with [industry or government] standards 
{as a defense against] compensatory damages has been removed...rules that would reduce a 
worker's right to recover based on employer fault have been deleted, sules eliminating collateral 
estoppel have been removed, the requirement that plaintiffs prove negligence (a major demand 
© F-D-C Reports, Inc., 1990. Photocnnvir.** .-:•*.— -d Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Foreword 
Before a drug can be prescribed for use in the United States, it must meet minimum 
statutory requirements for proof of its efficacy and safety as these have been established 
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In premarketing testing, the numbers 
and types of patients exposed to a drug are necessarily limited compared with the numbers 
and types of patients who will eventually be prescribed the drug after it is marketed. 
New uses, contraindications, and side effects of drugs will then inevitably be discovered. 
Thus, various kinds of postmarketing surveillance have been proposed over the past 
decade. 
A background paper on postmarketing surveillance of prescription drugs was origi-
nally being prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment for the project on strategies 
for medical technology assessment, as requested by the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce and its Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. At the further 
request of that committee and its subcommittee, that background paper was expanded 
into this full report, Postmarketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs. 
Current interest in drug regulation is also focused on the premarketing approval 
process, because the process has been criticized as unnecessarily delaying the release 
of valuable drugs in this country. As a result of such criticism, efforts are underway 
to shorten the approval process through administrative changes within FDA's Office 
of Drugs, and through revisions of the regulatory interpretations of the statutory require-
ments for "adequate tests" of a drug's safety and "substantial evidence" of its effectiveness. 
This report describes the drug approval process, the history and objectives of post-
marketing surveillance, the methods employed to accomplish it, and current activities 
in postmarketing surveillance. The report provides guidelines to determine whether 
shortening the drug approval process by various means would diminish its ability to 
detect adverse drug reactions prior to a drug's release for marketing. The report also 
identifies oversight issues and options for increased postmarketing surveillance both 
in the case that Congress decides to relax premarket approval requirements and in the 
case that it does not. 
-ff XU*****—. 
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Director 
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1. 
Summary 
INTRODUCTION 
To market a drug, the manufacturer must pro-
vide evidence of its efficacy and safety to the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Once these 
premarketing requirements are met and the drug 
has been released, FDA can remove a drug from 
the market—after giving due notice and an oppor-
tunity for a hearing—because of new evidence on 
the drug's eff.~acy and safety, the discovery that 
the drug was approved on the basis of any un-
true statement of a material fact, or the failure 
of the drug to meet manufacturing standards. In 
cases where a drug may be an "imminent hazard 
to the public health," FDA can suspend 'he drug's 
approval immediately, giving prompt notice of 
the action and offering the opportum y for i»n ex-
pedited hearing. 
In premarketing testing, the numbers and types 
of patients used to demonstrate a drug's efficacy 
and safety are limited compared with the numbers 
and types of patients who will eventually be pre-
scribed the drug after it is marketed. The initial 
decision to approve a drug for use, however, must 
be made on the basis of the available knowledge. 
Although postmarketing surveillance cannot 
provide knowledge of the safety or efficacy of 
drugs at the time of their introduction on the mar-
ket, various kinds of postmarketing surveillance 
have been proposed over the past decade to mon-
itor and aid in modifying the use of drugs. The 
principal focus of postmarketing surveillance pro-
posals has been on the safe use of prescription 
drugs, even though the range of issues has encom-
passed both efficacy and safety considerations, 
e.g., concern over refinements in use as well as 
better definition of drug risks. 
Current interest in prescription drug evaluation 
and monitoring is focused on the premarketing 
approval process and the length of time it takes 
for a drug to be approved by FDA; postmarketing 
surveillance appears to have waned as a policy 
issue. Thus, policy formulation and implementa-
tion for the premarketing approval process is be-
ing pursued without parallel efforts for the post-
marketing period. 
However, postmarketing surveillance deserves 
attention as a policy issue for both short- and 
long-term objectives. Regarding short-term ac-
tion, if current testing requirements for the pre-
marketing approval process are reduced, pharma-
ceutical manufacturers could be required to main-
tain their drug evaluation responsibilities by in-
creasing postmarketing surveillance. Regarding 
long-term action, postmarketing surveillance re-
mains a policy issue irrespective of current interest 
in the premarketing approval process: it is only 
after marketing that a drug's full therapeutic and 
harmful potentials can be determined. 
One way to shorten the premarketing period 
of the drug approval process would be by reinter-
preting the regulations for assessing safety and ef-
ficacy. This report provides theoretical and ex-
periential criteria for evaluating how such changes 
may affect the ability of current guidelines to 
detect a drug's harmful and beneficial effects. It 
also discusses the kinds of qualitative changes in 
the evidence required for drug approval that FDA 
is implementing. Finally, the report identifies op-
tions relating to FDA's postmarketing surveil-
lance. These options could be implemented re-
gardless of whether there is a change in current 
premarketing drug approval requirements. 
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THE DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS 
A drug's sponsor must provide: 1) "adequate 
tests by all methods reasonably applicable to show 
whether or not such drug is safe for use under the 
conditions prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested;" and 2) "substantial evidence that the drug 
will have the effect it purports or is represented 
to have" (21 U.S.C., sec. 355 (d)). This statutory 
language has led in practice to FDA's establishing 
a premarketing phase of drug testing that consists 
of two parts: 1) the investigational new drug 
(IND) application process, and 2) the filing of a 
new drug application (NDA). 
The IND application describes the investigators' 
qualifications and the planned clinical trials, the 
chemical composition of the drug, and data on 
the pharmacology and toxicology of the new drug 
collected in animal studies and in prior human 
studies, if any, such as those conducted in other 
countries. 
The clinical investigations in the IND process 
are divided into three phases (24): 
• Phase I: Clinical Pharmacology is that phase 
in which a drug is first used on humans to 
confirm dose ranges and pharmacologic ef-
fect. The number of subjects in phase I varies 
depending on the drug, but is usually in the 
range of 20 to 80 (excluding control patients). 
Pharmacodynamic and metabolic studies, in 
whichever stage of investigation they are per-
formed, are considered to be phase I clinical 
pharmacologic studies. 
• Phase II: Clinical Investigation consists of 
controlled clinical trials to demonstrate a 
drug's effectiveness and relative safety. These 
are performed on closely monitored patients 
of limited number, usually 100 to 200 pa-
tients, with equal numbers of control pa-
tients. 
• Phase III: Clinical Trials are expanded con-
trolled and uncontrolled trials to gather addi-
tional evidence of a drug's effectiveness for 
specific indications and to more precisely 
define its adverse effects. Phase III studies 
observe a total of 500 to 3,000 patients in 
more natural settings—in clinics, outpatient 
hospital facilities, and private practice. Phase 
III usually consists of more than two con- I 
trolled trials. I 
After completion of the testing required under I 
the IND application, the sponsor may file an 
NDA. At least two well-controlled studies estab-
lishing each indication for which the drug is in-
tended are required. More than one indication can 
be established in a single study. (These require- ] 
ments are under review; see chs. 3 and 6.) 
All INDs are classified by chemical type and 
therapeutic potential, so that those drugs consid-
ered by FDA to be of particular therapeutic im-
portance can receive priority review. The highest 
classification is given to drugs that are new molec-
ular entities (type 1) and that may represent im-
portant therapeutic gains (type A)—type 1A 
drugs. 
Several mechanisms are available to FDA to ob-
tain information about drugs once they have been 
approved for marketing. Once the NDA has been 
approved, the sponsor is required to monitor in-
formation and submit reports about the drug. 
Other information on adverse drug reactions 
(ADRs) is monitored by FDA in a number of 
ways: 
• the Spontaneous Reaction Reporting Pro-
gram, in which information on ADRs is sent 
to FDA by physicians, pharmacists, and hos-
pitals; 
• a monthly review of the medical literature 
on ADRs (reports and letters to the editors 
of medical journals, etc.); 
• intensive surveillance and epidemiologic 
studies of ADRs in selected hospitalized and 
ambulatory populations; 
• several specialized registries that collect and 
analyze possible ADRs; 
• in-house monitoring and research studies of 
such data bases as those of the Medicaid 
Medical Information Systems of some States , 
and those of commercial sources of drug use 
data; and 
• the World Health Organization, which ex-
changes reports with FDA, each summariz-
ing the ADRs added to their systems in the 
previous year. 
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This postmarketing information is useful for 
two purposes. First, it may provide the grounds 
for FDA to remove a drug from the market, when 
such action is appropriate. Second, it is used by 
FDA to ensure that limits are placed on advertis-
ing and promotional claims and that the drug's 
labeling is appropriate. 
FDA may request further studies when there are 
questions about a drug that were not sufficiently 
HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES OF F 
As a result of 1974 hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Human Resources' Sub-
committee on Health, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare formed a Review Panel 
on New Drug Regulation. The panel issued its 
report in May 1977 (16). 
A bill was subsequently introduced in the Sen-
ate in early 1978 to revise the drug provisions of 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. A revised bill, 
S. 1075, the Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1979, 
passed the Senate in September 1979. A similar 
bill, H.R. 4258, was not acted on by the House 
of Representatives. Included in the Senate bill 
were the following specifications: 1) drug spon-
sors could be required to conduct postmarketing 
surveillance of a drug for up to 5 years; 2) a 
prescription drug could have its distribution 
limited if the drug could not otherwise be found 
to be safe and effective; 3) the standard for a 
drug's immediate removal from the market would 
be changed from the drug being an "imminent 
hazard to the public health" to the less stringent 
standard of "unreasonable risk of illness or injury 
to any segment of the population;" and 4) 
establishment of a "National Center for Drug 
Science." 
During this period, in a speech to the Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers Association, Senator Ed-
ward Kennedy (D-Mass.) suggested that a better 
system was needed for monitoring the use and ef-
fects of prescription drugs after they were mar-
keted. As a result, the Joint Commission on Pre-
scription Drug Use was established in 1976, 
funded largely by the drug industry, with the 
mandate to design a postmarketing surveillance 
answered by the phase III studies, but which do 
not warrant delaying the release of what promises 
to be a useful new product (24). Although FDA 
has no explicit authority to require such studies, 
these "phase IV" studies are almost always per-
formed, as the alternative would be nonapproval 
of the drug. 
5TMARKETING SURVEILLANCE 
system to detect, quantify, and describe the antic-
ipated and unanticipated effects of marketed 
drugs, and to recommend a means by which in-
formation on the epidemiology of prescription 
drug use in the United States could be distributed 
regularly to interested parties. The Joint Commis-
sion issued its report in January 1980 (42), but by 
this time, interest in postmarketing surveillance 
had waned, and the commission's report and rec-
ommendations were little noticed. 
In 1976, the year in which the Joint Commis-
sion was formed, an interagency agreement was 
signed between FDA and the Experimental Tech-
nology Incentives Program (ETIP) of the National 
Bureau of Standards in the Department of Com-
merce. The purpose of ETIP was to provide incen-
tives or reduce barriers to technological innova-
tion through changes in the regulatory process. 
ETIP's agreement with FDA was to jointly fund 
a program to determine if improvement in post-
marketing surveillance could help reduce the 
regulatory requirements of the premarketing 
period, principally those of phase III of the IND 
process and those of the NDA process. The spe-
cific experiment was to develop postmarketing 
surveillance systems and a method of managing 
and evaluating the reform (11). The project con-
centrated on collecting the information required 
to design these systems (12). By 1982, FDA had 
assumed most of the funding, as ETIP was to be 
phased out that year. 
A Commission on the Federal Drug Approval 
Process was convened in mid-1981 to examine 
how FDA's procedures for the approval of new 
drugs could be expedited without compromising 
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6 • Postmarketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs 
public safety and to make recommendations on 
the development of cost-effective postmarketing 
surveillance to guarantee the quick withdrawal 
from the market of drugs that cause significant 
adverse effects. The commission had its genesis 
in a joint hearing held in April 1981 by the House 
Science and Technology Committee's Subcommit-
tee on Natural Resources, Agriculture Research, 
and Environment and its Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations and Oversight. The first meeting was 
held in July 1981. The commission completed its 
work and announced its general findings in the 
spring of 1982, and its printed report was to be 
released in late 1982. 
FDA is examining specific ways to speed up the 
drug approval process. It is reviewing past phase 
III trials to see if longer trials or those with large 
samples have contributed useful information be-
yond that obtained in phase II and early phase 
III testing. Past postmarketing studies that FDA 
required are also being reviewed to see if they pro-
vided the information that they were designed to 
obtain. Data on FDA approval time are being re-
viewed to see what other factors may slow the 
approval process. And, as a pilot test, an FDA 
committee is reviewing the pharmacologic and 
clinical data on selected drugs at the end of phase 
II testing, and will make recommendations about 
the best time for gathering additional information 
(e.g., phase III v. the postmarketing period) (11). 
METHODS OF SURVEILLANCE 
The primary objective cf postmarketing studies 
is to develop information about drug effects under 
customary conditions of drug use. Initial clues 
about a drug's potential effects come from the ex-
perimental studies carried out with both animals 
and humans in the premarketing period. Spon-
taneous or voluntary reporting (e.g., in letters to 
the editors of medical journals) is the oldest, and 
to date, the most productive source of new in-
formation about a drug's possible effects once a 
drug is marketed. Other types of studies are used 
to examine in more detail the possible effects of 
a drug. In general, these other types of studies use 
either cohort or case-control methods. 
In March 1982, the FDA Commissioner began 
a related organization by merging the Bureau of 
Drugs with the Bureau of Biologies, and replac-
ing the Director of the New Drug Evaluation Divi-
sion. The merged bureaus have since been desig-
nated the National Center for Drugs and Bio-
logics. 
Finally, in a related development, the Senate 
passed by a voice vote, in the first session of the 
97th Congress, the Patent Term Restoration Act * 
of 1981 (S. 255). The bill would restore to the term 
of a patent the time lost in complying with the 
Government's premarketing testing and review re-
quirements, up to a maximum of 7 years. Patented 
products eligible for extension would not be lim-
ited to human drugs, but would include "human , 
drugs and biologicals, antibiotic drugs, animal 
drugs and biologicals, food additives, color ad-
ditives, pesticides, other chemical substances, 
medical devices, and any other product subject 
to Federal premarket requirements" (72). In Sep-
tember 1982, the House of Representatives voted 
on the bill under suspension of its rules. Under 
such conditions, a two-thirds vote was required 
for passage, and although the bill received a ma-
jority of the votes, it fell just short of the two-
thirds majority needed. 
Thus, four types of studies are generally used 
to identify drug effects: 1) controlled clinical trials, 
2) spontaneous or voluntary reporting, 3) cohort 
studies, and 4) case-control studies (23,50,61,77). 
Controlled clinical trials match treatment and 
control groups as closely as possible, minimize 
bias through such methods as randomization and 
"double-blinding," and directly monitor patients 
for the duration of the study. Controlled clinical 
trials are considered the most definitive method 
for evaluating a drug's efficacy and safety, but 
they are often costly or impractical in specific sit-
uations, for example, when a drug's effects are 
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rare, or appear only after long-term use or a long 
latency period. 
Voluntary reporting by physicians and other 
health providers, hospitals, and consumers may 
act to alert FDA and pharmaceutical firms to pos-
sible adverse effects of drugs, so that the inference 
of an association between a drug and an observed 
health condition may be further studied by cumu-
lative, careful reporting, and confirmed or disaf-
firmed by more vigorous methods. Underreport-
ing may be a serious deficiency of this method. 
A drug may also be erroneously associated with 
an adverse effect until the suspected association 
fails to show up in repeated, statistically validated 
studies. 
Cohort studies follow a defined group of pa-
tients (the cohort) for a period of time. In this 
method, patients are not randomly assigned to 
groups, and there is no blinding. Cohort studies 
are usually prospective and observe the cohort 
from the beginning of drug use. A group of pa-
tients taking the drug of interest is assembled and 
followed to see, for example, if adverse reactions 
occur. A second group of patients (the controls) 
with the same medical condition, who are not tak-
ing the drug and who may be receiving alternative 
treatment, but who are otherwise matched as 
closely as possible with the cohort, may also be 
studied in parallel. The control group is used to 
identify the frequency of occurrence of any con-
dition observed in the drug-exposed group which 
is due to causes other than the drug (i.e., the 
"background incidence" of the condition). In this 
method, patients can be directly monitored to en-
sure they take the drug appropriately, and to 
observe the drug's effects; or monitoring can be 
less controlled. With less control, a larger cohort 
can be followed, but bias is thus increased. 
Case-control studies identify patients with the 
adverse effects to be studied (the cases), ancj com-
pare them with a sample (the controls), drawn 
from the same cohort that gave rise to the cases. 
Controls are matched as closely as possible with 
the cases, except with regard to the drug's sus-
pected adverse effect, to examine whether expo-
sure to the drug is the cause. Patients with con-
ditions suspected of being associated with a cer-
tain drug would have their medical records re-
viewed or be interviewed concerning the use of 
that drug. The histories of the controls would also 
be studied for information about drug use in the 
general population. By comparing the proportion 
of drug users among the cases with the propor-
tion of drug users in the general population, it is 
possible to infer the relative frequency with which 
adverse reactions occur in users of certain drugs 
as compared with nonusers. A sufficient number 
of appropriate cases must be identified and accu-
rate histories of exposure to drugs must be ob-
tained. 
Controlled clinical trials and prospective cohort 
studies can b«e used to determine a drug's beneficial 
as well as adverse effects. Case-control studies are 
usually used to trace adverse effects back to prior 
drug use. Voluntary reporting can uncover addi-
tional uses of drugs as well as their adverse ef-
fects, but reporting of adverse effects is much 
more common. 
The ability of a particular surveillance method 
to detect a drug's effect depends on two factors: 
1) the time that transpires between use of that drug 
and the occurrence of the drug's effect (the laten-
cy period), and 2) how often the effect occurs (its 
frequency). There are many other determining 
factors, such as accuracy of observation, and ac-
curacy and completeness of medical records, tut 
these factors present more of a problem in the 
design of a study's details. 
Controlled clinical trials, because of their rela-
tively short duration, will detect only acute or 
subacute effects. Long-term cohort studies can 
detect delayed effects, but the data bases necessary 
for such long-tenn, large studies are still sparse. 
Voluntary reporting is usually the way in which 
long-term effects are first identified. Long-term 
effects are usually confirmed through retrospec-
tive case-control studies, but such studies' reliance 
on historical data such as medical records can limit 
their accuracy. 
The chance that a particular study will discover 
a drug effect also depends on the study's sample 
size and the frequency of the drug effect. For ex-
ample, in a cohort study, if a drug causes blind-
ness in 1 out of every 100 users (1/100), how many 
users must be observed to find one case of blind-
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ness? If there are 1 miUion users of the drug, there 
would be 10,000 users blinded. But in a small sam-
ple of only 100 users, the probability of finding 
one or more cases of blindness would only be 63 
percent. If the sample were 200 users, the prob-
ability of finding one or more cases would increase 
to 86 percent. With a sample of 500, the prob-
ability would be 99 percent that at least one case 
of blindness would be found in the observed users. 
To state it another way, what number of users 
would have to be observed to be 95 percent sure 
of finding one or more cases of blindness when 
they occur at a frequency of 1 in 100 users? The 
answer is 300 users, and the general rule is that 
the number of users in the sample must be three 
times the reciprocal of the frequency; e.g., for a 
frequency of 1 in 1,000, the sample would have 
to be 3,000 to be 95 percent sure of observing at 
least one case. 
Except for some effects that are unique to a spe-
cific drug, many drug effects (e.g., stroke, bleed-
ing, skin rashes) are indistinguishable from condi-
tions due to other causes. Tne "background inci-
dence" of a condition must be known before pur-
ported drug effects observed in a study can rightly 
be attributed to a drug. 
Larger sample sizes are needed to determine a 
drug's effect as the background incidence of a con-
dition increases and as the frequency of a drug's 
contribution to a condition decreases. For exam-
ple, given a background incidence of 1/100, as 
the incidence of a drug's added effect decreases 
from 1/100 to 1/10,000, the sample size would 
have to increase from 1,600 to 11 million to re-
main 95 percent sure of observing at least one case 
of the added effect. The relationship between 
ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
Issue 1: 
Revising premarketing tests and short-
ening the drug approval process. 
The efficacy and safety tests in animals and hu-
mans specified in FDA regulations for premarket-
ing approval are based on broad statutory lan-
Ciage. Efforts to shorten the drug approval proc-
b.'tckground and added incidences is also revealed 
in: considering sample sizes at the extremes. For 
a known background incidence of 1/1,000 and an 
added incidence of 1/100, the sample size needed 
to observe at least one case of the added effect 
is only 500. But when the background incidence 
is 1/10 and the added incidence is only 1/10,000, 
the sample size must be 98 million. These illustra-
tions merely indicate what sample size is required 
to observe an effect when background incidence 
is known. 
Controlled clinical trials are used primarily for 
evaluating drug efficacy, not safety, because they 
are carried out on hundreds, or, at the most, a 
few thousand drug users. Their use for evaluating 
drugs already on the market is also limited by 
their high cost and logistical problems. In fact, 
the use of controlled clinical trials for determin-
ing efficacy alone is already constrained by these 
two factors (9,46). 
These limitations of controlled clinical trials in 
evaluating the safety of marketed drugs have led 
to relying on cohort and case-control methods for 
postmarketing studies. While these latter methods 
can only indicate an association between a drug 
and observed conditions, not that the relation is 
causal (49,77), the cumulative experience of multi-
ple cohort and case-control studies showing con-
sistent associations between a drug and such an 
effect can lead to a high degree of confidence that 
the relationship is causal. The most prominent 
examples of drug studies showing consistent 
associations are those on oral contraceptives and 
the risks of cardiovascular disease; similar ex-
amples of nondrug studies are those on the risks 
of smoking. 
ess have focused not on the statutory language 
but on the regulations issued by FDA to imple-
ment the law. Thus, the focus here is on oversight 
issues, not on legislative changes. 
Proposals to curtail or eliminate phase III pre-
marketing tests, or shift them to the postmarketing 
period, can be evaluated both theoretically and 
experientially. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ch. f—Summary • 9 
Theoretically, phase III testing is significantly 
more sensitive than phase II testing. Adverse ef-
fects with an incidence of 1/100 or more are more 
likely than not to be detected in the 100 to 200 
patients given a drug in phase II. But the theoreti-
cal sensitivity of detection rises in phase III to 
1/500 with 500 patients and to 1/1,000 with 1,000 
to 3,000 patients (see ch. 4, table 5). 
These observations are relevant to the detection 
of adverse reactions, but they are not so relevant 
to the detection of therapeutic effects. Since a drug 
that helps only 1 in 100 patients would not be very 
effective, efficacy should be established in phase 
II. Phase III is intended to gather additional evi-
dence on a drug's effectiveness for specific indi-
cations. 
If phase III testing were curtailed or eliminated, 
there is also the question of whether premarket-
ing evaluations would test sufficient numbers of 
patients to reasonably ensure a drug's safety or 
give substantial evidence of its efficacy. Even 
under current regulations, the use of a drug on 
human subjects is very limited before the drug is 
released for market: 20 to 80 patients in phase I; 
100 to 200 patients in phase II; and 500 to 3,000 
patients in phase HI—a range of only 620 to 3,280 
patients per drug (excluding controls). 
In addition to theoretical criteria, experiential 
criteria could be applied in considering proposals 
to curtail or eliminate phase III tests. The dimin-
ished power to observe adverse drug effects that 
such changes theoretically entail may not in fact 
be found, judging on the basis of actual experience 
in phase III testing, or if it is, it may only con-
cern infrequent, minor effects/Agreement of the 
experiential data with the differences theoretically 
expected would strengthen the hypothesis that 
curtailing phase III would lower the capacity of 
current premarketing tests to identify adverse 
reactions. If the experiential data fail to detect the 
theoretical differences, then a better case can be 
made for curtailing phase III, with or without 
transfer of some of its testing to the postmarketing 
period. 
Current interpretations of the statutory require-
ments for "adequate tests" of safety and "substan-
tial evidence" of efficacy emphasize methodology, 
as reflected in the requirement that each indica-
tion for which a drug is intended be supported 
by at least two well-controlled clinical trials. But 
FDA can alter the criteria by which it approves 
drugs. For example, propanolol, the first beta-
blocking drug approved for use in the United 
States, was approved by an advisory committee 
on the basis of all the evidence presented to FDA, 
even though no one study was found to be ade-
quate and well controlled (21). And in late 1981, 
timolol, another beta-blocker, was approved, on 
the basis of evidence from * foreign study, for use 
in preventing death and recurrent heart attacks 
in patients who have survived initial heart attacks 
(26). 
The approval of propanolol and timolol illus-
trates that FDA can grant exceptions to its usual 
requirement of two well-controlled U.S.-based 
clinical trials. In such cases, expert judgment relies 
on qualitative, not quantitative, criteria in ap-
proving a drug, and such an approach falls out-
side the theoretical and experiential guidelines out-
lined above. If FDA is to rely increasingly on such 
qualitative criteria through increased use of advi-
sory committees, it will be necessary for FDA to 
develop general guidelines to aid the advisory 
committees in their deliberations. Otherwise, in 
a case-by-case analysis, evidence of the same qual-
ity may lead to approval for one drug and nonap-
proval for another. 
Issue 2: 
Improving postmarketing surveillance 
and its role in the drug approval process. 
Even if phase III testing were not curtailed or 
eliminated, FDA's powers in the postmarketing 
period could be strengthened to enhance its sur-
veillance role. 
Postmarketing surveillance "systems" that have 
been advocated are not systems in the formal 
sense, but a series of related activities oriented 
toward several purposes, with the regulatory ap-
proval process being-only one. Three activities are 
most frequently mentioned. First is the building 
of a resource base through training of additional 
experts and improving epidemiologic tools such 
as methods for cohort and case-control studies. 
Second, unless a drug effect has a sufficient fre-
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quency of occurrence (usually identified as 1/ 
1,000) and for delayed effects of, for example, 
greater than 1 year, strengthened voluntary re-
porting is the most realistic method of identify-
ing possible adverse drug reactions. Once such 
reactions are suspected, clinical trials, case-
control, and cohort studies could be used to deter-
mine whether an association with drug use in fact 
exists. Third is the development of an efficient 
method for monitoring selected drugs after their 
release into the market. The most frequently men-
tioned mechanism is formation of prospective 
cohorts of drug users. 
These aforementioned components of a post-
marketing surveillance "system" and FDA's role 
in supporting and using them are oversight issues. 
There are also several legislative options that 
could strengthen FDA's powers in the postmarket-
ing period. The following legislative options are 
presented for congressional consideration. 
Option 1: Give FDA the power to require post-
marketing studies. 
A variation of this option is for FDA to use its 
existing regulatory powers over advertising and 
promotional practices to "certify" an industry-
sponsored postmarketing study. 
Option 2: Give FDA the power to restrict the 
distribution, dispensing, and administration of a 
drug. 
A variation of this option is for FDA to use its 
existing regulatory powers to develop a parallel 
approval process for the use of a limited group 
of c.ngs during phay III testing, such as for drugs 
of unusual need and promise. 
Option 3: Change the standard for a drug's re-
moval from the market from "imminent hazard 
to the public health" to "unreasonable risk of ill-
ness to any segment of the population" or some 
other less stringent standard. 
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Pages: 240 - 323 
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kind of amnestic effect. This happens to me now and then with 
other drugs and there are rare times when the telephone rings 
in the night and I do not remember it, and it does not disturb 
me. So I really cannot become particularly concerned about 
those side effects. I agree that it would be well to monitor 
them more closely in the clinical studies that follow. 
If I have any concerns or questions, I think there 
does need to be a restriction or warning against the use of 
this drug in the daytime — it does not seem to be an anti-
anxiety drug that one would want to take and drive an automobil 
or things like that. I am wondering if we have adequate 
studies in older individuals and I would ask Dr. Woo that. 
DR. WOO: They have done some geriatric studies. In 
the geriatric, the dose cannot go beyond .5 — they never gave 
it beyond '.5. 
DR. OVERALL: It would seem to me a drug of this 
sedative potency — it might be particularly "important to have 
some concern about the older individuals, and apart from that 
I really have no concerns about it and I am actually extremely 
impressed with the amount of work that has been done, the high 
potency and the short half-life of this compound. 
DR. UHLENHUTH: I would also just like to take this 
opportunity to compliment the company on the job they have donei 
It seems to me that the quantity and quality of the data 
addressing the general question is really outstanding. 
^375211 
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in addiction-prone individuals as for all hypnotics and 
prescriptions should be limited to those patients who are under 
medical supervision. 
DR. ENDICOTT: Yes, but that does not meet my concern 
that there be a warning that it is easier to overdose, or 
some indication that the therapeutic dose and the overdose 
dosage are relatively close, and patients should be discouraged 
from taking more than some upper limit. 
DR. HAYES: In regard to my cursory review, the things 
I thought needed attention are the scheduling, which will be 
considered by the committee, the basis of which Dr. Kennedy 
has given you his early appraisal, and some revisions in the 
package insert which I think we would be willing to consider 
when that as well as other bits of data are finally evaluated.' 
But other than I do not have anything. 
DR. KORNETSKY: At the present time we have not 
concerned ourselves with the specifics of the package insert. 
DR. SCHIELE: The question is whether the drug is 
approvable or not, and the package insert details would be 
hammered out. 
DR. KORNETSKY: Let me just ask one question regarding 
page 461. It says — physical and psychological dependence 
have not occurred in patients taking .5 milligrams per day for 
90 days or in normal human volunteers taking one milligram per 
day for 42 days. How does that fit with ;feh^\*t£rial that 
1
 J 0375214 
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1 !! basically for certain information. We get information about 
2 :.! the patient. We get information about the drug that is 
3 !l suspected. We get information about the reaction and we get 
4 i! information about other relevant medical features and other 
•i 
5 ji drugs. We also can contact the firm or the physician and get] 
•I 
6 •;( additional information if that is deemed necessary. 
*i 
7 ;; But what I am going to tell you about is a system 
8 '"of analysis which computerizes these forms. We have a 
9 :j standardized way of taking the information on the 1639 form 
.J 
10 .'and computerizing i t . We current ly have 450,000 reports in 
;j 
11 jj our computer file. We put 50,000 reports in every year. We 
12 «! get; the reports in within 1 week of receipt within the Food 
13 || and Drug Administration. So this is a current system that w^ 
14 !! are dealing with. There is no backloo. 
j 
15 l!" (Slide) - • 
16 jj " The reports come from any of these sources. They 
17 i may go from the physician or nurse to the manufacturer to tlwf 
18 !j FDA or they may come directly to FDA. 
ii -
19 : (Slide) 
I 
II 
20 -I When we look at our entire system, we see that 90 
•i 
i 
21 ,i percent of the reports come from the manufacturer. That is, 
!l 
22 •• they come indirectly to the manufacturer and to us. When we 
23 ;i look at the data we are going to look at today, we see 
MILIX* ftEFOftTlNQ CO.. I| 
>0? C Sum. Si 
Tuhintion. D C :D002 
24 «i roughly the same proportions, w© know that health profes-
73 i| sipnals provide only about 10 percent of the reports directlji ^  
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/ Summary Basis of Approval 
NDA 18-163 
Applicant: 
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals 
East Hanover, New Jersey 07936 
Drug Generic Name: temazepam 
Trade Name: Restoril 
!• Indications for Use: 
Restoril** (temazepam) is indicated for the relief of insomnia associated 
vith the complaints of difficulty in falling asleep, frequent nocturnal 
awakenings, and/or early morning awakenings. Although clinical studies 
show effects on sleep induction, sleep laboratory studies have not 
confirmed a reduction in sleep latency when the drug was administered 
within thirty minutes of retiring. 
Since insomnia is often transient and intermittent, the prolonged 
administration of RestorilR is generally not necessary or recommended. 
Restoril has been emp"^yed for sleep maintenance for up to 35 consecutive 
nights of drug admin: /.ration in sleep laboratory studies. 
• 
!!• Dosage Form, Dosage, and Administration: 
Oral Capsules, 15 and 30 mg, one of either strength before retiring. 
III.Manufacturing and Controls: 
A. Finished dosage form is adequately controlled by suitable 
methodology: IR, dissolution g.c, manufacturing processing is 
adequately described. 
B. Stability studies: 5 years stability is established by appropriate 
methodology: TLC, differential polarography. 
C. Method Validation: Has been satisfactorily completed in May, 1979 
(Chicago District Laboratories) and the revised dissolution 
methodology has been satisfactorily validated in October, 1980. 
**• Labeling: Labeling is technically satisfactory. 
' E. Establishment Impact Analysis: No adverse environmental effect will 
occur. 
F. Establishment Inspection: EIR 11/3/79, profile 12/24/80 
IV. Pharmacology: 
A* Temazepam it a benzodiazepine derivative that differs structurally 
from diazepam only by a hydroxy1 at the 3-position of the diazepine 
ring and from oxazepam by a methyl group at the 1-potition of the 
-diazepine ring. 
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Sandoz has submitted toxicity/carcinogenicity studies in mice at 10, 
80 and 160 mg/kg/day and in rats at 10t 40, 160 mg/kg/day (equivalent 
to 20, 80, 320 times the recommended human dose) as veil as a chronic 
toxicity study in dogs at 15, 45, and 135 mg/kg/day. " Mice receiving 
the highest dose had increased incidences of hyperplastic liver 
nodules and telangiectasis compared to controls. Rats ingesting the 
high dose exhibited hepatocellular hypertrophy with cytoplasmic 
lipidosis and a somewhat higher incidence and enhanced severity of 
kidney pathology including epithelial hyperplasia and cortical 
cysts. Esophageal distention also occurred in some high dose rats. 
Although mortality was greater relative to controls in all treated 
males and in females receiving the low dose, a causal relationship of 
drug treatment to mortality is doubtful because of the lack of dose 
response and the absence of consistent toxicity in the lower dosage 
groups. The incidence of total or specific tumors was not increased 
in mice or rats after long term temazepam treatment. All dogs 
receiving temazepam in the 1 year study showed dose-related 
uncoordination but no consistent toxicity or organ pathology that 
could be associated with drug treatment. Reproduction studies were 
conducted in rats and rabbits. In a perinatal-postnatal study 
(segment III) in rats doses of 60 and 120 mg/kg/day but not 30 
mg/kg/day resulted in higher nursing deaths. Teratology studies in 
rats demonstrated increased fetal resorptions at doses of 30 and 120 
mg/kg/day and an increased incidence of rudimentary ribs, which are 
considered skeletal varients, at doses of 240 mg/kg or higher. In 
pregnant rabbits doses of 40 mg/kg/day resulted in the increased 
occurrance of rudimentary 13th ribs.. No major fetal malformations 
were seen in any study that could be attributed to temazepam 
treatment. 
Drug metabolism studies with temazepam in mice, rats, dogs, and man 
showed that conjugated temazepam and conjugated oxazepam were the two 
principal urinary metabolites. Studies in absorption and excretion 
of temazepam in man indicated that the drug is well absorbed through 
the GI tract. Peak plasma levels were reached within 2-3 hours and 
declined with biphasic T half values of 0.6 and 9 hours. Similar 
absorption, time to peak plasma levels and plasma T half life were 
found in mice, rats and dogs. When temazepam was given to pregnant 
rats, temazepam and its metabolites were found in the fetus and also 
detected in the mother's milk. 
The relevant toxicities in rodents after chronic treatment with high 
doses of temazepam involve liver changes of hypertrophy, lipidosis, 
and hyperplasia and kidney pathology including enhanced nephritis, 
epithelial hyperplasia and cortical cysts. The firm has recommended 
in the event of repeated temazepam use in patients that liver and 
kidney function testa be performed and that the usual precautions 
should be observed in patients with impaired renal or hepatic 
function. 
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Medical Portion: 
A. Restoril is a 1, 4-benzodiazepine structurally related to marketed 
benzodiazepines such as flurazepam, diazepam, oxazepam, and 
chlordiazepanu The clinical efficacy of temazepam as a hypnotic was 
demonstrated in double blind studies involving 508 adult patients. 
Most of the clinical studies used subjective methodology, i.e. 
patient and physician questionnaires and simple numerical rating 
scales. A sleep laboratory setting was used for 3 other clinical 
studies. 
B. Substantial efficacy was shown by three major subjective clinical 
trials and one objective study (sleep lab). The following parameters 
were measured in all subjective studies contained in the NDA: 
(1) sleep induction 
(2) frequency of nocturnal awakenings 
(3) sleep duration 
(A) effect on early morning awakenings 
,(5) quality of sleep 
(6) residual effects of medication noted the following morning 
(7) patients general opinion of the study medication compared to 
previous sleep medications used 
(8) physicians' global evaluation of patients' responses 
Pivotal Clinical studies for efficacy and safety proof - Heffron, 
Rosen, Fillingim, Dement. 
(1) Heffron study - 55 outpatients aged 18-59, males and females 
with chronic insomnia for at least one year. Double blind 
placebo controlled parallel groups. Temazepam was significantly 
better than placebo (ps 0.05) in five of five measured 
parameters: sleep induction, nocturnal awakenings, sleep 
duration, early morning awakenings and sleep quality. The study 
length was four consecutive nights using the 30 mg dosage. 
Drowsiness and fatigue occurred frequently and were of a mild 
degree. 
(2) Rosen study - 82 adult outpatients age 18-59, double blind 
placebo control, comparison group using 30 mg. Dalmane. 
Diagnosis - chronic insomnia for at least one year. Temazepam 
was significantly better than placebo in three of five 
parameters: nocturnal awakenings, early morning awakenings, and 
sleep quality. The efficacy pattern was similar to that of the 
Dalmane group. No safety problems occurred in the study. 
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(3) Fillingim study - 75 adult outpatients with chronic insomnia of 
at least one year, ages 18*59* Double blind placebo controlled 
with a third group taking 500 mg Doriden per day, duration 4 
consecutive nights* 30 mg temazepam was significantly more 
effective (p 0.05) than placebo in five of five parameters: 
sleep induction, nocturnal awakenings, sleep duration, early 
morning awakenings, and sleep quality. Its efficacy profile 
paralleled that of 500 mg Doriden in all parameters. 
(4) Dement study - method continuous nightly monitoring of sleep 
pattern and sleep stages in * sleep laboratory. 8 adult 
patients were studied for at least 6 wks. and had to meet strict 
sleep lab confirmed entry criteria for the study. The study 
consisted of placebo nights, analyzed nights with active drug, 
and a recovery period using placebo for each dosage. Temazepam 
in both dosages showed statistically significant increases in 
total sleep time and significant reductions in wake time after 
sleep onset. No significant withdrawal effects were noted after 
administration of 30 mg temarepam for 35 consecutive nights. 
Many other well controlled studies were supportive of efficacy of the 
30 mg dosage in all age groups from age 18-96, both outpatients and 
hospitalized. The Dement study was the only study showing a hypnotic 
effect for the 15 mg dosage, other studies showing favorable trends 
but not reaching statistical significance. 
Two other sleep laboratory studies were performed. The Vogel study 
utilized 23 consecutive drug nights followed by an eleven night 
placebo (drug withdrawal) period. Temazepam significantly increased 
total sleep time and significantly decreased both the number of 
awakenings and the total wake time; the drug had no effect on sleep 
latency in this study. Each of the six insomnia measures was tested 
for insomnia during withdrawal; total sleep time was significantly 
less during post-drug nights one through three, and this effect was 
principally due to the values for the first drug withdrawal night. 
In the Kales study, six patients received temazepam from night 8 
through night 35 with placebo for the preceeding (baseline) week and 
during two weeks following drug discontinuance. The number of 
nocturnal awakenings was significantly decreased, but sleep latency 
and total wake time after sleep onset were not significantly changed 
from baseline values. When the three sleep laboratory studies were 
reanalyzed using* non-parametric techniques, there was no 
statistically significant median decrease from baseline for sleep 
latency (over the entire treatment period) for any of the three 
studies, and for the Kales study there was a significant median 
increase. With regard to sleep disturbances following withdrawal, 
the three studies did not follow a consistent pattern. For the 
Dement and Vogel studies, both sleep latency and total sleep time had 
large median deteriorations from baseline during the first withdrawal 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ 
-5-
period, and these deteriorations disappeared during the second 
withdrawal period. In the Kales study, there were small median 
deteriorations during the first withdrawal period which became larger 
during -the second withdrawal period. 
Phase I studies in normal volunteers showed the drug to be veil 
tolerated in single daily dosages up to 90 rug/day. Beyond this level 
significant increases in standing pulse rates appeared. Drowsiness 
and fatigue were common effects in all subjects. EKG's, eye 
' examinations, clinical laboratory tests, and vital signs did not 
deviate significantly. 
D. Safety evaluations were conducted in all of the clinical studies in 
the NDA, the duration of treatment being A consecutive nights except 
in the 35 night sleep lab study by Dement. A long term safety study 
using double blind parallel groups was conducted in 82 adult 
outpatients age 18-65 using 30 mg Dalmane for comparison, both drugs 
being given daily for 12 weeks Evaluations of laboratory tests 
including liver and kidney function showed no significant deviations 
during the treatment period. No liver enzyme induction occurred in 
this 12 week study. EKG's and eye examinations remain normal 
throughout. 
The pattern of occasional transient laboratory abnormalities, e.g. 
slight SCOT rises, was noted in all of the 4 day efficacy studies. 
Their occurences were transient and mild, occurring at the same rates 
in drug and placebo groups. Adverse reactions which occurred in all 
studies were rated as mild except for a few instances of severe 
drowsiness and fatigue. In most studies there were no significant 
differences in occurence rates between drug groups and placebo 
groups. The overall frequency for adverse reactions in all clinical 
studies (795 patients) including tolerance studies was: drowsiness 
(172), dizziness (72), and lethargy (52). Other side effects 
included confusion (2-32) and weakness (1-22). Rarely reported were 
tremor, ataxia, lack of concentration, loss of equilibrium, falling 
and palpitations (less than 12). 
E. The final draft of the new drug labeling was reviewed and found to be 
adequate and complete. 
IV. Copy of package insert attached. 
oyce trcamcr Thomas A. Hayes, llty. J°yc< 
Croup Leader Kj CorUumer Safety Officer 
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Rcttoril ttema/cpam) should he admin-
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tuning Mothers 
It is not known whether this drug is ex-
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• be exercised when kestonl ttema/cpamt is 
• administered to a nursing woman. 
•Pediatric Ise 
Safety and effectiveness in children below 
• the age of 18 years have not been established. 
ADVERSE REACTIONS 
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INTRODUCTION 
AND 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In October of last year the Attorney General established the 
Tort Policy Working Group, an inter-agency working group 
consisting of representatives of ten agencies and the White 
House. One of the tasks the Working Group was asked to 
undertake was to examine the rapidly expanding crisis in 
liability insurance availability and affordability. 
The following is the report of the Tort Policy Working Group on 
the causes, extent and policy implications of this crisis. The 
primary contributing agencies included the Department of 
Justice, the Department of Commerce and the Small Business 
Administration. 
Chapter 1 of the report (The Crisis in Insurance Availability 
and Affordability) describes in detail the significant problems 
many businesses, professionals and municipalities are having 
obtaining liability insurance. The Chapter documents a dramatic 
change in the last two years in the availability, 
affordability and adequacy of liability insurance. Where 
insurance is available (and in some areas it simply is not), 
premium increases of several hundred percent over the last year 
or two have become commonplace. Few if any private or public 
entities that rely on liability insurance have escaped the 
problems generated by this crisis. 
Part A of Chapter 2 (The Causes of the Crisis in Insurance 
Availability and Affordability) reviews the current financial 
condition of the insurance industry, and the economic factors 
leading to that condition. The property-casualty industry' in 
the past two years has suffered significant underwriting losses 
($21 billion in 1984; $25 billion in 1985) which have limited 
its ability to offer as much insurance as its customers desire, 
and have made it reluctant to insure high risk activities which 
may expose it to further substantial underwriting losses. These 
underwriting losses appear to be largely a result of coverage 
written in the late 1970's and early 1980vs which may have been 
underpriced due to the industry's desire to obtain premium 
income to invest at the then prevailing high interest rates. 
Nonetheless, there is little to suggest that the recent massive 
increases in premiums is related solely to these losses, or that 
the cost of liability insurance will decline significantly as 
the industry limits its underwriting losses and restores its 
desired level of overall profitability. To the contrary, 
1 
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indications are that developments in tort law are a major cause 
for the sharp premium increases. 1/ 
Part B of Chapter 2 reviews the contribution of tort law to the 
insurance availability/affordability crisis. The Working Group 
found that in the past decade there has been a veritable 
explosion of tort liability in the United States. Four specific 
problem areas are identified and discussed: 
° The movement toward no-fault liability, which 
increasingly results in companies and individuals being 
found liable even in the absence of any wrongdoing on 
their part. 
° The undermining of causation through a variety of 
questionable practices and doctrines which shift 
liability to "deep pocket" defendants even though they 
did not cause the underlying injury or had only a 
limited or tangential involvement. 
0
 The explosive growth in the damages awarded in tort 
lawsuits, particularly with regard to non-economic 
awards such as pain and suffering or punitive 
\ damages. And, 
5 ' ° ", The excessive^transaction costs*of the tort .system, in . 
which virtually two-thirds of every dollar paid out 
• -
 ;i
'through'the system is lost* to attorneys1 fees and 
litigation expenses. 
The Working Group was particularly struck by the extraordinary 
growth over the last decade of the number of tort lawsuits and 
the average award per lawsuit. A few examples amply illustrate 
this point: 
° Between 1974 and 1985 there has been a 758% increase in 
the number of product liability lawsuits filed in 
federal district court. 
0
 The number of medical malpractice lawsuits per 100 
physicians doubled between 1979 and 1983, and tripled 
during that period for obstetricians/gynecologists. 
° According to a jury verdict reporting service, between 
1975 and 1985 the average medical malpractice jury 
1/ The Working Group also considered whether state regulation 
of the insurance industry may be a cause of the crisis, and 
found little compelling evidence that state regulation is a 
major cause of these problems. 
2 
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verdict increased from $220,018 to $1,017,716, and the 
average product liability jury verdict increased from 
$393,580 to $1,850,452- 2/ 
0
 A survey of punitive damage awards in Cook County, 
Illinois indicates that the average personal injury 
punitive damage award (measured in constant 1984 
dollars) increased from $40,000 in 1970-74 to 
$1,152,174 in 1980-84. 
The above data demonstrates that the insurance industry was 
selling coverage at constant or even reduced cost over a period 
of years during which tort liability was undergoing a dramatic 
expansion. This suggests that a major factor underlying the 
availability/affordability crisis is the industry's attempt to 
bring premiums quickly back into line with rapidly growing 
liability risks. 3/ The high -- and in some areas unaffordable 
— insurance premiums reflect the fact that tort law is now 
placing a massive compensation burden on the private sector. 
A second important contribution of tort liability to the 
availability/affordability crisis is the tremendous uncertainty 
that has been generated by rapidly changing standards of 
liability and causation. The "rules of the game" have become so 
unpredictable that the insurance industry often cannot assess 
liability risks with any degree of confidence. This appears to 
have severely ..exacerbated the,problem. 
Chapter 3 of the report (Recent Insurance Industry 
Developments) summarizes a number of responses of the insurance 
industry/its customers and state regulators to the crisis. 
These developments include the use of claims-made policies, the 
inclusion within policy limits of all or part of defense costs, 
the increasing use of self-insurance and captives, and more 
exacting state regulation. 
In Chapter 4 of the report (Tort Law Reform) the Working Group 
concludes that while some of the above recent developments in 
the insurance industry, along with a likely improvement in the 
industry's financial condition, should relieve some of the 
current availability/affordability problems, it is unlikely that 
these changes will provide long-term, systemic relief without 
2/ For purposes of comparison, the dollar lost approximately 
half of its purchasing power during this period. 
3/ While some have suggested that the dramatic premium 
increases are an attempt by the industry to recoup its past 
underwriting losses, for the reasons .discussed in the report 
such a theory makes little economic sense. 
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,.**'." 
some fundamental reforms of tort lav. Indeed, there are good 
reasons to believe that absent such reforms, particularly the 
insurance affordability problem will remain a long-term fixture 
of the American economy. 
The Working Group recommends eight reforms of tort law that 
should significantly alleviate the crisis in insurance 
availability and affordability. The Working Group does not at 
this time recommend how these reforms should be implemented 
(whether at the federal or state level, or through legislative 
or judicial modification of the law); nor are these reforms 
meant,to be an exhaustive list of potential reforms. The 
recommended reforms are: 
° Return to a fault-based standard for liability. 
° Base causation findings on credible scientific and 
medical evidence and opinions. 
° Eliminate joint and several liability in cases where 
defendants have not acted in concert. 
° Limit non-economic damages (such as pain and suffering, 
mental anguish, or punitive damages) to a fair and 
reasonable maximum dollar amount. 
«» 
° Provide for periodic (instead of lump-sum) payments of 
damages for future medical; care or lost income.. 
° Reduce awards in cases where a plaintiff can be 
compensated by certain collateral sources to prevent a 
windfall double recovery. 
0
 Limit attorneys' contingency fees to reasonable amounts 
on a "sliding scale." 
° Encourage use of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to resolve cases out of court. 
Chapter 5 of the report (Government Insurance: A Non-Solution) 
details the reasons why government insurance or indemnification 
would be highly undesirable' and wpuld do nothing to remedy the 
problems underlying the availability/affordability crisis. Such 
a federal insurance or indemnification program would not only be 
extremely expensive, but also could exacerbate the problems of 
tort law by making the "deep pocket" of the taxpayer available 
in many cases. In addition, such a program could undermine 
public health and safety, require more extensive government 
regulation of private sector activities, involve the government 
in substantial litigation, lead to increased federal involvement 
in state insurance regulation, and inhibit the ability of the 
private sector to adapt insurance services to changing economic 
.and social conditions. 
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The Conclusion to the report lists five conclusions as to the 
appropriate response of the federal government* to the current 
crisis in insurance availability and affordability. In sum, the 
Working Group concludes that while there are a number of factors 
underlying the insurance availability/affordability crisis, tort 
law is a major cause which the federal government can address in 
various sensible and appropriate ways. As for some of the other 
factors underlying the crisis, such as the insurance industry's 
recent large underwriting losses, there is little the federal 
government can or should do to remedy these problems. 
In that both the tort liability and insurance developments in 
this report are highly dynamic, and because more detailed data 
and other studies undoubtedly will become available, the Working 
Group will continue to follow developments in this area, and, 
where appropriate, supplement its conclusions and 
recommendations. 
Richard K. Willard 
Chairman 
Tort Policy Working Group 
Robert L. Willmore 
Chairman 
Task Force on Liability 
Insurance Availability 
February, 1986 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 
Liability insurance is a linchpin in the operation of the United 
States economy, yet many American businesses, professionals and 
municipalities, both large and small, are encountering serious 
insurance problems arising from premium increases, policy 
cancellations and refusals to underwrite certain activities. 
The liability insurance crisis has three separate but related 
faces that individually or in various combinations make it 
difficult for many entities to obtain the desired liability 
insurance. These problems are availability of insurance, 
affordability of insurance coverage and adequacy of coverage. 
This Chapter describes the current nature and extent of these 
problems. The Chapter focuses, first, on the problems 
encountered within the various lines of insurance, and, second, 
on the effect of those problems on different sectors of the 
economy. 
I. INSURANCE COVERAGE SUMMARIES 
The following are insurance summaries taken predominantly from 
'insurance industry reports prepared by the Alliance of American 
'Insurers or.published in Business Insurance. • 
Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance ("EIL") 
EIL covers pollution incidents stemming from gradual pollution 
exposures (as opposed to "sudden and accidental11 pollution, 
which traditionally has been covered under general liability 
coverage). Two major companies dropped out of the market in 
1985, and by the end of the year only two companies were 
offering EIL coverage. Forty-seven companies were forced to 
close hazardous-waste management facilities for lack of EIL 
coverage. Most hazardous waste businesses currently are looking 
toward captives and self-insurance. Brokers expect significant 
price increases on the limited insurance still available. 
Sudden and Accidental Pollution Coverage 
Coverage for sudden and accidental pollution traditionally has 
been provided as part of general liability coverage. New 
general liability forms, however, specifically exclude all 
pollution liability. This is due to court decisions 
interpreting "sudden and accidental" coverage as also covering 
gradual and intentional pollution. (See Chapter 3 for a 
discussion of the new policy forms.) The London market 
currently is excluding pollution coverage from the large risks 
it insures. 
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Directors and Officers Liability (WD & Ow) 
Premiums in 1985 rose 50% to 500%, and include larger 
deductibles, lower limits, more restrictive endorsements and 
shorter policy durations. Industries particularly affected 
include financial institutions, electric (nuclear) utilities, 
new high technology business, wildcat oil and gas companies, 
research and development enterprises, real estate developers, 
highly leveraged businesses, petrochemical companies and the 
steel industry. Capacity constrictions have hurt larger risks 
more than smaller risks. Traditional primary and reinsurance 
capacity has been reduced, but Lloyd's of London, which has in 
>. the past not been active in this line, is offering primary 
coverage up to $20 million. Not surprisingly, business with 
Lloyd's of London is up to 100% to 200%. Much of the 
reinsurance market for such coverage has virtually dried up. 
Bank Fidelity Bond Coverage 
Premiums are up about 300%. A group of fifty banks are creating 
a mutual insurer to provide D & 0 and bankers blanket bond 
coverage. 
Motor Carrier Liability Coverage 
jpus^'and^trucking^companies^are having severe difficulties \ •• « 
obtaining;the insurance xoverage required by federal daw*. -The ,*• 
Motor/Carrier Act of 1980 requires^insurance minimums of from 
.- $750,000 for carriers of non-hazardous cargo to $5 million for 
carriers .of hazardous waste and most hazardous materials carried 
in bulk. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 set insurance 
minimums from $1.5 million to $5 million, depending on the 
passenger capacity of the bus. Capacity is limited both in the 
primary and reinsurance markets. Small trucking firms and 
independent owner-operators have the most difficulty getting 
insurance. 
Liquor Liability Coverage 
Liquor liability coverage may be available as part of a 
commercial lines package, but is severely constrained and 
virtually nonexistent in some parts of the country as monoline 
coverage. This line has been affected by the bankruptcy of one 
of the largest dram shop insurers, Ideal Mutual Insurance 
Company. 
Medical Malpractice Insurance 
r 
Availability problems are being encountered by nurse/midwives, 
obstetricians/gynecologists, pediatricians and dentists. 
Premiums are being raised and coverage limits are being reduced, 
sometimes by as much as 50%. Reinsurers are also restricting 
coverage in this line. St. Paul's Insurance Company, the 
largest medical malpractice insurer, has placed a moratorium on 
new policies. St. Paul's writes coverage for approximately 20% 
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of the Nation's doctors, and wrote an estimated $600 million in 
malpractice business in 1985. It had a pure loss ratio 
(excluding loss adjustment expenses and operating expenses) of 
81.3% in 1984. Doctor-owned mutual insurance companies account 
for more than half of the medical liability coverage in the 
country. 
Commercial General Liability ("CCL") 
Commercial general liability insurance has undergone significant 
premium increases. The Insurance Services Office ("ISO"), the 
property-casualty insurers' statistical and ratemaking 
organization, has filed a new CGL form which will limit coverage 
and which contains certain exclusions and policy limitations 
(see Chapter 3). 
Excess Coverage 
Excess coverage capacity has been sharply reduced. This 
coverage currently is offered primarily on a claims-made basis, 
which may or may not mesh with the primary, reinsurance and 
other excess layers. 
Reinsurance 
Reinsurance capacity for the United States market has been 
severely limited, particularly with regard to Lloyd's of London,, 
which has faced both its own problems and a disillusionment with 
the American market. - This capacity problem is expected to ease 
somewhat in 1986, but is likely to remain a problem for some 
time longer. 
II. SECTORAL SUMMARIES 
The following are summaries of the effect of the insurance 
availability/affordability crisis on various sectors of the 
United States economy. This information was obtained from 
surveys conducted by business groups, articles in the trade 
press and materials prepared by trade associations or provided 
by industry representatives. While the following does not 
include all of the available information, it summarizes the 
major findings. 
Municipalities 
Municipalities are among the hardest hit groups by both 
affordability and availability problems. Local officials 
preparing their budgets for the next fiscal year report that the 
market for public entities is "extremely limited" and 
"diminishing to nothing." Those cities able to secure bids are 
finding insurance companies' offers prohibitively expensive. 
Renewal rates have climbed by as much as 400% -- and often for 
lower coverages with higher deductibles. Some cities are facing 
premium increases of up to 1,000%. 
8 
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The United States Conference of Mayors conducted a survey of 39 
cities in the summer of 1985. Over half the cities were quoted 
premium increases of over 100%, and 16 were quoted increases 
greater than 200%. In addition, a recent report by the Wyatt 
Company, Public Officials Liability Insurance: Understanding 
the Market (1986), notes that local governments have reported 
premium increases of 200% to 300% in the insurance purchased for 
their officials. 
Rather than renew, many cities have decided to "go bare." All 
cities have been forced to reevaluate and sometimes limit the 
services they provide their communities. Finally, in the wake 
of policy cancellations, a number of city and county officials 
have resigned, fearing personal exposure to lawsuits stemming 
from their official duties. 
Transportation 
The American Public Transit Association, the nation's largest 
organization of transit operators, reports that premiums for 
those companies able to obtain insurance this year have gone up 
500% to 1,000%, and sometimes more. In Los Angeles, the 
Southern California Rapid Transit District's annual premium 
jumped from $67,000 to $1.7 million, while coverage was 
vreduced. . Transit problems were compounded by the bankruptcy of 
:
 :cme o£',the_ largest ^ companies, involved, in insuring mass, transit . 
^systems./' .Some (locals transit ^ ystepis have had .to suspend ., 
operations.^ -
 v 
Publishing 
Newspaper and magazine publishers are finding it more difficult 
to obtain libel insurance. 
Nurse-Midwives 
The American College of Nurse-Midwives represents 2,500 members, 
1,400 of whom were covered under a blanket policy through the 
association. The policy was cancelled on July 1, 1985. The 
.association lias been unable to obtain other coverage and has 
been attempting to create a captive insurer. The captive was to 
.. have started operation by April 1, 1986, but that deadline will 
not be met. 
Grocers 
A survey by the National Grocers Association found that its 
.members1 liability insurance premium rates had recently 
increased from 25% to 500%. The survey covered 161 retailers 
and 20 wholesalers. 
Architects and Engineers 
Most architectural and engineering firms, and particularly 
smaller firms, are experiencing severe availability and 
affordability problems. Insurance premium rate increases of 
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200% to 300% have become the norm. Roughly 30% to 40% of 
smaller firms are going bare. Engineering firms involved in 
asbestos or other toxic substances abatement activities face 
extreme difficulties in obtaining insurance, with rate 
increases, where insurance is available, of 5,000% not uncommon. 
Day Care Centers 
The National Association for Education of Young Children 
conducted a survey of day care providers. They covered family 
day care providers who care for children in a home setting, day 
care centers and headstart programs. The survey found that 40% 
of the.respondents had had their insurance cancelled or not 
renewed and the majority of those with coverage had premium 
increases, most of which rose 200% to 300%. 
Toy Manufacturers 
The Toy Manufacturers of America recently surveyed its 243 
members on insurance cost and availability problems. Final 
results will not be available until April, but initial responses 
are: 
Members ^Increase in premiums 
k 21- 50 
t , 9 - 50-100 
« . - 12: 100-150 
. 2 ;, 150-200 
11 300-500 
7 500-1000 
1 over-1000 
2 cannot obtain insurance Companies that normally had three to four months to negotiate a 
policy renewal have been given only 72 hours to do so this 
year. This permits insufficient time for policy shopping. 
The association reports that it had recommended a captive to its 
members a few years ago. Commercial insurers reduced prices 
upon learning of the proposal, eliminating industry interest in 
a captive. 
Household Appliance Manufacturers 
The household appliance industry has seen sharp reductions in 
available coverage, and the Association of Home Appliance 
Manufacturers has lost group coverage it had arranged in 1983. 
Many companies have been able to obtain only about one-third of 
the coverage sought for product liability, and the cost of that 
coverage is increasing. Member companies are having similar 
problems obtaining D & 0 insurance. 
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Automobile Repair 
The Automotive Services Councils, an association representing 
automobile repair shops and garages, conducted a survey with 104 
responses. Average premium increases were 70% to 80%. Some 13% 
of the membership reported purchasing an average of 30% less 
coverage. Approximately 41% had experienced policy cancel-
lations and 26% were unable to find new carriers. 
Medical Equipment 
.The.medical equipment industry has had a captive, MedMarc, an 
affiliate of the Health Industry Manufacturers Association, 
since 1979. The captive started with 35 companies and has 
recently reached 100 member companies. The rate of growth 
increased in 1985 as the result of cancellations by commercial 
insurers of about 20% of the Association's members and premium 
increases of five to ten-fold. 
Biotechnology 
Biotechnology companies are having a particularly difficult time 
in the tight market because they are generally new, small 
companies dealing mostly in research and development in a field 
- largely unknown to insurers* Their inability to obtain coverage 
(causes?them, difficulty*in .obtaining bank financing, which, in • 
;turn;vcauses some**of these companies to sell out or forego 
promising-research. The industry &s exploring the creation of a 
captive. 
Oil and Gas Drilling 
The International Association of Drilling Contractors represents 
1,500 contractors operating drilling rigs. It estimates mari-
time liability premium increases of 300% to 700% and inland 
liability premium increases of 100% to 150%. 
Construction Contractors 
Constructor magazine (October 1985) estimates average 
increases in general liability coverage of 40% to 75%. For 
contractors who were able to negotiate significant discounts in 
past years increases currently are running up to 300%. In 1985 
premium increases for umbrella coverage were approximately 300% 
for less coverage. 
Natural Gas Transportation 
The National L-P Gas Association represents 4,100 firms that 
prepare and transport liquefied petroleum gases for residential 
and industrial users. According to a spokesman, as many as 25% 
of the transporters are operating with less than the $5 million 
in insurance coverage that is required of motor carriers by 
federal law. Difficulties are attributed to unavailability and 
prohibitive costs of umbrella insurance. 
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General Manufacturing 
The Machinery & Allied Products Institute ("MAPI") recently 
conducted a survey of 81 companies producing a broad range of 
products in the manufacturing industries and obtained an 80% 
response rate. The typical respondent experienced increases for 
every type of insurance covered in the survey. The survey 
covered general liability, D & 0, environmental impairment 
liability, products and other property and casualty coverages. 
The size of the increases varied with the date of the renewal; 
consequently, the survey results understate the problem since 
many of the respondents are not up for renewal until early this 
year. Significant survey results are shown in the table below. 
MAPI Survey Results on Liability Coverages 
Premiums % Higher % Change (Median) 
CGL-Primary 
CGL-Excess 
D & 0 
EIL 
Products 
Other 
73 
100 
72 
94 
95 
87 
40 
250 
300 
60 
116 
40 
Lower Limits % Lower % Change (Median) 
CGL-Primary 
CGL-Excess 
D & O 
EIL 
Products 
Other 
13 
66 
27 
59 
33 
18 
-36 
-50 
-25 
-50 
-50 
-25 
Deductibles 
& Exclusions 
% Higher 
Deductible % More Exclusions 
GCL-Primary 
GCL-Excess 
D & O 
EIL 
Products 
Other 
34 
25 
49 
50 
50 
28 
97 
96 
95 
89 
100 
100 
In addition to the foregoing, 35% of the MAPI respondents 
indicated that their general liability coverage excluded "sudden 
and accidental" pollution coverage, while 49% indicated that it 
was excluded in some layers and included in others. Some 65% of 
the respondents indicated that they had some coverages cancelled 
since January 1, 1985. 
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Machine Tool Manufacturers 
The National Machine Tool Association represents 300 to 400 
businesses that manufacture heavy machinery which cuts, shapes | 
•and forms metal. Preliminary results of a survey indicated 
product liability premiums have doubled since 1984, and that 
about half of the respondents have been or expect to be put on 
claims-made policy forms. 
Battery Recycling & Smelting Companies | 
Battery recycling companies are typical of many industries where 
processes create toxic wastes. Recycling 50 million scrap 
batteries accounts for up to 50% of the annual lead smelter 
production. If the batteries are not recycled, they will be 
disposed of in landfills, leading to more serious toxic I 
exposure. One major smelting company was offered a $10 million 
policy with a $2.5 million deductible at a cost of $650,000. 
While it deems the policy uneconomic, it has not found an 
alternative. The problem is widespread with smelters of various 
metals. The uncertainty of the risk and size of pollution 
liabilities has lead to substantial reductions in coverage with 
sharp increases in deductibles and premiums. 4 
Power Equipment Manufacturers 
*K>utdbor* power?<equipmentMjnanuf acturers-had been reporting premium : 
•increases of from 50% to 70% during the past year; At the end 
- : rof the^year>* with many renewals coming due, some have - i 
experienced increases of 400% to 600%. The Association once 
*again is considering establishment of a captive. 
General Aviation Manufacturers 
The General Aviation Manufacturers Association reports that the ^ 
cost of liability insurance per aircaft was $51 for the 6,778 
business, commuter and private aircraft delivered in 1962, and 
increased to $211 for the 9,774 delivered in 1972. Currently, 
for the 2,000.planes delivered in 1985, the liability insurance 
cost has increased to $70,000 per plane. The cost of liability 
insurance to air frame manufacturers in 1985 was about $135 
million, with a total cost of $175 to $200 million for the ( 
entire industry that includes manufacturers of engines, 
electronics and parts. 
Ski Operators 
Liability insurance premium increases of up to 400% have been 
-reported by the National Ski Areas Association. Some small ski 
areas have closed, and the average price of lift tickets has 
increased substantially. 
Aerospace Equipment Manufacturers 
Aerospace equipment manufacturers are increasingly concerned 
that the escalating cost of product liability insurance and 
other associated costs are causing them to lose their ability to 
compete with overseas manufacturers of similar equipment. 
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III. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE INSURANCE 
AVAILABILITY/AFFORDABILITY CRISIS 
The above examples of insurance availability, affordability and 
adequacy problems demonstrate the broad scope of the liability 
insurance crisis in the mid-1980*s. In a similar crisis in the 
mid-1970*s, the problem areas were largely confined to medical 
malpractice and product liability. Medical malpractice coverage 
has been a continuing problem, with almost half that coverage 
currently underwritten by doctors1 and hospitals1 mutuals and 
other alternative markets. Product liability coverage, however, 
was readily available at declining cost during the late 1970*s 
and early 1980*s. 
A growing capacity shortage over the last year or more has 
. caused commercial insurers to review carefully their 
•. .'•• underwriting standards and pricing policies in order to 
determine where insurance capacity can be utilized most 
profitably. The inevitable result of this reevaluation has been 
a severe disruption for insurance buyers. 
^Insurance Availability 
Availability problems are occurring in certain specialty 
commercial insurance markets. These include pollution, day 
care, municipal, liquor, motor carrier and D & 0 liability 
^coverages.; *. The bankruptcies- of some specialty insurers, 
i ^particularly in the^lines of motor carrier and liquor liability, 
^ have affected the capacity in these coverages. 
•In each of these lines, insurers have perceived the possibility 
of significant losses based on highly publicized verdicts and 
settlements. General line insurers who ordinarily would fill 
the gap left by specialty carriers are unwilling to do so 
because they can use their scarcer dollars in less volatile and 
more profitable lines. 
Insurance Affordability 
Premiums are increasing in virtually all commercial coverages. 
Examples of affordability problems include nurse-midwives and 
general aviation manufacturers, both of which face premium costs 
which may be warranted by the experience, but are too expensive 
for the buyers. Solutions to problems like these appear to lie 
outside of the insurance system. 
Insurance Adequacy 
Problems of insurance adequacy are being experienced across all 
commercial lines of coverage. The main problem seems to lie 
with the fact that many buyers are unable to buy as much 
14 
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insurance as they desire. This is particularly true for large 
firms which seek large amounts of excess and higher limits 
coverage. These problems appear related in part to a capacity 
crunch created both by the insurance cycle and the withdrawal of 
capacity by the overseas reinsurers. The lack of capacity 
related to the insurance cycle shows signs of abating as the 
corner of the cycle has turned and surplus is increasing. But 
many firms may have to use alternative market mechanisms for at 
least a couple of years until this capacity fully returns. It 
may take much longer to get reentry by overseas reinsurers who 
have grave concerns about the American tort liability system. A 
second.area of inadequacy lies in the growth of exclusions, 
deductibles and other policy limitations that are just now being 
introduced into the market. These are discussed in Chapter 3. 
The Insurance Availability/Affordabilitv Crisis 
• . . ' • . . . • * . 
Finally, it should be noted that the crisis in insurance 
availability and affordability does not appear to be a crisis 
for the insurance industry. While the industry (as discussed in 
Chapter 2) is suffering substantial underwriting losses, the 
Working Group does not perceive this crisis to be a major threat 
-to the financial viability of the industry. Rather, it is a 
crisis, for the insureds who cannot obtain or afford the 
linsurance^they^believe;necessary^for their, on-going,activi-
t Jrties.;.;, And; •-', to , the extent -that entities are. forced .to operate 
V - -without insurance or with inadequate insurance, it is a crisis , 
.;. ..for victims of .tortious conduct who may find that liable 
'defendants cannot pay them their damages. , 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE 
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 
A number of reasons have been proffered for the crisis in the 
availability, affordability and adequacy of liability 
insurance. Many of these reasons relate to the economic 
decisions and performance of the insurance industry over the 
past decade. Other reasons focus on recent developments in tort 
law. While the two in fact are closely related, this Chapter 
discusses each of these areas separately. Part A deals with the 
general economic reasons for the current crisis; Part B reviews 
the contribution of tort law. 1/ 
1/ There have been suggestions that the availability/affordability 
crisis may be caused by certain aspects of state regulation. While 
some regulatory measures may have aggravated the problem, the Working 
Group has found little compelling evidence that the crisis is the 
resultsof a regulatory failure, either in the sense of insufficient 
or inadequate regulation, or in the sense of ill-conceived 
regulation. In this regard, it is worthwhile noting the 1977 report 
of the. Department of Justice to the Task Group on Antitrust 
-Immunities on >The Pricing and Marketing of Insurance, which . 
Concluded that "in the commercial lines . . . state regulatory 
schemes are-largely illusory and that insurers are generally free to 
set their own prices." Id., at vii. The report further indicated 
'that rigid state rate regulation, such as is found in automobile 
insurance, may in fact aggravate an availability problem, id., at 
vi. 
In this regard, it is worth noting the conclusion of the Medical 
Malpractice Policy Guidebook (1985), prepared by Henry Manne (general 
editor) and Barry Anderson, Patricia Danzon, Clark Havighurst, 
Charles Phelps and Frank Sloan (principal authors) for the Florida 
Medical Association. The Guidebook concluded that it was difficult 
to fault the state insurance regulatory system for the high medical 
malpractice insurance premiums in Florida. Id., at 11. The report 
concluded that premium increases lag claims costs, and that 
"malpractice premiums are almost certainly not 'too high9 compared to 
the increases in claims costs emerging over recent years." Id., at 
149-50.-
Some have pointed to state insurance reserve requirements as a 
cause of the insurance availability/affordability crisis, to the 
extent that they believe these requirements to have exacerbated 
capacity constraints. While the Working Group did not analyze 
whether state reserve requirements are too high or too low, it 
should be noted that these requirements exist to ensure the 
sofvency of insurance carriers, and thereby to protect 
insureds. It also should be noted that the only way that state 
insurance reserve requirements conceivably could be modified to 
(CONTINUED) 
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A. 
I. INSURANCE INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE 
Recent news accounts have presented a seemingly conflicting view 
of the economic performance of the property-casualty insurance 
industry. In order to understand the financial condition of the 
industry itself and of some of its specific lines of business, 
it is useful to compare the condition of the industry as a whole 
to what has been happening to premiums in the lines which 
present significant availability/affordability problems. 
The table below presents premium and loss data for the property-
casualty insurance industry for the period 1981 through 1985. 
Year Net Premiums 
Written 
(000) 
Loss and LAE Expenses 
(000) (000) 
Statutory Under-
writing Loss after 
Policyholder Dividends 
(000) 
1981 $ 98,805,725 
1982 103,115,653 
1983 v 107,802-.698, 
1984 .117,743,957v. 
1985*;142,300,000 
$75,764,229 
82.152,241 
87,719,055 
103,720,652 
126,846,220 
$27,132,052 
28,996,122 
30,799,231 
7 32,980,082 
; 37,353,750 
$- 6,323,534 
-10,415,751 
-13,285,049 
-21,455,300 
-25,200,000 
•Estimated Source; Best s Insurance 
Management Reports 
The most striking number in the table, of course, is the $25 billion 
underwriting loss estimated for 1985. This number represents the 
difference between premiums written and expenses, policyholder 
1/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED) 
produce lower premiums would be if the reserve requirements were 
relaxed. It would be difficult to justify relaxing reserve 
requirements, however, in light of the fact that both insurance 
t company insolvencies and the number of insurance companies 
reported to be in financial difficulty have increased 
substantially in the last two years. 
The Working Group is continuing to review the contribution, if 
any, of state regulation to the insurance availability/ 
affordability crisis. 
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dividends, 2/ estimated losses and loss adjustment expenses 
("LAE"). 
The underwriting loss, however, while significant, represents only 
part of the industry's overall financial picture. Since premiums are 
collected well in advance of any anticipated payout, they are 
invested and earn income. In addition, other income is -generated 
which also must be considered in reviewing the industry's financial 
condition. Overall income in 1985 resulted in the industry showing a 
$7.6 billion gain in policyholders' surplus (the equivalent of net 
worth), 3/ on an underwriting loss of $25.2 billion and net 
investment and other income of $32.8 billion. Thus, the industry 
appears to have made an overall profit in 1985, though at a lower 
rate than historical levels or other sectors of the economy. 
In discussing the overall financial review of the property/casualty 
industry, Best's reported that: 
Investor interest in the property-casualty 
industry cannot be denied. While the Dow 
Industrial Average had made headlines by 
surpassing the 1500 mark (a 25% gain for the 
year), Best's Index of property/casualty 
companies has jumped 50% at this writing, and 
security analysts specializing in insurance--
~- and cognizant of 1985's underwriting losses— 
! nevertheless'continue to-be optimistic about 
; "."• * the industry's prospects. 4/ 
Two factors must be taken into account in assessing the role of 
the insurance industry's financial performance in the insurance 
availability/affordability crisis. First, even though the 
industry currently is making a profit, that profit is well below 
the profitability of most other major industries, as well as the 
insurance industry's historical average. For example, in 1984 
the property-casualty insurance industry produced an annual rate 
2/ Questions have been raised as to whether or not the $2.1 
billion paid out in policyholder dividends should be included in the 
underwriting loss. Policyholder dividends are offered to some 
policyholders in some lines, and reduce the net cost of their 
insurance coverage. Consequently, any reduction in such premiums 
simply increases the net cost to policyholders. 
3/ Policyholders' surplus is the difference between insurers1 
assets and liabilities. It is considered "the financial Security 
that stands behind every insurance policy and is that which provides 
the cushion to support the shock of major catastrophe, stock market 
declines and loss of reserve inadequacies." ISO, Financial Condition 
of the Insurance Industry -- An Update (1985). 
4/ Best's Insurance Management Reports (December 30, 1985). 
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of return on net income after taxes as a percent of net worth of 
1.8%, whereas the median for Fortune 500 companies was 13.6%. 5/ 
The comparable rate of return for the property-casualty insurance 
industry from 1975 to 1984 was 10.9%. 6/ 
Second, the insurance availability/affordability crisis has not 
manifested itself across the entire spectrum of insurance 
services, but only in specific lines. These lines account for a 
. relatively small portion of the industry. For example, the 
entire property-casualty insurance market accounts for only 
approximately one-third of the overall insurance market in terms 
of written premiums. 7/ The two property-casualty lines that 
have:been the primary source of availability/affordability 
problems — general commercial liability and medical malpractice 
— amounted to only 7% of all the property-casualty lines in 
terms of 1984 written premiums. 8/ (These two lines thus 
represent approximately 2.5% of the entire industry's written 
premiums in 1984.) But, as can be seen in Subsection II, about 
one-fifth of the property-casualty industry's $21.5 billion 1984 
underwriting loss came from these two lines. And in 1985, the 
two lines accounted for almost one-quarter of the property-
casualty industry's estimated $25.2 billion underwriting loss. 
These two lines, as well as the Commercial Multiple Peril 
line, 9/ are discussed in greater detail in Subsection II. 
II. UNDERWRITING RESULTS BY MAJOR LINES 
t While the industry overall has been profitable, certain lines 
have made major contributions to the underwriting losses. This 
section examines the major commercial lines in which 
v availability and affordability problems have been most prominent. 
•
;
 Commercial Multiple Peril 
Commercial Multiple Peril ("CMP") is related to the general 
liability line of insurance in that it is a packaged line of 
business which includes some commercial general liability 
coverage and its long-tail losses; that is, losses which may be 
5/ Insurance Information Institute, 1985-86 Property/Casualty 
Factbook, page 22. 
6/ Id. The comparable statutory accounting rate of return was 
11.9%. icL. 
7/ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, page 150 
(January 25, 1986). 
8/ Insurance Information Institute, 1985-86 Property/Casualty 
Factbook, page 16. 
9/ If the Commercial Multiple Peril line is taken into account, 
approximately 14% of the property-casualty industry (in terms of 1984 
written premiums) accounted for about one-third of its underwriting 
losses in both 1984 and 1985. Id. 
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reported many years after the policy year, CMP experience over 
the past five years is reflected in the chart below. 
Commercial Multiple Peril 
Net Premiums Loss Under- Statutory Under-
Written and writing Writing Loss After 
LAE Expenses Policyholder 
Dividends 
Year (Billions) (Billions) (Billions) (Billions) 
1981 $6.8 $4.6 $2.5 $-0.5 
1982 6.9 5.3 2.7 -1.2 
1983 7.2 5.9 2.9 -1.7 
1984 8.2 7.9 3.2 -2.9 
1985* 11.7 10.4 4.1 -3.0 
•Estimated ~ " Source: Best's Insurance Management 
Reports 12/30/85 
While the underwriting losses for CMP rose to $3 billion in 
1985, it is readily apparent that until recently there had been 
little premium growth in the line. Best's predicts that the 
short-tail, non-liability portion of CMP should provide the 
ability for a fast turnaround for this line. It also notes that 
ISO's new CGL claims-made form will be added to the standard CMP 
form, but that market pressures should assure the availability 
and'affordability of the smaller businessowner's package. 10/ 
v
 ' Commercial General Liability 
Commercial General Liability ("CGL") coverage includes most of 
the commercial sectors which are experiencing serious 
availability/affordability problems. It covers product 
liability, municipalities, day care centers and other commercial 
coverages. It is the line for which ISO has introduced its new 
claims-made form. The experience of this line over the past 
five years is summarized below. 
General Liability 
Net Premiums Loss Under- Statutory Under-
Written and writing Writing Loss After 
LAE Expenses Policyholder 
Dividends 
Year (Billions) (Billions) (Billions) (Billions) 
1981 $6.0 $5.1 $1.8 $-1.0 
1982 5.6 5.4 1.8 -1.7 
1983 5.7 6.0 1.8 -2.1 
1984 6.5 7.8 1.9 -3.2 
1985* 11.1 13.2 2.7 -4.6 
* E s t i m a t e d ' S o u r c e : B e s t ' s Insurance 
Management Report 
Best's Insurance Management Reports (December 30, 1985). 
2ft 
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As is apparent, written premiums dropped in 1982 and 1983 and 
rose slightly in 1984. The figures for 1985, however, show a 
dramatic increase of 72% over the 1984 premium. Increases are 
continuing to occur in the line as policies come up for 
renewal. Losses increased throughout the period, but did so at 
a relatively even pace until 1984, when losses increased by over 
$1 billion dollars over the previous year's losses. 
Medical Malpractice 
Medical malpractice represents only about 1.8% of property/ 
casualty insurance written, but has been the source of major 
availability/affordability problems. The following chart 
summarizes the experience of the line over the past five years. 
Medical Malpractice 
, Net Premiums Loss Under- Statutory Under-
Written and writing writing Loss After 
LAE Expenses Policyholder 
Dividends 
Year (Billions) (Billions) (Billions) (Billions) 
1981 $1 .3 $ 1 . 6 $0 .2 $ - 0 . 5 
1982 : 1.5 .. 2 . 0 0 .2 - 0 . 7 
a 9 8 3 ^ > 1.6 \ 2 . 1 0 .2 - 0 . 8 
^1984 ' \ . - ~ 1.8 V-.-- •' 2 . 8 .. ' ; 0 .3 - 1 . 1 
1985* 2 . 6 3 . 6 < 0 .3 - 1 . 4 
•Estimated Source: Best's Insurance 
Management Report 
Medical malpractice experience is receiving considerable 
attention at the state level. Unlike many lines of coverage 
such as product liability, rates are based on ?tate claims 
rather than national data. 
III. PREMIUM TRENDS 
The recent rapid growth in premiums has been a major element in 
the current availability/affordability crisis. This section 
examines this trend. The following data was provided by the 
ISO: 
Cash-flow underwriting is generally acknowledged to have played 
a role in causing the large underwriting losses presently being 
experienced in the commercial lines. According to ISO, the 
industry's current underwriting losses are a result of "a 
21 
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prolonged period of underpricing and rapidly expanding tort 
liabilities." 11/ In this regard, the ISO report states: 
For the better part of seven years, the 
insurance industry has been engaged in a 
brutal price war. During the early 1980*8, 
the price for commercial insurance was 
decreasing, sometimes sharply, as insurers 
vied for premium dollars to invest at the 
high interest rates then in effect. At the 
time, commercial customers did not 
complain. Indeed, many realized that 
commercial insurance in the United States was 
being sold below cost, even when investment 
income was considered. 12/ 
Chart A, based on ISO data, tracks commercial line premiums in 
constant 1967 dollars. As can be noted from the chart, 1984 
marked the first real increase in premiums (in constant 
dollars) after five consecutive years of declining written 
premiums. But 1984 written premiums were almost 20% less than 
premiums collected in 1978, the year preceding the dramatic 
decline in premiums. At the same time, losses and expenses in 
1984 were at an all-time high. 13/ 
A similar comparison of the general liability premiums written, 
premiums earned and line outgo over the past ten years (not in 
constant dollars) is shown in Chart B. 
Analyzing this data, the Best's report notes that during the 
relevant period (1975 - 1985): 
. . . the inflation of liability awards could 
have been no secret to any underwriter. Had 
the ascending line of premiums written that 
was established in 1975 through 1978 
continued to rise, the general liability 
losses of $13 billion incurred in the last 
six years largely would have been 
avoided. 14/ 
11/ ISO, Financial Condition of the Insurance Industry -- An 
Update (1985). 
1 2 / I d . --• ' . , • 
13/ Id. 
14/ Best's Insurance Management Reports (December 30, 1985). 
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IV. THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE INSURANCE 
AVAILABILITY/AFFORDABILITY CRISIS 
The above discussion indicates that during the late 1970's and 
early 1980fs the insurance industry engaged in significant 
premium reductions while claim losses increased steadily. The 
result, not surprisingly, has been massive underwriting losses 
in recent years. 
It is useful in considering the contribution of such economic 
factors to the insurance availability/affordability crisis to 
distinguish two different effects which frequently are 
confused. The first is the inflationary effect on premiums of 
the recent decline in interest rates. The second is the premium 
cutting which took place in the late 1970's and early 1980fs as 
a consequence of the industry's desire to take advantage of high 
interest rates available during that period. 
As to the first effect, there is an obvious inverse relationship 
between premiums and the prevailing interest rate. A 
significant portion of an insurer's profits stem from the return 
on the premium income it invests between receipt of the premium 
and payout of the incurred liabilities. When interest rates are 
high, premiums tend to be lower since more of the insurer's 
income;comes.from such.return on investment; and when interest 
rates'are* low;- premiums-will- tend to be higher since the ..insurer 
is more-dependent on the premium principal to cover the 
anticipated payout. Thus, as interest rates fall ~ as they 
have in the mid-1980's — insurance premiums inevitably increase. 
This inverse relationship is illustrated by Chart C, which 
compares the prime rate in 1976 through 1985 to the annual 
percentage change of the total Commercial General Liability 
(CGL) premiums written by the insurance industry in each of 
those years. 15/ Chart C graphically demonstrates that the 
rate of growth of the written premiums changes inversely with 
the movement of the prime interest rate. 
To the extent that the recent sharp premium increases are 
related to the drop in interest rates, there is little the 
federal (or any) government can or should do to mitigate this 
market effect. Declining interest rates cause innumerable 
economic realignments which, on the whole, are quite beneficial 
to the economy. An increase in insurance premiums resulting 
from such a reduction in interest rates, while of itself 
undesirable, is a relatively minor side effect to the far more 
significant economic consequences of a drop in the interest rate. 
15/ The percentage change in 1976 through 1984 is obtained from 
the Insurance Information Institute's most recent Property/Casualty 
Factbook. The estimate for 1985 is obtained from the ISO data 
discussed supra. 
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Moreover, there is little that can be done to address this 
source of premium volatility. It would be absurd to try to keep 
interest rates high simply to keep insurance premiums as low as 
possible. But as long as interest rates fluctuate, premiums 
necessarily will reflect such changes. 
A second economic factor related to interest rates is the extent 
to which high interest rates may have triggered "excessive 
competition11 in the insurance industry which led the industry to 
sell its product too cheaply. For one thing, even assuming one 
accepts the concept of "excessive competition,H it is unclear 
how.such .losses in fact contribute to the insurance 
availability/affordability crisis. As discussed later in this 
Chapter, such losses are "sunk costs" which the industry cannot 
recoup simply by charging higher premiums. If premiums in fact 
.. r are higher than the insured risks and the currently available 
investment return dictate, either other sources of capital 
(including insurers who have suffered no losses or lower 
losses) should offer the same insurance at a lower price, or 
insureds will retain these "excess profits" for themselves 
through self-insurance or the formation of captives. The fact 
that there appears to be little insurance coverage being made 
available by new or expanding underwriters, and that many 
insureds are highly reluctant to self insure or form captives 
(even though, many .with serious.availability problems may have no 
alternative)/,: strongly,,indicates,that recoupment of losses is 
... not a particularly compelling explanation for the current 
** insurance, availability/affordability crisis. 
*It is particularly puzzling that the proponents of this theory
 m 
advocate the abolition of the insurance industry's antitrust 
immunity contained in the McCarran-Ferguson Act (Public Law 79-
15) as an appropriate response to the asserted problem of the 
industry's cash-flow "mismanagement." It is hard to reconcile 
the argument that the current problems of the insurance industry 
stem from "excessive competition" with the proffered solution of 
removing the industry's antitrust immunity. Since the goal of 
antitrust law is to enhance competition, if one truly believes 
that the problems of the insurance industry are a result of too 
.- much competition, the last thing one would advocate is a legal 
change which would increase the level of competition. While the 
Working Group did not review and takes no position on the 
continuing validity of the industry's antitrust immunity, 16/ 
it is readily obvious that the suggestion that allegedly 
"excessive competition" can be cured by even more competition is 
patently absurd. 
16/ Despite the assertions of some, the Working Group found no 
evidence to suggest that the industry's antitrust immunity is a 
significant factor in the insurance availability/affordability 
crisis. It should be noted, however, that the immunity has been 
criticized for a variety of other reasons. See the 1977 report of 
the Task Force on Antitrust Immunities, footnote 1, supra. 
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The reasons why the loss recoupment (or excessive pricing) 
theories advocated by some make little economic sense can 
•briefly be summarized as follows: 
0
 Insurers, like all profit maximizing companies, 
charge the price which maximizes their 
profits. Past gains or past losses are 
irrelevant to setting the price today which will 
maximize profits tomorrow. 'The argument that 
insurers are charging higher premiums to recoup 
past losses suggests that absent such losses 
their premiums would be lower -- that is, that 
they would not be charging premiums that 
maximize their profits. That makes little 
sense. 
0
 Even if excessive premiums were being charged by some 
insurers to recoup their past losses, for the reasons 
discussed, other insurers would offer the same coverage 
at lower prices reflecting the actual risk, or insureds 
would retain such excess profits for themselves through 
self-insurance or the formation of captives. 17/ 
0
 The commercial lines of insurance, which are at the 
center of the availability/affordability crisis, in 
* fact are relatively competitive. For example, the 1977 
report of the Task Force on Antitrust Immunities (see 
* footnote 1, supra) found that the property-liability 
- - insurance industry "appears to possess an atomistic 
market structure," including over 900 companies..* 
Id., at 7. 18/ The Task Force also found that the 
* restrictions to entry do not appear significant in the 
property-liability insurance industry, id.,, at 9, 
and that there appears to be price.competition in this 
line as a result of "an industry structure that favors 
competition." Id., at 27-28. 19/ It is, of course, 
17/ Many insurance companies are mutuals, meaning that they are 
owned by their policyholders. The suggestion that they are charging 
their policyholder-owners unnecessarily high premiums makes even less 
sense, since any such excess profits must be rebated through 
policyholder dividends. 
18/ The report states that 20 insurance groups account for 53% of 
written premiums, and that no single group accounts for a major share 
of the market. Id., at 8. This is consistent with the analysis of 
the Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook (H. Manne, 1985), which 
found the medical malpractice insurance market in Florida to be 
"substantially and effectively competitive." IdL., at 166. 
19/ See also page 348 of the report summarizing the Task Force's 
(CONTINUED) 
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difficult to conceive how premiums are being kept at 
artificially high levels for a line of insurance in 
which prices appear to be competitively determined. 
0
 Finally, many of the strongest proponents of the loss 
recoupment theory also contend that these losses were 
the result of excessive price competition in the 
industry. Obviously, it is difficult to reconcile 
these arguments. 20/ 
In sum, to the extent that purely economic factors underlie the 
insurance-availability/ affordability crisis, they do not appear 
to be the type of problems which can be cured by different or 
more intensive forms of government regulation -- either at the 
state or federal level — of the insurance industry. There, 
however, is a cause of the availability/ affordability crisis at 
the very heart of that crisis which the government is well 
placed to address in a variety of constructive ways. That cause 
is tort law, and its role in the crisis is discussed in Part B 
of this Chapter. 
B. 
* - * ' ' , * • - . " ' ' - ' • ' , . . • 
The above^discussion-hasvfocusedvlargely^on the/current 
financial condition'of the insurance industry, and the economic 
;* v ' .factors leading to that condition. * The following discussion 
examines the state 'Of tort law, and its central role in the 
insurance availability/affordability crisis. 
Unlike the above related economic data on the insurance 
industry, it is difficult to obtain good empirical data 
indicating precisely what has happened to tort liability in 
19/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED) 
conclusion that the "industry is structured in a manner conducive to 
competition." It should be noted that these conclusions did not 
appear to apply to some other lines of insurance such as life 
insurance. 
20/ These same points apply equally well to arguments that 
premiums are set excessively high to recoup losses resulting from 
mismanaged investment portfolios. Just as past losses are irrelevant 
to determining the premiums which will maximize profits, investment 
portfolio losses should have no bearing on premiums. In this regard, 
however, it should be noted that the property-casualty industry made 
$32.8 billion from net investment and other income in 1985. See 
supra. 
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recent years. 21/ It is plain, even to the most uninitiated 
that tort law has changed dramatically in recent years — from a 
relatively quiescent legal backwater into one of the most 
important and dynamic areas of the law today. 22/ Moreover, a 
growing body of case examples and empirical data suggest that 
the current tort system has serious problems and is operating 
quite poorly. The insurance availability/affordability crisis 
is one symptom — albeit the most dramatic and acute symptom ~ 
of the dislocations and problems generated by a malfunctioning 
tort system. 
I. PROBLEM AREAS IN TORT LAW 
In attempting to understand what has happened to tort liability 
in the United States, the Working Group has focused on four 
interrelated areas: fault, causation, damages and transaction 
costs. Each is discussed separately below. 
The Movement Toward No-Fault Liability 
One of the most disturbing aspects of the current tort system is 
the degree to which it has moved toward no-fault liability. 
While this movement began in earnest over twenty years ago, it 
appears to have accelerated dramatically in recent years. 
Beginning in the early to mid-1960's it became fashionable to 
^reject the-twin pillarsupon which tort-law historically had 
<been constructed -- deterrence and compensation ~ in favor of 
^seemingly more enlightened theories based largely on concepts of 
•societal insurance and risk spreading. 23/ While many of these 
21/ The Rand Corporation, through its Institute for Civil 
Justice, has produced the best empirical data and analyses 
available in the area. While the Institute has only been able 
to research discrete areas of civil justice, the conclusions 
drawn from those analyses are invaluable to understanding many 
broader problems. The recently published five-year overview of 
the Institute's program offers an excellent summary of the 
research, results and continuing work of the Institute's staff. 
22/ For example, at the end of fiscal year 1975, what is now 
the Torts Branch of the United States Department of Justice 
contained 39 attorneys, who handled or supervised about 4,000 
cases totalling approximately $1 billion in claims. At the end 
of fiscal year 1985, the Torts Branch had grown to 124 attorneys 
handling or supervising about 11,000 cases totalling 
approximately $200 billion in claims; 
23/ One of the most explicit statements of such a theory can 
be found in the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 
A.2d 539 (1982), in which the Court expressly denied defendants 
(CONTINUED) 
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theories were couched in terms of economic efficiency, they 
represented the beginning of a devastating, and to this day, on-
going challenge to the role of fault as a predicate of tort 
liability. The long-term effect of this development has been 
less to promote a more efficient or sensible tort system, 24/ than 
to undermine the importance of fault (or wrongdoing) as a moral and 
doctrinal justification for and limitation on tort liability. As 
this limitation has been removed or undermined in certain areas of 
tort liability, tort law increasingly has come to rest only on the 
pillar of compensation, with compensation often awarded merely for 
the sake of compensation. 
As the tort system moves away from fault it increasingly imposes 
liability upon persons and companies that have done nothing 
wrong. This has been accomplished in a variety of ways: by 
directly reducing ^ or even eliminating the fault requirement; by 
21/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED) 
the opportunity to raise a "state of the art* defense. The 
Court held that even if the danger at issue was scientifically 
. unknowable at the relevant time, defendants nonetheless were 
v s;till^ iiable.;for.*having failed..to. warn of an unknowable risk. .,*•--'* 
- As justification for*i,ts.holding, t*he Court relied heavily on ,, - i 
*-- risk-spreading;, vln the words of the Court, "manufacturers and ,. 
distributors .••»', can insure against liability and incorporate . 
the cost of the insurance in the price of the product." 447 
A.2d at 547. The Court went on to opine that the likely 
increase in premiums to compensate for unanticipated risks was 
"not a bad result." Id. 
24/ The belief that tort liability should be no-fault so as 
to serve as a risk spreading mechanism for all injuries is in 
fact quite anti-consumer. Such a view of tort liability 
effectively would mean that the price of every product and 
service would include an insurance surcharge for the risk of any 
. injury related -to the product or service. It has long been 
understood, however, that because of the extraordinarily high 
transaction costs of the tort system, such compulsory insurance 
througtu.the tort system would be among the most inefficient and 
costly ways for consumers to purchase insurance. Thus, for 
every $1 of compensation, the tort system requires the consumer 
to pay approximately $3 in premiums (assuming, as discussed 
* infra, two-thirds transaction costs), while that same $1 of 
compensation can be obtained through first-party health and 
disability insurance for only $1.25. H. Marine, Medical 
Malpractice Policy Guidebook 143 (1985). It is highly ironic 
that many proponents of no-fault liability argue that such 
liability is in the best interest of consumers. In fact, since 
consumers ultimately pay the premiums of whatever Compensation 
scheme is devised, quite the contrary is the case. See also 
Epstein, "Products Liability as an Insurance Market," 14 
J. Legal Stud. 645 (1985). 
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defining new duties that effectively create fault where no fault 
existed previously; and, by engaging in after-the-fact analyses 
that "find" fault wherever there has been an injury. 25/ The 
ultimate effect of these developments has been the same -- to 
shift liability for compensation to "deep pocket" defendants 
that have the resources to compensate plaintiffs generously. 26/ 
Fault has not, however, been openly (or completely) rejected as 
part of our tort law. One reason is that fault remains the only 
vehicle in tort law capable of distinguishing wrongful (or 
undesirable) from beneficial (or desirable) conduct. If fault 
were rejected altogether, it would mean that desirable 
activities would be just as likely to incur liability as 
wrongful conduct. An open rejection of fault thus necessarily 
would result in a sweeping transformation in the public's 
attitude toward tort law, which continues to be bottomed on the 
concept of tort liability as a form of justified redress for 
wrongful conduct. A second reason why fault continues to be 
part of tort law (and why courts often will engage in amazing 
distortions of relevant facts or legal doctrines to find fault 
rather than simply reject the principle of fault) is that fault 
is the basis of much of the structure and process of tort law. 
* 25/ The duty>to warn.has-been-a particularly fertile ground 
•for such after-the-fact compensation oriented findings of 
'fault. - It is all too easy after the occurrence of an injury to 
^postulate a warning that might have influenced the plaintiff to 
*be more careful or to reconsider his action, no matter how 
fanciful or unreasonable such a warning might appear prior to 
the injury. Such analyses have been a major factor in the 
medical malpractice and product liability litigation explosion. 
26/ A recent and almost classic example of such compensation 
oriented liability findings is the California Supreme Court's 
decision in Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal.3d 49, 
665 P.2d 947 (1983). In that case, a man was injured when an 
allegedly intoxicated driver lost control of her car, veered off 
the street into a parking lot, and crashed into a telephone 
booth in which the man was standing. Suit was brought against 
the companies responsible for the design, location, 
installation, and maintenance of the booth. The Court, in an 
opinion authored by Chief Justice Rose Bird, found that the risk 
that someone might veer off the road and crash into the phone 
booth was not unforeseeable as a matter of law. The Court also 
determined that it was of no consequence that the harm to 
plaintiff came about through the negligent or reckless acts of 
an allegedly intoxicated driver. In a concluding footnote, 
Chief Justice Bird stated that "there are no policy 
considerations which weigh against imposition of liability" 
against the defendants even though their "conduct may have been 
without 'moral blame,'" and referred specifically to "the 
probable availability of insurance for these types of accidents 
. . . . " 665 P.'2d at 953 n. 14. 
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If fault were no longer a central element in determining 
liability, the current tort system would in many ways be 
wasteful, inefficient and unfair in the extreme. 21/ 
Tort law thus has gradually (with a marked acceleration in 
recent years) been moving in the direction of no-fault liability 
without an adequate acknowledgement of either the existence or 
the implications of this development. The result is an 
increasingly common and perverse combination of fault-based 
levels of compensation based on no-fault liability. 
The Undermining of Causation 
Tort law traditionally has sought to place liability only upon 
those actors whose wrongful conduct actually caused an injury. 
-This principle is found in the concept of "proximate cause," 
which requires a reasonable relationship between a given cause 
and effect. For some time, however, proximate cause has been 
under systematic attack. No single doctrinal change can be 
identified as the primary vehicle for this attack. Rather, the 
challenge has come through a variety of questionable practices 
and doctrinal innovations. 
One such development has been the increasing use of joint and 
several*liability .to. shift the cost of compensation to "deep 
pockets.J'r Joint .and-severaLrliability developed in ,the context. 
r
 of defendants ^ acting in concert. * 28/ Over the years, however, 
it increasingly has been used to make a defendant with only a 
limited role*in causing an injury bear the full- cost of 
compensating plaintiff, even in some cases where the plaintiff 
may have been largely responsible for his own injury. 29/ The 
result has been that joint and several liability in the absence of 
concerted action can and does lead to highly inequitable 
27/ For example, the way in which damages are measured and 
awarded can only be justified, if at all, on the basis of • 
redressing wrongful conduct. Once wrongdoing is removed as an 
element of liability, many of the principles involving damages 
become-grossly unfair. 
28/ See generally Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984), 
Chapter 8. As may be obvious, as with so many other aspects of 
tort law, fault remains a central and essential justification 
for joint and several liability. 
29/ The application of joint and several liability in cases 
where there in fact is no concerted action is discussed in some 
detail in Speiser, Krause & Gans, The American Law of Torts § 
3:7 (1983). It is interesting to note that the English courts 
apparently have maintained the traditional common law basis for 
joint and several liability, and have refused to apply such 
liability in the absence of concerted action. Id.' 
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% 
treatment of defendants, particularly ffdeep pocket" 
defendants. 30/ 
A related development is the way in which joint and several 
liability has been applied by some courts to theories of 
"enterprise" or "market share" liability for injuries caused by 
generic products (e.g., DES). "Market share" liability, in 
its pure theoretical sense, allocates liability among 
manufacturers of a generic product on the basis of their share 
of the relevant market. While there can be some serious 
problems and inequities with this approach, as long as all 
relevant manufacturers (and their respective market shares) are 
accounted for, and the product is truly generic in nature, such 
an allocation of liability may be the only way plaintiffs in 
some cases can obtain compensation for injuries caused by 
wrongdoing on the part of the manufacturers of such a product. 
Serious problems with this approach arise, however, when not all 
relevant manufacturers are accounted for, or where the product 
is not truly generic in nature. Even more troublesome is the 
approach of several courts which use some industry liability 
allocation formula, but then apply joint and several liability 
to all defendants. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 
Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert, denied., 105 S.Ct. 123 
(1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 
37 (1984). This, in fact, represents a clear abuse of joint and 
several liability, and cannot be justified on the basis of the 
unique,difficulties, plaintiffs sometimes face in identifying the 
manufacturer;of an injury causing generic product. * 
A third means that has been used to undermine causation -- -
increasingly common in toxic torts cases -- is the use of 
presumptions or burden-shifting techniques to force the 
defendant to prove the lack of causation in order to avoid 
liability. 31/ Frequently, this amounts to asking the defendant 
30/ The legal doctrine of contribution in theory could serve 
to mitigate some of those inequities. In certain areas of the 
law, such as antitrust law, where joint and several liability 
generally tends to be applied to established businesses, 
contribution appears to function quite well. (And, in any 
event, joint and several liability in antitrust cases is 
virtually always based on concerted action -- the traditional 
basis for such liability.) In personal injury cases, however, 
many multi-defendant cases involve a "deep pocket" and one or 
more defendants who are either judgment proof or have limited 
assets or insurance coverage. In such cases, the belief that 
contribution serves as a mitigating factor is largely illusory. 
31/ A particularly dramatic example of such a practice can be 
found in Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247 (D. Utah 
1984), a low-level radiation exposure case in which the court 
shifted to the government the burden of proving that particular 
cancers were not caused by radiation exposure. 
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to meet an impossible burden of proving the negative. 
*. -
Another way in which causation often is undermined ~ also an 
increasingly serious problem in toxic tort cases — is the 
reliance by judges and juries on noncredible scientific or 
medical testimony, studies or opinions. It has become all too 
common for "experts" or "studies" on the fringes of or even well 
beyond the outer parameters of mainstream scientific or medical 
views to be presented to juries as valid evidence from which 
conclusions may be drawn. The use of such invalid scientific 
evidence (commonly referred to as "junk science") has resulted 
in findings of causation which simply cannot be justified or 
understood from the standpoint of the current state of credible 
scientific and medical knowledge. 32/ Most importantly, this 
development has led to a deep and growing cynicism about the 
ability of tort>law to deal with difficult scientific and 
medical concepts in a principled and rational way. 
These are but four developing areas that are causing defendants 
to be found liable for injuries they did not cause. The one 
common attribute of these developments is that the defendants to 
whom liability is shifted almost invariably happen to be those 
with the deepest pockets. 
* -..--• . The Explosive Growth in Damage Awards 
Another area of great, concern./is th,e explosive, growth in tort * 
- damages awards over the last decade,. A few statistics will 
illustrate ..this point. , ... 
Jury Verdict Research, Inc.,. publishes data on the average jury 
verdict in product liability and medical malpractice cases. The 
service's latest report 33/ shows that the average medical 
32/ An instructive decision in this regard is the district 
court opinion in Johnston v. United States, 597 F.Supp. 374 
v (D. Kansas 1984). The court there exhaustively reviewed the 
theories and credentials of a number of plaintiffs' experts on 
the effects of low-level radiation, and rejected their testimony 
,as biased, contradictory and totally without scientific merit. 
Of particular interest is the court's frustration that these 
same experts had played prominent roles in major radiation cases 
such as Silkwood and Allen, and that their testimony was being 
used in numerous cases throughout the country. The court noted 
its disappointment that such "so-called experts can take such 
license from the witness stand [to] say and conclude things 
which . . . they would not dare report in a peer-reviewed 
format." Id. at 415. 
33/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Injury Valuation; Current 
Award Trends No. 304 (1986). The 1985 data provided by the 
service is incomplete, and is subject to refinement. The 
(CONTINUED) 
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malpractice Jury verdict increased from $220,018 in 1975 to 
$1,017,716 in 1985 (see Chart D), a 363% increase. 34/ Average 
product liability jury verdicts during this same period increased 
from $393,580 to $1,850,452, a 370% increase (see Chart E). 3£/ 
Interestingly, much of this increase can be attributed to a 
remarkable growth in verdicts above $1 million. In 1975 there 
were three million-dollar medical malpractice verdicts and nine 
million-dollar product liability verdicts reported by Jury 
Verdict Research, Inc. In 1984, the numbers had grown to 71 
33/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED) 
service indicates that it bases "its findings, values and 
probabilities upon collected verdicts using accepted statistical 
methods in their analysis and application." Nevertheless, the 
reported average annual verdicts are not used by the Working 
Group as an accurate statement (though they may very well be) of 
the average jury verdict in any particular year. Rather, the 
* Working Group found the Jury Verdict Research data useful for 
purposes of showing the trend in jury verdicts over the last 
decade. In this regard, it should be noted that the service has 
oised the same basic methodology since well before the relevant 
.reported-years.* Moreover, while there are different estimates ^  
i'of average jury verdicts for particular areas and years, a 
^number of other sources that have collected such data --
including the Institute for Civil Justice -- corroborate the 
overall trends reported by Jury Verdict Research, Inc. 
34/ This percentage increase is consistent with a survey of 
California Superior Court medical malpractice verdicts. That 
survey shows the average medical malpractice award as increasing 
from $152,970 in 1975 to $649,210 in 1983, a 324% increase. 
American Medical Association Special Task Force on Professional 
Liability and Insurance, Professional Liability in the f80s 
(October 1984). Because the $250,000 cap in California on 
awards for non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases was 
only recently affirmed as constitutional (see Chapter 4), it is 
unclear what effect, if any, the cap has had on malpractice 
verdicts in California. It is worth noting, however, that the 
recent, insurance problems for medical malpractice have been far 
less serious in California than in many other states, and that 
in California the insurance crisis primarily has affected areas 
other than medical malpractice (e.g., municipal liability). 
35/ This remarkable increase is also reflected in the 
Institute for Civil Justice study of civil jury verdicts in Cook 
County, Illinois. For example, the average wrongful death award 
in Cook County increased (in constant dollar terms) from 
$166,000 in 1970-74 to $336,000 in 1975-79, a doubling over 
roughly half a decade. M. Peterson, Compensation of Injuries: 
Civil Jury Verdicts in Cook County 54 (1984). 
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million-dollar medical malpractice verdicts and 86 million-
dollar product liability verdicts (see Chart F), an increase of 
over 1200% in the number of such verdicts. 36/ If these million-
dollar verdicts are deleted, the increase in average verdicts is 
reduced sharply. For example, the increase in the average medical 
malpractice jury verdict from 1975 to 1985 drops to 26% and the 
comparable average product liability verdict jury increase is 
87%. 37/ This clearly suggests that the explosion in damages has 
come largely at the high end of the awards scale. 
The Jury Verdict Research data is of only limited value on the 
absolute number of million-dollar payments, since in all 
likelihood the vast majority of such payments are through 
settlements rather than verdicts. The data is highly relevant, 
however, in that it shows that the percentage rate of increase 
of verdicts is far higher for large verdicts than for small or 
medium-size verdicts. Since a significant distinguishing factor 
between large verdicts and small or medium-size verdicts is that 
large verdicts tend to be composed to a far greater extent of 
non-economic damages, 38/ this strongly suggests that non-
economic damages play a major role in the explosive growth in 
large verdicts (as compared to the much more moderate growth in 
small and medium-size verdicts). 
While it is not possible to quantify precisely how much 
particular: elements* of ^damages.have contributed to this ...'' 
explosion, it* appears that non-economic damages are a 
substantial-factor. * Such damages include non-pecuniary 
compensatory damages for intangible injuries such as pain and 
suffering and mental anguish, as well as punitive damages. Such 
non-economic damages are inherently open-ended and subjective, 
ancf, therefore, easily susceptible to dramatic inflation. Of 
interest in this regard is a recent preliminary study by the 
Institute for Civil Justice which indicates that the average 
punitive damage award in Cook County, Illinois, increased from 
$63,000 in 1970-74 to $489,000 in 1980-84 (see Chart G). 3j>/ Of 
36/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., supra. The trend toward 
million-dollar verdicts is also documented by the Institute for 
Civil-Justice. M. Shanley & M. Peterson, Comparative Justice: 
Civil Jury Verdicts in San Francisco and Cook Counties, 1959-
1980 26-30 (1983). 
37/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., supra. 
38/ H. Marine, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 138-39 
(1985). The study shows that for medical malpractice awards 
between $100,000 and $200,000, non-economic damages account for 
approximately 27% of the total award, while for awards above 
$600,000, the non-economic share increases to 54%. 
39/ M. Peterson, Punitive Damages; Preliminary Empirical 
(CONTINUED) 
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particular interest is that the average Cook County punitive 
damage award in personal injury cases increased from $40,000 in 
1970-74 to $1,152,174 in 1980-84 (see Chart H). 40/ 
This explosion in damage awards, particularly in the case of non-
economic damages, is vastly in excess of the rate of inflation 
over the comparable period. 41/ For whatever reasons,.tort 
damage awards have suddenly soared in the United States without 
any apparent justification. 
Excessive Transaction Costs 
Another, serious problem of the tort system is its extraordinarily 
high transaction costs. A study by the Institute for Civil 
Justice of the asbestos litigations shows that out of every dollar 
paid out by the asbestos manufacturers and their insurers as a 
result of the asbestos litigation, 62 cents on the verage is lost 
attorneys' fees and litigation expenses (see Chart I). 42/ 
This does not include the transaction costs borne by the courts in 
adjudicating these claims. 
It also is worthwhile viewing the transaction costs from the 
•22/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED) 
Findings .13 (1985). These averages were adjusted for 
inflation and are stated in terms of the 1984 dollar. The 
study's analysis of punitive damage awards in San Francisco also 
showed an increase in such awards, though of lesser magnitude 
than in Cook County. 
40/ Id., at 25 (also adjusted for inflation). 'Peterson 
notes that personal injury punitive damage awards in Cook County 
between 1980-84 amounted to over half of all punitive damages 
awarded in all case categories by Cook County juries from 1960-
84. 
41/ For purposes of comparison, one dollar in 1985 had 
approximately half the buying power of one dollar in 1975. 
42/ J. Kakalik, P. Ebener, W. Felstiner, G. Haggstrom & 
M. Shanley, Variations in Asbestos Litigation Compensation and 
Expenses xviii (1984). These costs, of course, include both 
plaintiffs' and defendants' litigation expenses. In comparing 
the costs attributable to defendants' litigation expenses to the 
costs attributable to plaintiffs' litigation expenses it is 
useful to remember that defendants incur such costs whether or 
not they prevail, and, indeed, may incur substantial costs 
defeating even clearly frivolous claims. Measurements of 
plaintiffs' litigation expenses (such as in Chart I), reflect 
only those cases in which plaintiffs prevail, while defendants' 
litigation expenses include all cases, whether or not plaintiffs 
prevail. 
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perspective of the prevailing plaintiff- The study also shows 
that for every dollar awarded to plaintiff, 34 cents on the 
average is lost to legal fees and an additional 5 cents is lost 
to legal expenses. 43/ In some cases, legal fees alone 
amounted to as much as 45% of plaintiff's award. 44/ 
It is difficult to justify such extraordinary transaction 
costs. But it is particularly difficult to justify such costs 
when the costs often are borne largely by the seriously injured 
and by consumers who ultimately must pay for these costs through 
higher prices for goods and services. The only clear bene-
ficiaries of this system appear to be lawyers. 
II. BURGEONING TORT LIABILITY AS A MAJOR CAUSE 
OF THE INSURANCE AVAILABILITY/AFFORDABILITY CRISIS 
The above discussion describes a tort system that in recent 
years has dramatically increased in scope. One way of measuring 
that increase is in terms of the increase in the number of tort 
lawsuits and in the level of damages awarded in such lawsuits. 
While the available data is limited, and by no means perfect, it 
clearly confirms that there has been a substantial increase in 
recent years in both the number of tort lawsuits and awarded 
damages.. 
•. The,growth in the number-of, product liability suits has beenv _s 
':•>. astounding. For example, the number of product liability cases 
filed in federal district courts has increased from 1,579 in 
1974 to 13,554 in 1985, a 758% increase (see Chart J). 45/ 
There is no reason to believe that the states courts have not 
witnessed a similar dramatic increase in the number of product 
liability claims. 
A similar trend can be found in medical malpractice, where 
claims 46/ filed against physician-owned companies increased 
from 10,568 in 1979 to 23,545 in 1983, a 123% increase in four 
43/ Id., at 84. For tried claims, these costs increase 
to 39 cents and 6 cents respectively. Id. 
44/ Id^ With legal expenses of 5%, prevailing plaintiffs 
in such cases receive only half of the awarded verdict. 
45/ Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
46/ Claims do not, of course, translate directly into 
lawsuits, since most claims are resolved prior to the filing of 
litigation. But a substantial increase in claims almost 
certainly means a corresponding substantial increase in 
litigation. 
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years. 47/ The number of medical malpractice lawsuits per 100 
physicians more than doubled from 1976 to 1981, and for 
obstetricians/gynecologists actually tripled during this 
period. 48/ In federal courts, which contain only a fraction 
of all medical malpractice claims, such claims have 
increased almost three-fold in the last decade (see Chart K). 49/ 
A similar increase can be found in claims filed against 
municipal and county officials. A survey of over twelve hundred 
local governments found that such claims had increased by 141% 
between 1979 and 1983. 50/ Tort claims against municipalities 
also have increased dramatically in recent years. For example, 
New York City witnessed a 375% increase from 1977 to 1985 in 
personal injury claims, with a corresponding 345% increase in 
average settlement cost. 51/ The City's long-term liability 
for tort claims already filed is projected to be $1.5 billion. 52/ 
The explosive growth in damages over the past decade has already 
been related in detail. Suffice it to say that the increase in 
the average tort award appears to have outpaced even the 
extraordinary increase in the number of such lawsuits. The 
extent of some of these increases are difficult to comprehend. 
For example, one verdict reporting service found that the 
average jury verdict in personal injury lawsuits had increased 
by approximately .25% or, more in three separate years (24.5% in 
^1980/'30*.49% in 1981*and :2X.54%> in 1983). .53/ The average 
annual' increase in such awards -since 1975 has been over 15%. 54/ 
A subcategory of damages that dramatically illustrates this 
development is the average jury verdict for the wrongful death 
47/ American Medical Association Special Task Force on 
Professional Liability and Insurance, Professional Liability 
in the f80s 6 (November 1984). 
48/ H. Manne, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 18 (1985). 
49/ Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
50/ Wyatt Co., Public Officials Liability Insurance: 
Understanding the Market (1986), page 22 (the provided 1984 data 
is incomplete, see pages 9-10, and therefore is not used for 
comparison). 
51/ Statement by Mayor Edward I. Koch before the Governor's 
Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance, Feburary 21, 1986. 
52/ IdL 
53/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., supra. 
54/ Id. This is more than double the average annual CPI 
increase during the same period. W-
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of an adult male. The average award increased from $223,259 in 
1975 to $946,140 in 1985, a more than four-fold (324%) increase 
in ten years (see Chart L). 55/ 
The increase in the number of tort lawsuits and the level of 
awarded damages 56/ (or settlements) in and of itself has an 
obvious inflating effect on insurance premiums. To illustrate, 
assuming all other factors are held constant, 57/ if ths* 
- number of lawsuits against a company or person doubles in ten 
years, and if the average damage award (or settlement) doubles 
over this same period, that company or person will experience at 
least a four-fold increase in insurance premiums over those ten 
years. As noted above, however, for both medical malpractice 
and product liability the last ten years have witnessed much 
more than a doubling in lawsuits and average awards. 
The above observation leads to an important but troubling 
insight into the current insurance availability/affordability 
crisis. Some have speculated that the crisis is the result of 
the attempt by the insurance industry to recoup losses resulting 
from its underpricing in the late 1970's and early 1980fs. If 
this theory is correct, then it would seem likely that as such 
losses are recouped, premiums would decline. The above 
' analysis, however, suggests that while the insurance industry 
» may have underpriced,its product for a period of time, the 
1
 current"explosion*in premiums'results in,large part from the 
-\ ; fact that now that the insurance' industry is facing substantial 
underwriting losses, it must price coverage to reflect the 
actual risks presented by tort law. In other words, for a 
variety of reasons, the insurance industry appears to have kept 
prices constant or engaged in price reductions in a period 
during which the risks generated by tort liability increased 
55/ Id. 
56/ Jury verdicts, of course, represent only the tip of the 
claims resolution process. Most claims are resolved before 
trial. However, settlements by their very nature reflect the 
range of verdicts available to the plaintiff. Thus, as jury 
verdicts skyrocket, so do settlements. Settlements also reflect 
the plaintiff's likelihood of success. As tort law becomes more 
and more favorable to plaintiffs — particularly in reducing or 
even eliminating plaintiff's burden of showing fault or 
causation — settlements further increase. Accordingly, in 
addition to the obvious effect on settlements of increasing jury 
verdicts, liberalized standards of fault and causation increase 
the percentage of claims resolved favorably to plaintiff and 
increase the size of settlements. 
57/ Of course, all factors are not held constant. For 
example, if there is an increase in the percentage of claims 
resolved favorably to plaintiffs, premiums would have to be 
increased correspondingly. 
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dramatically. Now that the industry is attempting to match 
premiums to riik, there appears tp be a dramatic, pent-up 
increase in premiums to bring premiums back into line with 
rapidly growing liability risks. 
The above analysis, if correct, is troubling in that it suggests 
that even after the insurance industry's underwriting 
profitability is restored, premiums are likely to remain 
relatively high. That is, while the more extreme availability 
problems may be resolved once the industry controls its 
underwriting losses, affordability problems may remain as a long-
term fixture absent significant reforms of tort law. 
There is, however, another important contribution of recent 
developments in tort law to the availability/affordability 
crisis which 'goes beyond the number of lawsuits and size of 
damage awards. The changing standards of liability and 
causation have generated tremendous uncertainty. The "rules of 
the game" of tort liability have changed so dramatically and 
rapidly in recent years that few are willing to speculate on v\/ 
what those rules will be even a few years hence. Invariably, sf£ 
however, those rules seem to have been changed to the prejudice 
< of parties with pockets sufficiently deep to bear increasingly 
generous awards of compensation. 
I This uncertainty as-to.what the ,rules of tort liability , 
, ;*, applicable tp any particular company, person or activity will be 
~in'future years makes it extremely difficult for the insurance •• • < 
I industry to assess risk (and establish appropriate premiums) > 
with any degree of confidence. This undoubtedly exacerbates the S 
affordability problem, and may be a major factor underlying the 
availability problem. Simply put, insurance, like other 
business activities, operates most efficiently within a stable 
''.. - legal regime. Tort law, unfortunately, over recent years has 
been anything but stable. 
The recent explosion in tort liability and the lack of legal 
certainty is a particularly noxious combination that seems to 
react almost synergistically in promoting the insurance 
availability/affordability crisis. The rapidly accelerating 
growth in both the number of tort lawsuits and the size of 
damage awards in and of itself significantly increases future 
liability risks. But that risk is magnified by the perception — 
based in large part on the lack of a stable legal regime -- that 
this accelerating growth will continue unabated. The insurance 
industry thus appears to be extrapolating the massive liability 
surge of recent years into the future, and seems to be setting \ 
its rates in part on the assumption that the on-going 
deterioration of tort law will continue>for some time. Simply ' 
put, assessments of future liability risks reflect not only the 
recent rapid growth in such risks, but the perceived likelihood 
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that past excesses wiillJ be outpaced by li ie excesses yet to come 58 / 
In conclusion, the current problems of tort law can be 
summarized as follows: 
0
 Too many defendants are found liable (or forced into 
settlements) where there should be no liability, either 
because they engaged in no wrongful activity, or 
because they did not cause the underlying injury. 
0
 Damages have become excessive, particularly in the area 
of non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, 
mental anguish and punitive damages. And, 
- ° Transaction costs az e far too high. 
The ways in which these aspects of" the tort system are 
contributing to the current insurance availability/affordability 
crisis can be summarized as follows: 
The private sector is being asked to carry a 
compensation burden which in some instances it simply 
cannot afford to carry without substantial economic 
dislocations. Thus, even where insurance is available, 
in order to carry this compensation burden, it often is 
priced at unacceptable levels. 
: ... The affordability/availability problem is greatly 
exacerbated by the lack of a stable legal regime which 
I would allow the insurance industry to assess liability 
I risks with some degree of confidence. 
58/ A recent Administration study of the childhood vaccine 
industry, for example, found that uncertainty as to tort 
liability was a major factor underlying the severe insurance 
availability problems facing the industry and jeopardizing the 
childhood vaccination program. See the Report of the Working 
Group on Vaccine Supply and Liability (April, 1985). 
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CHAPTER 3 
RECENT INSURANCE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS 
The insurance availability/affordability crisis has led both the 
insurance industry and its customers to consider various changes 
to the ways in which liability risks are insured. The following 
is a description of the most significant of these developments 
and their immediate implications. 
I. COVERAGE CHANGES 
One of the most important of these changes has been the 
development of new commercial policy forms by the Insurance 
Services Office ("ISO"), the statistical and rate-making 
organization for the property-casualty industry. While these 
new forms have been filed with each state insurance department, 
most states have not yet acted on the new submissions. 
These new policy forms are more limited in scope than the old 
forms in that they are written on a claims-made basis and permit 
certain coverages to be excluded entirely. 
Claims-Made Policies 
General liability insurance, • including product liability, 
coverage, traditionally has been written on an occurrence basis; 
that is, the policy applies to all injuries and damages that 
occur during the policy period irrespective of when claims are 
presented. Under claims-made coverage, the policy covers 
injuries and damages which occur during the policy period and 
for which claims are filed during the policy period. 
The ISO submission provides that a policyholder can purchase 
unlimited tail coverage (the period during which claims are 
covered after termination of the policy) for a cost of up to 
200% of the original premium. In addition, a five year extended 
claims reporting period for known claims is provided for 
situations where no other insurance is applicable. There is 
still disagreement over the reinstatement of aggregate policy 
limits for tail coverage and the effect of defense cost 
inclusions. 
A claims-made policy covers claims occurring after the 
"retroactive date," ordinarily, the inception date of the 
policy. Under some circumstances, insurers will be permitted to 
advance.the retroactive date, necessitating the purchase of tail 
coverage for incidents occurring during the prior period. The 
retroactive date may be advanced when: (1) there is a change of 
insurer, (2) there is a change in the insured's operation, (3) 
if the insured fails to inform the insurer of risks he knew or 
should have known about, or (4) with the consent -f the 
insured. 
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The ISO has indicated that it does not intend to limit the use 
of claims-made policies to specific problem areas such as long-
tail or latent injury exposures. 
The claims-made forms have not yet been approved by the states, 
and twelve states have expressly disapproved them as filed. The 
ISO is working with the Insurance Commissioners to resolve 
^differences. 
The insurance industry has indicated that it wishes to use 
claims-made policies. In general, 1986 is viewed as a 
transition year during which insurers will train their personnel 
in the use of the new policy forms and adapt their computers to 
accommodate the changes. Insurers have indicated that in states 
where the new forms are not insured, they may use non-admitted 
subsidiaries or surplus lines carriers to provide the coverage 
to their clients on claims-made basis for large complex risks 
and risks in "volatile" classes, or else simply not provide 
coverage to those risks. 
Claims-made policies and other limited coverages also are being 
adopted by reinsurers. Lloyd's of London has introduced a new 
claims-made form, as have Weavers and Trenwick American 
.Reinsurance, Each policy is somewhat different. Trenwick, a 
, United;:States reinsurance company, has stated that it will not 
twrite^any.vgeneralrliability^reinsurance on an occurrence basis,. 
5 . tafter; January*lo£ this. year. Trenwick also has written a 
-v* - ~ .^claims-made form for ^ use by its ceding companies for "difficult" 
., ^risks. .Other reinsurers have indicated they would reinsure both 
•occurrence and claims-made policies, but would strongly 
encourage the use of-claims-made for heavy casualty risks. As 
indicated in Chapter 1, some businesses already have been asked 
to take claims-made coverage for their excess limits coverage. 
Because of the many different claims-made forms currently being 
used, this is likely to cause gaps in coverage. 
Laser Endorsements 
The ISO policy form also includes "laser endorsements" which can 
be used to limit coverage. These provisions permit an insurer 
to exclude claims from a specific incident, product or period of 
'time. Several Insurance Commissioners have objected to this 
provision and stated that, at a minimum, it should be revised to 
require the signature of the insured indicating an awareness of 
the exclusion. The inclusion of a laser endorsement would 
necessitate either the insured's purchase of tail coverage for 
that product or incident, or the insured's "going bare" for that 
liability. 
Pollution Exclusion 
Both the new ISO and Lloyd's of London claims-made commercial 
general liability policies specifically exclude pollution 
w-*3*r -•• .. . • 
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I v coverage. Traditionally, the general liability policy has 
I included the business community's liability for damage caused 
the "sudden and accidental" discharge of toxic substances. 
Environmental Impairment Liability ("EIL") policies are used to 
I cover damages from gradual pollution incidents. In a number of 
I highly controversial cases, courts have expanded the meaning of 
I "sudden and accidental," causing insurers to be liable for EIL-
type (gradual pollution) coverage when it was not intended under 
I the policy. 
I As a result, insurers currently are reluctant „ provide any 
I pollution coverage, though Lloyd's of London has indicated a 
I willingness to cover some liability at additional cost on a 
I "named peril" basis only. 
J Defense Cost Inclusion 
I Ordinarily, the costs of defending against liability claims are 
not included within the aggregate limits of the commercial 
general liability policy. Insurers traditionally have 
controlled the defense of claims against their insureds by 
I engaging defense counsel and by governing the vigor with which a 
I claim is challenged. The insurers paid all costs, and the full 
J amount of the policy limits were available to pay any settlement 
or judgment against the insured. 
1 During the-product .liability crisis of the mid-1970's there were :.**• 
I a number of allegations that insurers were, in fact, fueling the -
A--f-:-* - *' claims*situation by settling too'quickly in many cases that the 
'
 ;
" '" insureds believed should have been more vigorously contested. 
As a result, many companies insisted that their insurance 
contracts include a right to at least partial, if not £ 
control of defense strategy. 
In the mid-1980fs, defense costs have escalated rapidly, mostly 
because of the cost of attorneys' fees, and possibly, in part' 
J because of the insureds' desires to contest claims to the 
I fullest degree possible. 
I In order to control costs, the ISO had proposed to change the 
I commercial general liability form to include defense costs 
within the aggregate limits of the policy. This practice 
already is incorporated in at least some other policy forms. 1/ 
1/ Business Insurance, December 9, 1985, page 1. 
«... * o 
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I 
The proposal brought a sharp response from insureds, the bar, 
and the Risk and^Insurance Management Society, a trade 
association of risk managers and insurance buyers. They believe 
that there will be cases of defense costs exceeding the limits, 
leaving no money to pay a settlement or judgment. Some are 
concerned that defense counsel may urge settlement of unworthy 
claims in order to prevent defense costs from exhausting all 
available coverage. Others believe that there will be a spate 
of bad faith claims against insurers when the policy limit is 
used for legal costs and the insured is left liable for 
damages. 
In response to the concerns of insurance customers, regulators 
and brokers, the ISO has revised its proposal so that up to 50% 
of the aggregate limits may be spent on defense costs before the 
policy limits will begin to be reduced by those expenses. An 
endorsement will be available so that up to 300% of the limit 
may be spent on defense costs before the policy limit is 
affected. A discount will be applied if the policyholder buys 
less than the 300% endorsement. Insurers apparently will have 
the option to apply an endorsement which will charge all defense 
costs to the policy limits. 2/ 
At its annual meeting in December, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners passed a resolution urging states not to 
" ^ approver the JSO/proposal Aintrl>the^proposal .can be studied by >• ..v 
-Ahe* Commissioners•:*. .The ISO/, whictf had hoped to initiate the -
'* defense'cost change in July of 1986, will postpone filing its 
* request with the states until at least February 15, 1986. 3/ 
II. ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE MECHANISMS 
As liability insurance becomes unavailable or unaffordable, 
means of liability protection outside the conventional insurance 
markets increasingly are being sought and used. 
1
 2/ Business Insurance, December 16, 1985, page 1. 
3/ Business Insurance, December 23, 1985, page 1. 
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Insurance Company Creation (Captive or Other) 
One response available to large companies unable to buy the 
insurance coverage they need is to set up their own insurance 
company. Thirty-three major United States companies recently 
have established an offshore insurer, A.C.E. Insurance Company, 
which began operation in November, 1985, and provides up to $150 
million in liability coverage. Founding companies include IBM, 
GE, U.S. Steel and Chase Manhattan, as well as other 
companies. While A.C.E. offers coverages not available 
elsewhere, its policies are available only to large companies 
since it only pays claims exceeding $100 million. 
j n addition, it recently was announced that a group of fifteen 
chemical and petrochemical companies are creating a company 
called CASEX, which would provide excess limits coverage for 
products, directors and officers, and sudden and accidental 
pollution liability. 
Another group of fifty United States banks are creating a mutual 
insurer, Bankers' Insurance Co., Ltd., to provide directors and 
officers liability coverage and bankers blanket bonds. 
During the medical malpractice crisis the early to mid-
1970*8, groups of medical professionals unable to obtain 
malpractice coverage formed their own companies, commonly known 
las bedpan.mutuals^:.to handle:.their claims. Such insurance 
I groups currently provide about half of the coverage in the 
-•; malpractice*liability market. * 
Self-Insurance 
Some industry groups and trade associations, as well a is 
municipalities in several states, have joined together to self-
insure as groups, and others have been able to set up a formal 
self-insurance program just to handle their own claims. 4 
Self-insurance, either individual or group, also has been a 
useful vehicle for municipalities for which insurance has become 
either unavailable or unaffordable. 
One major problem encountered by firms seeking to set up self-
insurance programs is that reserves for self insurance are not 
4/ A formal self-insurance program is different from "going 
bare" in that the former sets up reserves to cover claims and 
treats it similar to an insurance system whereas the latter 
simply hopes claims do not occur, which may cause financial 
difficulties if and when they do occur. 
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accorded the same tax treatment as insurance company reserves, 
in that self-insurance reserves are fully taxable. While this 
presents no problem for municipalities and other tax-exempt 
entities, it is a major hurdle for private entities. 
Small firms are generally unable to establish a meaningful self-
insurance program individually, but may benefit from group self-
insurance if no other insurance is available. 
Product Liability Risk Retention Act Groups 
The Risk Retention Act (."RRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 3901 et seg., was 
intended,as a mechanism to (1) create an alternative product 
liability insurance market, and (2) provide a means for smaller 
insurance buyers to purchase general liability insurance --
including product liability coverage -- as groups. The RRA 
evolved from an intensive interagency study of the product 
liability "crisis" in the mid-19701s. President Reagan signed 
the Act in September 1981, noting that it was a "marketplace 
solution" to provide product manufacturers, distributors and 
sellers with affordable product liability insurance. 
A Risk Retention Group ("RRG") is formed by any number of 
product sellers as an insurance company licensed to operate 
under.the laws of any state. The RRG may provide only product 
liability:and.completed:operations coverage to its members.. / 
(Completed^operations.is work performedby a contractor or .-
product manufacturer installing its product.) .The RRG may sell 
insurance .in any state without meeting the licensing or other 
regulatory requirements of any state other than its domicile. 
No state may discriminate against an RRG, but states may impose 
normal premium taxes and enforce compliance with unfair claims 
settlement practices statutes. 
The Act is restrictive in that it limits a RRG to products and 
completed operations coverage, but permits the establishment of 
a domestic group captive that is able to do business countrywide. 
A Purchasing Group ("PG") may be formed to negotiate for a group 
policy from any insurer to cover product liability completed 
operations, and commercial general liability when either of the 
first two coverages are included. The PG and any entity 
providing services to the PG are exempt from any state law which 
would.-prohibit the PG from purchasing this coverage on a group 
basis. 
A group of companies purchasing together presents an attractive 
premium base with lower administrative costs to the insurer. In 
a tight market small companies are subject to cancellation or 
sharply higher prices because an insurer may prefer to use its 
58 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
resources on a few large risks. The provisions for purchasing 
groups was necessary to overcome statutes and regulations in 
about forty-four states which prohibited so called "fictitious 
groups" set up for the purpose of buying property or casualty 
insurance on a group basis. 
Very few companies have used the RRA to date, but the rapid 
change in market conditions likely will lead "to a much greater 
interest in its provision. 
One reason that the RRA has been little used is the fact that ;i t 
is limited to products and completed operations coverages, 
although groups may include other coverages as long as products 
is the primary purpose. It is a useful means of expanding 
insurance capacity, and would provide additional capacity in the 
alternative market if the products limitation were removed. 
III. STATE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 
State legislators and insurance regulators have recognized the 
severity of the liability insurance crisis, and have responded 
in a variety of ways. One state has barred cancellation or non-
renewal of policies and prohibited any increases in the cost of 
policies in effect. Several other states are considering 
^similar actions. ~ The National Association of Insurance 
^Commissioners adopted a resolution opposing mid-term 
•^cancellations and short notices of non-renewal. Other states 
t
%are~"implementing or considering the use of Market Assistance 
* Programs, which are voluntary assigned risk pools designed to 
I take risks such as day care centers on a rotating or shared 
basis. Yet other states are considering joint underwriting 
associations in which the state regulator mandates the sharing 
of certain risks 
Half the states have "file and use" rate regulation in which the 
insurance department is notified of a rate increase which 
becomes effective without action by the regulator. Many of 
these states reportedly are rethinking their systems because of 
the sharp increases in the rates of some of the problem lines of 
coverage. 
Regulators normally have viewed commercial insurance as 
transactions between knowledgeable buyers and sellers, and, 
accordingly, have refrained from interfering with the market's 
operation. The recent concerns expressed by the Insurance 
Commissioners is a measure of the depth of the availability/ 
affordability crisis, and may foreshadow a heightening in the 
regulatory "oversight" of commercial insurance. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TORT LAW REFORM 
As discussed in Chapter 2, two primary areas have been the focus 
of the Working Group's examination into the crisis in liability 
insurance availability and affordability: the current economic 
difficulties of the insurance industry; and, the extraordinary 
growth in tort liability in recent years. For the reasons 
discussed in Chapter 2, while it seems likely that the insurance 
industry will be able to work its way out of its present 
economic straits, it is very unclear -- if not doubtful ~ that 
this, will significantly alleviate the crisis in insurance 
availability and affordability. Early indications are that 
insurers will continue to avoid areas that present a high risk 
of tort liability, or, where they do provide insurance, will 
demand high premiums. That is, while the more extreme aspects 
of the availability crisis may be resolved once the industry 
regains its desired level of profitability, it appears unlikely 
at this time that the high premiums that have led to serious 
affordability concerns will be reduced significantly. 
For these reasons, as well as for the other reasons discussed in 
Chapter 2, there appears to be little that can or should be done 
by the federal or any other government to "remedy" the economic 
factors that underlie the current availability/affordability 
crisis.. The excesses of the tort system, however, present a 
very real opportunity to address a major cause of the insurance 
crisis with sensible and appropriate reforms. And while some of 
the changes in the insurance market currently under contempla-
tion (see Chapter 3) probably will relieve some availability/ 
affordability problems, it seems unlikely that these changes 
will provide long-term, systemic relief without fundamental 
reforms of tort law. 
The following is a list of eight tort reforms that would bring a 
greater degree of rationality and predictability to tort law, 
and thereby significantly assist in resolving the 
availability/affordability crisis. This is by no means an 
exhaustive list of possible tort reforms. Nor does the 
accompanying discussion of these reforms indicate how they 
necessarily should be implemented; that is, on the federal or 
state level, or through legislative or judicial modification of 
the law. Rather, this list identifies eight recommended tort 
reforms which if implemented should return tort law to a 
credible fault-based compensation system that provides a fair 
and reasonable level of compensation to deserving plaintiffs 
through a more predictable and affordable liability allocating 
mechanism. While these reforms undoubtedly will be resisted by 
some, they in fact are quite modest and should not dramatically 
alter the basic principles of tort law as those have existed for 
centuries. 
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Recommendation No. It Retain fault as the basis for 
liability. 
For the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, fault should be retained 
as a basis for tort liability. As noted there, fault is the only 
mechanism in tort law for distinguishing desirable from 
undesirable conduct, and is an indispensable predicate to many 
other aspects of the tort liability system without which the 
system would generate arbitrary and unfair results. 
For non-product liability cases, negligence should remain the 
applicable standard of liability. Strict product liability 
should .under no circumstances be extended outside the 
traditional area of product injuries. Thus, theories which 
would apply strict product liability to landlords or to 
professionals providing services (e.g., pharmacists, 
architects, etc.) should be strongly resisted and expressly 
rejected. The trend in some states 1/ to extend strict 
liability doctrines outside the area of product injuries is a 
highly pernicious development which will significantly undermine 
the ability of those sectors of our economy to function 
proper ly.. 
Strict product liability in its traditional sense represents a 
sensible application of fault-based liability to the realities 
m.~ * of. modenvxindustrial/, life.. - The Working Group, accordingly, does . 
: not. recommend^the'^-abolition:pfk strict product-liability, ,-.. 
*, /, provided; the. doctrine is/kept within, its traditional bounds.
 ;. 
•" "\ Unfortunately, .strict product liability has been subject to 
extensive abuse that often.has had the effect of transforming 
the doctrine in practice into absolute liability. 
The following are the elements of a strict product liability 
standard which does not present an impossible or unfair burden 
to plaintiffs in demonstrating fault on the part of defendant-
manufacturers, while at the same time not establishing a scheme 
of absolute liability which simply uses the manufacturer as an 
insurer for all risks of injury. 
0
 Liability should be predicated on the existence of a 
defect which is found to make the product unreasonably 
dangerous. 
'•'.•• Defendants should only be held liable for uses of a 
product that are both reasonable and foreseeable. 
Liability should not be predicated upon unreasonable or 
unforeseeable alterations of a product that cause the 
, injury, particularly where such alterations are 
' prohibited or warned against. (Alterations, in this 
regard, can include the failure to provide required and 
reasonable safeguards, maintenance or inspections.) 
1/ See in this regard the recent opinion of the California 
Supreme Court in Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal.3d 454, 698 P.2d 
116 (1985), extending strict product liability to landlords. 
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0
 Manufacturers should not be liable for defects which 
have been the subject of an adequate warning or which 
are readily apparent to the reasonable consumer. 
Manufacturers should only be required to warn with 
regard to uses of a product that are both reasonable 
and foreseeable. 
0
 Manufacturers should only be held to the state of the 
art in existence at the time of manufacture of the 
product. Manufacturers should not be held liable fox 
unknown or unknowable hazards. 
The above elements, if applied in a principled manner, should 
ensure that strict product liability will serve to compensate 
persons injured as a result of a manufacturer's fault, while 
preventing that liability doctrine from simply being used as a 
risk spreading'mechanism designed to operate as a product-based 
insurance scheme. 
Recommendation No. 2: Base causation findings on credible 
scientific and medical evidence and opinions. 
One of the most pernicious developments in tort law has been the 
extent to which causation findings are based on fringe 
scientific or medical opinions well outside the mainstream of 
accepted scientific.,or jnedical beliefs. Increasingly,:juries 
'- *are< asked to make difficult decisions about highly.complicated . 
*•_• issues* of < science and medicine. ^ Unfortunately, the personality 
and demeanor of expert witnesses often may be more critical in 
making such determinations than decades of evolving scientific 
and medical investigation and thought. 
This problem has resulted in the growing perception that the 
tort system often is wholly arbitrary in allocating liability in 
cases involving difficult issues of science and medicine. This 
is a particularly problematic situation in toxic tort and drug 
liability cases. 2/ 
There are a variety of reasons for this problem: 
0
 Many judges do not have the training or inclination to 
understand complicated scientific and medical concepts, 
and are unwilling or unable to devote the time and 
energy needed to educate themselves in a complex body 
of knowledge. 
° In order not to deprive plaintiffs of their opportunity 
for compensation, many courts allow plaintiffs to take 
2/ For example, see the discussion of Johnson- v. American 
Cyanamid Co., infra. 
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whatever scientific or medical views they may have --
however incredible — to the jury. 
0
 Many in the legal system do not appreciate how credible 
scientific and medical views develop, and the degree to 
which legal decisionmaking is a poor vehicle for 
developing such views. 
0
 There often is an understandable frustration with the 
fact that science and medicine frequently cannot offer 
the kind of certainty that the legal decisionmaking 
mechanisms strive to obtain. 
The inability of the tort system to deal credibly with 
complicated scientific and medical issues strikes at the very 
heart of the ability of tort law to deal with the growing number 
of cases involving highly complicated scientific and medical 
issues. While there are no easy answers, there are several 
remedial actions that the Working Group recommends: 
° Greater deference must be paid to government agencies 
and certain private institutions that have devoted 
decades of attention and millions of dollars to 
researching and trying to assess the value of medical 
d. and scientific developments. Where such agencies and 
,:w:?. institutions iiave determined t^hat particular products, 
-?V4 .services or. techniques ^rar^e safe tor* socially beneficial, 
r\ -\ CQurts should tread very ^ carefully.in overruling those 
~ * judgments through the vehicle of tort.law. Lay juries 
are a very poor mechanism for second-guessing the 
judgment of established mainstream scientific and 
medical views. Other legal mechanisms for determining 
those views, such as rulemaking and licensing 
proceedings, generally are far superior in making 
credible determinations involving complicated issues of 
science and medicine. 
Courts must be more aggressive in determining the 
credibility of scientific and medical evidence and 
opinions before trial, and not simply allow parties to 
present any theory to the jury. Appellate courts, in 
turn, should give trial courts greater latitude in 
making such decisions in early stages of litigation. 
Judges, where feasible, should receive training on 
basic methods of scientific, medical and statistical 
analysis so that they can make such determinations. If 
necessary, impartial masters with appropriate training 
should be used for this purpose. 
Studies and opinions that have not been subjected to 
the peer review process should be presumed invalid. 
Where peer review has taken place, judges (or masters, 
where appropriate) should acquaint themselves with the 
results of such review. 
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Courts must learn to accept the reality of 
uncertainty. They must understand that the fact that 
some degree of uncertainty always exists does not mean 
that every scientific or medical belief is as credible 
as the next. Judges and legislators must not try to 
"force" scientific certainty where such certainty 
simply is not possible. Attempts to do so through 
burden-shifting, presumptions or by requiring agencies 
to issue scientific "findings," simply create a 
misleading and deceptive gloss of scientific certainty 
that in fact does not exist. 3/ Ultimately, the 
legal system must accept the fact that some things are 
unknown, and, given existing methods and data, perhaps 
unknowable for the foreseeable future. 
Recommendation No. 3: Eliminate joint and several liability. 
One of the most troubling problems in tort law arises from 
injuries caused by multiple tortfeasors. Historically, such 
cases were handled by bringing separate actions against each 
defendant; joint and several liability only existed where 
concert-of-action was shown (see discussion in Chapter 2). 
Further, under the doctrine of contributory negligence, a 
negligent plaintiff could not recover damages from any 
defendant: Such an approach seemed harsh where plaintiffs were 
*only minimally at fault for their own injuries. Eventually, and .v 
\in part to remedy the harshness of the old rule, the doctrines * 
"of* comparative fault and joint and several liability were 
developed to make it easier for plaintiffs to obtain 
compensation. . 
Comparative fault operates to assure that each party, including 
the plaintiff, is liable for its own fault. Joint and several 
liability, although originally applied to situations where 
concert-of-action was shown, is now in many cases applied to a11 
defendants, regardless of their connection to the injury. 
Comparative fault, when coupled with the doctrine of joint and 
several liability, allows plaintiffs to recover the entire 
judgment from "deep pocket" defendants -- even if such 
defendants are only found to be minimally at fault. Joint and 
several liability thus frequently operates in a highly 
inequitable manner -- sometimes making defendants with only a 
small or even de minimis percentage of fault liable for 100% of 
plaintiff's damage. Accordingly, joint and several liability in 
the absence of concerted action has led to the inclusion of many 
"deep pocket" defendants such as governments, larger 
corporations, and insured entities whose involvement is only 
tangential and who probably would not be joined except for the 
existence of joint and several liability. 
3/ As noted, the Working Group does not believe that 
scientific uncertainty can be handled simply by requiring 
government agencies to issue pronouncements of risk or causation 
for which there in fact is no credible basis. 
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Another problem area is the relationship of joint and several 
liability to "enterprise" or "market share" liability. See 
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 
cert, denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). In theory, "market share" 
liability such as that established in the California Supreme 
Court's seminal opinion in Sindell attempts to allocate 
liability for a generic product (e.g., DES) among various 
producers on the basis of their share of the relevant market. 
Even assuming such an allocation is reasonable, 4/ some 
jurisdictions have devised variations of or alternative 
approaches to Sindell which apply joint and several liability 
among-the producers of a generic product. 5/ See, e.g., 
Abel- v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, 
cert, denied, 105 S.Ct. 123 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly 
Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984). 6/ The 
difficulties plaintiffs face in attempting to show which 
manufacturer of a generic product was responsible for plain-
tiff s injury in fact can be (but are not always) substantial. 
While the Working Group does not advocate one approach over 
another, it firmly believes that any allocation of liability on 
the basis of market share should limit a manufacturer's 
liability to its specific share, and that such liability should 
not, in the absence of actual concerted action, be joint and 
several in nature. 
The <• Working. Group/.thus Recommends elimination of joint and - -.* 
several^liability,-* exceptvin the limited circumstancescwhere the 
.plaintiff rcan'-demonstrate that the ^ defendants have actually 
acted ,in. concert.to cause plaintiff's injury. 7/ • 
* • ' • • " - • • • - . . • • 
4/ Because of a number of problems and inequities associated 
with Sindell, only a few states have embraced the position of 
the California Supreme Court. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, 
"Failure to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a 
Legislative Solution," 73 Calif. L. Rev. 941 (1985). 
5/ It is .unclear whether even Sindell is a true, "market 
share" allocation decision, since under Sindell plaintiff must 
only sue manufacturers representing a substantial share of the 
market, and may allocate all liability among those defendants in 
proportion to their respective market shares. 
6/ Particularly disturbing are decisions such as Abel which 
appear to distort the principles of concerted action to impute 
concerted action to manufacturers of a generic product. 
7/ Joint and several liability as discussed in this report 
should not be confused with the legislatively enacted schemes 
for allocating financial responsibility for the cost of cleanup 
of hazardous waste sites and spills under the Nation's 
environmental laws, and, in particular, under the Superfund Act 
(CONTINUED) 
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Recommendation No. 4; Limit non-economic damages to a fair 
and reasonable amount. 
Non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish 
and punitive damages are inherently open-ended. 8/ They are 
entirely subjective, and often defy quantification. For 
example, in many instances it simply is not possible, no matter 
how much money is awarded, to compensate someone fully for the 
pain and anguish of the loss of a loved one or from a serious 
injury. Moreover, because such damages are essentially 
subjective, awards for similar injuries can vary immensely from 
case to case, leading to highly inequitable, lottery-like 
results. Accordingly, such damages are particularly suitable 
for a specific limitation. 
The open-ended nature of such damages makes them a particular 
problem from the standpoint1 of achieving predictability. Unlike 
economic damages (medical expenses, lost earnings, etc,), which 
can be reviewed objectively'and thus can be predicted within a 
given range, non-economic damages are entirely subjective and 
unpredictable. 
Non-economic damages also can serve as a significant obstacle in 
the settlement process. Plaintiffs and defendants often can 
^ 7 / (FOOTNOTE-CONTINUED)> 
(the Comprehensive, Environmental Response,Compensation id 
Liability Act of 1980) and the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA). Unlike the tort system, which is intended 
to compensate injured persons and to deter wrongful conduct (see 
Chapter 2), Superfund and RCRA represent a legislative choice to 
allocate the cost of these programs among those who contributed 
to the problems the programs are designed to remedy. Thus, 
Superfund and RCRA liability, like the liability established 
under other environmental laws, are founded upon congressional 
objectives which provide that those who contributed to the 
problem or profited from the manufacture which created the 
waste, ought to bear the cost of cleaning it up. Those whose 
specific contribution to the site can be identified and severed 
from the whole are not jointly liable under this scheme 
Without some degree of joint and several liability under 
Superfund and RCRA, the effective enforcement of these programs 
could be seriously impeded as a result of protracted and costly 
litigation among responsible parties over the precise allocation 
of cleanup costs. 
8/ There are two types of non-economic damages: compensatory 
(pain and suffering, mental anguish, etc.) and punitive 
(sometimes called exemplary damages). The latter are designed 
purely to punish the defendant. 
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agree quickly on the amount of economic damages, but disagree 
sharply on non-economic damages. Plaintiffs frequently have 
unrealistic expectations of non-economic damages in the hundreds 
of thousands or millions of dollars to which defendants simply 
are unwilling to agree. Plaintiffs thus often reject settlement 
offers that from the standpoint of compensation for economic 
damages are quite reasonable. Plaintiffs1 attorneys also often 
see high non-economic damage awards as necessary to justify high 
contingency fees, which may lead them to press for a high non-
economic damage award when it may be in their clients' interest 
to obtain a quick and fair settlement. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs should be entitled to reasonable 
compensation for their pain and suffering and mental anguish. 
The key in this regard is to provide such compensation, but to 
ensure that it will be kept within reasonable bounds. 
The Working Group believes that $100,000 would be such a 
reasonable limitation. In this regard, it should be noted that 
only a handful of claims involve non-economic damages in excess 
of $100,000. For example, it is estimated that only 2.7% of all 
medical malpractice claims (5.6% of all paid medical malpractice 
claims) receive non-economic compensation in excess of 
$100,000. 9/ However, in those medical malpractice cases going 
to verdict.where non-economic damages above $100,000 are 
awarded; the.jionreconomic ,damages ,-award. averages between .. 
$428AOO0band< $,738,000 *(the -latter figure being the ."best , 
estimate,") *« 10/ -For such awards including non-economic..damages 
in excess.of $100,000, on the average 80% of the total award is . 
for <the non-economic damages component of the award. 11/ Since . 
the non-economic damages in excess of. $100,000 awarded in these 
cases (including verdicts and settlements) account for between 
28% and 50% of all paid out medical malpractice damages, the non-
9/ H. Manne, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 132-48 
(1985). In comparison, approximately half of all claims that 
end in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff include a non-
economic damages award in excess of $1*00,000. Id. This 
suggests that non-economic damages are a major factor in forcing 
claims.to trial. p 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Guidebook wa$ >prepared for the 
Florida Medical Association. Henry Manne Served as the general 
editor,.and the analysis on the effect of a $100,000 cap was 
prepared by Patricia Danzon -- "perhaps the most widely known 
and published economist in the country on the subject of medical 
malpractice." Id., at 10. 
10/ Id. 
11/ -Id. In this regard, it is worth noting that non-
economic damages as a percentage of overall damages increases 
substantially as the overall damages increase. Id.. at 138-
39. See discussion in Chapter 2. 
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economic damages payments in excess of $100,000 alone account 
for up to half of all medical malpractice damages. 12/ Thus, a 
$100,000 limitation on non-economic damage awards would affect 
only a relatively small percentage of all claims, but would 
introduce substantial predictability into the tort system. 13/ 
It also is necessary to deal with punitive damages. While some 
thought was given to an absolute ban on punitive damages, or 
perhaps a separate limitation, the Working Group concluded that 
the best approach would be to include punitive damages within 
the $100,000 limitation on all non-economic damages. 
Nevertheless, punitive damages should only be awarded for 
willful.conduct bordering on a criminal violation. 
Specifically, the Working Group recommends that an award of 
punitive damages be predicated on a demonstration of actual 
malice. 
Even if these recommendations are adopted, punitive damages at 
best have a tenuous basis in tort law. Increasingly, there has 
been growing skepticism among legal scholars about the role of 
punitive damages, 14 /and numerous instances of extraordinary 
*- 12/ Id.. The best*estimate of.the Guidebook is that pain 
- and suffering awards above-$100,000 account for nearly 39% 
**=••-• all medical malpractice damages. * 
, 13/ Some states have struck down such limitations on 
* constitutional grounds, primarily on the basis of equal 
protection, on the theory that it is unfair to limit the 
recoveries of certain plaintiffs (e.g., medical malpractice 
claimants) while allowing other plaintiffs to receive unlimited 
recoveries. Recently, however, both the California Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld such 
a limitation for medical malpractice verdicts awarded under 
California law. .See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 
Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665 (1985); Hoffman v. United States, 767 
F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court refused to hear 
either case, finding with regard to the former that no 
substantial federal question was presented. Constitutional 
concerns such as this, however, can only be sensibly considered 
in-the context of specific legal proposals. 
14/ See, e.g., Owen, "Problems in Assessing Punitive 
Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products,H 49 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1982); Seltzer, "Punitive Damages in Mass Tort 
Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and 
Control," 52 Fordham L. Rev. 37 (1983); Sugarman, "Doing Away 
With Tort Law," 73 Calif. L. Rev. 555 (1985); Schwartz, 
"Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive 
Damages: A Comment," 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Ellis, 
"Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages," 56 S, 
Cal. L, Rev. 1.(1982). 
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abuses. 15/ Punitive damages add considerable uncertainty, and 
frequently have very little real deterrent effect because they 
are awarded years after the offending conduct. In any event, 
the punishment of misconduct is primarily a function of the 
public law enforcement system, and should not be a common 
purpose of private litigation. 
Nevertheless, the Working Group does not recommend prohibiting 
punitive damages in tort cases provided they are included within 
the limitation on non-economic damages. If this is infeasible, 
the Working Group recommends that punitive damages be 
abolished. 16/ 
Recommendation No. 5: Provide for periodic payments of future 
economic damages. 
Traditionally, a losing defendant is required to pay all of 
plaintiff's future damages in one lump-sum payment. When 
damages were within reasonable limits, this generally was not a 
major problem. But as average damages have skyrocketed into the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars this has become an increasing 
burden on the defendant (or defendants' insurers). The Working 
Group, therefore, recommends that future economic damages be 
paid,periodically.. 17/., ^ 
•* Allowing * defendants :;to pay; for>plaiutiff.! s- damages, periodically y . v--: 
s.^ .r'"* has several- advantages-.-. First, it gives defendants the ability, 
in- some cases to digest major adverse judgments by spacing 
15/ One of the most flagrant examples is the $8 million 
dollar punitive .damage award against the defendant in Johnson 
v. American Cyanamid Co., (District Court No. 81 C 2470), for 
its decision to produce the Sabin rather than the Salk polio 
vaccine. Despite the fact that the defendant had complied in 
this decision with the well established medical judgment of the 
United States government and virtually the entire medical 
community, the jury apparently decided to use punitive damages 
to overrule this judgment and to force the Sabin vaccine off the 
market.-. .Ironically, the Sabin vaccine has proven far more 
effective than the Salk vaccine in combating polio. The case 
presently is on appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, and the 
federal government has filed an amicus brief urging reversal. 
16/ It frequently is noted that the deterrent effect of 
punitive damages could be achieved through a system of civil 
fines. 
17/ Where there is legitimate concern that a particular 
defendant may not be able to make the periodic payments in 
future years the court should be empowered to require the 
defendant to ensure the periodic payment through the purchase of 
an annuity. 
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payments out over time, much in the same way that many consumers 
can afford major purchases by buying on installment. Second, 
society is benefited by the fact that plaintiffs have a 
guaranteed stream of income, and cannot deplete their awards 
within a few years. This sharply reduces the possibility that 
severely injured plaintiffs eventually will become wards of the 
state. 
An important additional advantage f requiring courts to award 
damages in terms of periodic payments rather than lump-sum 
awards is that it uses the market's rather than a court's 
assessment of the applicable interest rate. Under the existing 
practice in most states, the trial court determines plaintiff's 
economic loss over plaintiff's lifetime, and then awards 
plaintiff the present value of those losses in a lump sum. The 
interest rate used to make that present value calculation is 
critical, and can significantly reduce or inflate the lump-sum 
payment. Frequently, courts in making that calculation use 
interest rates that bear no reasonable relationship to what in 
fact is available in the market. 
A periodic payment requirement effectively avoids this problem 
by having the court determine the stream of future economic 
losses and require defendant to purchase an annuity providing a 
corresponding stream of compensation (where defendant is 
sufficiently large, an actual annuity probably would be 
unnecessary).. Under such-a<procedure, the market determines the 
^appropriate interest rate-for calculating the present^^alue of 
-Hh<:-.«.*.,; jrthose?payments -(the present value would equal the cost of the 
annuity). Since the payments are guaranteed through the 
annuity, subsequent changes in the interest rate would have no 
effect on plaintiff's compensation. Defendant, on the other 
hand, would have the market rather than a judge or jury 
determine the correct interest rate for assessing the p- * •. 
value of future damages. 
Periodic payments, as noted, are not unfair to plaintiffs 
because the payments would be scheduled to be made as the 
damages are in fact incurred (that is, as earnings are actually 
lost, or as certain expenses actually occur). 
Because the benefits of such a provision would be relatively 
limited for smaller awards, the Working Group recommends that 
periodic payments only be required where the total economic 
,. damage § award exceeds $100,000. 
I 4 
Recommendation No. 6: Reduce awards by collateral sources of 
compensation for the same injury. 
1 The collateral source rule prohibits the finder of fact from 
I taking collateral sources of income related to the same injury 
into account in making an award of damages to the plaintiff. 
I This effectively permits the plaintiff to obtain double recovery 
J of certain components of his damages award. 
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In an era when collateral sources of income were financed 
largely by plaintiff himself, the collateral source rule may 
have been sensible. Today, however,'when many collateral 
sources are provided or subsidized by the government or by third 
parties (such as employers, who often are required by law to 
provide certain collateral benefits), the traditional 
justification is called into question. Increasingly, the 
collateral source rule simply permits a windfall recovery by the 
plaintiff. 
As to publicly provided collateral sources of compensation, 
there is no justification for not taking such sources into 
account in determining plaintiff's ultimate damages. The 
collateral source rule in such circumstances has the effect of 
requiring citizens to pay compensation twice ~ once as 
taxpayer, and once as the consumer of the product causing the 
injury. 18/ 
The situation is somewhat more complicated in dealing with 
private sources of collateral compensation, particularly where 
subrogation is involved. 19/ Where a third party (such as an 
insurer) is subrogated to plaintiff's claim, the collateral 
source rule may not in fact result in any double recovery. As a 
practical matter, however, subrogation often is not a 
significant consideration:in many tort actions. In some areas, 
such; as ^ automobile ..accidents,^subrogation, is..quite.common. . In 
4>* Other, areas,, however,*; such *as> medipal malpractice/, subrogation , • 
* ?%.. v-,- i»s.fari«less common, v^ ;• .• :••-•-; * * 
As to private sources,- the best approach appears to be to 
require collateral-sources of compensation related to the same 
injury to be taken into account as long as a third party is not 
subrogated to that portion of plaintiff's claim. Further 
analysis may suggest that elimination of subrogation (that is, 
simply offsetting all collateral sources against the award, and 
prohibiting subrogation arrangements) may have a limited effect 
and be justified on the basis of significant reductions in 
transaction costs. 
While the correct approach to workers1 compensation benefits 
must be considered Very carefully, workers should be required to 
seek their workers' compensation benefits where appropriate. 
The Working Group takes no position on whether subrogation and 
indemnification actions between employers and manufacturers 
18/ Another reason to be concerned about such a windfall is 
that much of the windfall is in fact a windfall for attorneys in 
the form of attorneys' fees. 
19/ In the context of insurance, subrogation allows the 
insurer to obtain from the tortfeasor-defendant all or part^ o.f 
its payments to the insured-plaintiff arising from the injury 
caused by the tortfeasor. 
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found liable as third party defendants should be eliminated, as 
has been proposed in some legislation. The Working Group will 
continue to review the merits of proposals dealing with such 
subrogation and indemnification actions. 
Recommendation No. 7: Schedule contingency fees. 
Currently, plaintiffs1 attorneys receive a flat percentage ox 
their clients1 awards, usually between 30% and 40%, but 
sometimes as high as 50%. Where plaintiff's award is moderate, 
such a contingency fee may, in fact, be quite reasonable, since 
the attorney has significant costs and may face substantial 
risks that must be reimbursed. But as the average plaintiff's 
verdict has increased in recent years, such a high percentage 
becomes difficult to justify. Increasingly, there are 
indications of - extraordinary abuses where attorneys receive fees 
in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for limited work. 
Particularly in mass liability cases where the groundwork for 
liability has been laid in previous cases by other attorneys, 
the fees often bear no relationship whatsoever to the work of or 
the risk to plaintiff's attorney, 20 / • • 
Nevertheless, the Working Group does not recommend, as some have 
suggested, the abolition of contingency fees. Often, such fees 
are the only means available to the poor to afford an attorney 
±and obtain-access<to-the-legal'system. The.problem with 
"contingency fees*emerges when awards become very high, and a 
•flat contingency rate becomes excessive. The Working Group, * 
therefore, believes that contingency fees should be scheduled to 
^decrease as awards increase. 
Specifically, the Working Group recommends the following 
schedule: 25% for the first $100,000, 20% for the next 
$100,000, 15% for the next $100,000, and 10% for the 
remainder. Thus, for an award of $500,000, plaintiff's attorney 
would receive $80,000 rather than $166,666 (assuming a one-third 
contingency fee), and for an award of $1,000,000, would receive 
$130,000 rather than $333,333, 
There are a number of justifications for scheduling contingency 
fees: 
° Verdicts often are inflated by judges and juries to 
compensate plaintiff for what is well understood to be 
high attorneys' fees. Defendants thus pay for such 
fees through higher insurance premiums or awards, 
20/ As discussed in Chapter 2, the prevailing plaintiff is 
not only liable to his attorney for the agreed to contingency 
fee, but also for litigation expenses. Such expenses often can 
amount to an additional five to eight percent of the underlying 
award 
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which, in turn, are passed on to consumers through 
higher prices. It is difficult to justify placing such 
a burden on American consumers for the purpose of 
paying what often amounts to exorbitant attorneys' fees. 
0
 Similarly, in order to compensate plaintiffs for very 
high contingency fees, settlements often are higher 
than otherwise would be the case. As with high awards, 
these payments ultimately are passed through to the 
consumer. More problematic; however, is that 
attorneys' fees often can become a major impediment to 
settlements since defendants may balk at paying a 
higher than justified award in order to compensate 
plaintiffs for exorbitant attorneys' fees. In such 
situations, attorneys' fees create an additional burden 
, by causing cases not to be settled that otherwise would 
be settled. 
° Contingency fees also distort the incentives of 
attorneys. Such fees may lead plaintiffs' attorneys to 
hold out for high non-economic damages (and, 
potentially, windfall profits for the attorney 
requiring only minimal additional work on the 
attorney's part), while the clients may be best served 
with obtaining economic damages and more limited non-
C" economic^damages-as/promgtlyoas possible. • 
\ '." ' •' '* " • • • ' " ' '••'.• t • 
i * ° - r ' Scheduling, contingency fees also should substantially .* 
reduce the excessive transaction costs presently 
* , • plaguing the tort system. This is particularly 
important in such areas as the asbestos litigations 
:* where there are only limited resources available to 
*•'• compensate a large pool of plaintiffs. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that the Federal Tort Claims 
Act contains a 25% cap on attorneys' fees for lawsuits filed 
under the Act, and a 20% cap on attorneys' fees for settlements 
obtained under the Act's administrative claims process. 
28 U.S.C. § 2678. Violations of these limitations are 
punishable b y fine or imprisonment, or both. A similar 25% 
attorneys' fee cap (with similar sanctions) is found in the 
Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 406. None of these caps 
appears to have had any significant effect on the ability of 
persons suing the government to obtain adequate legal 
representation. In fact, the number of lawsuits filed under 
both the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Social Security Act has 
increased substantially in recent years. 
The Working Group has considered and recommends against the 
adoption of the English Rule on attorneys' fees, which would 
transfer attorneys' fees to the losing party. While such a rule 
might deter some frivolous litigation, it also would inhibit 
many lawsuits that may be merited but where some preliminary 
discovery may be necessary to determine the strength of 
plaintiff's cflaims. Moreover, because many plaintiffs 
essentially are judgment proof, the widely held belief that such 
73 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a rule would significantly deter frivolous lingatjon may N-« 
largely illusory. 
A preferable (but still problematic) alternative approach to the 
English Rule would be to use a transfer of attorneys1 fees as a 
means of motivating parties to settle their claims at an earlier 
point in litigation. Thus, a rule modeled on Rule 68 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21/ but including 
attorneys' fees, might be useful. Perhaps the most promising 
approach would be to combine alternative dispute resolution with 
a transfer of attorneys1 fees. 
Recommendation No. 8; Develop alternative dispute 
, resolution mechanisms. 
i The Working Group believes that alternative dispute resolution 
holds much promise. Experimentation and experience, however, is 
the only reliable vehicle for determining which systems will 
work. Alternative dispute resolution proposals range from 
binding arbitration to mediation, and include such procedural 
innovations as mini-trials and expedited discovery techniques. 
Many of these proposals are worthy of serious consideration, and 
states represent excellent laboratories in which to develop and 
explore these various alternative dispute resolution proposals. 
The Working Group strongly'supports alternative dispute 
resolution, and believes that the organized bars, legislatures, 
!>r ;> - >'and*jurists should be more receptive to alternative dispute 
resolution proposals. Where necessary, particularly in areas 
such as medical malpractice, states should be encouraged to 
consider seriously the necessary constitutional changes to 
permit the use of alternative dispute resolution. 
The Working Group believes that the most promising use of 
alternative dispute resolution will.be to encourage the early 
settlement of lawsuits. For example, requiring non-binding 
arbitration where part or all of attorneys' fees shift to the 
party which rejects an arbitration award and obtains a less 
favorable result in litigation, much as costs of litigation are 
shifted for rejected offers of settlement under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 68 (see supra), might be an effective means 
21/ Rule 68 ("Offer of Judgment") provides that costs of 
litigation will shift to a plaintiff who has rejected an Offer 
of Settlement made under the rule and not obtained a judgment 
more favorable than the rejected offer. There currently is a 
proposal under consideration to include attorneys' fees in Rule 
68, as well as to make other changes to the Rule. Inclusion of 
attorneys' fees in Rule 68, however, has a number of serious 
problems that must be considered very carefully. These and 
other problems have led the Department of Justice to caution 
against the proposed changes to Rule 68. 
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for using alternative dispute resolution to facilitate and 
expedite early settlements. 
The Working Croup does not believer however, that alternative 
dispute resolution needs to or should involve major changes to 
the standards of liability or causation in tort law. The merits 
of alternative dispute resolution are largely unrelated to which 
standard of liability is used in resolving disputes. The value 
of alternative dispute resolution lies in procedural rather than 
substantive changes in the law. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GOVERNMENT INSURANCE: A NON-SOLUTION 
The growing liability insurance availability/affordabllilj 
crisis has spawned calls for government insurance or 
indemnification for persons or companies unable to obtain 
adequate insurance coverage through the private sector. For the 
reasons discussed below, such government insurance or 
indemnification would be highly undesirable and would do nothing 
to remedy the problems underlying the availability/affordability 
crisis. 
The most serious deficiency with the various schemes for 
government insurance or indemnification is, as noted, the fact 
that such proposals do not address the problems that have led to 
the availability/affordability crisis. Instead, these schemes 
simply would pass the costs of the crisis directly to the 
taxpayer. While it is difficult to estimate the potential cost 
of such a program to the American taxpayer, it should be noted 
that the insurance industry suffered an estimated $25 billion 
underwriting loss in 1985 (see Chapter 2). This loss does not 
include self-insurance or captive insurer losses, which in all 
likelihood represent additional billions of dollars. 
A government insurance or indemnification program would by 
definition certainly-involve the riskiest activities; that is, 
those activities that even the insurance industry is unwilling 
to underwrite. To the extent that the government attempts to 
address affordability problems by offering coverage more cheaply 
than the industry, the government, of course, simply would be 
subsidizing certain purchasers of insurance. Again, the cost of 
such subsidization is difficult to estimate, but considering 
that the insurance industry paid out over $126 billion in 1985, 
with related expenses of $37 billion (see Chapter 2), such a 
subsidy easily could involve tens of billions of dollars 
annually. 1/ (Again, these figures do not include self-
insurance or captive insurers). 
Government insurance or indemnification would not only pass 
these costs to the taxpayer, but could exacerbate the current 
problems of the tort system. One of the few constraints left in 
tort law as the recognition that "deep pockets" are not after 
1/ For example, over recent years the National Flood 
Insurance Fund has been subsidizing flood insurance by roughly 
$150 million annually. The cumulative loss for the program to 
date is approximately $1.4 billion. The President, in his 
latest budget submission, reiterated his intention to continue 
to phase out this costly subsidy. The riot, insurance program, 
which existed from 1968 to 1984, was able to sustain itself 
through collected premiums. The relative success of the 
program, however, was largely due to the'decline in urban riots 
after the program was instituted. 
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all bottomless*-- that there is a finite amount of resources 
that can be reallocated through tort liability. Government 
indemnification or insurance would remove that last restraint, 
since the resources of the Federal Government are all too often 
viewed as without limit. Thus, courts and juries might be even 
more willing to skew liability and causation standards to ensure 
compensation, and to award the most generous compensation 
conceivable. 
There are, however, a number of compelling reasons for rejecting 
the concept of government insurance or indemnification other 
than-because of its potential cost and the failure to address 
the real problems underlying the crisis. Perhaps foremost among 
. those reasons is that such a program would most likely 
jeopardize among the most effective and important mechanisms 
currently existing in the private sector to protect public 
health and safety. The insurance industry plays a vital role in 
promoting public health and safety by policing insureds to 
ensure that risks of injury are minimized. Insureds who fail to 
minimize such risks, or who experience higher than normal claim 
rates, may find the desired level of insurance coverage more 
difficult to obtain and more expensive. The insurance industry 
thus plays an important role in creating incentives that protect 
public health and safety, both in policing insureds, and in 
passing uthe-benefits, of safety back to the insureds through 
• <- lower ^ premiums ,*- t v ;..,••. ---...
 f . v 
*-••-*' v While'the^rdle of insurance in promoting public health and . 
safety is,by no means .perfect,-and the above description 
admittedly is somewhat idealized, insurance creates important 
health and safety incentives which cannot be dismissed 
lightly. This critical function of insurance is undermined to 
the extent that the government supplants the private sector in 
providing insurance or indemnification, particularly for high 
risk activities. The government, even if and when it 
demonstrates the best of intentions, simply does not have the 
resources, experience, flexibility or incentives to replicate 
the activities of the private sector in policing insureds1 
practices and setting premiums to reflect claims experience. In 
addition, were the government to undertake such activities, the 
existing health and safety bureaucracies almost certainly would 
prove inadequate. Substantial additional funds, personnel and 
resources would need to be devoted to these activities, and in 
many areas new bureaucratic structures would need to be 
established. 2/ If, as seems likely, such additional 
investments of government resources are not made, government 
insurance or indemnification would operate as a clear 
disincentive to greater safety since insureds would receive 
\ 
2/ The necessary collection and analysis of relevant 
information would of itself be a major undertaking requiring 
substantial investment of additional government resources. 
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the benefit of a risk transfer to the government (and, 
accordingly, would have less incentive to protect public health 
and safety) without any corresponding checks upon their conduct 
or activities. Both the consumer and the taxpayer would be the 
ultimate losers. 
To the extent that the government institutes an insurance or 
indemnification program, such a program also would increase 
significantly in two ways the involvement of the government in 
the private sector. First, while the government, as noted, 
cannot replicate the efforts of the insurance industry, it would 
have to become involved in the activities it has insured or 
indemnified to ensure that such insurance or indemnification 
does not lead to completely open-ended liability on the part of 
the government. This necessarily would involve new additional 
forms of government supervision and regulation of private sector 
activities. 
A second undesirable but inevitable effect of such a program 
would be that the government frequently would be forced to 
manage, or at least actively oversee, the litigation of cases 
involving the liability of its insureds, since the insureds 
often would have only a limited incentive to contest 
aggressively claims, however meritless, against which they are 
fully insured or indemnified. Even putting aside the 
consideration of the massive investment of litigation resources 
that would be needed by both the insuring agencies and the 
Department of Justice, this could involve the government 
- directly*-and actively in some of the most controversial and 
visible tort litigation in our society, much of which would 
involve ^ litigation in state court under substantive, procedural 
and evidentiary rules of state law. 
An additional consideration is that such a program necessarily 
would involve the federal government in state regulation of the 
insurance industry since such regulation could have a 
significant impact on the kind of insurance or indemnification 
the federal government would have to provide. For example, 
state regulators who might wish to avoid approving politically 
unpopular rate increases or policy provisions might be far more 
inclined to withhold such approvals if they perceived the 
federal government as ready and willing to provide an 
alternative source of insurance. The federal government, in 
turn,-in order to avoid such wholesale transfers of the 
insurance burden, could very easily find itself compelled to 
regulate the insurance industry directly, or to regulate the 
state regulators. Either way, it would represent a substantial 
intrusion by the federal government into the regulation of the 
insurance industry. 
Finally, a federal program of insurance or indemnification would 
interfere with and perhaps severely inhibit the ability of the 
market to devise new policies, insurance mechanisms, and 
specific contractual provisions to meet changing economic and 
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social conditions. Where the current services of the insurance 
industry prove inadequate or unacceptable, insurers and insureds 
have strong incentives to restructure those services so that the 
needs of the marketplace can be met (witness, for example, the 
current discussions over the introduction of claims-made 
policies and the inclusion of defense costs). Where government 
insurance or indemnification is available, however, insureds may 
be far more inclined to seek such insurance (particularly where 
it is subsidized, either intentionally or unintentionally) than 
to negotiate with insurers or invest considerable effort and 
resources shopping for better conditions. Insurers, in turn, 
who may feel themselves compelled to offer otherwise 
unattractive services to customers they wish to retain, may find 
a government insurance or indemnification program a convenient 
dumping grounds for the risks they would rather spin-off. 3/ 
The end result could very well be that the ability of the 
marketplace to respond to new conditions with innovative 
solutions could be severely chilled if the "safe harbor" of 
government insurance or indemnification were available to both 
the insureds and the insurers. 4/ 
In sum, government insurance or indemnification would be a 
highly undesirable and counterproductive response to the current 
availability/affordability crisis. It effectively would amount 
to the. nationalization, of.a potentially large portion of one of 
the Nation1s leading, financial industries. And,, given the 
history of:past government involvement in the private sector, it 
is all too apparent that removing the federal government from 
the insurance industry once the purported justification for its 
presence had passed would be an arduous if not ultimately futile 
endeavor. 
3/ Such risks most likely would include the type of long-
latency, catastrophic risks endemic to toxic torts. As is 
apparent from the asbestos litigations, such insurance would 
expose the taxpayer to potentially massive liability. The 
problem of insurers spinning off certain types of business very 
likely would generate pressure for some form of federal 
regulation of such practices. 
4/ It should be noted in this regard that the contractor 
indemnification provision which the Administration supports in 
the context of Superfund reauthorization is purely discretionary 
in nature, is limited to cleanups under the control of the * 
Environmental Protection Agency, is linked to a critical 
limitation on liability (liability would be predicated only on 
negligence), and would be provided only because it will be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep this vital 
program in operation without such limited and closely regulated 
contractor indemnification (which presumably will include both 
limits and deductible?y. 
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CONCLUSION 
This report contains within it a number of c servations, 
conclusions and recommendations. The most : portant of these, 
however, for the purposes of the Tort Policy Working Group, are 
what this report implies as to the appropria e response of the 
federal government to the current crisis in insurance availability 
and affordability. In this regard, the pertinent conclusions are 
straightforward and relatively apparent. 
First; tort law appears to be a major cause of the insurance 
availability/affordability crisis. 
Second; there^are a number of beneficial reforms of tort law 
that the federal government can support and promote in sensible 
and appropriate ways. 
Third, to the extent that other factors — such as the recent 
large underwriting losses of the insurance industry — underlie 
this crisis, there is little the federal, government can or 
should do to remedy these problems. While the contribution of 
these economic factors seems clear, it is likely that these 
problems will work themselves out in the short-term as the 
insurance.industry restores its desired level of profitability, 
and as other'insurance* industry developments (see Chapter 3) are 
implemented.v It seems highly^unlikely, however, that these 
changes will substantially alleviate the crisis, particularly 
the affordability aspect of the crisis, without substantial 
reforms*of tort law. 
Fourth, the Working Croup found nothing to support the 
suggestion that this crisis could be remedied through federal 
regulation of the insurance industry or of state insurance 
regulators. 
Fifth, while a federal insurance or indemnification program 
obviously could provide subsidized insurance where insurance is 
unavailable or unaffordable, for many reasons (see Chapter 5) 
such a program would be highly undesirable and ultimately 
counterproductive. 
In sum, tort law appears to be a major cause of the insurance 
availability/affordability crisis which the federal government can 
and should address in a variety of sensible and appropriate ways. 
But significant, long-term reform cannot and should not come solely 
from the federal government. Ultimately, state governments and 
courts must address the current excesses of tort law. Their active 
participation is essential to finding workable solutions to the 
increasingly debilitating problems of tort law. 
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REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
Report: BB 
(A-88) 
Subject: Impact of Product Liability on the Development of New 
v Medical Technologies 
Presented by: Alan R. Nelson, M.D., Chairman . 
Referred to: Reference Committee B 
(Betty L. Cottle, M.D., Chairman) 
1 Resolution 6 (A-87), which was adopted by the AMA House of 
2 Delegates, calls for a study of the impact of product liability on 
3 the availability of drugs and other medical therapies. This report 
4 provides an overview of the impact of product liability lawsuits on 
5 research and development of vaccines, contraceptives, and other 
6 medical therapies, finding that product liability lawsuits are 
7 having a profound negative impact on the development and utilization 
8 of potentially life-saving medical technologies. The AHA supports 
9 continuing the efforts of tort reform. 
10 
11 INTRODUCTION 
12 
13 Product liability is having a profound negative impact on the 
14 development of new medical technologies. Innovative new products 
15 are not being developed or are being withheld from the market 
16 because of liability concerns or inability to obtain adequate 
17 insurance. Certain older technologies have been removed from the 
18 market, not because of sound scientific evidence indicating lack of 
19 safety or efficacy, but because product liability suits have exposed 
20 manufacturers to unacceptable financial risks. 
21 
22 The number of cases commenced in federal courts involving 
23 product liability generally has increased at a compounded annual 
24 rate exceeding 17% over the last 14 yearsl (see Figure 1). From. 
25 1974 to 1985 the average jury award in product liability suits 
26 climbed from $494,580 to $1,850,452. It is estimated that only 
27 one-third of the award goes to the plaintiff; the remainder covers 
28 attorney's fees and court costs. .% 
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1 pharmaceutical manufacturers have been hard hit by product 
2 liability suits, especially manufacturers of vaccines and 
3 contraceptive agents. The number of lawsuits filed against the 
4 manufacturers of DTP (diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis 
5 vaccine), for example, has climbed from fewer than 100 during the 
6 three-year period 1982-1984 to 110 in 1986 alone. Current legal 
7 interpretation of product liability law, especially the doctrine of 
8 strict liability, diminishes the incentives of a manufacturer to 
9 research, develop, and produce vaccines. 
10 
11 It has been claimed that the main culprit in skyrocketing 
12 liability insurance rates is the insurance industry, which 
13 purportedly made imprudent investments in the early 1980s when 
14 interest rates were high and now charges exorbitant premiums because 
15 the interest rates have dropped.2 Evidence clearly shows that the 
16 profits of the insurance industry vary significantly from year to 
17 year, and interest rates are an important determinant of insurance 
18 industry profits. A recent study, however, demonstrated that the 
19 rise in liability insurance premiums is not due to collusion among 
20 insurers, cyclical behavior, or systematic errors in forecasting 
21 losses, but to growth in the discounted value of expected liability 
22 losses.3 In the pharmaceutical industry meaningful product 
23 liability insurance has all but disappeared. According to one 
24 financial analyst in London, "Lloyds and other companies have become 
25 very cautious about this type of business in the US because of 
26 unpredictability . . . . It has been difficult for them to assess 
27 the level of likely claims and hence to price business.M* 
28 
29 This report will describe the different legal doctrines used in 
30 product liability suits and discuss the impact of product liability 
31 on the manufacturers of vaccines, contraceptives, and other drugs 
32 and devices. 
33 
34 THEORIES OF RECOVERY 
35 
36 Product liability suits typically employ one of three legal 
37 doctrines: negligence, breach of warranty, or strict liability. 
38 Negligence is a violation of the duty to use ordinary and 
39 reasonable care with respect to persons to whom a duty of care is 
40 owed. To sue for negligence in product liability, a plaintiff must 
41 show that defendant breached his or her responsibility to exercise 
42 reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, testing, or 
43 inspection of the product or in providing adequate warning 
44 concerning the use of the product. A drug manufacturer would likely 
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1 be found negligent if a drug was not manufactured in accordance with 
2 "current good manufacturing practices," and the specific failure was 
3 causally linked to the injury. Currently, most drug and medical 
4 device manufacturers follow good manufacturing practices, and few 
5 cases of negligence result from defective manufacture, assembly, or 
6 testing and inspection of finished products. Most suits invoking 
7 the negligence doctrine base their claim on the duty to warn, 
8 although, increasingly, plaintiffs allege failure to conduct 
9 adequate general safety testing and sometimes improper design. 
10 
11 The duty to warn can be applied in suits invoking either the 
12 negligence or strict liability doctrines. Generally, the legal duty 
13 is to warn medical professionals, as "learned intermediaries," about 
14 the inherent dangers in the use of the product. Learned 
15 intermediaries are presumed able to understand the risks and weigh 
16 them against the expected benefits to be derived from use of the 
17 product and are expected to uphold their fiduciary responsibility to 
18 do what is in the best interests of their patients. The concept of 
19 learned intermediary has generally relieved manufacturers of 
20 responsibility to warn patients directly of the dangers inherent in 
21 the use of a drug or medical device. Manufacturers have been held 
22 liable, however, if their package inserts, "Dear Doctor" letters, 
23 advertising, promotional materials, or the activities of their sales 
24 staff provide misleading, insufficient, or ambiguous information on 
25 risks associated with the use of the drug and thereby prevent 
26 physicians from making informed decisions. 
27 
28 A manufacturer is legally held to the standards of an expert and 
29 is responsible for keeping abreast and informing the medical 
30 community of newly discovered adverse effects. The adequacy of the 
31 warning is generally based on the level of knowledge at the time of 
32 the injury. A manufacturer has not been expected to warn of dangers 
33 discovered subsequent to the injury, about which they could not have 
34 known at the time of the injury. 
35 
36 The scope of liability based on negligence may have been 
37 expanded by the case of Toner v. Lederle Laboratories.5 In this 
38 case a young boy was paralyzed from the neck down after receiving 
39 the whole cell DTP vaccine. The plaintiff's lawyer alleged that the 
40 manufacturer knew how to make a pertussis vaccine that was safer and 
41 equally effective but did not pursue development. The attorney for 
42 the defense argued that the effectiveness of .the split cell vaccine 
43 was unproven. The jury held that Lederle was negligent for "failing 
44 to design or manufacture a safer vaccine," and returned a $1.13 
45 million judgment for the plaintiff on that basis. 
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1 There are two types of warranties, express and implied. The 
2 doctrine of express breach of warranty allows recovery from a 
3 manufacturer whose product did not conform to an assertion by the 
4 manufacturer, when, as a result of that lack of conformance, the 
5 plaintiff was injured. Express warranties are based on oral or 
6 written statements and can be absolute. For example, if a drug 
7 company specifically stated there were no contraindications to a 
8 drug but an individual was later shown to have a contraindication to 
9 that drug (even if the contraindication was discovered subsequent to 
10 the statement), the manufacturer could be liable for breach of 
11 warranty. As stated by the courts, "The obligation of a warranty is 
12 absolute, and is imposed as a matter of law irrespective of whether 
13 the seller knew or should have known of the falsity of his 
14 representations."6 Implied warranties are created by statute and 
15 attach to all sales. They attach if the product has been 
16 distributed in a truly "defective" state (ie, is not fit for the 
17 intended purpose or deviates from similar goods) and if the 
18 "defective" product resulted in personal injury. Breach of express 
19 warranty is relatively easy to avoid and defend against in 
20 comparison to negligence and strict liability, and although breach 
21 of implied warranty is still alleged in most cases, it has been 
22 displaced in most cases by negligence and strict liability in 
23 medical product liability suits. 
24 
25 Strict liability holds a defendant iiable for a "defective" 
26 product regardless of fault. The plaintiff must simply show that 
27 the product was defective or unreasonably dangerous and that it 
28 caused physical harm. The public policy rationale behind the 
29 doctrine of strict liability is: 
30 
31 On whatever theory, the justification for the strict 
32 liability has been said to be that the seller, by marketing 
33 .- his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and 
34 assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the 
35 consuming public who may be injured by it; that the public 
36 has the right to and does expect, in the case of products 
37 which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the 
38 seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their 
39 goods; that public policy demands that the burden of 
40 accidental injuries caused by products intended for 
41 consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be 
42 treated as a cost of production against which liability 
43 insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such 
44 products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the 
45 hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are 
46 those who market the products.7 
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1 Almost all states recognize that there are some products, such 
2 as prescription drugs and vaccines, that cannot be made completely 
3 safe. Manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products are specifically 
4 protected from strict liability by those states that have adopted 
5 comment k of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: 
6 
7 Unavoidably Unsafe Products: There are some products 
8 which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite 
9 incapable of being made safe for their intended and 
10 ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of 
11 drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the 
12 Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to 
13 very serious and damaging consequences when it is 
14 injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a 
15 dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the 
16 vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the 
17 unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a 
18 product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper 
19 directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it 
20 unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other 
21 drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very 
22 reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians or tinder 
23 the prescription of a physician. It is also true in 
24 particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, 
25 because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient 
26' medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or 
27 perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience 
28 as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug 
29 notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller 
30 of such products, again with the qualification that they 
31 are properly prepared and marketed and proper warning is 
32 given, ... is not to be held to strict liability for 
33 unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely 
34 - because he has undertaken to supply the public with an 
35 apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a 
36 known but apparently reasonable risk. 
37 
38 At least one court, however, has held that, under certain 
39 circumstances, a drug may not be afforded protection by comment k of 
40 the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In Feldman v. Lederle 
41 Laboratories8 the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: 
42 
43 We see no reason to hold as a matter of law that all 
44 prescription drugs that are unsafe are unavoidably so. 
45 Drugs, like other products may contain defects that could 
46 have been avoided.by better manufacturing or design. 
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1 Thus, although a drug has been through the rigorous FDA approval 
2 process and found by that expert regulatory agency to be safe and 
3 efficacious, some courts have decided that it is a jury question as 
4 to whether drugs contain "defects'* that could have been avoided. 
5 
6 IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY ON DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL THERAPIES 
7 
8 Effect of Product Liability on Vaccine Manufacturers: 
9 
10 Vaccines are one of the great success stories of medicine. 
11 Their impact on the prevalence of communicable diseases has been 
12 very impressive, and the amount of suffering and pain prevented by 
13 vaccines is incalculable. For example, the prevalence af measles 
14 dropped from 315.2 per 100,000 population in 1950 to 0.6 per 100,000 
15 in 1983.9 "The number of cases of poliomyelitis dropped from 
16 57,000 in 1952 to 4 in 1984. Smallpox has been eradicated from the 
17 world, while diseases such as tetanus, diphtheria, and polio have 
18 been extensively controlled. Vaccines are still an extremely 
19 important means of preventing the spread of disease and are needed 
20 for #,herd immunity." In England, when the DTP vaccination rate 
21 dropped from 79% in 1973 to 31% in 1978, there was an epidemic 
22 outbreak of pertussis.' 
23 
24 Vaccines do have some risks. The most serious vaccine-related 
25 injuries and their estimated prevalence are shown in Table 1. I 
26 in society's interest to adequately compensate vaccinees who are 
27 injured by vaccination. The issue is not whether to compensate the 
28 injured parties but to determine a method to compensate for injuries 
29 directly resulting from vaccination that is fair to the injured, the 
30 manufacturer, and society at large. 
31 
32 .-Until 1986 (see below), the tort system was the only formal 
33 setting in which to determine compensation~for parties directly 
34 injured from vaccination. Successful vaccine liability suits 
35 usually were based on a failure to warn. Vaccine manufacturers are 
36 considered to have a greater responsibility to warn recipients than 
37 do the makers of most pharmaceuticals or medical devices and are 
38 generally obliged to ensure that any warnings accompanying their 
39 vaccines are actually communicated to the vaccinee rather than 
40 simply to the physician. This duty to warn the vaccinee rather than 
41 the physician is an exception to the concept of the "learned 
42 intermediary". In Davis v. Wveth Laboratories10 the courts ruled 
43 that, when vaccines are administered at mass immunization clinics, 
44 there is no learned intermediary, and ix? is the "responsibility of 
45 the manufacturer to see that warnings reach each consumer, either by 
46 giving the warning itself or by obligating the purchaser to give 
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1 warning.n Subsequent court decisions concluding that vaccination 
2 procedures are so routine as to remove the learned intermediary from 
3 the process, have expanded the manufacturer's duty to warn to 
4 include immunizations in a private physician's office. 
6 In Reves v. Wveth Laboratories** the federal courts held that, 
7 even though the polio vaccine was properly produced and 
8 administered, shipped with printed warnings, and there was strong 
9 evidence that the disease was caused by an unrelated wild virus 
10 rather than by the vaccine, the manufacturer was liable because it 
11 should have warned the plaintiff's parents that there was a remote 
12 possibility that the vaccine might cause polio. The reasoning was, 
13 
14 Statistically predictable as are these rare cases of 
15 vaccine-induced polio, a strong argument can be advanced 
16 that the loss ought not to lie where it falls, but should 
17 be borne by the manufacturer as a foreseeable cost of doing 
18 business, and passed on to the public in the form of price 
19 increases to his customers. 
20 
21 Over the last 10 years the number of liability suits filed 
22 against vaccine manufacturers has increased significantly, 
23 resulting in vaccine prices that greatly exceed the inflation rate 
24 (see Figure 2). 
25 
26 The reluctance of manufacturers to produce vaccines without 
27 adequate protection from product liability suits was also 
28 exemplified by the swine flu vaccine difficulties during the Ford 
29 Administration. In 1976, the CDC forecast a probable outbreak of 
30 the swine flu and recommended a national immunization program. 
31 Vaccine manufacturers and their insurers refused to produce vaccines 
32 for the national program without special protection from liability. 
33 According to one insurance executive, "new liability doctrines made 
34 the manufacturers uninsurable at any price."*2 Legislation had to 
35 be enacted making the United States the sole possible defendant in 
36 any action for damages arising out of the swine flu vaccination 
37 program. Thousands of claims were filed producing conflicting court 
38 decisions that exacerbated the uncertainty prompted by Reves v 
39 Wveth. The government paid almost $80 million, much of it to people 
40 immunized for swine flu who contracted Guillain-Barre syndrome. 
41 
42 Because of product liability concerns and an inability to obtain 
43 reasonably priced insurance, several companies, including Wyeth and 
44 Parke-Davis, ceased producing childhood vaccines.13 
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1 More recently, the manufacturer of a vaccine for Japanese 
2 encephalitis discontinued its distribution in this country because 
3 the firm was unable to obtain liability insurance. Individuals 
4 traveling to the rural areas of India, China, Korea, Nepal, Burma, 
5 and Thailand may be at increased risk of developing encephalitis 
6 because of the withdrawal of this vaccine from the US market.14 
7 
8 Considerable concern has been expressed regarding the impact of 
9 product liability on the development of valuable vaccines in the 
10 future. For example, a headline in Science pointedly questioned 
11 HWill an AIDS vaccine bankrupt the company that makes it?"15 
12 Brian Cunninghan (Vice President and General Counsel for Genentech) 
13 stated, "As the law stands today, manufacturers are held liable for 
14 injuries caused by a vaccine even though they were not negligent in 
15 designing it. In these circumstances, in my opinion, the legal 
16 system has simply run amuck. And for a small company like 
17 Genentech, we simply cannot take the financial risk."15 Recently 
18 the National Academy of Sciences found: 
19 
20 Given the extremely high cost of vaccine development 
21 programs and the present concerns over liability for 
22 vaccine-related injuries, many manufacturers may be 
23 unwilling to initiate or pursue the derivation or 
24 distribution of a vaccine to prevent AIDS.16 
25 
26 The doctrine of a duty to warn is predicated on the assumption 
27 that the informed individual has the freedom to weigh the risks 
28 against the benefits and to decide whether or not to purchase or use 
29 the product.1^ Most vaccinees, however, especially those 
30 receiving vaccines required for school entry, often do not have the 
31 freedom to reject immunization. Therefore, other forums for 
32 compensation of the injured are generally considered necessary. In 
33 1986, Congress passed a bill to provide an alternative environment 
34 to settle compensation questions regarding vaccines required for 
35 school entry. This grew out of the recognition that the courts are 
36 an inappropriate setting in which to settle such questions. The 
37 bill did not make its compensation mechanism an exclusive remedy and 
38 continues to permit these cases to be brought as lawsuits in the 
39 traditional court system. On November 14, 1986, President Reagan 
40 signed this legislation into law. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
41 Act of 1987 established an excise tax to fund future claims and to 
42 authorize appropriations from general revenues to fund preexisting 
43 claims. The excise tax, taking effect January 1, 1988, is $4.56 per 
44 dose for DTP, $4.44 per dose for MMR, $0.29 per dose for 
45 poliomyelitis vaccine (both oral and injectable), and $0.06 per dose 
46 for diphtheria and tetanus vaccines.18 
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1 All vaccines have some inherent risk. However, society has 
2 gained tremendously by mass vaccination programs. It would be a 
3 travesty to have product liability concerns adversely affect the 
4 continued development and utilization of this life saving 
5 technology. The no-fault compensation program of 1986, while far 
6 from perfect, is a step in the right direction. 
7 
8 Analysis of Contraception Liability: 
9 
10 Contraceptive research and product development has been greatly 
11 impeded by product liability concerns. In the early 1970s, there 
12 were 13 pharmaceutical companies actively pursuing research in 
13 contraception and fertility. Now, only one US company conducts 
14 contraceptive and fertility research.*9 Unless the liability laws 
15 are drastically altered, it is very unlikely that pharmaceutical 
16 companies will aggressively pursue research in this area. 
17 
18 The Director of the National Institute of Child Health and Human 
19 Development has expressed concern about this issue:^0 
20 
21 Research [is constrained by] a system that becomes driven 
22 primarily by concerns over lawsuits. This is already 
23 affecting our institute's research program in two ways. 
24 First, our ability to test new drugs and devices related to 
25 pregnancy has been curtailed because of the inability of 
26 some of the investigators we support to obtain liability 
27 insurance for the testing at any price. If we cannot do 
28 the clinical testing, we cannot bring new products to the 
29 public. Second, our ability to conduct research on 
30 alternative obstetric practices to what is standard, 
31 accepted and safe from a medicolegal standpoint faces 
32 constraints based on fear of a malpractice suit if an 
33 j adverse outcome occurs in the experimental group....When we 
34 are forced into a situation where we-must follow 
35 established dogma rather than be allowed to try something 
36 new and possibly better for fear of a malpractice suit, 
37 medical research and progress will come to a halt and the 
38 health care of our people will suffer. This must not be 
39 allowed to happen. 
40 
41 But it may already be happening. In 1986, a landmark case 
42 allowed recovery of $4.7 million from Ortho Pharmaceutical 
43 Corporation by a woman claiming that her child's birth defects 
44 resulted from use of Ortho-Gynol Jelly.21 This ruling was upheld 
45 on appeal in spite of overwhelming scientific evidence that 
46 contraceptive gels are not teratogenic. The FDA had previously 
47 reviewed the data and concluded that no warning about possible 
48 teratogenicity was necessary. The courts allowed the judgment of 
49 persons with no medical training to overrule the federal agency 
50 which has the responsibility and the medical expertise to ensure 
51 that drugs are safe and effective. The appellate court ruled: 
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1 Plaintiffs' burden of proving that Katie Wells' defects 
2 were caused by the product did not necessarily require them 
3 to produce scientific studies showing a statistically 
4 significant association between spermicides and congenital 
5 malformations in a large population . . .. [I]t does not 
6 matter in terms of deciding the case that the medical 
7 community might require more research and evidence before 
8 conclusively resolving the question.22 
9 
10 This indicates that the courts will now allow as the sole basis 
11 for liability anecdotal evidence that is considered unacceptable by 
12 the scientific standards of the day23* The appellate court stated: 
13 
14 We recognize, as did the Ferebee court, that a cause-effect 
15 relationship need not be clearly established by animal or 
16 epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that, 
17 in his opinion, such a relationship exists. As long as the 
18 basic methodology employed to reach such a conclusion is 
19 sound, such as use of tissue samples, standard tests and 
20 patient examination, products liability law does not 
21 preclude recovery until a "statistically significant" 
22 number of people have been injured or until science has had 
23 the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory 
24 studies of the chemical.24 
25 
26 Intrauterine devices have also been under attack from plaintiff 
27 lawyers alleging negligence. The manufacturers of all but one IUD 
28 have stopped their distribution and sale within the US because of 
29 product liability concerns (a second manufacturer of IUDs has 
30 recently entered the US market). The Oalkon Shield, manufactured by 
31 A.H. Robins, exposed some users to higher than normal risks of 
32 pelvic inflammatory disease and infertility. Trial evidence 
33 suggests that Robins may have known of the risks uniquely associated 
34 with its IUD yet did not inform physicians or the public of the 
35 problems. A relatively small number of plaintiff lawyers 
36 specialized in handling suits against the makers of the Dalkon 
37 Shield and were able to obtain adequate cash flows from out-of-court 
38 settlements. However, in 1985 Robins declared bankruptcy, which 
39 caused all of the outstanding cases to be consolidated in the 
40 bankruptcy courts, halting all settlements and eliminating the 
41 source of cash flows for the lawyers. At that point, these same 
42 lawyers began focusing their attention on other IUD manufacturers, 
43 especially G.D. Searle Company. The number of suits filed against 
44 Searle shot up to 800 by 1986, and Searle spent $1.5 million 
45 defending the last four trials alone.25* In January 1986, Searle 
46 removed the Cu-7 IUD from the market, citing "unwarranted product 
47 litigation" as the main reason for its action. At that time, the 
48 .total sales for Cu-7 were only $11 million annually. One 
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1 study reported that the withdrawal of the Cu-7 and TCu-200 IUDs from 
2 the market by Searle and the earlier withdrawal of Ortho 
3 Pharmaceutical Corporation's Lippes Loop IUD in September 1985 left 
4 an estimated 1.4 million women in need of an alternative method of 
5 birth control. This situation may result in an increase of up to 
6 123,000 pregnancies per year.26 
7 
8 Analysis of Other Drug and Medical Device Product Liability: 
9 
10 Small drug and device manufacturers, including much of the 
11 medical biotechnology industry, are very susceptible to product 
12 liability suits and rising liability insurance premiums. It is not 
13 surprising, therefore, that a survey discovered that over two-thirds 
14 of biotechnology companies consider product liability an important 
15 factor to consider when deciding whether to proceed with commercial 
16 introduction.27 Nearly 60% felt that tort reform was needed to 
17 limit liability, and over one-third of small and mid-size companies 
18 may refuse to bring a product to market unless liability insurance 
19 is available. The threat of product liability suits has even halted 
20 the distribution of investigational drugs under study. For example, 
21 the distribution of Botulinum A toxin, an investigational drug used 
22 to treat strabismus and blepharospasm, conditions for which no- good 
23 alternative therapy exists, had to be halted for many months due to 
24 lack of product liability insurance. 
25 
26 One of the most disconcerting movements by the courts is their 
27 willingness to ignore overwhelming scientific evidence when 
28 determining whether a product was the "proximate cause'9 of the 
29 injury. For example, in addition to the Wells case discussed above, 
30 the prescription drug Bendectin was withdrawn from the market not 
31 because of scientific evidence of its hazards but because of the 
32 large number of lawsuits against the manufacturer. The American 
33 College of Obstetrics and Gynecology felt that Bendectin was safe 
34 and effective in treating nausea and vomiting of pregnancy. The 
35 College stated, "The decision by Merrell Dow [to discontinue the 
36 distribution of Bendectin] creates a significant therapeutic gap. 
37 Nausea and vomiting during pregnancy cannot always be treated by 
38 symptomatic means, and in the past year, severe cases have led to 
39 serious maternal nutritional as well as other deficiencies."2S 
40 
41 In 1987, the FDA developed a new set of regulations in an 
42 attempt to get potentially life-saving drugs to desperately ill 
43 patients more rapidly. The new regulations, known as the Treatment 
44 IND regulations, allow physicians to prescribe selected drugs to 
45 patients while the drugs are still in%Phase III; occasionally drugs 
46 can be distributed late in Phase II trials if the manufacturer is 
47 willing to make them available. This new system may remove a 
48 regulatory block to improved patient care. The potential of product 
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1 liability suits, however, threatens use of the Treatment IND 
2 process. A Chief Executive Officer of a major pharmaceutical 
3 company has stated, "the product liability specialist could take 
4 someone to court and convince a sympathetic jury that the venal drug 
5 company in its desire to charge for drugs as soon as possible took 
6 advantage of a sick and dying person and deprived him or her of his 
7 last few precious weeks on earth."29 
8 
9 RECENT CHANGES IN STATE LAWS REGARDING PRODUCT LIABILITY 
10 
11 Nineteen states have enacted new legislation addressing product 
12 liability (see Table 2). Some have incorporated provisions 
13 specifically protecting drug and device manufacturers. For example, 
14 Ohio, Oregon, New Jersey, and Texas provide a defense to punitive 
15 damages against a manufacturer if the drug was approved by the FDA 
16 and a manufacturer acted with due diligence when any additional 
17 risks were reported. New Jersey also established a rebuttable 
18 presumption that a warning which has been approved by the FDA is 
19 adequate. 
20 
21 CONCLUSION 
22 
23 The AMA recognizes that product liability issues are having a 
24 profound negative impact on the development and utilization of 
25 potentially life-saving medical technologies. Laws developed to 
26 protect the public at large can sometimes hurt the very individuals 
27 they were meant to protect. Basic biomedical research is 
28 deteriorating in certain fields because product liability inhibits 
29 utilizing that research to develop new medical products. Small 
30 companies involved in innovative research, such as many of the 
31 biotechnology firms, are delaying or foregoing certain product 
32 releases because of inability to obtain adequate insurance 
33 coverage. Finally, useful products are being taken off the market 
34 because the discoimted costs of defending litigation and purchasing 
35 insurance premiums can sometimes exceed the projected profits for 
36 the product. 
37 
38 Patients deserve to receive the best medicine that can be 
39 provided. There is a social responsibility to protect individuals 
40 from unnecessary harm and to compensate a person when wronged, but 
41 there is also a responsibility to protect manufacturers from 
42 unjustified liability when, using the best available knowledge, they 
43 develop products that, although unavoidably unsafe, offer such 
44 benefits that their manufacture and distribution greatly benefits 
45 society as a whole. It is particularly*important to eliminate tort 
46 liability that is predicated not on the manufacturer's unacceptable 
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1 conduct but rather on the injured person's "need" for compensation 
2 or the manufacturer's presumed ability to provide that 
3 compensation. To do less will jeopardize all citizens, which would 
4 be the greatest miscarriage of justice. 
5 
6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
7 
8 The Board of Trustees recommends that: 
The AMA urge the continuation of efforts at the state^level 
11 to reform product liability form; and 
12 
13 2. The AMA support creative solutions to prevent product 
1 4
 liability suits from slowing the development and utilization </ 
15 of medical technologies in this country, j J^\ 
9 
10 
* • 
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The scene is a typical one. A patient, perhaps you or It goes to a doctor and gets a prescription. Then a pharmacist fills 
the prescription, with instructions to take the drug in the pre-
scribed amount and manner over the following days, weeks or 
; morjth*. This scene is repealed millions of times across this 
country every day—some 1.6 billion prescriptions are filled 
every yea/ in the United States, an average of seven for; every 
man, woman and child. In fact, the process is so commonplace 
that the pills* tablets, capsule* and other medications that vir-
tually every one of us relies on to restore or maintain good i 
health sd tome point in our lives come to be taken for granted.* 
Yet theie drugs—arid the improved quality of health they j 
bring to the American people—ere truly "miracle* of modern 
science/*Jin fact/the process for discovering, developing and' 
testing new drugs encompasses some of the most exciting areas 
of scientific discovery today* The endeavor runs the gamut !, 
from bask biomedical investigation of living cells and mole- ; 
culei to applied research that yields new consumer products to 
Improve health care,, j . \
 L . 
\ I THE CUTTING EDQE 
I 
L » 
"Wt art on the cutting edge of the biological sciences,;' says 
RhodaOruen,a Wodirnlst'at Hoffmann-La Roche* Imi,,a 
leading pharmaceutical research and manufacturing flrrh, head-
quartered in Nutley, N.J. "We suck up new information like a 
sponge. Everything we do is subject to change as new scien-
tific information becomes known.** i I i 
The research process is a complicated, time-consuming, and 
costly one whose end result is never known at the outset. Dis-
covering a new drug has been likened to searching for the 
proverbial needle in a haystack. Literally hundreds and some-
times thousands of chemical compounds must be made and 
tested to find one that can achieve the desirable result without 
too-serious side effects.1 ^ j | j 
The complexity of the process can be gauged, in part, by the 
diversity of scientific disciplines engaged in finding new drugs. 
Traditional organic chemists, physiologists and statisticians 
have been joined in recent years by new kinds of specialists. 
Biochemists study the chemistry of life processes. Molecular 
biologists study the molecules that make up living matter. Tox-
icologies investigate chemicals' potential for harm. Phar-
macologists look at how drugs work. And computer scientists 
apply the power of their sophisticated machines to analyze and 
'assess new chemicals. Each provides a different way of look-
ing for that needle. ; :•• ,' . j j | 
Such a complicated prooess costs vast amounts of time and 
! money. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
I (PM A), a trade group of rcscardh-bascd drugmakers, says 10 
! years or more are needed to study and test a new drug before 
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the Food and Drug Administration can approve it for the gen-
eral public. That includes early laboratory and animal testing, , 
the subject of,this article, as well as later clinical trials using I 
human subjects! (See page 10.) i 
Drug companies spend about $65 million, on average, to de-
velop a new drug, says economist Steven Wiggins of Texas 
A&M University. Actually, Wiggins, who conducted a study 
on the costs of drug development on behalf of PMA, says the 
real cost of bringing a drug to market is more like $125 mil-
lion. That includes what the economists call the opportunity 
cost of investing money in research whose payoff may be years 
away, instead of in a more immediate moneymaking venture. 
A company such as Hoffmann-La Roche, whose annual sales 
in the United States alone exceeds $1 billion, spends about $2 
million each business day on research worldwide. j 
BUILDING ON GOOD SCIENtE , """"" 
There is no standard route by which the 2,400 drugs now sold 
in the United States were developed. "Each drug has its own 
way of being born,** says Clement Stone, senior vice president 
for Merck, Sharp & Dohmc research laboratories, West Point, 
Pa. •'Often we consciously search for.a drug for a specific use, 
. but more often it is serendipity. What is required, though, is 
good science building on good scienci."
 ( 
In some cases, a pharmaceutical company decides to develop 
a new drug aimed at a specific disease or medical condition. In 
• others, company scientists.may be free to pursue an interesting 
. or promising line of research. And, in yet others, new findings 
from university, government or other laboratories may point 
. the way for drug companies to follow in their own research. 
Indeed, the process typically combines elements of all three 
avenues. "We let our scientists do and make use of the best re-
search they can in their fields/* says Ronald Kuntzman, vice 
• president for research and development at Hoffmann-La 
Roche. "The only question we ask as a company is whether 
• this research it leading toward development of a new drug." 
N^w drug research starts by studying how the body func- * 
tiomj, both normally and abnormally, at its most basic levels. 
The pertinent question, Kuntzman says, is: "If I change it (the 
body's functioning!, will I have a useful drug?",That, in turn, 
leads to a concept of how a drug might be used to prevent, cure 
or treat a disease or medical condition. Once the concept has 
been developed, the researcher has • target to aim for, Kuntz-
man adds. I •*'.••-''*,'.';' '•; 
Omen elaborates: "Disease processes ire complex and in-
volve a sequence of events, (f you want io intervene in the dis-
ease process, you try to break it down into hs component parts. 
You then analyze those parts to find out what abnormal events, 
ut occurring at the cellular and molecular levels, You would 
then select a particular step as a target for drug development 
with the aim of correcting the cellular or molecular dysfunc-
tion," 
g • * UPC Wir 
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A NEW CHOLESTEROL DRUG 
Tike cholesterol, a Wax-like substance found naturally in the 
body. Too much cholesterol,j either naturally or in the diet, gin 
cause h to build upon the inikfe walls of blood vessels. This 
* \ ' • 
can clog the arteries that deliver blood to the heart muscle, 
blocking the flow of oxygen and nutrients, causing a heart at-
tack. 
There have been few drugs that effectively cut cholesterol 
levels without either toxic or unpleasant side effects. This has 
;limited their use. Others that were tested acted too late in the 
process by which the body makes cholesterol to lower its lev-
els. What was needed, says Eve Slater, a cardiologist and "K 
Merck's director for biomedical research, was a drug that 
would act earlier in the cholesterol-making process. 
To find one, scientists at Merck and elsewhere spent decades 
studying how the body makes and uses cholesterol. Along the 
Way they identified more than 20 biochemical reactions neces-
sary for the body to make cholesterol, along with the enzymes 
required at each step to turn one chemical into the next one in 
the chain. 
The research problem. Slater says, was to find the step 
where interference by a drug would effectively lower cho-
lesterol production. By the 1970s, scientists had found a pos- * 
sibility. They had isolated a chemical, mevalonic acid, that, 
was an early link in the cholesterol chain and an enzyme called 
HMG-CoA reductase that produced mevalonic acid.: 
What was needed, then, was a drug that could either inhibit 
HMG-CoA reductase or prevent cells from correctly using the 
enzyme. ' 
Sometimes, scientists arc lucky and find the right compound 
quickly. More often, Gruen says, hundreds QT even thousands 
must be tested. In a series of test tube experiments called as* 
says, compounds are added one at a time to enzymes, cell cul-
tures, or cellular substances grown in a laboratory. The goal is 
• to find which show some chemical effect. Some may not work 
well, but may hint at ways of changing the compound's chemi-
cal structure to improve its performance. The latter process 
alone may require testing dozens or hundreds of compounds. 
——
 ;
 H— — 
COMPUTER CtrUES 
A more high-tech approach is to use computers to simulate 
an enzyme or other drug target and to design chemical struc-
tures that might work against it. Enzymes work when they at-
tach to the correct site on a cell's membrane. A computer can 
show scientists what the receptor site looks like and how one 
might tailora'compound to block an enzyme from attaching 
there. ' ; . 
Nevertheless, "computers give chemists clues to which ' 
compounds to make, bit they don't give any final answers," 
says Kuntzman. "You still have to put any compoundyou u 
made based on a computer (simulation] into a biological sys-
tem to see if it works." 
Yet a third approach involves testing compounds made natu-
rally by microscopic organisms. Candidates include fungi, vi- , 
ruses and molds, such as those that led to penicillin and other 
. antibiotics. Scientists grow the microorganisms in what they 
call a fermentation broth, One type of organism per broth. 
Sometimes 100,000 or more broths are tested to see whether 
any compound made by a microorganism has a desirable 
eff<*> \ I 
In the icferch for a tew cholesterol drug, scientists found a 
funguf that inhibited the HMG-CoA reductase enzyme'In a test 
i • ! 
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Pharmaceutical firms conduct laboratory and 
animal research with new drugs before they can 
begin experiments with humans. Scientists at 
'»*
r
 Hoffmann-La Roche conduct basic research Into 
normal life processes (above) as well as studies 
targeted to developing specific new drugs. The '. 
. Investigator, In the above right photo Is studying 
y obesity In laboratory rats, with the ultimate 
*' • goat of developing medicines to control obesity 
.' In humans: | '; ' ' . ' • •' 
(Photos courtesy of Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 
Nutley.NJ.) 
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tube. Chemists then had to identify which of the fungus' 
dozens of chemical byproducts was actually inhibiting the en-
zyme. Once that was done, the chemical*s structure was ana-
lyzed and improved on to enhance its effects. 
To this point, the search for a new drug has been confined to 
a laboratory test tube. Next, scientists have to test those com-
pounds that have shown at least some desired effects in living 
animals. "We have to find what the drug is doing on the down 
side," Kuntzman explains. 
ANIMAL TESTING 
In animal testing, Kuntzman says, drug companies make every 
effort to use as few animals as possible and to ensure their hu-
mane and proper care. Two or more species are typically 
tested, since a drug may affect one differently from another. 
Such tests show whether a potential drug has toxic side effects 
and what its safety is at different doses. The results "point the 
'way for human testing and, much later, product labeling/* 
1 Kuntzman says.. 
| So far, research has ainted at discovering what a drug does 
t to the body. Now, it must also find out what the body does to 
J the tfrug. So, in animal testing, scientists measure how much j 
! of a drug is absorbed into the blood, how it is broken down j 
j chemically in the body, the toxicity of its breakdown products1. 
| (metabolites), and how quickly the drug and its metabolites are 
i Excreted from the body. Sometimes such tests find a metabolite 
i that is more effective than the drug originally picked for de- j 
J vplopment. j j * ' ' j \i I 
\ j Of particular Concern i* h6w much of the drug is absorbed i 
| Into the blood. "If a drug s active ingredients don't get into the 
j blood/* Kuntzman says, "it won't work/* Scientists may add 
I other chemicals to the drug to help the body absorb it or. Ion j 
1 
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the other side, to prevent it from being broken down and ex-
creted too soon. Such changes in the drug's structure mean 
even more testing. 
Absorption rates can caW a host of problems. For example, 
for a certain drug to be effective, 75 percent of it may need to 
reach the bloodstream. But absorption rates can vary among in-
dividuals from, say, 10 percent to 80 percent. So, the drug 
must be able to produce the desired effects in those who absorb 
only 10 percent, but not cause intolerable side effects in people 
who absorb 80 percent. 
44If we can improve the absorption rate *we can reduce the 
variation in what real dosages people would be subject to," 
Kuntzman says. A more standard absorption rate for all indi-
viduals, say around 75 percent to 80 percent, would mean that 
the dose could be reduced and still have the desired effects. 
THE WRONG ROAD 
By this time in the testing process, many drugs that had 
seemed promising have fallen by the wayside. More often than 
many scientists care to admit, researchers have to just give up 
when a drug is poorly absorbed, is unsafe, or simply doesn't 
work. "In research you have to know when to cut your losses 
if you are going down a wrong road," says Merck's Clement 
Stone. And,he adds, there are many more wrong roads than 
right ones. 
Nevertheless, progress may yet be made. Occasionally, 
Storte says, a stubborn scientist keeps looking and finds a us-
able compound after others had given up. In other cases, com-
pounds may be put aside because they failed to work on one 
disease, only to be taken off the shelf years later and found to 
work on another. i 
. Such was the case was zidovudine (formerly known as 
azidothymidine, or AZT), the first drug approved for treatment 
of AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome). The drug 
was first studied in 1964 as an anti-cancer drug, but it showed 
little promise. It was not until the 1980s, when desperate 
searches began for a way to treat victims of the deadly AIDS 
* virus*, that scientists at Burroughs Wellcome Co., of Research 
! Triangle Park, N.C., took another look afzidovudine. After it 
showed very positive results in human testing, it was quickly 
approved by FDA in March 11987. 
Even so, "a minuscule number of drugs we test ever reach 
.testing in man/* says Richard Salvador, a Hoffmann-La Roche 
vice president and director of preclinical development. The Up-
john Company of Kalamazoo, Mich.,.estimates that of every 
2,000 chemicals studied, only 200 show any potential in early 
tests. Only 20 of those may be tested in people, and only one 
may be safe and effective enough to reach pharmacy shelves. 
Other estimates are gloomier—PMA puts it at one in 10.000. 
One of the most important new products to gain FDA ap-
• proval for testing in people is a vaccine to protect against 
\ AIDS. In August 1987, FDAiapproved human studies of such 
a vaccine developed by MicroGcneSys, Inc., of West Haven, 
i Conn. 
1 ( THE ROLE OF FDA 
\ The role of FDAHp the early %\&%t% of drug research is- small. 
! The Food, Drug, ahd Cosmetic Act requires FDA to ensure 
; that the new drugs developed by pharmaceutical companies arc 
> ' • . . : • • 
safe and effective. It does not give the agency responsibility to 
develop new drugs itself. So, FDA physicians, scientists and 
other staff review test results submitted by drug developers. 
I The purpose: to determine whether the drug is safe enough to 
test in humans and, if so—after all human testing is com-
pleted—to decide whether the drug can be sold to the public 
and what its label should say about directions for use, side 
effects, warnings, and the like. j 
FDA first becomes involved when a drug company nas com-
pleted its testing in animals and is ready to test a drug on hu-
mans. (Actually, some animal testing continues after human 
tests begin to learn whether long-term use of the drug may 
cause cancer or birth defects. Also, more animal data may 
be needed if human tests turn up unexpected effects. And new 
• therapeutic uses may be found by continued animal studies.) 
Although FDA usually does not tell drug companies what 
specific laboratory or animal tests to run, the agency does have 
regulations and guidelines on the kinds of results FDA expects 
to see in any request to conduct human testing. *'We certainly 
send signals to the drug companies on what they need to do," . 
says Elaine gsber, director of FDA's Office of Biologies Re-
search and Review. I 
And the drug companies listen to those signals. Botn 
Hoffmann-La Roche's Kuntzman and Merck's Stone say their 
companies follow and sometimes exceed FDA's guidelines. 
44
 We want to optimize our chances of taking a compound from 
animal to human testing," Stone says. \ 
So drug research is a long, difficult and costly road, cer-
tainly. But sometimes the hard work, the scientific sleuthing, 
and the time and dollars spent pay off. Such was the case in 
August 1987, when FDA approved—in nine*and-a-half 
.mdnths—the much studied and much anticipated cholesterol-
lowering drug mentioned earlier—lovastatin. That approval 
holds the promise of longer and better lives for millions of 
Americans with heart disease and substantial sales for Merck, 
the drug's developer. FDA's evaluation of lovastatin was aided 
by the care with which Burroughs Wellcome conducted its 
studies, presented the results, and responded to requests from 
agency scientists conducting the review, according to Commis-
sioner Frank E. Young, M.D., Ph.D. J 
But to scientists like Hoffmann-La Roche's Kuntzman, drug 
research goes even beyond preventing or curing disease or 
making money. It is also a tool for finding out more about the 
human body and its basic life processes. i 
PROGRESS, NOT PERFECTION 
"Research is an evolutionary process," Kuntzman says. "You 
change studies and use experiments to lea<) to other experi-
ments. As you go along you may not even see the connection 
between studies. In a sense, research has no end. The only end* 
would be when we understand everything there is to know 
about the human body. I expect that we will never know 
1
 enough about the body." | 
j l Merck's Eve Slater agrees. "We can make progress," she 
says, "but we are unlikely to achieve perfection." In the end, 
that is what researching and developing new drugs is all' 
about—understanding and progress. • 
Jeffrey F. Cohn is a free-lance writer in Washington 
who often writes on health issues. 
. he. 
j 
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What Is Deterred? 
The Innovator Departs 
Who fled most quickly for shelter from the baying new tort pack? Those 
quickest on their feet, of course—the person of action, the company of 
initiative, the mover, the shaker, and the doer. When it comes to liability 
problems, the bold innovators are the most fleet-footed of potential de-
fendants. More often than not, they adjusted to the threat of liability by 
doing less. Not innovating is a remarkably easy thing to do. 
The Founders had promised quite the opposite—a steady march of inno-
vation and progress impelled by the pursuing avengers of liability. The 
pursuit was there all right. But the innovation did not follow. To the 
contrary, in the very markets where the legal pursuit was the most in-
tense—on the trail of exotic drugs, contraceptives, pesticides, small planes 
and cars, hazardous waste disposal, and medical procedures—the mood 
among suppliers became most sullen, hostile, defensive, and then coldly 
stagnant. Soon tired of running, the fox retreated to its burrow and refused 
to come out. 
Research expenditures by U.S. companies working on contraceptives 
peaked in 1973 and plummeted 90 percent in the next decade. Steroidal 
oral contraceptives in this country underwent no significant changes after 
1976, and no truly new contraceptive chemical entities have been intro-
duced since 1968. Clinical tests of a contraceptive implant system called 
Capronor, developed by the National Institutes of Health, were stalled for 
more than a year for lack of liability insurance. The implanted contracep-
tive Norplant, which releases a hormone for five years, was developed by 
the New York Population Council and as of 1986 was on the market in five 
other countries. But no American firm dared to market it at home. A new 
and effective IUD, the Copper-T 380A, won FDA approval, but no major 
firm was willing to market it for several years. In late 1987, one tiny 
company finally announced that it would sell the product, at a price vastly 
above the cost of manufacture, and without any liability insurance (which 
was, in any event, unavailable), presumably on the assumption that if a 
wave of lawsuits struck, bankruptcy would provide a quick and clean exit 
from the market. So the United States, a leader in contraceptive research 
and marketing well into the early 1960s, has today lost its edge and its 
hunger for progress. Research on other aspects of reproduction has suf-
fered as well. "Who in his right mind," the president of a major pharma-
ceutical company asked in 1986, "would work on a product today that 
would be used by pregnant women?" 
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The story has been much the same in other high-tech markets favored 
with attention from the liability system in recent years. Between 1965 and 
1985, the number of U.S. vaccine manufacturers shrank by more than half; 
by 1986 the nation depended on a single supplier for vaccines against polio, 
rubella, measles, mumps, and rabies. In the 1960s there were eight U.S. 
manufacturers of whooping cough vaccine; by 1986 there were only two. 
And only two major companies, Merck and Lederle Labs, were still invest-
ing heavily in vaccine research. America, once the world leader in this 
technology so vital to the public health, was quickly losing ground here 
too. 
Consulting engineers report that they systematically favor old products 
over new ones in their design specifications, fearing (quite correctly) that 
newer design options carry a greater risk of liability, whatever real decrease 
in risk they might actually represent. Liability-conscious universities de-
cline to license patents to small companies, despite the fertile environment 
they offer for innovation, fearing that anyone suing over a patent-related 
product would be sure to go for the university's deep pocket as well. 
Liability concerns forced a Virginia engineer to abandon his business of 
designing better hand controls for cars used by the handicapped, a business 
he had set up after his own son had been crippled in a motorcycle accident. 
America, land of the Wright brothers, has lost even its appetite for 
innovation in small planes. Burt Rutan, the pioneering designer of the 
Voyager, didn't have the resources to compete with larger manufacturers, 
but he had a cheaper way of getting his products out into the marketplace. 
He sold construction plans for novel airplanes to do-it-yourselfers, who 
built the planes in their garages. But in 1985, fearful of the lawsuits that 
would follow if a home-built plane based on his designs crashed, he 
stopped selling the plans. 
As the new tort soldiers marched forward, in whatever field, technolo-
gists fell back; it was that simple. The phenomenon ran so contrary to the 
accepted articles of the new tort faith that many in the law-and-economics 
priesthood doggedly refused to acknowledge the facts at all. Their theories 
had declared, quite emphatically, that sharper liability would spur more 
innovation. How could the facts dare to be otherwise? The answer was that 
the accepted theories were wrong. 
The theories depended, first of all, on a fine-tuned and highly predicta-
ble legal process which consistently disfavored more dangerous products 
and favored safer ones. The success of the new liability engine thus de-
pended on great precision in the courts. But the legal assembly line relied 
on unskilled workers, heavily pressed for time and with many extraneous 
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What Is Deterred? 
: — factors—sympathy for the victim most especially—on their minds. This 
introduced a great uncertainty into the system. And there are limits to the 
total uncertainty—scientific plus regulatory—that any endeavor can toler-
t ate. With innovative science and technology, that limit is reached much 
sooner than with the old and familiar. 
Worse still, the new tort theoreticians penned a book of new legal rules 
that discouraged innovation at every turn. From the innovator's perspec-
tive, much of the damage was done at the very beginning, when the courts 
replaced negligence with strict liability. The negligence standard had in-
quired whether the technologist—the human actor on the scene—was 
careful, prudently trained, and properly supervised. Who is most likely to 
pass a negligence test? The best and the brightest—the technologists work-
ing at the leading edge of their professions. It is at the frontiers of science, 
after all, that the best engineers, pharmacologists, doctors, and chemists 
typically congregate. Under the new legal standards, however, the people 
themselves, and their good care, good training, and good faith, were quite 
irrelevant. The new inquest concerned the product itself and its alleged 
defects. Where once human conduct had been its focus, the tort system 
now placed technology itself in the dock. 
This seemingly modest change sharply tilted the system against innova-
tion. The reason lies in quite understandable human psychology. Jurors 
can make reasonably sensible intuitive judgments about people—even 
about professionals—because we are all in the people-judging business 
every day of our lives. But jurors are not experts about technology itself, 
and intuition here is a terrible guide. When a juror is asked to categorize 
technologies—as distinct from their inventors or managers—as good, bad, 
or ugly, the answers follow a quite predictable pattern. Age, familiarity, 
and ubiquity are the most powerful legitimizing forces known to the 
layperson. The inexpert juror is predisposed at every turn to identify 
technologies that are novel, exotic, unfamiliar, or adventuresome as un-
welcome and fraught with danger—in short, defective. 
It is a matter of human nature, an instinct as ancient as the species itself. 
Mothers who stay at home underestimate the familiar risks of their own 
environment—electric sockets, bottles of cleaning fluid, pediatric services, 
and cars, while overestimating the less familiar hazards of chemical pollu-
tion and nuclear power. Blue-collar workers see too little threat in their 
familiar cigarettes, alcohol, and construction-site environments, and too 
much threat in the less familiar hazards of air travel or high-tech medicine. 
People everywhere underestimate the risks they know well and face every 
day and overestimate those that are new and foreign. The familiar is safe, 
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Biopsychobehavioral Correlates of Insomnia, V: 
Clinical Characteristics and Behavioral Correlates 
Joyce D. Kales, M.D., Anthony Kales, M.D., Edward O. Bixler, Ph.D., 
Constantin R. Soldatos, M.D., Roger J. Cadieux, M.D., Glenn J. Kashurba, M.D., 
and Antonio Vela-Bueno, M.D. 
The authors compared two large samples of 
insomniac patients with a group of control subjects. 
Sleep difficulty usually began before the age of 40 
and generally persisted for many years (average 
duration, 14 years). Several characteristic behaviors 
were correlated with the symptom of insomnia. 
During the day and at bedtime, patients reported 
difficulty relaxing and frequently described 
themselves as tense, anxious, overly preoccupied, 
worrted. and depressed. Reports of poor mental and 
physical health were far more prevalent in the 
insomniac patients than in control subjects. These 
results indicate that psychiatric factors need to be a 
primary focus in the multidimensional treatment of 
chronic insomnia. 
(Am J Psychiatry 141:1371-1376, 1984) 
Insomnia is a prevalent symptom (1-4) of a wide spectrum of psychiatric and medical disorders and 
situational disturbances (5-11 and DSM-UI). When 
longstanding and severe, this symptom profoundly 
affects patients' lives and often becomes the central 
focus of distress, obscuring the factors involved in the 
development of the insomnia. 
As a result, when seeking treatment insomniac pa-
tients frequently perceive their sleep problem as their 
primary disorder. To accurately assess the problem and 
to formulate effective treatment plans, psychiatrists 
need to elicit specific details concerning the condition's 
onset, clinical course, and characteristics. To date, 
however, these factors have received little attention in 
termsof clinical research. 
Our primary goals in this study, therefore, were to 
assess the onset, clinical characteristics, and behavioral 
and psychosocial correlates of chronic insomnia. Ac-
cordingly, we evaluated two large samples of adult 
patients with a primary complaint of chronic insom-
Recetved Dec. 29, 1983; revised March 8 and March 22, 1984; 
accepted March 29, 1984. From the Department or Psychiatry and 
Sleep Research and Treatment Center, Pennsylvania State University 
College of'Medicine, Hershey, Pa. Address reprint requests to Dr. 
Jovce Kales, Department oi Psvchiatrv, Hershev Medical Center, 
Hershev, PA 1703J. 
Copyright v 1984 A men can Psvchtatnc Association. 
nia. In one group, data on the onset and clinical 
characteristics of insomnia were gathered through 
comprehensive sleep histories. In another group, re-
sponses to specific items on the MMPI related to sleep, 
behavioral, health, and psychosocial factors were com-
pared with those of control subjects. 
METHOD 
In our Sleep Disorders Clinic we evaluated 100 
consecutive patients with a primary complaint of 
chronic insomnia of at least 1 year's duration. These 
same patients made up the sample of a previous study 
in which multiaxial diagnoses were made according to 
DSM-UI (11;. The insomniac patients were 47 men 
and 5} women berween the ages of 18 and 84 years 
(meanrSE age, 47 .9r l .6 years). Seventeen percent 
were less than 30 years old, 34% were between 30 and 
49 years old, and 49% were 50 years old or older. 
Each patient completed at home a comprehensive 
questionnaire consisting of more than 350 coded items 
that provided detailed demographic information, a 
sleep history, physical and mental health profiles, and 
a description of current and past use of medication, 
alcohol, tobacco, and caffeine. 
The same questionnaire was completed by a sample 
of 100 control subjects, consisting of 41 men and 59 
women (meanrSE age, 48.2-1.5 years; range, 24-80 
years) who were screened to ensure that they were 
without a sleep complaint or severe medical illness, not 
using any medication, and able to comply with the 
study requirements. These subjects were recruited 
from volunteers in the community, medical and techni-
cal staff and students of the medical center, and their 
friends and acquaintances, all of whom responded to 
advertisements for good sleepers. As previously report-
ed (11, 12), none of the patients or control subiects 
was found to have sleep apnea or nocturnal myoclonus 
as a clinical condition. There were no significant 
differences berween insomniac patients and control 
subjects in terms of socioeconomic status, educational 
level, marital status, or general living arrangements. 
We have reported previously on the MMPI patterns 
of patients with chronic insomnia (13, 14). This study 
focuses on responses to individual MMPI items relat-
Am J Psychiatry 141:11, November 1984 
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Treatment of Sleep Disorders 
Joyce D. Kales, M.D. Associate Director of Sleep Research and Treatment 
Center; Professor, Department of Psychiatry, Pennsylvania State University 
College of Medicine, Hershey, Pennsylvania 
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Psychiatry, University of Athens School of Medicine, Athens, Greece 
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Sleep disorders are quite common in the general population and frequently 
encountered in medical practice. In a survey of the adult population of a large 
metropolitan area (Los Angeles), more than half (52.1%) reported a current or 
previous sleep disorder.1 Specifically, the prevalence for various sleep disorders, 
either currently or in the past, was: insomnia, 42.5%; nightmares, 11.2%; some 
type of excessive daytime sleepiness, 7.1%; and sleepwalking, 2.5%. 
Physicians in a nationwide survey2 reported that an average of 17% of their 
patients had insomnia; psychiatrists reported the highest prevalence of insomnia, 
32%. For other sleep disorders the estimated prevalence was as follows: night-
mares, 4.3%; hypersomnia, 2.9%; enuresis, 2.2%; night terrors, 1.2%; som-
nambulism, 0.6%; and narcolepsy, 0.6%. Psychiatrists and child psychiatrists 
most frequently reported patients with insomnia, nightmares, and hypersomnia, 
whereas child psychiatrists and pediatricians more often encountered enuresis, 
somnambulism, and night terrors.2 Thus, in psychiatric practice the evaluation 
and treatment of sleep disorders constitutes an important area.3-6 Most often 
both evaluation and treatment of the patient with a sleep disorder can be accom-
plished in the office setting.7 
Emotional factors are predominant in the etiology of insomnia,3.3.8-io 
some types of hypersomnia6"-12 and secondary enuresis,5J3 and in adult sleep-
walking,5 ,4 night terrors,5J5 and nightmares.5J6 However, childhood sleep-
walking,5UJ7 night terrors,5J5 nightmares.5-18 and primary enuresis5 , 9 2 ° are 
most often related to maturational factors. Sleep disorders such as nar-
Address reprint requests to: Joyce Kales. M.O., Associate Director, Sleep Research and Treat-
ment Center, Pennsylvania State University College of Medicine, Hershey, PA 17033. 
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210 TREATMENT OF SLEEP DISORDERS 
colepsy6- ' --5 and sleep apnea6-26"29 are caused by organic factors (either 
obvious or presumed) but often have extensive psychosocial consequences, 
which frequently cause secondary psychopathology.6-24 2 5 2 9 
Using the sleep history, psychiatric assessment, general medical assessment 
and drug history, the psychiatrist is in the best position to comprehensively 
evaluate and treat sleep disorders with either primary or secondary psycho-
pathology.5-7 With the exception of sleep apnea patients who must be evaluated 
in the sleep laboratory, evaluation and treatment are completed in the office 
setting.3"7 
There have been problems with the diagnostic classification of sleep disor-
ders. An unofficial classification, which appeared as an appendix in DSM-IH, 
presented with many serious shortcomings including: excessive number of diag-
noses (about 70); many unsubstantiated and confusing diagnostic terms with 
little validity; over-reliance on expensive sleep laboratory tests; neglect of psy-
chobehavioral dimensions of sleep disorders; and incompatibility with a multiax-
ial format. A number of these problems have been recognized and resolved in the 
DSM-III-R. In this classification only a dozen specific sleep disorders are 
grouped into: dyssomnias (insomnias, hypersomnias and sleep-wake schedule 
disorders) with the predominant disturbance in the amount, quality or timing of 
sleep: and parasomnias (sleepwalking, night terrors and nightmares) where 
abnormal episodic events occur during sleep. Because this classification relies on 
physicians' clinical skill rather than an unnecessary focus on sleep laboratory 
procedures, it facilitates management of sleep disorders by the physician in the 
office setting. 
In this chapter we summarize data from recent studies regarding the nature 
of psychopathology in insomnia,5 8 - ' ° sleepwalking,5 , 4 night terrors,5 , 5 and 
nightmares,5 , 6 as well as the psychological correlates and psychosocial conse-
quences of narcolepsy6 24 and sleep apnea.6 29 We also present recommendations 
for the management of these disorders.3"6 
INSOMNIA 
Clinical Characteristics 
Insomnia is a symptom of various medical, psychiatric, pharmacologic, and 
situational conditions. At times, however, particularly when insomnia is chronic 
and severe, it may affect the patient's life so much that the patient considers it as 
a distinct disorder in itself.3 5 Difficulty falling asleep is the most frequent 
problem, either as a single complaint or in combination with difficulty staying 
asleep or early final awakening.5 -30 (See following table.) 
KALES ET AL 211 
Clinical Features of Insomnia, Narcolepsy, and Sleep Apnea 
Insomnia 
Complaint of difficulty in falling asleep, staying asleep, or awakening too early 
More common in women and the elderly 
Relatively high levels of psychopathology often present 
Patterns of depression, anxiety, and obsessive/compulsiveness are common 
Irregular schedules and activity levels or napping may be factors, especially in elderly 
patients 
Medical illness or drug use should be excluded as causes 
Narcolepsy 
Excessive daytime sleepiness characteristic at onset 
Onset often in childhood or adolescence, but diagnosis delayed 
Sleep attacks of short duration 
Auxiliary symptoms of cataplexy, hypnagogic hallucinations, or sleep paralysis most 
often present 
If cataplexy is present, diagnosis is confirmed 
Often a family history of disorders of excessive sleep 
Psychopathology is secondary to psychosocial consequences of the condition 
Sleep Apnea 
Gasping and choking and/or periodic loud snorting sounds with intervals of breath 
cessation of more than 10 seconds 
Often associated with excessive daytime sleepiness 
Excessive thrashing movements during sleep 
Morning headaches often reported 
• • • • • • * 
Modified from Kales et aP 
Insomnia is more prevalent with increasing age, in women, in association 
with psychological disturbances, and among individuals of lower educational 
and socioeconomic status. ,-531 ~35 Insomniac patients generally tend to overesti-
mate the various measures of their sleep difficulty.36-*38 Nevertheless, sleep 
laboratory studies have shown that they do have significantly more sleep diffi-
culty than normal sleepers, and discriminant function analysis based on sleep 
measures, personality variables, or both has successfully differentiated insom-
niacs from normal controls.39*42 Thus, the complaint of insomnia should gener-
ally be considered as valid by the clinician. 
Insomnia may be transient (occurring in response to various stressful 
events, medical conditions, or pharmacologic agents), or chronic (more or less 
ingrained into the patient's life style.)3""5 Patients with chronic insomnia man-
ifest typical behaviors during the day and prior to sleep.30 During the day they 
characteristically feel depressed, worried, tense, irritable, and preoccupied with 
themselves.30 Not surprisingly, at bedtime they report that they have difficulty 
relaxing: they describe themselves as feeling tense, anxious, worried, or 
depressed, and as though thefr "minds are racing." 
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excessive sleep: men and women who reported sleeping ten hours or 
more had about 1.8 times the mortality rate of those who reported 
7.0 to 7.9 hours of sleep. In the same study, those who often used 
sleeping pills had 1.5 times the mortality rate of those who never had 
used sleep medication. Overall, the data supported the common notion 
that the asymptomatic or healthy person sleeps about eight hours a 
night. The authors point out, however, that their data need to be inter-
preted conservatively because thev were not able to control for all 
major illnesses.40 
Although this information on optimum sleep length may be useful 
in understanding the role of sleep in general health status, the clinician 
needs to keep in mind that the need for sleep varies widely from per-
son to person. An additional problem in quantitatively assessing sleep 
needs arises with insomniacs, who frequently overestimate their sleep 
difficulty45"51 (see also Chapter 3, Sleep Laboratory Studies of In-
somnia). 
Psychosocial Correlates of Insomnia 
Insomnia as a Chronic Psychobehavioral Disorder 
More than 30 million people in the United States are disabled by 
chronic conditions, and half of them are considered to have major 
disabilities.52 Among these disabling conditions are psychobehavioral 
disorders (such as chronic pain syndromes and obesity), which, al-
though functional in nature, are characterized by excessive somatic 
symptomatology.53 W e believe that chronic insomnia should be in-
cluded in this category. Unlike chronic medical illnesses that have 
distinct organic pathology, such as arthritis, diabetes, and emphysema, 
chronic psychobehavioral disorders usually lack any demonstrable 
pathology, or, if pathology is present, the symptoms are grossly dis-
proportionate to it. 
The treatment of chronic psychobehavioral disorders such as in-
somnia is a major challenge to modern medicine. These conditions are 
usually refractory to conventional medical treatment and have a major 
economic impact. Conservatively estimated, the cost of chronic dis-
abling conditions in the United States, in general, is well over $100 
billion annually.52 The cost of one psychobehavioral disorder alone, 
chronic pain, was estimated to be between $35 and $50 billion in 
1976.54 Similarly, one of the most costly consequences of chronic in-
somnia may be its economic impact on the public. 
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difficulty falling asleep,3*7'8 as well as reporting lighter sleep with more 
frequent awakenings.7'11 An increased prevalence of insomnia has also 
been associated with psychologic disturbances3'5'7'12*13,14 and lower so-
cioeconomic status.3'6*7'10*15 These two factors that increase the likeli-
hood of insomniac complaints appear to be related, because mental 
health disorders are more prevalent among persons of lower socioeco-
nomic status18'17 and social class has been found to be inversely related 
to degree of life stress, as measured by life-change events.18 Further-
more, the noise, crowding, and other conditions associated with dis-
advantaged social environments may also contribute to sleep distur-
bance.19 
Two nationwide health surveys in the United States have shown 
that insomnia is experienced by a considerable proportion of the gen-
eral population; one revealed a prevalence of 21 percent,4 and the other, 
32 percent.9 Regional surveys have produced similar percentages. In 
the Los Angeles metropolitan area, the estimated prevalence of in-
somnia was 32 percent,3 while a survey in Alachua County, Florida, 
showed a prevalence of 35 percent.6 The slight variations in preva-
lence among these four large surveys were probably caused by differ-
ences in the questions asked. Specifically, the three surveys in closest 
agreement (32%, 32%, and 35%) asked about "difficulty sleeping at 
least sometimes,"3'6'9 whereas the study reporting the lowest figure for 
sleep difficulty (21%) asked specifically about insomnia.4 
In one of the U.S. nationwide surveys, insomnia was reported more 
frequently by older subjects and was more common among women 
(26%) than men (13%).4 In the other U.S. health survey, which in-
cluded more than 6,000 adults, difficulty falling asleep or staying asleep 
was a problem "at least sometimes" for 40 percent of the women and 
for 30 percent of the men. Sleep difficulties were more common among 
older subjects, especially women.9 
In the Los Angeles metropolitan area survey, insomnia was more 
common among older individuals, particularly women, and among per-
sons of lower educational and socioeconomic status.3 It was also cor-
related with more frequent mental health difficulties and physical prob-
lems. The prevalence of current complaints of difficulty sleeping was 
32 percent, while the prevalence of such complaints at any time during 
the respondents' lives was 42 percent. 
Consistent with the other surveys, the Alachua County study showed 
that trouble sleeping was more prevalent among older people.6 Also, 
hypnotic drugs were used more often by older subjects, particularly 
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Table 2.1. Prevalence of Insomnia 
Evaluation and Treatment of Insomnia 
Area Represented 
in Survey 
United States4 
United States9 
Alachua County, Florida6 
Los Angeles, California3 
Sample 
Size 
1,064,004 
6,672 
1,645 
1,006 
Prevalence of 
Difficulty 
Sleeping 
21% 
32% 
35% 
32% 
Factors 
Affecting 
Prevalence* 
A,S 
A,S 
A, S, SES 
A, S, SES 
* A = Age; S = Sex; SES = Socioeconomic Status 
by women and by divorced, widowed, or separated individuals. Among 
the 35 percent of respondents who had difficulty sleeping, the following 
categories of frequency were reponed: 22 percent had difficulty sleep-
ing "sometimes" and 13 percent, "often" or "all of the time." 
Table 2.1 summarizes data on the prevalence of insomnia from the 
two nationwide surveys and two regional surveys conducted in the 
United States. 
Two other surveys of note were conducted in the United King-
dom.7-8 An assessment of over 2,000 adults in the cities of Dundee and 
Glasgow, Scotland, showed that sleep difficulty increased with age.7 
Reports of nervousness were also related to sleep difficulty; those who 
described themselves as being nervous reported more difficulty getting 
to sleep and staying asleep. This study also indicated that sleep diffi-
culty was more prevalent among the less advantaged social classes. Fi-
nally, it showed that when compared with men, women reponed that 
their sleep difficulty began at an earlier age and presented with more 
complaints of sleep disturbance, a higher incidence of nervousness, and 
more frequent use of hypnotic drugs. In a study conducted in Mersey-
side, England, the frequency of both nocturnal sleep disturbance and 
daytime naps increased with age.8 
Because of its high prevalence in the general population, insomnia is 
understandably the sleep disturbance encountered most frequently by 
physicians. A nationwide survey of physicians indicated that 19 percent 
of all adult medical patients (aged 18 and older) complain of insomnia.2 
When medical specialties in this survey were compared, psychiatric 
patients had the highest percentage (35%) of complaints of insomnia. 
The frequency of complaints of insomnia for adult patients in other 
specialties was as follows: surgery, 22%; internal medicine, 18%; fam-
ily-general practice, 16%; neurology, 16%; and obstetrics-gvnecology, 
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Food and Drug Administration's Adverse 
Drug Reaction Monitoring Program 
Beulah La* and Wayne M. Turner 
The advene drug reaction monitoring program of the Divi-
sion of Drug Experience within the PDAw described. 
Historical informatioD on the development and activities of 
the current drug reaction monitoring program, and goals and 
objectives of the current program are discussed. Also presented 
are a brief description of the Voluntary Reporting System, in-
tensive drug monitoring studies and special epidemiologic stud* 
ies, and a workable definition of alert reports and examples of 
theirprevious role within the PDA. 
Pharmacists should participate actively in adverse drug reac-
tion monitoring. 
Key words: Drugs, adverse reactions; Pood and Drug Adminis-
tration (US.); Methodology 
In 1952, reports of an association between chloramphen-
icol and aplastic anemia were appearing in the literature. 
Among the first reports written were two by well-known 
American hernatologiste, Wintrobe1 and Sturgeon.2 Further 
inquiries within the medical community provided additional 
confirmation of this new, rare and serious suspected drug 
effect This event led to the awareness of alack in effective 
monitoring for advene drug reactions once a drug has been 
approved and marketed Thus, the Committee on Blood 
Dyacraaias was established in 1954 under the guidance of the 
AMA for the development of a Registry on Blood Dyscrasias. 
In 1961, an increasing awareness of drug reactions resulted 
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in the expansion of tins committee into the Committee on 
Adverse Reactions, and the Registry began to monitor all 
adverse drug reactions (ADRs). During that same year, the 
FDA also created an adverse drug effects reporting system. 
It was agreed that FDA would focus on coHecting data from 
universities, government and teaching hospitals, while the 
AMA Registry would concentrate on data from individual 
physicians and smaller hospitals. There was to be a free ex-
change of information.3 As a result of under-reporting, lack 
of information provided, inability to determine incidence 
rates and the parallel efforts of the FDA, the AMA's Registry 
of Adverse Reactions was discontinued in 1970. ^ 
In 1970, as a result of a reorganization of the Bureau of 
Drugs, the adverse drug reaction monitoring functions were 
delegated to the Division of Drug Experience (DDE). DDE 
was established to: 
FDA's complex objectives for monitoring ADRa were 
better recognized in the ensuing years. There were vital 
needs for. (1) monitoring acute adverse effects of newly 
marketed drugs, (2) generating and csqrturing well-docu-
mented spontaneous reports, (3) detecting rare and long-
term drug effects, (4) surveying drug morbidity and mar* 
tality, (5) developing a national adverse drug reaction in-
formation center, and (6) disseminating evaluated drug use 
and drug reaction data. 
. Currently, DDE uses five sources to meet the majority of 
its needs for monitoring adverse drug effects. These are: 
I. A VcJuntajy Reporting System, consistiDg of ipontane 
reports, manufacturers* (mandatory) reports and special 
registry reports* 
30. 
1. Collect and evaluate information on drug usage, adverse 
reactions and other drug experience data, 
2. Disseminate drug information throughout the Bureau and 
other organizations, 
3. Evaluate the sodoeconomk implications of drug use in-
formation, 
4. Participate in the World Health Organization (WHO) drug 
monitoring program, 
5. Promote drug epidemiologic and drug nwnitoring waearch, 
a n d ' • • . . - , • • 
6. Conduct studies obtaining drug-use trends. 
On09.ft?aS/78/OS01*OS29$00.50 Vol 55 AugtS7S American Jotrnei o< HoepttsJ PHermacy S M 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P—S -A 9m * * * * * *™ 
2. Intensive drug monitoring studies, 
3. Special epidemiologic studies, 
4. CommunicstioM with WHO and national drug monitoring 
centers, and 
5. Published literature. 
To expand upon these sources, an experiment in post-
marketing surveillance is underway, cosponsared by the 
National Bureau of Standards (NBS), FDA and the Joint 
Commission on Prescription Drug Use (JCPDU). This effort 
m directed at "identifying and analyzmg the legal policy, and 
technical implications and consequences of postmarketing 
surveillance of new drugs, and designing and testing one or 
more systems to identify or further characterize relatively 
common, serious adverse effects which can be seen within 
tiro years folkwiiig marketing.^ 
into two phases. At the end of Phase I, several proposed 
designs including their implementation and methodology 
for evaluating effects and costs of postmarketing surveillance 
systems, would be available to FDA, NBS and JCPDU. 
Phase II will test and evaluate one or more of the systems 
developed under Phase I. Projected completion date of this 
study is late 1980. 
SurvelSance Sources 
Voluntary Reporting System (also known as Spontane-
ous Reporting System). (J) Spontaneous Reports. FDA's 
spontaneous reports are dependent upon participation by 
health professionals in private practice or hospital settings. 
Reports of adverse drug reactions are mailed directly to 
DDE. Two drug experience report forms have already been 
sent to community practitioners. The original long form 
(FD-1639) is preferred because it contains approximately 
25 data elements, and, if properly completed, should provide 
case reports that may be evaluated thoroughly. This form 
has been used successfully in hospitals. However, because 
of its length, it is rarely used by private practitioners. Thus, 
a short form (FD-1639a) was developed which had the 
benefit of brevity (13 versus 25 data elements) and the 
convenience of a ©elf-addressed, prestamped format. This 
form is periodically attached to the FDA Drug Bulletin 
which is sent to over one million health care professionals. 
Widespread distribution of this latter form to community 
practitioners has resulted in increased participation in the 
program.6 
(2) Manufacturer (Mandatory) Reports. In lata 1962, 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was revised under "the 
Kefauver-Harris Amendments to require manufacturers 
with an approved New Drug Application (NDA) to report 
adverse drug reactions to FDA. These reports, collected 
voluntarily from health professionals, are submitted to FDA 
on a regular basis. 
(3) Special Registry Reports. Special registries collect 
and evaluate the occurrence and recurrence of adverse drug 
reactions and their most frequent patterns or sequences. 
They are responsible for consolidating prior and current data 
on adverse effects. 
An example of a specialty registry is the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology's Registry of Tissue Reactions to 
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Drugs which correlates morphologic biopsy and necropsy 
data with the historical, clinical, medicinal and laboratory 
data of the patient7 Clinicopathologic studies of cases which 
have in common a particular organ or category of reactions 
to a particular type of drug are published periodically (e.g., 
liver reactions to oral contraceptives). These studies may 
lead to an investigation of the tumorigeoic and teratogenic 
effects of drugs as well as the mechanisms of drug-induced 
reactions in tissues and cells. Individual cases are submitted 
voluntarily by the medical community. 
The idea of monitoring drug experiences through registries 
is relatively new to FDA. Existing and past registries have 
been developed and implemented by professionals with in-
terest in collecting specific types of data^  FDA has financially 
supported some of these efforts, (e*., contrast agents, ocular 
aide effects). In the interest of monitoring dnjg safety and 
efficacy, a future goal of the FDA is to stimulate and support 
new registries of adverse drug experiences. 
The major benefits of the Voluntary Reporting System 
include the infinite size of the reporting sources, the avail-
ability for active involvement by health professionals and 
the relatively inexpensive cost of materials. In addition, its 
ability to support known reactions and to uncover rare, se-
rious or fatal reactions allows for the generation of hypoth-
eses for further studies. Major criticisms of the system in-
clude gross under-reporting, difficulty in obtaining foDow-up 
information and the inability to derive incidence rates (lack 
of denominator data). 
Intensive Drug Monitoring Studies. Intensive drug 
monitoring studies (e.g., Boston Collaborative Drug Sur-
veillance Program) provide systematic and detailed collec-
tion of data from well-defined groups of inpatients. The 
aurveillance is done by ipeeifllly trammi h»*Hh pmte*smnqlq 
(eg., nurse monitors, clinical pharmacists) who devote their 
full-time efforts toward recording all drugs administered and 
all events which might conceivably be drug-induced.8 Sub-
sequently, statistical screening for drug-event associations 
may lead to special studies. 
The major benefits of these studies include the ability to: 
(1) derive incidence rates, (2) analyze factors which may 
contribute to reactions, (3) identify drug interactions and 
study' them, (4) detect previously unrecognized reactions, 
and (5) generate and test hypotheses. Criticisms have in-
cluded: (1) the great expense of resources, (2) the relatively 
small population size resulting in nontdentification of rare 
reactions, (3) the relatively short period of observation re-
sulting in nomdentificatian of delayed reaction*, and <4) the 
lack of follow-up and outcome information. Ongoing studies 
include the acute medical, surgical and pediatric care set-
tings which limit the drug monitoring only to those drugs 
which are characteristic of medical, surgical and pediatric 
inpatient use. 
Special Epidemiologic Studies. Special epidemiologic 
studies (e.g., Drug Epidemiology Unit, Boston University 
Medical Center9) detect associations between major disease 
outcomes and drugs used in long-term therapy for outpa-
tients. Case-control and cohort approaches are currently 
used. 
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Cohort studies assess the relationship of one or more 
variables (e.g., drugs) toward increasing the risk of disease 
development These variables are measured initially in a 
group of healthy persons and then are reviewed over a period 
of time to determine if a particular disease has developed. 
Some of the major advantages of this type of study are the 
ability to: 
1. Repeat initial measurements of variables, 
2. Demonstrate time relationships between ths presence of 
variables and the subsequent disease, 
3. Determine incidence, 
4. Use the depth and variety of information for leyeral mea-
sures of safety (as well a* efficacy), 
& Study the effecUtf known familial and demographic vari-
ables, 
6. Make follow-up information complete and comprehen-
sive, 
7. Generate hypotheses and test them, and 
& Test hypotheses derived elsewhere. 
Information bias*, loss of follow-up because of attrition, 
high cost and long-term commitment of funds and personnel, 
and lack of randomization (versus controlled clinical trials) 
are some criticisms of cohort studies. 
Case-control studies measure the relationship of existing 
disease states to drugs and other variables. For every group 
of patients with a particular disease state, a suitable dis-
ease-free control group is used for comparison. These studies 
aim at determining factors (e.g., drugs) responsible for dis-
ease development Some of the advantages of case-control 
studies include the ability to: 
1. Derive relative risks attributable to various factors, in-
cluding drugs, 
2. Detect delayed and rare drug reactions, 
3. Identify previously unrecognized reactions, 
4. Confirm recognised reactions, 
5. Focus on known sources of cases (e.*\. specialty and death 
registries, hospitalized serious cases, even existing cohort 
studies), 
6. Generate hypotheses and test them, 
7. Test hypotheses produced hy other studies, and 
& Succeed with minimum resources. 
Criticisms of this type of study concern the difficulties in 
selecting appropriate control groups and in collecting com-
parable information on cases and controls. 
Other Sources, To supplement all the previously discussed 
sources, medical and pharmacy journals are screened each 
month by DDE personnel to detect new, rare and serious 
adverse drug reactions published in letters-to-tbe-editor or 
ini journal articles.10 
Another means of obtaining additional information is 
through exchanges with other countries. DDE has been 
designated by WHO as the National Drug Monitoring 
Center for the United States. Information is usually acquired 
from WHO or other national centers through news bulletins, 
personal communications or international meetings. 
Alert Reports 
Alert drug reactions are defined by DDE to include: 
1. New and unexpected reactions not listed in the labeling, 
% Serious, life-threatening or fatal reactions, 
3. Unusual increases in numbers or severity of reactions 
(clusters), 
4. Potential association with congenital anomalies, or 
5. Indents c^ therapeutfcaihire which suggest problem* with 
drug bioavailability. 
Within DDE, all incoming voluntary reports are imme-
diately screened for alert reactions. These reports are then 
presented to an Alert Committee meeting whichk composed 
of physicians and pharmacists. The tasks of this committee 
are to determine whether or not (1) a probability of a causal 
relationship may be surmised from the suspected reaction(s) 
to the suspected drug(s), (2) the particular "alert" should 
be forwarded to FDA's New Drug Evaluation (NDE) Divi-
sion which has the responsibility of reviewing and evaluating 
drug safety and efficacy, and (3) follow-up information 
.should be requested and, if so, what additional information 
is needed for optimal evaluation. Therefore, before FDA 
issues new proposed labeling changes or drug alerts to the 
public, consultations have occurred between NDE, expert 
outside advisors and DDE. 
Until recently, because of the difficulties in establishing 
direct cause and effect relationships between the drug(s)and 
reaction(s), the Voluntary Reporting System had contrib-
uted only indirectly to regulatory action by FDA. It had, 
however, played a role in helping FDA substantiate and 
document actual instances of previously unusual and rare 
adverse reactions that appeared in the literature. Some ex-
amples of these are clindamycin and severe lower bowel ef-
fects,11 diethylstilbestrol and vaginal adenocarcinoma in the 
offspring,12 sustained-release potassium chloride tablets and 
severe gastrointestinal ulceration,13 and ibuprofen and oc-
ular effects. 
A significant advance did occur late in 1976 through 
spontaneous reports which involved direct initiation of 
regulatory action. Several reports associating gamma ben-
zene hexachloride with central nervous system (CNS) tox-
icity were received.14*1* Although prior to this time it was 
known that variable percutaneous absorption could occur 
from its topical application in humans, the resulting CNS 
toxicity was not well established. These reports provided the 
necessary clinical support which contributed to hew warn-
ings in the official labeling.16 
History also shows that FDA made some premature alert 
decisions to the pubOc from insufTictentevideixe. These may 
have led to injurious delays in drug testing and drug usage. 
Two examples are: (1) dimethylsuttbxide (DMSO) and tons 
clouding, which was later concluded to occur only in ani-
mals,17 and (2) the original multifilament Dalkon shield and 
septic abortions or maternal deaths, which was later con-
cluded by FDA to differ insignificantly from other 
IUDs.1*1® 
As can be seen, there is a problem of identifying and 
evaluating previously unknown drug reactions. At times, 
FDA is suffering from drug information gaps and the diffi-
cult choice of quantifying the benefits as well as the risks of 
certain drugs. However, health professionals and the public 
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must understand that the success and failure of ADR alerts 
is dependent upon astute suspicions that an unnecessary risk 
is being taken by the patient Often, these observations or 
information gaps can be provided by any member of the 
health care team. 
Summary and Conctusfon 
FDA uses five surveillance sources to monitor adverse 
drug reactions. The primary focus of the program is coi-
lecting new, rare and unpublished suspected drug effects. 
A major surveillance source depends upon information and 
materials received voluntarily from health professionals. 
p\tprm»riatm »r» in * nniqiia paritifln to use their proximity 
and frequent communications with medical personnel to 
obtain ADR information. Tbey have access to suspected alert 
reactions from their oral exchanges with staff physicians, 
nurses, students and fellow pharmacists. FDA's experience 
has been that adverse drug reaction reporting is unrewarding 
and time-conwiming for the physician. This provides a great 
opportunity for pharmacists to participate in a professional 
service which contributes toward drug safety. 
A successful methodology used in private practice and in 
hospital settings for participating in the Voluntary Re-
porting System involves the collection of data by a single 
pharmacist This person should be motivated to accept the 
responsibilities of collecting the information needed in the 
suspected drug-reaction association, discussing the infor-
mation with an appointed committee or other fellow con-
sultants, sending the information to DDE and following 
through on additional information if requested (Figure 1). 
It is well recognized that greater pharmacist involvement 
in health care is needed. The identification of new, rare or 
unusual adverse drug reactions enables the FDA to reassess 
whether or not the benefits of a drug outweigh the risks. 
Cooperation by all pharmacists and other health profes-
sionals is vital for the success of a voluntary program. 
Figure I. Suggested procedure for the pharmacist to use when reporting 
a drug reaction 
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PREVENTION BY CHOLINE OF THE DEPLETION OF 
MEMBRANE PHOSPHATIDYLCHOLINE BY A 
CHOLINESTERASE INHIBITOR 
To the Editor: Choline serves, within cholinergic neurons, as a 
precursor to both acetylcholine and such membrane phospholipids 
as phosphatidylcholine.1 The availability of extracellular choline, 
provided by the circulation or formed intrasynaptically through 
acetylcholinesterase-mediated hydrolysis of acetylcholine, can in-
fluence the synthesis1 and release2 of acetylcholine, the synthesis of 
phosphatidylcholine,3 and levels of phosphatidylcholine in mem-
branes.4 Moreover, the choline in membrane phosphatidylcholine 
can be mobilized to serve as a precursor to acetylcholine,5 when 
extracellular choline is inadequate.3 
We previously proposed6 that patients with Alzheimer's disease 
be given supplemental choline when treated with drugs, such as 
acetylcholinesterase inhibitors, that diminish the availability of ex-
tracellular choline to cholinergic neurons. In such circumstances, 
the supplemental choline may both enhance the release of acetyl-
choline2 and protect the neuron from the depletion of its membrane 
phospholipids. We now show that, without such supplemental cho-
line, acetylcholinesterase inhibitors can in fact cause the depletion 
of phospholipids. 
Sections of striatum from rats, superfused in Krebs-bicarbonate 
medium, were stimulated electrically for one to eight periods of 
20 minutes each that were separated by similar intervals; the medi-
ums were assayed for acetylcholine, and the tissues for membrane 
phosphatides. When the acetylcholinesterase inhibitor physostig-
mine was present in the medium, membrane levels of phosphati-
dylcholine declined to 76±4 percent of initial values (n « 14). 
(The levels of the other principal phosphatides also declined stoi-
chiometrically, suggesting that the choline deficiency diminished 
the amount of membrane in the cell, rather than altered its com-
position.) Sections stimulated without physostigmine showed no 
decline in membrane phospholipids (97±4 percent of initial val-
ues; n - 7). Moreover, the addition of choline (0.01 to 0.04 mM) 
to the physostigmine-containing medium caused a dose-dependent 
enhancement of acetylcholine release and fully protected the 
sections from phospholipid depletion (103 ±2 percent of initial 
values; n = 17). 
A multicenter study is about to begin that attempts to confirm 
earlier studies7 demonstrating a therapeutic effect of tetrahydro-
aminoacridine, another acetylcholinesterase inhibitor, in patients 
with Alzheimer's disease. Although the patients in that earlier trial 
also received supplemental choline (as lecithin7), the announced 
protocol for the replication study provides only tetrahydroamino-
acridine. Our data suggest that failing to give a source of choline to 
patients receiving acetylcholinesterase inhibitors may decrease 
phospholipid levels in their cholinergic neurons. Although our data 
have been derived from in vitro studies, it should be noted that other 
reports have described elevations in the levels of phospholipid 
breakdown products within the brains of untreated patients with 
Alzheimer's disease; such subjects may be especially vulnerable 
to the depletion of phospholipids caused by acetylcholinesterase 
inhibition.8*9 
ISMAIL H. ULUS, M.D. 
RICHARD J. WUHTMAN, M.D. 
Cambridge, MA 02139 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
1. Blusztajn JK, Wurtman RJ. Choline and cholinergic neurons. Science 1983; 
221:614-20. 
2. Maire J-CE, Wurtman RJ. Effects of electrical stimulation and choline avail-
ability on the release and contents of acetylcholine and choline in superfused 
slices from rat striatum. J Physiol (Paris) 1985; 80:189-95. 
3. Millington WR, Wurtman RJ. Choline administration elevates brain phos-
phorylcholine concentrations. J Neurochem 1982; 38:1748-52. 
4. Wecker L. The utilization of supplemental choline by brain. In: Hanin 1, ed. 
Dynamics of cholinergic function. New York: Plenum Press, 1986:851-3. 
5. Blusztajn JK, Liscovitch M, Richardson UI. Synthesis of acetylcholine from 
choline derived from phosphatidylcholine in a human neuronal cell line. Proc 
Natl Acad Sci USA 1987; 84:5474-7. 
6. Wurtman RJ. Cholinesterase inhibitors and opiate antagonists in patients with 
Alzheimer's disease. N Engl J Med 1983; 309:555. 
7. Summers WK. Majovski LV, Marsh GM, Tachiki K, Kling A. Oral tetrahy-
droaminoacridine in long-term treatment of senile dementia, Alzheimer type. 
N Engl J Med 1986; 315:1241-5. 
8. BirinyM,OumgY<:,ArusC, RustanT,rTeyWH .^l«3r«sedglycerol-3-
phospho^ yk:ho^ lne in post-mortem Alzheimer's brain. Lancet 1985; 1:517. 
9. Miatto O, Gonzalez RG, Buonanno F, Growdon JH. In vitro 3,P NMR 
spectroscopy detects altered phospholipid metabolism in Alzheimer's dis-
ease. Can J Neurol Sci 1986; 13:535-9. 
LIABILITY FOR VACCINE-RELATED INJURIES 
To the Editor: Japanese encephalitis is a mosquito-borne viral in-
fection that occurs in epidemic and endemic forms in much of Asia.1 
Although infection can be asymptomatic, clinical cases are usually 
severe and often fatal. 
Several vaccines are produced commercially for immunization 
against this disease. The vaccine produced by BIKEN Corporation 
in Japan is safe and effective and was approved as an investigational 
new drug by the Food and Drug Administration.1 The Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) distributed this vaccine to physicians who 
registered as collaborative investigators. These physicians could 
then give the vaccine to travelers who would be at risk, using 
an informed-consent protocol and reporting any adverse effects 
to the CDC. 
On June 30,1987, the CDC informed the collaborating investiga-
tors that the vaccine could no longer be obtained from BIKEN 
because the company did not have appropriate liability insurance, 
and there was no statutory mechanism for absolving them of liabil-
ity. Because of the limited demand, it is unlikely that any American 
company would undertake the manufacture or distribution of this 
vaccine. 
An increasing number of American companies are seeking busi-
ness and development opportunities in the Far East. There is also a 
steady stream of tourists going to areas in which the disease is 
endemic in India, China, Korea, Nepal, Burma, and Thailand. This 
number will increase dramatically in 1988, when the Summer 
Olympics are held in Seoul, South Korea. It is regrettable that these 
travelers will have to be at risk for a potentially fatal but preventable 
disease because of a liability issue. 
It is apparent that the American public, and not just physicians, 
are paying a price for the medical malpractice-liability crisis. The 
Japanese encephalitis vaccine issue is one small but important part 
of this problem. One way to resolve this particular problem would 
be to include all vaccines in the no-fault compensation program for 
childhood vaccinations recently signed into law (and discussed by 
Iglchart in the May 14 issue2). It would also be helpful if such 
programs were funded; that they were not was a distinct deficiency 
of the pedi a trie-oriented legislation at the time of its passage. Good 
intentions are not enough. 
LEONARD C. MARCUS, V.M.D, M.D. 
Travelers* Health and 
Newton, MA 02160 Immunization Services 
1. Japanese encephalitis: report of a World Health Organizatioo Working 
Group. MMWR 1987; 33:119-20, 125. 
2. Igtehart JK. Compensating children with vaccine-related injuries. N Engl J 
Med 1987; 316:1283-8. 
The above letter was referred to Mr. Iglchair, who offers the 
following reply: 
To the Editor: Dr. Marcus* letter raises several points about the 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Act that deserve reaction. It also 
contains a bit of misinformation that may needlessly alarm some 
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readers. Dealing with the latter point first, I am informed by the 
CDC that people who travel to Seoul for the Summer Olympics are 
considered by the agency to be at negligible risk of contracting 
Japanese encephalitis. Only if they intend to travel to rural areas of 
Korea (or of other countries in which the disease is endemic as well) 
should they possibly be considered candidates for Japanese enceph-
alitis vaccine, according to the CDC. 
There appear to be two major reasons why Japanese encephalitis 
vaccine is not covered by the Vaccine Injury Compensation Pro-
gram. The first is that it is not a licensed product. The second is that 
the program was intended to provide compensation for those in-
jured by vaccines required for school entry. One can only speculate 
about whether the inclusion of Japanese encephalitis vaccine under 
the program would provide sufficient relief from liability to per-
suade the manufacturer to seek licensure. One major vaccine manu-
facturer (Lederle Laboratories) has testified that the program as 
established under the new law will not reduce its liability. 
To date, no funding mechanism has been established for the com-
pensation program, so it has not yet become operational. The 
House-passed Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 contains 
provisions that would establish an excise tax to fund future claims 
and authorize appropriations from general revenues to fund pre-
existing claims. The excise tax would be $4.56 per dose for diphthe-
ria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine; $4.44 per dose for measles, 
mumps, and rubella vaccine; $0.29 per dose for poliomyelitis vac-
cine (both oral and injectable); and $0.06 per dose for diphtheria 
and tetanus vaccines. Appropriations to cover preexisting claims 
would be authorized at a level of $80 million per year for four years. 
The excise tax would take effect January 1, 1988, but claims could 
not be filed until October 1, 1988. Other proposed amendments 
would extend protection to the person who administered a vaccine 
(a step strongly advocated by physicians' groups), clarify the defini-
tion of a compensable condition to include only conditions having a 
serious impact six months after immunization, and modify benefits 
for preexisting conditions. The system would have a five-year life, 
but would be automatically terminated if more than 150 new claims 
were awarded in any 12-month period. The program strikes bal-
ances all along the way, but without such compromises it would 
never have been created in the first place. 
JOHN K. IOLEHART 
Potomac, MD 20854 12008 River Rd. 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE FOR DISABLED CHILDREN 
To the Editor: As chairman of the Committee on Children with 
Disabilities of the American Academy of Pediatrics, I am writing 
concerning the Sounding Board article by Butler et al. in the July 16 
issue.1 The analysis deserves considerable praise for effectively de-
scribing the difficulties of ensuring access to health care for children 
with disabilities. However, three issues need further discussion. 
First, the authors indicate that there may be discontinuity of 
coverage as a result of a change in a parent's employment. Our 
recent Health Care Financing Study of Chronic Illness at Albert 
Einstein College of Medicine3 has demonstrated that about 15 per-
cent of families with children who have severe chronic disabilities 
were denied insurance for either their families or the disabled chil-
dren. This was often done because of the presence of a "preexisting 
condition.** In addition, some self-insured employers have reported-
ly denied employment to parents of disabled children because of 
apparent concern about raising the employer's insurance costs. 
Health maintenance organizations have also allegedly denied mem-
bership to families with disabled children. 
Second, as the authors mention, state variations in coverage make 
it difficult to use Medicaid as a national program to ensure compre-
hensive health care services for disabled children. Unfortunately, 
the income-eligibility standards for Medicaid vary from state to 
state, as does each state's willingness to provide optional services, 
including many therapies that physically handicapped children re-
quire. It would be unwise to force families to become medically 
indigent in order to qualify for Medicaid, only to receive limited 
services beyond basic health care. Given states' sensitivity about 
their rights and prerogatives, Medicaid as it is currently structured 
would appear to be an unlikely source of comprehensive health care 
for chronically ill and disabled children. 
Third, problems of access to health care for people with disabil-
ities do not end in childhood. A frequently heard criticism is that 
families can obtain pediatric care for their children with disabilities, 
but that it is enormously difficult to find physicians with the requi-
site skills or interest who are willing to care for adults with develop-
mental disabilities. v 
The view of our American Academy of Pediatrics committee is 
that comprehensive health care, home care, and catastrophic-illness 
care for the population with disabilities are inexorably linked, and 
that Medicaid and private insurance will need to be supplemented 
by catastrophic-illness insurance if we are to ensure the provision of 
community-based care for the disabled. In addition, efforts to in-
crease access to care must be coupled with the training of profes-
sionals to increase their skills in dealing with the disabled and to 
correct or mitigate the pejorative attitudes that unfortunately re-
main pervasive among health care professionals. 
HERBERT J. COHEN, M.D. 
Bronx, NY 10461 Albert Einstein College of Medicine 
1. Butler JA, Rosenbaura S, Palfrey JS. Ensuring access to health care for 
children with disabilities. N Engl J Med 1987; 317:162-5. 
2. American Academy of Pediatrics. Health care financing for the child with 
catastrophic costs, June 1987. 
The above letter was referred to the authors of the article in 
question, who offer the following reply: 
To the Editor: My coauthors and I are grateful for Dr. Cohen's 
amplification of our remarks. We certainly concur that preexisting-
condition clauses, state variations in Medicaid benefits, problems 
associated with health care access for older adolescents, and prob-
lems of physician training and attitude all can constitute serious 
obstacles to adequate health care access for disabled children and 
youth. 
Our only concern with the letter is that some may read it as a 
generalized condemnation of Medicaid, which, although far from 
perfect, remains the largest single source of insurance for low-
income children with disabilities. Optional benefits under the pro-
gram do vary, but now are often fairly generous. In 1985, for exam-
ple, 36 states covered services by persons other than physicians, 18 
covered private-duty nursing, 36 covered physical therapy, 29 cov-
ered occupational therapy, 34 covered therapy for speech, hearing, 
and language disorders, 48 covered prescription drugs, 45 covered 
prosthetic devices, 35 covered rehabilitative services, 50 covered 
intermediate care facilities, 33 covered psychiatric services, and 26 
covered personal care services.1 In addition, all states can now pay 
for case management. In our own research on children with disabil-
ities in five states, we discovered that publicly insured children had 
much broader coverage than privately insured children, reflected in 
the fact that Medicaid-eligible parents paid out of pocket for only 
5 percent of all health care visits, whereas privately insured parents 
paid out of pocket for 23 percent of all visits.2 
Also, Medicaid is improving its standards of care. Twenty-six 
states have adopted the federal reforms contained in the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, allowing states to cover preg-
nant women and infants whose family income exceeds the payment 
level established by Aid to Families with Dependent Children but is 
below the federal poverty level. Congress is currently debating two 
pieces of legislation: one, proposed by Senator Durenberger, would 
extend Medicaid benefits to any disabled child whose family income 
is less than 185 percent of the poverty level; the other, proposed by 
Senator Bradley and Congressman Waxman, would extend Medi-
caid eligibility to all pregnant women and infants in that income 
bracket These efforts, even if imperfect, are likely to advance far 
sooner and provide far more benefit to low-income children with 
disabilities than any contemplated reform of the private insurance 
industry. To the extent that Congress succeeds in restructuring 
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incidental factors are gaining importance as FDA's information quality 
concerns increase. 
§13.11 New Drug Applications: The Process 
The drug approval process is the archetype of necessary regula-
tion. Drugs cannot be judged safe or unsafe by the average person who 
picks up a tablet or bottle; and each drug compound is intended to act 
in the body with some physiological effect. So there is little dispute 
about the need to have a governmental drug clearance and regulation 
process. However, once past that point of consensus the regulatory 
process by which drugs are cleared becomes controversial for its cost, 
time, expense, and laxity or rigidity, depending on one's political 
outlook.1 
Federal drug approval processes seek a body of safety evidence 
sufficient to predict whether or not the drug will be harmful. Founded 
on the tragic experience with untested elixir sulfanilamide,2 the pro-
cess helps to identify hazards and to screen out risks which are not 
justified by therapeutic benefits.3 Because all drugs have some risks, 
efficacy studies must show that the drug's contribution to patient care 
will be sufficient to overcome its hazards.4 
study methods which should be used by drug sponsors. 47 Fed Reg 46627 (Oct 19, 
1982). Speech by Acting Commissioner Novitch to Conference on Generic Drugs (July 
15, 1980). See also FDA Appropriations: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Agriculture and Related 
Agencies, Senate Appropriations Comm, 97th Cong 1st Sess (1981) (testimony of Commis-
sioner Hayes) 
1 See e.g., R Merrill 8c P Hutt, Food and Drug Law Cases and Materials 409-33 (1979); 
P Termin, Taking Your Medicine (1979); Comment, The Focd and Drug Administration: 
Law, Science and Politics in the Evaluation and Control of New Drug Technology 67 Nw U L Rev 
858 (1973). "[T]here can be iitde doubt that it is more difficult and cosdy to obtain 
approval of a new drug in this country than in the other . . . . " Merrill, Can FAD Do 
Anything Right! 2 Va Law School Report 19, 20 (1978) 
2
 This drug's fatal ingredient, a diethylene glycol solvent, spurred Congress to adopt the 
1938 Act's "new drug" testing for safety. See §3.04, Ch 13 
3 Many of the safety-related issues come up in animal testing or during Phase I human 
testing under an IND, at which point the further development of the drug is dropped. 
The 1962 amendments were spurred by a teratogenic drug, thalidomide, which was 
distributed in a poorly controlled investigation. See §3.07, Ch 13 
4
 21 USC §505 is a balance of risks and benefits, not an absolute barrier to hazardous 
drugs. For example, an anticancer agent with liver damage as a side effect may be an 
acceptable risk for cancer patients. The approved process identifies dosages at which 
adverse effects occur and quantifies the benefit and hazard probabilities so that a factual 
judgment can be made on approvability 
© McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
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There have been at least three historical phases to FDA's approv-
al since the 1962 Drug Amendments created FDA's modern drug 
control powers.5 In each, communication channels between developer 
and reviewer have been the index of success for drug approvals. Be-
tween 1963 and 1976, the process of approval was a scientific debate, 
the terms of which were developed through extensive paper submis-
sions. This process did not attract much controversy or attention out-
side of the pharmaceutical community, compared to its later period. 
FDA paperwork gradually became longer and more detailed until 
truckloads of papers constituted a formal new drug application filing.6 
The predominant issue in debate was whether the existence of a pre-
market proof of efficacy had created a delay in relative availability of 
necessary therapeutic drugs in the United States as compared to other 
countries without that requirement. The "drug lag" debate attracted 
more economists and congressmen than virtually any other subject in 
the field of FDA regulation.7 
A lawyer-designed procedural reform effort, which was highly 
skeptical of FDA drug reviewer dialogue with industry scientists, ar-
rived in the late 1970's.8 This theory held that "pressure" to approve 
could be avoided by isolating the reviewers. This proceduralist scheme 
of drug approval interactions emphasized controls, inspections, and 
oversight. Contact with reviewers by outside researchers who devel-
oped drugs was forbidden except under formalized methods of dis-
course.9 While it facially served to cut off improper contacts, it 
produced an adversary atmosphere in which drug developers and re-
viewers could barely talk beyond "name, rank and serial number," in 
5 See $13.02 for the development of 21 USC §505 in the 1962 amendments 
6 Actual case reports on each patient constitute the bulk of the NDA. As soon as the 
approval letter is issued the actual NDA file is retired to a Federal Records Center, so 
as to leave more room for storage at FDA. "The average application today contains 
100,000 pages, filling hundreds of volumes. Applications arrive at FDA, literally, in truck 
loads." Address by HHS Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council (June 
23, 1982) 
iSee e.g., R Merrill & P Hutt, supra note 1, at 430-33; S Peltzman, Regulation of Phar-
maceutical Innovation (1974); P Temin, Taking Your Medicine (1979); W Wardell 8c L 
Lasagna, Regulation and Drug Development (1975). And see also GAO Report, "FDA 
Drug Approval-A Lengthy Process That Delays the Availability of Important New 
Drugs/' HRD-80-64 (May 28, 1980) 
8 HEW Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Final Report (May 1977) 
9 "Public" participation would occur by additional committee reviews and public disclo-
sures but the questions which inevitably arise in reviews would not be answerable in a 
dialogue 
December, 1983 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13-58 CHAPTER 13 DRUG REGULATION: APPROVAL 
the words of a top FDA official.10 In hindsight, it is ironic that the two 
principal incidents of alleged improper, or illegal, reviewer conduct 
occurred during this phase of tighter controls on all drug developer 
contacts with the FDA.11 Such incidents were rare, but did not mark 
the earlier or later periods of freer contacts. Legislation to codify the 
proceduralist reforms was offered and passed the Senate, but failed to 
draw a consensus for support during its time in the Congress.12 
The 1981-84 period of reform in the drug approval process em-
phasizes communications at all levels as the centerpiece of an effort to 
expedite the drug approval process. Casting aside some of the 
proceduralist reforms which had failed to win congressional endorse-
ment, this latest phase brings a confident FDA into more open dia-
logue with its constituency of drug consumers and manufactures.13 
The procedures for drug approval today fall into essentially four 
stages. The drug manufacturer discovers a compound or conducts 
experiments with a known compound, which is tested in appropriate 
laboratory screening tests and then is examined in animals as a possi-
ble pharmacological entity. Private research funding predominates; 
public funding aids less marketable products and some drugs for exot-
ic therapies,14 but for the most part FDA drug reviewers deal with 
private firms sponsoring the new drug. 
FDA's approval process beings with an investigational new drug 
(IND) application, filed 30 days before first human experimentation 
with the drug, so as to permit FDA an opportunity to examine the 
proposed testing.15 The IND process is undergoing modifications 
10 H Meyer, Director, National Center for Drugs & Biologies, Address to Washington 
Forum (June 10, 1982) 
H The indictment of a drug reviewer for receiving gratuities from a drug developer of 
DMSO and the firing by FDA of a physician and a statistician for accepting gratuities 
from a marketer of contact lens sterilizing solution occurred as a result of activities in 
1977-80. As one result, the individual former reviewers are being sued and the govern-
ment refused to pay counsel fees, see "FDA Reviewer Liability in IND/NDA Decision," 
44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) TG-6 (July 19, 1982) 
12 See S Rep No 96-321, regarding S 1705, 96th Cong, 1st Sess (1979) 
13 The confidence was seen in testimony by FDA's new leadership, see e.g., FDA Oversight 
Hearings Before House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 3, 1982) (testimo-
ny of FDA Commr A Hayes) 
l* Address by HHS Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council (June 23, 
1982) 
is See 513.12 
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which may reduce delays and assure more prompt development of 
FDA-drug firm communications.16 
IND regulations resulting from the 1983 proposed rules will be 
made final and will become part of the operating system of the Nation-
al Center for Drugs and Biologies, perhaps in 1984 or 1985. FDA is 
considering several new ideas, not yet even proposed as rules, under 
which more of the burden will rest with outside review boards at the 
first level of clinical approval; overall effect of the proposed new IND 
rules would be more rapid clearances for the earliest, least intrusive 
human investigations.17 
Because safety is a paramount consideration at the more inten-
sive, later stages of drug investigations, the clinical "hold," staying the 
conclusion of the routine 30-day pretesting period, is more readily 
applied against larger or more risk-related human experiments per-
formed under INDs after the short initial testing phase.18 Commercial 
distribution of the IND product is not allowed, but in some cases FDA 
will grant written permission for the sale of the investigational 
product.19 
The second stage of FDA approval of the process begins with 
meetings preparatory to the filing of the new drug application 
(NDA).20 The FDA should meet with the drug firm and examine the 
IND evidence to identify special problems and additional testing which 
is needed. When FDA has a research program in mind, it will usually 
negotiate with the firm at this stage for additional testing. By the time 
of the pre-NDA meeting, the firm should have completed Phase I basic 
human studies and Phase II studies in patients for whom the drug will 
be expected to produce a therapeutic result.21 
The goals of those phases are distinct. Phase I seeks phar-
macologic effects information and early evidence on effectiveness in 
16 Hayes testimony, supra n 13 
17 The Investigational New Drug proposed rules are found at 48 Fed Reg 26720 (June 
9, 1983). Discussion of the FDA's desire for future use of the outside review boards is 
detailed in proposed Investigational New Drug (IND) Regulations preamble id at 26722. 
18 Proposed rules on clinical hold procedures, 21 CFR §312.42 (proposed), formalize 
the methods now in use for suspending or delaying the use of the drug in humans. 
19 Commercial sale is prohibited without written FDA approval. An example likely to 
be approved is an expensive orphan drug, for which no sustaining market is yet available. 
Proposed 21 CFR §312.6, 48 Fed Reg 26737 (June 9, 1983) 
20 Id 
tiSee e.g., House Comm on Science and Technology, 96th Cong, 2d Sess, The Food and 
Drug Administration's Process for Approving New Drugs (Serial HHH Comm Print 
1980) 
December, 1983 
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20-60 patients. Phase II measures several hundred closely monitored 
patients for the clinical effectiveness of the drug. Both prepare the 
product for its real test, the multiple Phase III effectiveness and safety 
tests which form the basis for risk assessments and label warnings, 
during which thousands of patients may be exposed.22 
FDA and the firm have the greatest interest in results from the 
Phase III clinical studies, which have been designed to elucidate neu-
tral, "blind" research results. This is the point at which drug products 
do or do not prove effective in double-blind controlled clinical studies. 
Evidence generated at this point is crucial to approval. Meetings with 
FDA continue during this phase as preliminary results are reviewed.23 
These meetings may be frustrating, for the agency employees 
may be skeptical. But in tactical terms the persuasion must be done at 
this level, for it is quite risky to file over protest and then sue the 
agency after rejection.24 FDA has procedures for internal appeals, and 
one should always try the internal appeal option if the issue is a pivotal 
study or otherwise is of crucial importance.25 
The final phase of the review process leads to formal acceptance 
of the proposed NDA. Concurrent reviews of the application by several 
groups within the National Center for Drugs 8c Biologies each produce 
a reviewer's recommendation.26 Internal meetings within FDA gener-
ate questions, and meetings with the drug developer pose those ques-
tions. An advisory committee to the FDA may review the new product 
and advise what additional work needs to be done.27 Advisory commit-
22 Proposed 21 CFR §312.21, 48 Fed Reg 26737 (June 9, 1983) 
23 Id. There will be more of these meetings to inform sponsors more quickly of the 
correctable deficiencies. Address by HHS Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceuti-
cal Council (June 23, 1982) 
24 Filing under protest means the claiming of an opportunity for a hearing. At this point, 
the application will be denied, the hearing will probably be denied, and the courts will 
probably defer to FDA's wisdom in reviewing the application. So the procedure will be 
seldom utilized. 21 CFR §314.110(c) (proposed), 47 Fed Reg 46655 (Oct 19, 1982) 
25 Internal appeals within the Office of New Drug Evaluation are a commonly available 
internal remedy to appeal disagreements. Preamble to NDA Proposed Rules, 47 Fed 
Reg 46633-34 (Oct 19, 1982) 
26 Concurrent review allows each reviewer to have a detailed technical section on that 
person's area of responsibility and a 50- to 200-page summary of the total NDA technical 
data 
27 Advisory committees review the progress of studies and suggest additional studies. 
"Sterling's Trilostane . . . Recommended," 44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) TG-9 (June 
28,1982). Advisory committees were involved in the decision to clear for marketing the 
anti-inflammatory drug Oraflex in 1982. FDA Oversight Hearings Before House Comm on Govt 
Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 3, 1982) (testimony of FDA Commr A Hayes) 
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tee clearance is a helpful step for FDA, but as a legal matter does not 
represent a required step of approval and does not speed up the 
process.28 
After the FDA is satisfied with the product's adequate and well-
controlled studies showing its safety and effectiveness, the agency 
collects other necessary information, as by validation of testing meth-
ods.29 FDA's field force inspects the manufacturing facility for compli-
ance with good manufacturing practices.30 The verification of inactive 
ingredient safety may involve review of a master file, submitted directly 
to FDA as a proprietary protection by the inactive ingredient suppli-
er.31 Labeling claims receive a preliminary review.32 
After these reviews, the hierarchy within the FDA drug operation 
endorses the recommendation to approve the NDA.33 Time delays at 
this stage may be significant, for the demise of an approved drug 
product through adverse patient reactions quite often leads to adverse 
congressional questioning of the drug approval managers. Managers, 
because of this disincentive to speed through reviews, may ask ques-
tions which delay the process, or may sit on an application until stimu-
lated. In the parallel example of "paper NDAs," discussed as a 
separate process in a later section,34 the FDA has delegated approval 
authority for all paper NDAs after the first one in a product class (i.e., 
28 For example, a sponsor whose NDA was delayed in the FDA for years could not 
persuade a court to order FDA action on the NDA even though the advisory committee 
had already cleared the product. Newport Pharmaceuticals Intl Inc v Schweiker, Food Drug 
Cos L Rep (CCH) 138148 (DC DC 1981) 
29 Methods validation permits an FDA laboratory which analyzes the purity of the drug 
to duplicate the sponsor's testing method. This assures that the quality of the sample 
used will be duplicative when future FDA inspectional samples are checked. GAO 
Report, "Speeding Up the Drug Review Process," HRD-82-16, 17 (Nov 23, 1981) 
W21 CFR §314.100(b) 
Mid at §314.11. FDA does not review the safety of the inactive ingredient in the master 
file until the file is referenced by an NDA applicant for use in connection with an active 
ingredient. But FDA considers the safety of inactives to be a very critical part of its total 
drug safety decision. Brief for United States in United States v Generix Drug-Corp, No 
81-1222 (US pending Oct 1982 Term) 
32 21 CFR §314.100(d). Comparative claims of efficacy probably will not be permitted 
in the labeling, as a result of a 1982 fight between drug manufacturers concerning a 
disputed label claim. Crout Signals an End to Comparative Efficacy Labeling, 13 Wash Drug 
Letter 4 (Dec 14, 1981), " Rx Drug Comparative Promotional Claims", 44 F-D-C-
Reports (Pink Sheet) 11 (July 26, 1982) 
33 Authority to approve is delegated at 47 Fed Reg 26822 (June 22, 1982) 
34 See 513.19 
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after the controversy has passed) to the division director level and the 
subdelegation has speeded approvals of the me-too product copies.35 
An "approvable" letter states that the application can be approved but 
that label and labeling copies must be submitted.36 At this point, the 
firm prepares and FDA approves or modifies a "summary of safety and 
effectiveness" which is the publicly disseminated, summary basis of 
approval for the drug product.37 Then the "approval" letter is sent and 
the drug may be marketed. A monthly list of approved drugs carries 
news of the approval.38 
FDA has three controls after approval. The first advertisements 
for a prescription drug must be submitted to FDA and, thereafter, FDA 
can request that ads be submitted.39 Pre-approval promotional efforts 
are strongly discouraged and can delay an approval.40 Reports of ad-
verse reactions must be submitted very rapidly to FDA during the first 
year after approval.41 Problems of late reporting have led some firms 
into conflict with the FDA, while FDA has attempted in proposed rules 
to expedite all adverse reaction reports, first during the IND process42 
and later by requiring updating of adverse information after the filing 
of the NDA but prior to approval.43 In some cases FDA imposes addi-
tional post-approval testing by agreement with the manufacturer— 
35 Address by National Center for Drugs &: Biologies Director H Meyer to National 
Association Pharmaceutical Manufactures, Dorado Beach, PR (Jan 16 1983) 
36 21 CFR §314.100(d) 
37/rf at §314.14(e). Note that the total file is withheld. But factual internal memoranda 
of FDA reviewers would be available under the Freedom Of Information Act, see Sterling 
Drug Inc v Harris 488 F Supp 1019 (SD NY 1980) 
38 This listing is available by mail subscription from National Technical Information 
Service, Springfield, Virginia 
^ See Ch 15 
40 FDA has been adamant in opposing promotional information prior to marketing 
41 As the NDA-IND changes come into regulations format, rapid transmission of adverse 
reactions already provided for in 21 CFR §310.300 will be expanded. Address by HHS 
Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council (June 23, 1982) 
42 Adverse reaction data on investigational new drugs is extremely important. In its 
proposed rules, FDA would require IND holders to report within no later than 20 days 
an incident of adverse experience "that may suggest significant hazards, contraindica-
tions, side efTects or precautions." 21 CFR §312.12(b)(l)(i) (proposed), 48 Fed Reg 
26741 (June 9, 1983) 
43 The NDA reports are divided into immediate repons, 15-day reports, and 30-day 
reports, with those of least gravity taken into the annual report as well. 21 CFR 
§314.80(c) (proposed), 47 Fed Reg 46652 (Oct 19, 1982) 
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forcing agreement as the negotiated precondition for product approv-
al where a doubt about safety or efficacy remains.44 
The most common debates on new drug approval relate to effica-
cy. Safety screening steps in animal and basic human studies usually 
alleviate safety concerns or place the safety risks into perspective, from 
which therapeutic benefits can be said to outweigh risks, though as 
with all small-scale inquiries, safety information in test phases may 
differ from actual market experiences.45 FDA is careful to get this 
safety information in as complete detail as possible, during the pre-
approval phases, to assist in the final risk assessment. Failure to pro-
vide the date risks an enforcement action.46 FDA has used many clini-
cal guidelines for study methods,47 and has recommended that these 
be used in the drug industry, particularly by generic firms which cus-
tomarily are weak in the research field.48 Efficacy controversies are 
usually scientific disputes about whether a study was adequately con-
trolled, to avoid prejudice to the "blinding" of the research, and 
whether statistical tables of patient progress demonstrate that the drug 
had a significant advantage over the control placebo product.49 FDA 
has devoted a great deal of attention to the adequacy of controls in a 
study to assure that the agency's scientists agree that the proof of 
44 Special reporting obligations may be imposed, 21 CFR §310.304, and FDA actively 
sought approval of a Phase IV authority which would permit agency control of post-
approval studies on the product, while drug reform legislation was pending in 1977-80. 
That additional reporting may be part of the 1983 regulations 
45 Because of the intentionally small number of persons exposed to a drug before it is 
marketed, each patient's experience will be carefully studied and there may be debates 
about reactions or effectiveness in a handful of patients, who represent one millionth 
of the numbers of patients who would be exposed after approval. FDA is very aware of 
the difficulty of predicting adverse reaction experiences and so is ready to control the 
new product after it enters the marketplace. Oraflex was a product marketed between 
May and August 1982, which was suspended from sale by its manufacturer as a result 
of adverse reaction reports received after FDA approval. 
46 Proposed 21 CFR §314.80, 47 Fed Reg 46652 (Oct 19, 1982) 
47 Preamble to Proposed NDA Revision Rules, 47 Fed Reg 46627 (Oct 19, 1982). 
48 Address by National Center for Drugs & Biologies Director H Meyer to National 
Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, Dorado Beach, PR (Jan 16, 1983); Speech 
by Acting Commissioner Novitch to Conference on Generic Drugs (July 15, 1980); 
Testimony of Commissioner Hayes to Congress, FDA Appropriations: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm on Agriculture, Senate Appropriations Comm, 97th Cong 1st Sess (1983) 
49 FDA guidelines and the Good Clinical Practices rules control the experimentation 
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efficacy is well established. Courts uphold FDA in this complex area.50 
A product with no significant advantage over a placebo would not be 
effective enough to justify the product's risks to patients, and could 
deter the user from use of a product which would be effective. 
FDA audits the data which are submitted in the NDA process as 
part of its bioresearch monitoring programs, such as those for clinical 
investigators51 The use of foreign data as a basis for approval is per-
missible as long as some United States research supports the approva-
bility conclusion and as long as the foreign data were compiled under 
standards acceptable to the FDA (which conclusions could be audited 
by FDA visits to that foreign testing site.52 If the audits or the manufac-
turing site inspections are not satisfactory, there may be a delay in the 
approval of the product.53 
Drug approval is a human process and humans tend to disagree 
at times. The NDA process includes a level of appeal which proceeds 
from the reviewer to the supervisory officials, to a committee which is 
headed by the Director of the National Center for Drugs and Bi-
ologies.54 It is important that firms use their appeal rights, so that they 
50 Courts have tended to be quite deferential to FDA in the "new drug" area, see e.g., 
Weinberger v Hynson Westcott & Dunning 412 US 609 (1973); Rutherford v United 
States 442 US 544 (1979), and this has been especially true in the efficacy evidence area. 
see e.g., Smithkline Co v FDA 587 F2d 1107 (DC Cir 1978); Edison Pharmaceutical Co 
v FDA 513 F2d 1063 (DC Cir) rehearing denied 517 F2d 164 (DC Cir 1975): but if the rules 
of efficacy are changed in midstream and approval is refused, the firm may be able to 
find a sympathetic court, Amer Cyanamid Co v FDA 606 F2d 1307 (DC Cir 1979). See also 
cases cited at Ch 15 
"See 21 CFR pts 52 et seq and Ch 23 
52 Although FDA has permitted foreign data to satisfy Phases I and II, before the 
controlled double-blind efficacy studies, FDA has required at least one of the Phase III 
studies to be a United States study. 21 CFR §314.1(c)(2), item (12)(c). An exception 
exists for drugs intended to treat diseases which are rare in the United States. In 
1974-80, 51?& of new drug approvals for truly new drugs or indications contained 
foreign clinical studies, and of these 17% were studies deemed pivotal or significant for 
approval. Under a new policy revision, foreign clinical data may be the sole support for 
an NDA if the data are applicable to United States medical practice, if the investigators 
are of a "recognized competence/' and if FDA deems those data valid without an on-site 
FDA inspection. FDA Oversight Hearings Before House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong, 
2d Scss (Aug 3, 1982) testimony of FDA Commr A Hayes) 
M A firm which refuses inspection or fails to show that the facility is adequate to make 
the product will have a difficult time winning FDA clearance for its NDA 
M FDA Oversight Hearings Before House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 
3, 1982) (testimony of FDA Commr A Hayes) 
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are not foreclosed from litigation for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.55 
Public access to the drug approval process occurs when approval 
is announced and the summary of the data which served as a basis of 
safety and efficacy is made available.56 The detailed information re-
mains confidential; that which is released cannot be used as a basis for 
approval of another firm's subsequent products.57 
The process for drug products which are "orphans," i.e., which 
have so little a market as to be unattractive for manufacturers' invest-
ments in research, is different. More FDA involvement with testing, 
potential involvement of other federal agencies like the National Insti-
tutes of Health, and possibly a relaxed efficacy requirement because 
of smaller test populations, will be some features of an orphan drug 
approval process.58 It has been suggested that orphan products are so 
difficult to run through larger double-blind studies that FDA should 
accept expert opinions concerning efficacy, but the suggestion would 
be so different from normal FDA insistence on having two double-
blind clinical studies that its future is questionable.59 
The time for the NDA approval process is 180 days, by statute, 
from filing to final action.60 Reforms within FDA have been made to 
reduce the perennial inability to abide by this time period.61 But a 
court would uphold a reasonable delay and would side with the FDA 
55 The comparable food additive clearance process produced the litigation in Stauffer 
Chem Co v FDA 670 F2d 106 (9th Cir 1982). Stauffer failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies after an adverse opinion letter from FDA. In the NDA process, reconsideration 
opportunities already exist. 21 CFR §10.75. And see Dormer, Contesting Advene FDA 
Decisions: Is it Worth The Risk? 4 Med Device 8c Diag Industry 26 (1982) 
56 21 CFR §314.14 
57 "FDA Discussions of Unpublished Data/* 44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) TG-7 (June 
7, 1982) 
58 These are "orphans" because they lack sufficient commercial markets to justify the 
costs of development. FDA has set up an Office of Orphan Product Development to 
work with the Dept of HHS Orphan Products Board and the Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association Commission on Drugs for Rare Diseases. FDA Oversight Hearings Before 
House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 3, 1982) (testimony of FDA 
Commr A Hayes) 
59 "FDA Drug Efficacy Determinations," 44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) 3 (May 10, 
1982) 
60 21 USC§355(c) 
61 FDA Oversight Hearings Before House Comm on Govt Operations, 97th Cong, 2d Sess (Aug 
3, 1982) (testimony of FDA Commr A Hayes), and see also Address by HHS Secretary 
Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council (June 23, 1982) 
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where injunctive relief to force approval is sought.62 Measures to 
speed up the process have been under consideration for some time.63 
§13.12 New Drug Applications: Investigational New 
Drug Exemptions 
The investigational new drug exemption provisions of §505 of 
the Act are extremely important for drug firms to comprehend.1 No 
new drug can be approved without first satisfying FDA about its safety 
and effectiveness in humans. To gather the needed evidence requires 
an investigational new drug exemption application (IND) which puts the FDA 
on notice of the proposed clinical trials. An IND is deemed approved 
if FDA does not object; usually, FDA has reviewed animal test results 
and the proposed program for the new drug's human tests within two 
months of the IND filing.2 
Prior to the 1962 amendments, there was no IND system compa-
rable to the present elaborate system; four lines in the Act, rather than 
the present page of text, discussed investigational new drugs.3 But 
eleven birth defects cases in the United States which followed the 
widespread "investigational" use of an unapproved drug in the early 
1960s, thalidomide, led Congress to write strict control authority into 
the Act.4 The investigations issue entered the bill late, as a result of 
the publicity given thalidomide while the bill was in final stages of 
62 Newport Pharmaceuticals Intl Inc v Schweiker Food Drug Cos L Rep (CCH) 138148 
(DDC 1981) 
to Compare Address by HHS Secretary Schweiker to National Pharmaceutical Council 
(June 23, 1982) with HEW Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Final Report (1977) 
and Commission on the Federal Drug Approval Process, "Substantial Evidence Require-
ment Should be Reduced," 44 F-D-C Reports (Pink Sheet) 2 (Mar 2, 1982) 
i 21 USC §355(i). This section has had a "profound effect" on United States and world 
drug development by its very existence in United States law. Crout, The Nature of Regula-
tory Choices 33 Food Drug Cosm LJ 143, 420 (1978) 
* 21 CFR pt 312; and HEW Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, Final Report 19-23 
(1977). 
3 Before 1962,21 USC §355(i) read simply: "The Secretary shall promulgate regulations 
for exempting from the operation of this section drugs intended solely for investigation-
al use by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the safety 
of drugs." Food Drug & Cosmetic Act ch 675, 52 Stat 1040, 75th Cong 3d Sess (1938) 
* Ley, Federal Law and Patient Consent 24 Food Drug Cosm LJ 520, 521 (1969) 
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it GRASE. The issues are quite distinct. There may be opposing experts; 
the fact that FDA does not agree with the experts "does not eliminate 
the fact of their disagreement," and the plaintiff has the burden to 
establish such generality of recognition. Chattem, Inc v Heckler Food Drug 
Cos L Rep (CCH) 138293 (D DC May 10, 1985). 
Add to text at end oj section: 
When is a drug the "same" drug? I he answer depends on the 
context. In the case of orphan drug status, a court decided that the FDA 
properly treated two drugs as being different, and properly granted 
orphan drug status to one. Under 21 USC §360cc(a), orphan status will 
be exclusive once the NDA is granted, and this w ill exclude other 
products from the market. Thus, FDA approval is a reviewable decision 
when challenged by a third party whose drug would be excluded. On 
the substance of the issue, the court agreed with FDA that a 
biotechnological drug and a human extracted material which were used 
for the same purpose were not the same. The FDA's decision was 
upheld. GenentecK Inc v Bowen 676 F Supp 301 (D DC 1987). 
The advocate should consider that exemptions may apply from 
new drug status, and case precedents on animal drugs might be applied 
to human drugs as well. FDA took what a court believed was an 
unreasonably narrow view of exemptions and an unreasonably strong 
demand for new animal drug restrictions. This would conflict with the 
statutory policy that FDA would not interfere with medical practice. 
FDA's view was rejected by the court. United States v Algon Chemical, Inc 
Food Drug Cos L Rep (CCH) f 38079 (D NJ 1988). 
§13.11 New Drug Applications: The Process 
Add to footnote 1: 
See economic analyses of the FDA approval delay problem, S Pekzman, 
The Benefits and Costs of New Drug Regulation (R Landau ed 1973); 
Schifrin, Lessons From The Drug Lag: A Retrospective Analysis of the 1962 
Drug Regulations 5 Harv J Law & Public Policy 91 (1982). 
Add to eighth line oj text in carryover paragraph on page 13-62 at end of 
sentence: 
Since enactment of 5355(c) in jgg2t FDA has considered the date of 
"approval" to be the date on which FDA issues a written notification 
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of a new drug's approval. Mead / • )hn $« m 
(D DC Jan 27, 1987). 
Add to text at end of second full paragraph, page 1 ? 58: 
Xhe new drug approval requirement applies to both users and 
distributors of the new drug; there is no implicit exemption from §505 
because one is an end user of a drug rather than a commercial firm. 
Duncan v United States Food Drug Cos L Rep (CCH) 1138269 (WD Okla 
1984). 
Change Rutherford citation 
806 F2d M55 llOih < • - . 
Add Hi Irxi after ntiu* r") * . 
There was a great debate over this data's status in the early 
1980's, with one court holding that it was not a trade secret but that 
it was confidential commercial information. Public Citizen v FDA 704 F2d 
1280, 1291 (DCCir 1983) 
Congress ultimately settled the argument and determined that 
the data would be withheld, upholding the FDA administrative position 
that such data was properly confidential. Congress adopted at FDA's 
request a legislative determination that safety and efficacy data may be 
withheld by FDA upon a showing that commercial confidentiality helps 
the developing of secret research data maintain a stronger competitive 
position. Loss of exclusive use would cause a loss of competitive 
position, and under those extraordinary circumstances, FDA need not 
disclose the data when requests for disclosure are made under the 
Freedom oflnformation Act, Pub L 98-417, 98 Stat 1585 §104 (1984), 
and see O'Reilly, Knowledge is Power: Legislative Control of Drug Industry 
Trade Secrets 54 U Cin L Rev 1 (1985). 
Add to footnote 58: 
and as to orphan drug developments, see Grossman, The Orphan Drug 
Act: Adoption or Foster Care? 39 Food Drug Cos LJ 128 (1984). 
Add to text at end of section: 
FDA has the power, through a generic rule applicable to a number of 
drug applicants, to limit the applicants' access to certain regulatory 
entitlements which had been readily available in the past. Upjohn Co v 
FDA 811 F2d 1583 (DC Cir 1987) 
i ic! IPi 1 , < i i • 1 illiiililll Inc. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
|3*07 1962 Nt AMENDMENTS 3-19 
ed the clause once it had been added to the legislation, and unanimous 
votes led to enactment on September 6, 1958.!* 
Problems with color additive products under the 1938 Act sur-
faced during the 1950$, when a reexamination of approved colors 
found that they could create human safety risks,14 Legislation set safe 
limits on levels of colorants in finished foods, drugs, and cosmetics and 
established certification procedures for approval of batches of co-
lors.^ After the food additives debate, color additives legislation was 
adopted with relative ease, but it also included the Delaney anti-cancer 
clause.*5 
§3.07 ew Drug Amendments of 1962 
The two principal conditions which historically have led to major 
food and drug legislation have been the existence of a persuasive 
leader with legislative skills, and the occurrence of a crises in which the 
weaknesses of existing protective legislation are exposed to the public 
by the news media, Harvey Wiley and the meat adulteration muckrak-
ing and Senator Royal Copeland and the elixir sulfanilamide incident 
were joined in 1962 by Senator Estes Kefauver and the thalidomide 
birth defects case. The result of that combination of efforts and events 
was a major revision of drug approval authority for the Food and Drug 
Administration. 
The 1938 Act gave the FDA a negative option authority; it could 
act against drugs, but if it failed to act in a timely manner and did not 
use specific procedures, the drug would come onto the market despite 
any uncertainties as to its safety.1 The statute failed to require proof 
l j 460,462 (1973), For oihcr participant! in the controversy, see Sunshine. Reguluory 
Aspects ofFood Additives—Yesterday. Today and Tomorrow SI Food Drug Cosro LJ 
264 (1976) and Kleinfeld supra note 2 at 559 
\% Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub L No 85-929 Si i 1784 (codified at 2i 
USC IMS) 
IS Jans*en, FDA Since 193S: Major Trends and Developments IS J Fob I 2U n) 
(1964) 
H 21 USC 1576 
15 Id at 576(b)(5)(B) 
»To refuie to allow a drug application to take effect. FDA would have to hold a hearing 
and male findings in the form of an order, if no order were made, the application would 
become effective in 60 day*, former 21 USC »55(c); but the secretary could delay action 
for up to 180 days from the date of Wing. See Cavers, 77>c Food Drug & Cosmetic Act 
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that drugs were effective, so the FDA was forced to approve implicitly 
a drug which had not been shown to be unsafe even though it may not 
have been effective for the use intended.* 
Senator KeEauver's public hearings were a dramatic attack on 
prices and profits of the pharmaceutical industry,3 Much of the original 
economic thrust of his efforts was effectively blunted by prudent de-
fensive lobbying on the part of the pharmaceutical industry. Kefauver 
had spent a great deal of time on patent reform and the promotion of 
generic drug products and vigorously criticized advertising practices 
which failed to communicate adverse information about drugs and 
their side effects to physicians,* 
The sponsors of legislation increasing the power of FDA over 
new drugs made much of the thalidomide incident. In that case a new 
drug marketed in Europe, but only available on a test basis in the 
United States, proved to be teratogenic with infants born with seal-like 
flippers instead of limbs.5 Under the proposed legislation more time 
was to be made available to FDA's drug review staff, through extension 
of statutory time limits, to make decisions about new drug applications 
filed by drug firms.* More extensive safety and effectiveness testing 
would be required with efficacy tested through ^adequate and well-
controlled" studies. "Adequate tests by all methods reasonably appii-
of 1938: it* legislative History and its Substantive Provisions 6 1 fc Contemp Prob 2, 
40 (1938) 
2 S Rep No 1744, 87th Cong 2d Sess (1962): 
In the first place, once the Food and Drug Administration determines thai its 
value a* a drug outweighs its toxicity, the Department claims that ii must permit 
the drug to be marketed even though its claim to effectiveneis is exaggerated. In 
the lecond place, where a drug is essentially innocuous, it must dear the drug 
despite the feet that its daim of effectiveness is not borne out by the evidence. 
. , . The Department believes that the manufacturer should satisfy the Food and 
Drug Administration that his product is effective for the purposes claimed before 
it is marketed 
Quoted in [1962] US Code Cong k Ad Newt 2892 
* 11962] US Code Cong k Ad News at 2898, Ketou> ei [TJhe record is dear that by 
any test and under any standard the prices of most drugs are excessive and unreason* 
able1' 
* Views of Senator Ktfauver, S Rep No 1744. 87th Cong 2d Sen (1962) 
* In the United Sutes, over 2.5 million doses were distributed in investigations by 1,270 
phvsicians. Comment, The food and Drug Administration: Uw, Science and Politics in 
the Equation and Control of /Ven Drug Technology 67 NwU I Kev 858, 868 n 41 
6 21 USCJS55W 
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cable1' would be required to determine the safety of drugs during the 
clearance process,7 The burden of providing substantial evidence of 
effectiveness was placed squarely on the drug manufacturer, and a 
continuing post-approval reporting requirement was also imposed to 
maintain the flow of safety information.* Explicit records inspection 
authority was added for investigation of new drugs.9 
A major compromise issue in the legislative development of the 
1962 amendments was advertising, an issue which had been hotly 
contested in 1938 as well The conference reconciled conflicting 
House and Senate views by rejecting mandatory FDA pre-approval of 
drug advertising for prescription drugs,10 However, the conference 
report strongly encouraged prior review of such advertisements (with-
out much future adoption of the encouragement) and limited the 
FDA's post-clearance power to act against advertising which it had 
already reviewed,11 
Along with the drug approval authority and efficacy amend-
ments, FDA received a number of incidental powers including power 
to register establishments and controls over antibiotic drugs.12 As a 
concession to iht Kefauver view on drug marketing economics, gener-
ic names for products were to be established by FDA and then dis-
seminated on labeling in order to make the public aware of the identity 
of trademark-named drug products•** 
A review of the amended statute's impact on technology drew 
7
 Mat §855(d)(i); subsection (d) defines "substantial evidence 
»Id ai (&){\)\ this had Us origins in President Kennedy'* letter of April 10,1962. to the 
chairman of the Senate committee studying drug amendments; "Drug manufacturers 
should be required to keep records on and repon to the Department of Health Educa-
tion fc Welfare any indications of adverse effects from the use of a new drug or antibiot-
ic" Set 1*962} US Code Cong tic Ad News 2896 
* 21 u s e ISW0K2) 
10 (1962) US Code Cong & Ad News 29M-M 
It is the intention of the managers on the pan of the House . . . lhat no action 
shall be brought by the Secretary under this section because of the use of an 
advertisement submitted to him prior to publication and found not to be in 
violation of this paragraph unless he subsequently finds the adveniscment in 
violation, advises the advertiser, and allows reasonable tune to eCTect the neces-
sary correction. 
Id 
»2 2tUSCHS57(M,S60 
IS 21USC 1*58; s#e Conference Ref oi adc pting Senate version, 119621 US Code Cong 
U Ad News 2932 
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this conclusion from the 1962 amendments: "Among federal agencies 
undertaking technology assessment, the FDA is unique in that its sole 
responsibility is to determine whether the benefits to be gained by 
releasing a new technology outweigh the risks inherent in that innova-
tion/'H 
Unlike other comparable agencies the FDA was given no respon-
sibility, formal or informal, for promoting the particular aspect of 
technology which it must regulate, 
A& neither an advocate of technology nor absolute arbiter of legal 
status—to the extent that courts retain that role—the FDA was placed 
in a unique position by the 1962 drug amendments. Readers may draw 
their own conclusions about the consequences of the use and abuse of 
FDA's powers since those important amendments. Congress set up 
procedures with which the agency subsequently disagreed; FDA felt 
that individual hearings could not be practicably implemented, and the 
Supreme Court agreed.15 Historical fact suggests that the procedural 
amendments of 1962 were soon obsolete as the agency became con* 
scious of the mass of implementation work. Historians of the 1990s will 
record the ultimate value of those amendments for the FDA and for 
society, 
Between the new drug amendments and the medical device 
amendments of 1976, FDA underwent a consolidation of existing 
statutory authorities which expanded the bounds of the statute. Ani-
mal drug authority, the Drug Listing Act, and an amendment resolving 
a longstanding dispute over labeling and sale of vitamin and mineral 
foods were adopted during the period from 1962 to 1976.16 
§3.08 Medical Devices Amendments 
Of the statutory categories created by r n 938 Act the one left 
H Comment supr* note 5 at 870 
i* The Supreme Coun dismissed the procedural fine points or ihe amended act's 
hearing provisions with the comment; 
The deluge of litigation that would follow if "me-too drug* and OTC drug* had 
to receive de novo hearings in the coum would inure to the interests of manufac-
turers and merchant! \t\ drugs, but not to the interests of the public that Congress 
was anxious to protect by the 1962 amendments. . . 
Weinberger v Bentex Pharmaceuticals, lnc 412 US 645 (197.5) 
l« Act of Apr 22. 1976, Pub L No 94-278. 90 Stat 401 
© Shepard't Inc. 
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all cases, except in the situation in which an OTC drug may be unsafe 
unless it is placed on prescription as a manner of controlling distribu-
tion.1* 
§14.04 Definitions; Sa-
Safety is not an absolute determination; its boundaries are the 
current knowledge of science and its assumptions are the normal 
behavior of man. Water is safe except when ingested in large quantities 
by swimmers; salt can have toxic effects at very high levels. The judg-
ment of marketability made by both the manufacturer and the Food 
and Drug Administration for a drug product takes into account the 
benefiu of the product and the relative risk presented in light of other 
available remedies and the particular therapeutic situation to which the 
drug is addressed,1 Even dying patients, if the status can be defined, 
are entitled to be protected from drugs which are not "safe", and are 
denied access to those drugs which may be unsafe, as the Supreme 
Court decided in the lactrile anticancer case in 1979.* And the proof 
of safety is not an easy assignment by any means.* 
When FDA set out to define safety as it applies to drugs studied 
in the over-the-counter (OTC) drug review, it declared; 
Safety means a low incident c adverse reactions or significant side 
W The need for prescription drug distribution in lieu of stronget label warnings hat 
been debated in a 1978 administrative bearing, Matter of Supplemental New Drug 
Application, Bcnylin Expectorant, Docket 76N-0485 (FDA 1978), and lee Parke Davis 
fc Co v Califano, Food Drug Cos L Rep (CCH) ttBISi (6th Cir 1977) 
1 Pf]he typical issue for the FDA is not the absolute safety of a drug. Most drugs 
are unsafe in tome degree. Rather, the issue for iht FDA is whether to allow sale x 
of the drug, usually under specific restriction*. Resolution of this issue inevitably 
means calculating whether the benefits which the drug produce* outweigh the 
costs of its restricted use, 
Hess k Dark Division of Rhodia, lnc v FDA 495 F2d 975,993 (DC Cir 1974) 
* United States v Rutherford 47 USLW 4724 (June 18, 1979) 
S "Proof of a drug's safety i s . . . problematic . . . because of the uncertainty as to what 
constitutes an adequate demonstration of safety. Drugs that are toxic for a small number 
of patients may b« perfectly harmless for the great majority or users Because all 
drugs induce some chemical reaction •.»no drug can be termed absolutely safe," Note, 
Picking Your Poison: The Drug Bttlacy Requirement and the Right of Privacy 25 UCLA 
L Rev 577, 585-86 (1978). But see United Slates v Rutherford 47 USLW 4724 (June 18, 
1979) 
November 1979 
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effects under adequate directions of use and warnings against unsafe use 
ai well as low potential for harm which may result from abuse under 
conditions of widespread availability.4 
FDA then defined the term as subject to proof by "adequate tests 
by methods reasonably applicable to show the drug is safe under the 
prescribed, recommended or suggested conditions of use/* 
Congress intended that safe have the ordinary meaning of an 
absence of harmful consequences.* A perplexing regulatory problem 
has been to define safe in the abstract,6 FDA's legislative approach in 
1978*79 drug reform proposals was to find a product safe whose 
health benefits "dearly outweigh** its risks,7 But "how much risk is 
acceptable in light of the beneficial effects likely to be achieved"8 
remains a difficult calculation. Former FDA Chief Counsel Richard 
Merrill stated the quandary: 
FDA is asked to apply the label 'safe' to compounds whose hazards are 
imperfectly understood and, in some cases, recognized to be serious, 
even if infrequent... (FDA) has been given this responsibility by a public 
that assumes a product it has determined to be 'safe* has no prospect of 
producing harm.* 
It is important to underscore the term which acts as a qualifica-
tion on the statute's misbranding prohibition against unsafe drugs: 
M
.. • when used in the dosage, or manner or with the frequency or 
duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling 
« 21 CFR i$S0.10(a)(4)(iy, and set 57 Fed Reg 85 flan 11972) 
s See Merrill, C*n FDA Do Anything Right? 2 Va Law School Report 20 (1978); Repon 
by the Commissioner of Food and Dr\x%% on Finding* and Recommendations of the 
Review Panel on New Drug Regulation 95 (1978) 
« Rutherford v United States 588 F2d 1234 (10th Ck 19 78) c i d47 USLW 4724 (June 
18,1979) 
7 Sec S1045.96th Cong 1st Sets U979), and S 2755,95th Cong 2d Sett 1109(e) (1978): 
"tT]he term 'safe' means that the health benefits of the drug entity clearly outweigh the 
risks presented by the drug entity, taking into account the standards and requirements 
applicable to drug products eligible to be licensed under the monograph . , /*. The 
definition includes several (acton to be considered as well, which may change m the 
legislation U debated 
» Merrill supra note 5 
a M i l SO 
©Shepard i In i c: 
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thereof.'^0 Intended use controls how we can and do measure the 
safety of a drug, as that intention is manifested in directions in the 
labeling,11 A drug is shown to be safe in the context of its recommend-
ed uses, not in the abstract J2 
A prescription drug which bears full warnings is more likely to 
obtain prompt NDA approval for distribution than one which may be 
dangerous to the public if mistakenly misused.15 But, as FDA's ad-
ministrative law judge has opined, "questions of the safety of a drug 
when it is used in a manner contrary to the label warnings can be 
considered only in limited circumstances."1* FDA bears the burden, 
according to that 1978 ruling in the Benylin proceeding, to demon-
strate a reasonable possibility of misuse in violation of label instruc-
tions, if the agency wishes the safety-related issues which are not 
labeled to be considered in a safety decision.** Generally, misuse is not 
a major part of clearance considerations other than for a "controlled 
substance" drug. The 1978-79 drug law revision proposals would 
grant FDA more authority to include these misuse considerations in 
drug approvals and in decisions on continued approval.** It would 
"make dear that safety is always a relative matter — that using any 
drug always presents some risks that have to be weighed in the light 
10 A drug is misbranded if "it is dangerous to health when used in the dosage, or manner 
or wiih the frequency or duration prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the label-
ing therof," 21 USC «352<j) 
n United Stales v 62 Packages . , , Marmola Prescription Tablets 48 F Supp 878 
Wis 1943) ttfif 142 F2d 107 (7ih Cir 1944) cert denied 823 US 731 (1944) 
W Sec Initial Decision, Matter or Supplemental New Drug Application Benylin Exports 
rant. Docket 76N-G48S (FDA 1978) and cfPhanaaceuiical Mfrs Assn v Richardson 318 
F Supp SOL 315 (D Del 1970) 
15 21CFR $330.10(a) (4)(vi) presumes that a drug will be for over-the-counter sale unlets 
risks are found to be associated with it, See Initial Decision, Benylin Expectorant Docket 
76N-0483 (FDA 1978). and Parke Davis fc Co v Califcno 564 F2d 1200 (6th Cir 1977) 
ten denied 435 US 942 (1978) 
w Initial Decision, Benylin Expectorant, Docket 76N-0483, slip opinion at 7 (FDA 1978) 
15
 Id at 8; "Consideration of safety evidence relating 10 uses of a drug outside of the 
label requirements necessitates a showing that there is a reasonable probability that such 
non-label indicated uses can be expected to occur." 
rt S 1045.96th Cong 1st Sess (1979), and S 2755, 95th Cong 2d Sess (109(e)(2)(C) 
(1978); and "the risks of a drug include the risks from improper use and the societal 
risks that ate presented by the drug." Department of HEW, Section-by-Section Analysis, 
Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 (1978) 
November 1979 
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CHAPTER 1* DRUG REGULATION: SAFETY 
of the benefits." *7 These proposed bills, howe 1 • • > t 1 e still in serious 
doubt in the 1979 session. 
§14,05 Risk—Benefit Decisions in Drug Approvals 
No drug is absolutely safe.1 There will be some condition or 
circumstance in which any drug can cause harm to some susceptible 
individual. The societal role of the Food and Drug Administration is 
to make tough choices about which risks are acceptable in order to 
obtain a drug's benefits.* In making these risk—benefit judgments, a 
great deal of guesswork is inevitable. Animal tests and controlled 
clinical experiments do not always detect the problems which mass 
distribution of a drug would disclose. For the Bureau of Drugs, pre-
dicting and then balancing risks and benefits in a fair and equitable 
manner is the prime objective of the drug approval exercise.* 
Safety decisions since the 1962 Drug Amendments have included 
exacting review of the benefits promised for a drug. Because Congress 
believed FDA's safety control of new drugs was satisfactory, the only 
change made was the addition of an effectiveness consideration,4 Prior 
to 1962, benefits were considered only in those cases in which the drug 
was a serious pan of life-saving therapy, the failure of which would 
n Remark* of Secretary Califano. HEW Press Conference on Drug Regulation Reform 
Act of 197S at 5 (Mar 16,1978) 
1 Hess fc Clark Division .of Rhodia, Inc v FDA 495 tt* 975, 995 (DC Cir 1974). 
Rutherford v United Stales 47 USLW 4724 (1979); and see generally Merrill, Compeij-
sation for Prescription Drug Injuria 59 Va L Rev 1 (1973) 
2 FDA's rationale for the 1978 proposed drug amendments stated; M[T)he decision on 
whether a drug can be used for medical care in the United States is a risk-benefit 
determination. The definition of 'safety' [in S 27551 reflects longstanding practice in 
evaluating drugs for approval.... Every drug — even aspirin — presents some risks. 
If 'safety1 were defined to mean the absence of any risk, then no drug could be ap. 
proved." Department of HEW, Section-By-Section Analysis* Drug Regulation Reform 
Act of 1978 (1978). CfHuvi. Public Policy Issues in Regulating Carcinogens in Food S3 
Food Drug Cosm LJ 541 (1978) 
s Crout, the Nature of Regulatory Chokes 38 Food Drug Cosm LJ 413 (1978); Huu, 
Philosophy of Regulation 28 Food Drug Cosm Ij 177 (1973); and see Note, The Food 
and Drug Administration: Law Science and Politic* in the Evaluation and Control of New 
Drug Technology 67 NwU I Rev 858 (1973) 
4 See Senate comments. S Rtp No 87 1744.87th Cong 2d Sess (1962), 119621 US Code 
Cong k Ad News 2890 
(!) Shepard'i Inc, 
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HAPTER 14 DRUG REGULATION: SAFETY 
application,11 internal disagreements among FDA toxteologms, chem-
ists, pharmacologists, and other scientists^ over details of the approv-
al process, and often conflicting scientific judgments1* lengthen the 
process of approval* A recent additional complication is the openness 
for decisionmaking within the Bureau of Drugs* which strives for a sort 
of consensus14 among employees. The HEW study of the new drug 
approval process extensively examined the complaints about that pro-
cess which were raised by the bureau's "conscientious objectors/'15 
whose complaints precipitated several years of external and mtemal 
evaluations of the process of drug approval,*6 Recently, still another 
player in the approval "game" has been added, with the emergence of 
therapy groups such as epilepsy organizations and the American Heart 
Association to spur the FDA toward approval of new therapeutic 
products for their respective areas of interest. This was the case with 
informal lobbying for approval of valproic acid in treatment of epilepsy 
in 1978.1? 
The most difficult of all regulatory decisions, and drug approval 
decisions, are those in which potential carcinogenic or other chronic 
effects may be present but cannot be confirmed by present human 
evidence, w Though this text is not of sufficient length to cover these 
complex issues, a reader interested in risk—benefit and relative risk 
theories would do well to begin with the literature on cancer causation, 
n For a good brief statement o b e currtni NO A process, sec Review Panel, supra note 
6 at 23-25 
** Id at 3142; the Review panel found that industry had noi dominated ihe reviewing 
staff, as had been alleged, to resolve iheie disagreements in industry's favor 
i* Conflicting views are frequent and ltd to FDA action to formulate a dissenter policy, 
$ce Rtpon by the Commisiioner supn note 9 at ix 
i4/d»tviiMX 
W Jd*ix-xi 
l* Merrill supra note 8 
»? HEW Press Release P7M2 (Feb 28, 1978). Commissioner Kennedy obliquely ac-
knowledged the legislative oversight pressure of the epilepsy patient organizations when 
he remarked that "new drugs are not approved by referendum*' 
18 For an example of an extremely difficult approval decision by the FDA in this field, 
examine the animal drug Sensitivity of Method (SOM) debate reflected in a 1979 pro-
nouncement, 44 Fed Reg 17070 (Mar 20,1979): MlT]he Commissioner now believes that 
the time is ripe for formulating a comprehensive approach for regulating all chemical 
carcinogens." And see aspartame notice of Board of Inquiry, 44 Fed Reg 31716 (June 
I, 1979) 
© Shepard* inc. 
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including both the legal19 and political*0 aspects as well as the scientific 
causation theories. It is so particularized an examination that no useful 
brief statement can be made to distill the thousands of pages written 
about cancer causation in recent years. 
§ i Warning Labels 
A drug must bear adequate warning labels to communicate its 
dangers.1 The sole exception to this rule applies to prescription drugs 
in retail containers for which a physician has given directions for use.2 
Warning labels enable \hc consumer to avoid overdoses of habit-form-
ing or toxic drugs,3 and permit the consumer to know of drug interac-
tion problems which may be present with certain drugs. As the 
interactions of smoking and alcoholic beverages with drugs become 
better known, foT example, drug warning labels can be expected more 
frequently to caution against smoking or drinking while under medica-
tion.4 
If label warnings can be simply and directly stated, and protect 
the consumer effectively, then their use on the drug should obviate the 
need for prescription-only distribution. Only in limited circumstances 
can FDA base a decision on the safety of a drug when it is misused in 
defiance of proper labelings Considerations of improper use as a 
M Hutu The Basis and Purpose of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Mis-
branding of Food 33 Food Drug Cosm IJ 505 (1978) 
» Carter, How to Asses* Cancer Risks 204 Science 811 (May 25 1979) 
121 VSC 1352(0(2) 
* Id at |S55(bK2), and otcepuon from iS52(f) 
s Secretary of Agriculture recommendations following the Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster, 
(1302. tuied: "Much injury results from insufficient direction* and from insufficient 
directions and from lack of warning a gains; overdosage, or administration io children, 
or uie in disease conditions where the drug is dangerous, or possibility of drug addic-
tion*1 Senator Copeland, the 1938 Act*! principal sponsor and a homeopathic physician, 
noted thai pain relievers sometimes ltd to overdosages in "pathetic instances" because 
"there is always a temptation on the pan of a human being to think. *lf a little medicine 
will help me a good deal, more will help me still more/ " Senate Debate (Mar 9,1937). 
Both are quoted in C. Dunn. Federal Food Drug k Cosmetic Act 1326 and 744, rcspec-
lively 
« See e.g.. Oral Contraceptive Patient labeling, 43 Fed Reg 4214 (Jan SL 1978) 
»Initial Decision, Matter of Supplemental New Drug Application. Benylin Expectorant, 
Docket 76N-0483 (FDA 1978), and see United States v Article Decholtn 264 F Supp 
473 (£D Mich 1967) 
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Medical and Surgical Risks 
The title of this chapter could sen e for a 1500-page textbook of 
medicine and surgery, but our aim here is more modest. It is to 
illustrate some of the important ways in which treatment-associated 
risk is identified and measured in contemporary medicine. Coronary 
heart disease and hypertension are two major diseases considered in 
some detail. Coronary bypass surgery is prominent in the treatment 
of CHD, and the problems of its evaluation compared to drug treat-
ment illustrate a whole class of treatment-related risk-assessment 
problems. The treatment of hypertension, on the other hand, is an 
area where the insurance perspective is uniquely strong, allowing a 
striking comparison between the risks of treating and not treating. 
Then we examine the process by which prescription drugs are tested. 
Drugs are the mainstay of modern medicine, and so the limits on risk 
detection in drug testing have wide impact on treatment-related 
risks. Here the comparative risks of treating versus not treating 
reveal some curious quirks in how small risks can become the basis 
of big controversies, while big risks go unnoticed. To begin, however, 
it is useful to understand the limits on the individual physician's 
ability to detect treatment-related risk. 
Risk as Perceived by the Individual Physician 
There are natural limits on the individual physician's ability to per-
ceive treatment-related risk. These limits have to do with the size of 
any one physician's practice. 
To understand the origin of those limits, consider how a busy 
practice operates. If the physician works six 10-hour days a week and 
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Risks Related to Drugs and Drug Regulation 
Twentieth century technology has transformed two old institutions, 
the doctor and the drug, from relatively harmless comforters and 
anodynes into powerful forces capable of strong actions, good and 
bad. Drug regulation in the United States appeared in three succes-
sive steps: (1) in the first years of this century, following a number 
of deaths due to a contaminated vaccine; (2) during the 1930's, 
following a number of deaths due to a sulfa drug product that was 
formulated with a toxic solvent; (3) in 1962, following the recogni-
tion that thalidomide was responsible for children being born with 
deformed limbs. All three steps focussed on tightening standards of 
manufacturing, testing, and labeling to minimize the risk of adverse 
reactions; the most recent big changes added for the first time the 
requirement that drugs be proven effective for uses claimed for them 
by their manufacturer.5 
Each country has its own special approach to drug regulation, but 
the economic and technological power of the United States is such 
that the activities of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are 
closely watched internationally, and frequently imitated by other 
countries, though each country brings a special character to their 
drug regulatory system: the Japanese are extremely rigid; the Ameri-
cans demand complete documentation of every aspect of the drug's 
testing program, irrespective of the mountain of paper—and cost— 
entailed; the British are sensible and flexible; the French have a 
system which is a unique amalgam of the bureaucratic and the 
personal; the Germans and the Canadians lean heavily on the FDA's 
policies. 
The bias in all drug regulatory systems is toward preventing unex-
pectedly hazardous drugs from reaching the market. That bias is 
understandable from the history of how drug regulation came into 
being, through public reactions to a series of disastrous incidents 
involving relatively small numbers of victims compared to other 
hazards in our lives. This bias poses a curious paradox, as illustrated 
by the following rather simple-minded parallel. We disrupt traffic 
and incur rather special risks to-rush injured or seriously ill people 
to the hospital by ambulance so that they can come as quickly as 
humanly possible to the best available treatment, and sometimes we 
bend heaven and earth to rush a special medicine to a few people who 
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need it. Yet somehow none of this sense of urgency carries cner to 
the regulatory review of new drugs. 
An example of the cost in human lives of the slow pace of the drug 
regulatory system is the seven years it took for FDA approval from 
the time of the first publications showing that administration of beta 
blocker drugs reduced mortality in the first few years after heart 
attack. The results of the first clinical trials were reported in 1974, 
and in 1976 the Swedish regulatory authorities approved this use for 
one of the beta blocker drugs—alprenolol—then already available in 
the Swedish market. The first FDA approval of this usage for a beta 
blocker came in November'1981 In 1975, Professor William War-
dell of the University of Rochester had called this beneficial action: 
of the beta blocker drugs to the attention of the then-commissione-
of the FDA, Alexander Schmidt, together with calculations indicai 
ing that each year's delay in approving this use would cost abou 
20,000 lives.6 Six years after WardeH's letter, when the first approva 
finally came, FDA Commissioner Arthur Hayes announced thai 
indeed, the newly approved product would save 17,000 lives per year 
Nobody thought to haul him up to the Capitol, sit him down in fron 
of the TV cameras and a Congressional investigating committee, anc 
ask him what about the 100,000 people who died in the time between 
the first publications and the approval, without which few physicians 
will use a drug. In effect, Americans had to use ONURONE for .: 
half dozen years even though something demonstrably effective ua 
already available. 
Yet, when it recently developed that there had been five deaths 
from allergic reactions associated with the widely used analgesic 
drug ZOMAX, there was a strong reaction in Congress and the 
launch of an investigation to learn how this terrible thing had been 
allowed to happen to the American people. 
Critics of drug regulation point out that the only time that Con-
gress, the President, and the American people were of one mind in 
praising the FDA was when Dr. Frances Kelsey delayed the approv-
al of thalidomide in the United States. President John F. Kennedy 
transformed her into a heroine by presenting her with a special medal 
in the White House Rose Garden. The message was not lost on her 
colleagues at the FDA or in other regulatory agencies around the 
world: there is no credit to be gained for lives saved due to speedy 
regulatory action, but a very small number of fatalities or other 
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severe adverse reactions to a drug will lead to public humiliation and 
scorn for any regulatory official who may have acted other than very 
cautiously and conservatively in reviewing the drug. 
If one were to judge the overall value of drug regulation strictly 
on a body-count basis of lives lost due to regulatory delays as against 
lives saved due to keeping unduly dangerous drugs from the market, 
one would have to question seriously whether drug regulation is a 
very good bargain. With little or no regulatory involvement, many 
other industries design, test, manufacture, and market complex 
products on which many lives depend, and it would appear that both 
competitive forces and the pressure of product liability lawsuits are 
effective checks on the sale of unduly risky products. At the very 
least, we ought to be a sophisticated enough society to be able to see 
and understand the risks that are prolonged, as well as the risks that 
are minimized, by regulatory review. A simple-minded stranger 
looking in might wonder: if we have ambulance crews on duty 
around the clock and allow them to run red lights when called, 
should we not have our drug regulatory agencies working a three-
shift, seven-day week to minimize the fatal consequences of delaying 
the introduction of improved drugs? 
The FDA and other drug regulatory agencies around the world 
get most of the criticism whenever the subject of long delays in 
bringing new drugs to market arises. However, there are two other 
often overlooked factors that contribute to these delays. One of these 
is that only large pharmaceutical firms can mobilize the resources to 
develop and test a new drug, but one of the inevitable consequences 
of large size in any organization is that it necessarily becomes slow 
and bureaucratic in its operation. The second delaying factor is a 
technological one. As pharmacologists and physicians have become 
increasingly cognizant of the power of modern drugs, the processes 
for testing new drugs have become increasingly elaborate and search-
ing. There has been a steady expansion in the kind and number of 
animal toxicologic tests run on new drug candidates, and the whole 
field of designing clinical trials has been fundamentally transformed 
during the last two decades. Thus, the whole process of new drug 
development is vastly more complex and time-consuming since the 
days when insulin was rushed from the laboratory to the bedside. It 
is probably amenable to some considerable pruning, but there is little 
incentive in the current regulatory environment for that to happen. 
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In clinical trials of various treatments, one seeks to standardize 
diagnostic criteria and methods, to standardize the severity of disease 
in the patients admitted to the trial, and to standardize the various 
treatment regimens which the trial is designed to compare. Standard-
izing the cooperation of the patients with the prescribed regimens, 
however, is easier said than done—even when everyone acts in the 
best of faith and solemnly swears to do just what the doctor asks. 
Clinical trials have come to play an increasingly important role in 
modern medicine, putting different treatment methods to the test of 
quantitative comparison in as controlled a fashion as ethical medical 
practice allows. When a new treatment modality appears for a previ-
ously untreatable disease, the controlled clinical trial will naturally 
include a no-treatment group, though often disguised from patients, 
nurses, and doctors by use of a placebo, i.e. an ONURONE treat-
ment. Contemporary standards of ethics mandate that participants 
in the trial know they are in a trial and be informed about the various 
treatments that they may (or may not) actually receive. The designs 
of such studies are a not-always judicious blend of scientific experi-
ment and everyday medical practice. 
There are many vexing problems in the design and execution of 
clinical trials, but they are one of the very important advances which 
have come into clinical medicine in the last quarter-century. Their 
routine use in the evaluation of virtually all new methods of treat-
ment—plus their use in the retrospective assessment of many time 
honored methods of treatment—is gradually transforming medicine 
from an almost wholly empirical art to an amalgam of quantitatively 
validated technology and art. Clinical trials are gradually providing 
the main outlines of how the best practice should be carried out, but 
clinical judgement and the art of medicine continue to guide most 
diagnosis and treatment. Thus, the physician's judgment will contin-
ue to be an important element in the risk of disease, however much 
it may seem that technology may have displaced the art of medicine 
and the essential human contact between patient and physician or 
nurse. In medicine, the patient is an object of a discipline which, in 
using technological-scientific procedures, puts.on a scientific face but 
is both more and less than a science in the extent to which it draws 
on the art of human judgment tempered by experience. 
The growth of medical knowledge based on well-designed clinical 
trials is a slow process. Clinical trials take a great deal of time to plan, 
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to be reviewed by the necessary disinterested individuals for ethical 
concerns, to find the appropriate patients to enter into the trial, to 
carry out the sequence of treatments called for, to analyze the data, 
and finally to communicate the data to other physicians and health 
care personnel. There are pitfalls in the process, many of which come 
down to bending the need for scientific rigor to the exigencies of 
caring for patients. The trial has to have enough rigor to give a 
definite answer to the question of which treatment modality is best, 
or the better of two; at the same time it has to be a close enough 
approximation of routine clinical practice so that treatment efficacy 
shown in the trial will also be found in practice. Some big clinical 
trials take three to five years to complete, especially if they involve 
questions about diseases that progress slowly. 
Yet there is a huge numerical gap between even the largest of 
clinical trials and the potential patient population that would use a 
new drug. Some of the biggest trials are those in which contracep-
tives were evaluated: these have had between 10,000 and 25,000 
participants. Most new drugs, however, are tested in 1000-2000 
people. In the case of the oral contraceptives, there are about 12 
million women in the United States using these products and prob-
ably upwards of 50 million worldwide. In the case of drugs for 
hypertension, there are about 40 million hypertensives in the United 
States. Certainly not all will ever take any one drug, but, if a drug 
appears to be especially efficacious and well tolerated, and poses little 
risk, it may be used in half or more of the patient population. Conse-
quently, the clinical trial population and the population who may use 
the product in the market will differ in size by hundreds of thousands 
to millions. That number gap has the important consequence of 
making the first few years' use of the drug after market introduction 
into a big but poorly controlled experiment. 
The initial years of market experience are necessary to close the 
number gap between the population size in the clinical trial and the 
population size needed to define safety-degree to the 4-5 SDU range 
(i.e. risks of 1 adverse reaction in 10,000 to 100,000 patients). This 
point has already been mentioned in the discussion on oral con-
traceptives in Chapter 5, but it is a very important fact of life about 
which our society manages to delude itself. To illustrate why the 
number gap exists, suppose the clinical trials have involved 5000 
patients, which is an unusually large number; if 50 patients have 
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similar adverse reactions, it is reasonably certain that the risk of that 
adverse reaction can be defined as 1 in 100 during the time period 
involved. Suppose, however, that only one patient develops a particu-
lar kind of adverse reaction. It is difficult to know what to conclude 
about a single event—it may or may not be related to the drug, and 
so the matter has to be held in abeyance until more experience is 
gained with the drug. Thus, having 5000 people in the clinical trial 
does not allow definition of a risk level of 1 in 5000, but something 
rather more like 1 in 1000. 
Suppose five patients developed similar adverse reactions in a 
group of 5000 patients: one has an approximate idea that the risk is 
1 in 1000. This figure is only an approximation, however, for it may 
be that there was a chance clustering of a few "extra" adverse reac-
tions within the study group and that the true risk is less. On the 
other hand, the events in the study group may somehow have mini-
mized the occurrence of the adverse reaction, such that in subsequent 
market experience with the drug, the adverse reaction turns out to 
occur at a 2-5 times greater incidence than in the trial. As a practical 
matter, the biggest unicohort size one can define with reasonable 
accuracy in a clinical trial is about one-fifth the size of the trial's 
population. If, however, the patients in the trial have to be consid-
ered as being divided into subgroups—by age, sex, other disease 
conditions, etc.—then the biggest unicohort definable will be about 
one-fifth of the biggest subgroup. 
The initial use of the drug in the first year or two after its market 
introduction builds up large numbers of users—assuming the pro-
duct is widely prescribed—and will necessarily begin to reveal ad-
verse reactions which occur at the 1 in 10,000 to the 1 in 100,000 
level of incidence. As in the clinical trial phase of experience with the 
drug, it is not possible to draw any conclusions from a single adverse 
reaction. Therefore, it usually takes 4-6 occurrences before an asso-
ciation with the drug is suggested. However, one of the things lacking 
in the United States is a means of insuring that adverse reactions to 
drugs are reported; as a result, more than nine-tenths go unreported. 
Thus, it may take over 2 million people's use of a drug before the full 
extent of its risk is reasonably well defined to the 1 in 50,000 level— 
per use if it is an acute-use drug, per year if it is a chronic-use drug. 
If we had a mechanism in place that insured efficient and timely 
reporting of adverse drug reactions in the first years after a new 
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product entered the market, we could reduce both the number gap 
and the time required to identify drug-related risk. Even with an 
efficient system of reporting adverse drug reactions, however, there 
will still be a large number gap between the biggest clinical trials and 
the smallest numbers needed to reveal all the risk information we 
crave to know about any widely used drug. 
Therein lies one of the reasons for saying that life is an experiment: 
there is no earthly means to finance or manage a clinical trial that 
could define the degree of drug safety to more than 3 SDU (1 adverse 
reaction per treatment period in 1000 patients). Yet our social and 
political behavior indicates that we reserve the right to react with 
shock, horror, and witch-hunting when drug-related risk shows up 
at the 3^.5 SDU level (1 in 1000 to 1 in 30,000). 
The number gap is a fact of life, but it is not generally understood. 
When a newly introduced drug is associated with adverse reactions, 
there is usually a big uproar and witch-hunt—talk of prosecuting 
people in the company which developed the drug, suspicious con-
gressional cross-examination of FDA people who reviewed and ap-
proved the product, and a usually brief but intense coverage of the 
subject by the news media. By the time media attention shifts to a 
fresh subject, the drug in question usually has acquired such a wide-
spread reputation as a poison that it is practically useless thereafter. 
Many months or years later, when the nature of the association has 
been worked out and reported within professional circles, the news 
media give little attention to the resolution of the story, which some-
times exonerates the drug. 
The automobile manufacturers seem to be able to recall their 
products without' such catastrophic losses in credibility, but drugs 
are much more politicized, despite the fact that automobiles kill 
many more people than drugs do. 
For example, McNeil Pharmaceutical recently recalled, on its own 
initiative, its pain-relieving non-narcotic drug, ZOMAX, for re-
evaluation in light of a small but growing number of reports of 
serious and very rarely fatal allergic reactions to the drug. There 
were five known fatalities possibly attributable to use of the drug, 
which had been widely prescribed and so had a very large cohort of 
past and present users. Prior to McNeil's voluntary recall of 
ZOMAX, the recall of a drug because of possible adverse reactions 
had meant the drug's end as a product. McNeil's stated intention, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
124 R I S K WATCH 
however, was to clarify the risk situation and then decide whether 
to reintroduce the product, and if so to make changes in instructions 
to physicians and patients which would act to minimize risk. This 
"recall for re-evaluation" was a bold and innovative step, signifying 
a new degree of realism in evaluating the risks of adverse reaction 
to a widely used drug. 
However, a congressman promptly demanded an investigation of 
what the FDA had done wrong, what the company had done wrong, 
and so forth, effectively taking the matter out of McNeil's hands and 
turning it into a media happening. The concept of a "recall for 
re-evaluation" is ethical, scientifically sound, and beneficial to the 
public health, but no pharmaceutical company is likely to repeat 
McNeil's experiment for a long time to come. Instead, recalls will 
continue to be postponed until adverse reactions are clearly occur-
ring at a risk level which is high enough to force everyone involved 
to jettison the product permanently. This policy means that: (1) we 
shall continue to lose opportunities to preserve useful drugs by mak-
ing risk-reducing changes in their instructions for use; (2) more 
people will have to suffer adverse reactions to trigger a permanent 
recall than a recall for re-evaluation. 
An intriguing and not yet fully understood footnote to the 
ZOMAX episode was revealed about eight months after McNeil's 
voluntary withdrawal. A prescription-event monitoring study of 
ZOMAX in England showed that patients taking the drug appeared 
to have about half as many heart attacks and strokes during their 
time on the drug as would have been expected for their age group. 
After the drug was withdrawn and the patients all had to turn to 
other drugs for pain relief, the rate of heart attacks and strokes 
resumed at the usual rate.7 If this unexpected finding is in fact related 
to the use of ZOMAX, it would certainly suggest that many more 
premature deaths were prevented by the use of the drug than it may 
have caused, if even the worst assumptions about its risk were true. 
The basic fact is that drug use, both in clinical trials and in everyday 
medicine, is a risk discovery process. Clinical trials can only screen 
for relatively high-risk problems at the 1-3 SDU level; the discovery 
of the more dilute risks—at the 3-5 SDU level—has to occur in the 
course of the drug's use in everyday medicine. 
Useful new drugs do not grow on trees, but now cost an average 
of $70 million and take seven to ten years each to develop. Every new 
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stricture in the heavily politicized arena of drug regulation adds new 
layers of cost and time. Each new layer of cost effectively raises the 
minimum patient population size for which drug development is 
economically justifiable. The term "orphan drugs" has recently ap-
peared. These are drugs for diseases that affect too few people to 
allow a return on the expense to develop, test, and register the drug 
product. The orphan drug phenomenon has been created by succes-
sively more complex and costly regulations governing new drug 
development. 
Pharmaceutical innovation is a goose that has laid many golden 
eggs in the past half century. One cannot but wonder how hard the 
process can be squeezed before investment simply moves into other 
areas,8 leaving it to governments to develop the new drugs. Review-
ing the meagre pharmaceutical innovations which have come out of 
the state-run industries of Eastern Europe does not inspire one to 
believe that this would be a very effective way to meet present and 
future disease challenges. 
Not all the news is bad, however, as a drug gains use-experience 
in the market, for sometimes unsuspected new therapeutic uses are 
identified for older drugs—the above-mentioned apparently favor-
able action of ZOMAX, for example. Once the initial several million 
patients have used the drug and its overall risk picture is reasonably 
well-defined, these new uses are indeed bonuses. They do cost money 
to document in clinical trials and to gain approval from regulatory 
authorities for inclusion in the indicated uses for the product. These 
costs pose a major problem when the discovery of a new use comes 
at or after the end of the drug's patent life, for thereafter the drug 
is public property, and a new claim registered by any manufacturer 
is more or less automatically available to all. That quirk in the 
regulatory and patent laws deprives all manufacturers of the eco-
nomic incentive to innovate with older drugs, which is one reason 
why most manufacturers will opt to bring forward a new, "me-too" 
drug of the same class as the older one, around which to develop new 
uses. That has two disadvantages: (1) it keeps the regulatory system 
clogged reviewing "me-too" drugs; (2) each new drug raises a whole 
new set of risk questions, which can only find minimal answers in 
clinical trials. Because of the number gap, about 2 million patients 
have to undergo the involuntary experiment of testing for adverse 
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reactions that occur at the 3-4.5 SDU level (1 adverse reaction per 
treatment cycle in 1000 to 50,000 patients). 
One area of recent pharmaceutical innovation which partly side-
steps this problem is the development of new drug delivery systems, 
or therapeutic systems. These are special dosage forms which meter 
the drug, into the body at low, usually steady rates for extended 
periods of time. They have their own patent protection and thus can 
be used in conjunction with some older drugs to develop better 
tolerated, less frequently dosed forms while still relying on the exist-
ing risk definition of the drug that came from its initial years in the 
market. Controlling the rate of entry of drug into the bloodstream 
can have an important influence on balance between therapeutic 
actions and side-effects of many drugs. These new drug delivery 
systems make it both scientifically and economically possible to 
extend or improve the uses of some older drugs. Examples of such 
products are the "skin patches" which administer nitroglycerin for 
angina, scopolamine for motion sickness or vertigo, clonidine for 
hypertension, and estrogen for the menopausal syndrome and to 
prevent postmenopausal mineral loss from bones. These technologi-
cal advances are gradually turning the major pharmaceutical compa-
nies away from their long-standing, single-minded focus on new 
chemicals as the sole means of pharmaceutical innovation. 
Everyone should understand that there is no such thing as a 
risk-free drug, just as there is quite obviously no such thing as 
risk-free surgery. It is unfortunate that the term "drug safety" is used 
so widely in so many contexts, both lay and professional, for it is 
fundamentally misleading and contributes to the confused politiciza-
tion of pharmaceuticals. U.S. drug regulations require that the "safe-
ty and efficacy" of each new pharmaceutical product be proved, 
thereby implying promise of the unattainable goal of absolute safety. 
German regulations avoid the confused semantics of the term "safe-
ty," and ask instead that the product should be "free of concern," 
which is also unrealistic, for how can any intelligent person be "free 
of concern" in the face of a defined risk of death or serious injury? 
The choice of words in these two sets of drug regulations symbolize 
the lack of realism and confusion with which we, as technologically 
advanced societies, confront risk. Often while we dither, patients are 
left with ONURONE. 
Part of clinical judgment is to balance risk and benefit in the use 
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of a drug. With great insight, Plato used the term pharmacon to mean 
both "medicament" and "poison," leaving it to the context to indi-
cate which meaning was appropriate. It is not always easy to make 
such judgments in clinical practice, nor can these judgments be made 
"free of concern." The use of an effective anticancer agent may 
necessitate—and warrant—the acceptance of a 1 in 10 risk of fatal 
bone marrow suppression, but when the antibiotic chloramphenicol 
turned out to have a 1 in 30,000 risk of fatal bone marrow suppres-
sion, its previously general anti-infective use was promptly restricted 
just to the treatment of typhoid fever, for which it was uniquely 
effective and still offered an overwhelming advantage compared to 
other treatments.9 A diuretic drug called tienilic acid had to be 
withdrawn several years ago when it turned out, after its first half-
year in the U.S. market, that its use carried a 1 in 500 risk that the 
patient would develop a sometimes fatal liver disorder; 10 curiously, 
the same drug had already been in the market in France for several 
years without this problem having become evident, nor was there any 
evidence that it was occurring in France when very careful studies 
were done there after the problems became known in the United 
States. That discrepancy remains a mystery. Aspirin is probably the 
most widely used drug of any—a recent British survey showed that 
4.5 million out of the 57 million total population took it at least once 
a week, and half a million people took five or more a day.11 Aspirin 
has its recognized risks—among them are gastrointestinal bleeding 
and ulceration, plus precipitation of asthma attacks in people with 
a certain kind of allergy problem—but the risks of these occurrences 
are very dilute. However, the exceptional person who has encoun-
tered an adverse reaction to aspirin is well-advised to use another 
agent in the future. 
The most troublesome kind of adverse effect of a drug is the one 
which takes many years to appear. Two examples will illustrate. The 
first is an antidiarrheal drug, clioquinol, which had been widely used 
in many countries for many years throughout the world before its use 
in Japan was associated with several hundred cases of serious neuro-
logical damage, blindness, and a number of deaths.11 Protracted 
investigation has failed to give a satisfactory explanation for how this 
catastrophe occurred when and where it did, but an extensive litiga-
tion process put the blame on the drug and held the pharmaceutical 
companies involved liable. The second example is a true "time 
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bomb"—diethylstilbestrol (DES). This artificial estrogen compound 
had been developed in the 1930's; among its clinical uses during the 
1940's and 1950's was the treatment of impending miscarriage. In 
the late 1960's a small number of young women in Boston were found 
to have a previously extremely rare form of vaginal tumor; case-
control analysis showed that during the fetal lives of these young 
women their mothers had received DES treatment for impending 
miscarriage. In earlier years, this choice of treatment had been espe-
cially strongly advocated within Boston medical circles, which prob-
ably accounts for why the problem was first recognized in Boston, 
instead of elsewhere. Other—seemingly minor—abnormalities in the 
genital tract are also observed in about 1 in 3 of either males or 
females exposed to DES in fetal life; fortunately, the lifetime risk of 
developing the vaginal tumor in the exposed females appears to have 
been about 1 in 7000 (3.8 SDU)J2 The whole story will not be 
known, however, until the people exposed during fetal life have lived 
their entire lives. 
There is no conceivable clinical trial or drug regulatory mech-
anism which could have prevented either catastrophe. Both could, 
of course, have been prevented if, back about 1900, all countries had 
legislated against administering synthetic chemical substances to hu-
mans, just as we can readily prevent jet plane crashes by banning jet 
planes. The cost in human suffering and in premature death of 
restricting our pharmacopoiea to the ONURONEs of the 19th cen-
tury would create such a preposterous imbalance of risk and benefit 
that there can be no alternative to accepting occasional disasters as 
part of the price of improved lives and health for the vast majority. 
Nor should we delude ourselves that drugs extracted from natural 
sources—plants or animals—offer any inherently greater insulation 
from risk, for every natural substance has its undesirable, frankly 
toxic, and sometimes lethal actions. 
The only hope for minimizing the risk of such events in the future 
is the added understanding that we gain with each passing year from 
the big investment being made in biomedical research. It may eventu-
ally enable us better to foresee certain kinds of problems and avoid 
having always to deal with them in retrospect. 
We have been lucky to have gained so much and lost so little as 
modern technology has moved so rapidly into medicine. Infrequent 
disasters involving small numbers of people have brought govern-
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ments into the process in the name of protecting the public health. 
We should pay much more attention than we now do to the health 
consequences of the slow pace of pharmaceutical innovation and 
regulation, for the resulting forced dosing with ONURONE can be 
responsible for many thousands of premature deaths. The whole area 
of medicine and drugs is so thoroughly politicized that the foresee-
able changes will probably bring both a slower pace and more 
governmental involvement, not less. An important area for improve-
ment is the monitoring of unexpected drug actions—both adverse 
and beneficial—during the drug's use in the first few million patients. 
Improved monitoring would reduce the number gap standing be-
tween risks definable in clinical trials and risks acceptable to society. 
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Therapeutic implication* of the drug lag 
The Ameru^mlagwahrespect to BrHamm the 
the past decade was analysed to determine whether, in therapeutic terms; Britain has grimed 
or last from adopting the more permissme pokey. The therapeutic impact of m new drug en 
the whole community is difficult to assets, mainly became there ere few methods or data 
amuabte for measurssg benefit. On the evidence currently available, Britain probably did 
not lose appreciably from me introduction of Ineffective drugs, nor from the fact that a greater 
number of net* drugs were made avertable. The main deleterious effect was mat Britain suffered 
mm ioxkHtyduetonewdrngsthandid the United State*, as could have hem anticipated from 
; the fact that mora new drugs were marketed mere. However, considering the size of the total 
harden of drug toxicity, the portion due to new dru{^ was extremely smatl^ and would in any 
case be at least parHsUy offset by the adverse effects of older alternative dntgt had the latter \ 
been used instead. Conversely, Britain experienced dearly discernible gains by introducing 
useful new drugs, either soener than the United States or exdustoehj. On balance, Britain 
appears to hoot gained m comparison from its more permissive poUcy toward the marketing 
of new drugs coupled with a more rigornm pmgrmn of postmarketing surveiiance. Wide* 
hastes raised by this etudy tnchude the destrahfoty of further intensifying postmarketing 
'survedlance, psrtkuhtrly in the case of new dntgs; the conflict between the presently 
concerned pubUc health rok of a regulatory agency end the desire of a physician to choose 
optimal therapy for particular patientt; the therapeutic and sodd implications of the control 
of drug utilization as distinct from marketing; and ike significance of the latter controls for 
the future of medicine* * 
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by differences in therapeutic approaches 
in Britain and die United States. American 
physicians were found to be poorly in-
formed about drugs used widely aad for 
some years abroad but not yet available 
in the United Sutes.: 
The present paper examines the thera-
peutic implications of that international 
difference. Compared with the United 
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b u t this argues for a need for more knowl-
e d g e and perseverance, rather than for 
• fewer drugs. 
- . I n economic terms, t h e conclusion of the 
I5 main study to date by Peltzman** is dear. 
] - Peltzman estimated that the effect of the 
J 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug and 
I Cosmetic Act has been to cost the Ameri-
j can consumer at least $250 to 350 million 
J •' annually, or about 6% of total drug sales. 
| Peltzman'* argument was in absolute 
1 terms. Since regulation of the drug devel-
I opment process has become more rigorous 
1 in Britain also since 1962, some losses may 
| have been incurred there as well. But 
] • Peltzman's argument dealt with areas in 
] which, as shown in the present study, 
j Britain appears to stand favorably in com-
] parison with the United States. It is 
I probable, therefore, that British patients 
j have gained economically in comparison 
1- with Americans. 
| In addition to economic factors, one 
k should consider the influence of drug 
J: regulatory policies on the existence and 
j : innovative output of the research-based 
r pharmaceutical industry, which ias been 
1 responsible for most advances in drug 
] : therapy. 
I Lasagna" has reviewed the literature that 
| points to a steep rise over the past decade 
| in the cost of developing a single new drug 
| •'••/. entity in the United States, and the inhfbi-
1 toiy effect that this may be having on the 
] industry's willingness to explore new areas 
I where remuneration may not be dearly 
] foreseeable. The time required for a drug to 
j undergo the necessary testing and pass 
j through the regulatory review process is an 
i . important factor in the cost of develop-
] ' - ment, and so the "drug lag* has a bearing 
j on this cost. 
j A recent study of the economics of the 
] \ pharmaceutical industry in Britain was per-
j . formed by the Economic Development 
•{; • Committee for Chemicals, at the invitation 
j of the Minister of Health following a rec-
] ' • ommendation along these lines contained 
l
 m in the Sainsbury Repent on the pharmaoeu-
j " ' tical industry and the National Health Ser-
vice. In the report of this study58 it was 
noted that one of the factors contributing 
to the attractiveness of the United King-
dom for the development of a pharmaceu-
tical industry was the system for the regis-
tration of new medicines. The report also, 
however, noted that the continuing attrac-
tiveness of Britain would depend on 
(among other Jacton) "maintenance of the 
system for the registration of new medi-
cines in its present reasonable and non-
bureaucratic form under the new statutory 
arrangements." 
Conclusions 
Three general conclusions emerge from 
this study about the processes of develop-
ing and introducing new drugs and about 
the differences between the British and 
American approaches. 
The first conclusion concerns the effects 
of the "drug lag," based on the evidence 
currently available. 
As Lasagna** has pointed out, the pro-
tection conferred by delaying the introduc-
tion of new drugs needs to be weighed 
against the therapeutic losses thus incurred 
From the present study, it is dear that each 
country has gained in some ways and lost 
in others. On balance, however, it is diffi-
cult to argue that the United States has 
escaped an inordinate amount of new-
drug toxicity by its conservative approach; 
it has gained little else in return. On die 
contrary, it k relatively easy to show that 
Britain has gained by having effective 
drugs available sooner. Furthermore, the 
costs of this policy in terms of damage due 
to adverse drug reactions have been small 
compared with the existing levels of dam-
age produced by older drugs. There appear 
to be no other therapeutic costs of any 
consequence to Britain. In view of die dear 
benefits demonstrable from some of the 
drugs introduced into Britain, it appears 
that the United States has, on balance, lost 
more than it has gained from adopting a 
more conservative approach than did Brit-
ain in the post-thalidomide era. 
The second conclusion relates to the 
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relative attention given to ascertaining a 
drug's safety in the earlier phases rather 
than in later phases of its development 
Toxicity testing in animals can never guar-
antee a drug's safety in man77; neither can 
the Small numbers of closely monitored pa-
tients required for premarketing trials of 
efficacy guarantee its safety in thepopula-
tion at large. Given these facts, the actions 
of a regulatory agency should hinge to a 
ing surveillance. If postaarketing surveil-
lance is poor ornonexiktent, then the de-
cision to approve a new drug is a grave and 
irreversible one; it sbc*Jd be delay ed as; 
long a* possible (forever?) in the hope that, 
exhaustive preclinical and clinical testing, 
together with the experience of other coun-
tries, will reveal all -unsuspected toxicity in 
the drug before it is approved for market* . 
ing. If, on the other hand, postmarketing 
surveillance is rigorous enough to detect; 
even rare .drug toxicity, promjrtly, tiben 
drugs could be introduced more rapidly, 
with confidence that (provided information 
from the surveillance system 5$ acted upon 
at once ) no widespread hartn to the com-
munity will ensue even if the drug does 
turn out to induce unsuspected reactions. 
. It should be recognized that, contrary 
to general belief, the early stages of new-
drug investigation are , extremely safe.11 
When widespread, cataj±mphic drug tox-
icity lias occurred, it has only been after 
a drug ha* been marketed, and never in tibe' 
early phases of development. Tliere is a 
tendency for episodes erf this nature to be 
taken as evidence of laxity in thedrug-ap-
proval procew^ however, lift the present 
regulatory era when preclinical tests are 
being used to the limit of their usefulness 
(and possibly beyond), it would be .more• 
«>raect to regard widespread toxicity as a 
failure of ppstniarketing surveillance, rath-
er than a failure. of premarketing screen* 
ing . .-V-•••:".•: ..•••...•..•..•;.•; \ . : ; / ; : ^ : ; - : c i . > , V 
. Therefore, if the resources available to 
develop and regulate new drugs are not un-
limited, the way these resources ane cur-
rently deployed should be re-eaciuniiied* 
Rath^ thw centum 
land human premarketing hurdles, society 
inight benefit more from ascertaining and: 
improving the predioUve power for man of 
:'animal safety tests, and from intensifying 
postmarketing surveillance. The latter ap-
proach appears to be a major difference in 
; practice between the current drug regula-
torysystemsin the United States andjPrit> 
ain. In the United States, animal and pre-
marketing procedures are generally more 
demanding; implementation of the regula-
tion requires a large number of people; 
and assessment takes a relatively long time, 
Nationwide postmarketing surveillance is, 
however* poorly develppri by internal '. 
standards. In the:-^ ?itt« l^,"ipSiEig^11 '^ *^ *-""P'nBt'! 
marketing requiremeot* are' less onerous, 
and new drug apphcatiom are proofs 
more quickly• with a considerably mailer . 
staff.14'41 Cc^vewely,, 'Sxj^'>-:<mq^ed. 
- to place more reliance on its more sophistk 
cated surveillance system^ and this ap-
proach appears (with the reservations 
made earlier) to have forestalled w 
spread toxicity due to the introduction of 
new drugs. As already discussed, Britain 
appears on the evidence currently avaflable 
to have benefited from this approach. 
The third conclusion is that fundamental 
differences can be discerned in the roles of 
the regulatory agencies in Britain and in 
the United S t a t e s ^ - \ ^ ^ t ' : ^ ^ \ - 0 ^ , t 
enoes oai^ profo 
practio* of medicine. > 
•'. In the t y ^ 
cacy of a proposed new drug has been a 
formal requirement of the approval process 
since 1062, when/efficac^ was foarmaUy 
added to safety" -'"by; > Aie:';.jCi^ iivBrrJHtaate 
amendments to th^ Food, -Drug and O s -
metics Act Befort 1962, 'evidence of effi-
cacy, altiiough jdktt ^ 
in fact given some w d g h t u It is, indeed," 
entirely reasonable in prindple to m ^ 
the question of efficacy with that of safety, 
since no toxicity is tolerable if a drug lades 
efficacy. 
In Britain the m*in formal focus of the 
drug approN^ prooess from ^  
. /?•$ 
i; 
•*; 
ft 
. A 
•t 
i 
•AX 
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Benefits, Risks, Vaccines, and the Courts 
The hero of the 1500's was an explorer who blazed trails through hostile 
terrain to discover new worlds and wealth. The "hero" of the 1900's is a 
victim who blazes trails through hostile lower courts to establish a new 
precedent for lawsuits and wealth. 
The high cost of such thinking is that few manufacturers want to make 
vaccines any more (see Science, 1 March, p. 1012). The profits are small; 
the risk of lawsuits very great. The country may soon be in the ludicrous 
position of developing a vaccine for AIDS and of not being able to find a 
manufacturer to produce it. 
How have we strayed so far from the days of the 1700's when Zabdiel 
Boylston inoculated his son and friends to protect them against smallpox? 
Boylston inoculated 247 people with live pox, of whom 6 died—that is, 1 in 
41. He was reviled by the medical profession and others. Then an epidemic 
occurred in which the remaining 241 survived while 1 in 7 of the general 
population died. Today Boylston is considered a pioneer, and the risk in 
vaccination is 1 in 100,000. Yet a lawsuit settlement in the millions of dollars 
for the one victim removes the incentive to protect the 99,999. 
Boylston's heroic experiment had a risk ratio that would not be accept-
able under today's regulatory codes. Those codes—considered too lenient 
by some, too strict by others—are at least based on some rational and 
statistical design. The lawsuit, however, is usually decided on highly 
emotional grounds, the poor victim against the infinitely wealthy govern-
ment or corporation. Who would be so cruel as to deny a few millions here 
or there to a crippled victim or a bereaved family? Yet the result of such 
compassion is to deny protection to the many. 
The dilemmas are large, and real. A probability of 50 children getting 
permanent brain damage after receiving vaccine against diphtheria, pertus-
sis, and tetanus (DPT) is heartbreaking, even weighed against 3.5 million 
children inoculated. The control experiment has been done, however. When 
the DPT vaccine fell into disuse in England and Japan during the 1970's the 
death rate shot up (for example, during one 2-year period in England 36 
children died per 100,000 who were infected with whooping cough). Various 
forms of legislation are being considered, but the approach of having the 
government subsidize whatever the courts allow, either to companies or to 
victims, seems unworkable. If a federal judge can order a drug company to 
pay $10 million to a single victim, $8 million punitive damages, what will the 
judgments be when the federal government is the ultimate underwriter? 
It is not appropriate to shield companies or the federal government from 
punishment for lax or incompetent procedures. It is appropriate, however, 
to face the reality that a conscientiously executed procedure for making 
vaccines will still produce some tragic side effects. Do we continue to act 
out a play in which any bad result must have a villain, or do we face the 
reality that modem vaccines have great benefits and some built-in risks? 
At some point the judicial system will have to face the most inexorable of 
all laws, the law of probability. Risks of diseases and harmful side effects 
from vaccines are steadily being reduced, but they will never be absolutely 
zero. Damage from industrial accidents involved lengthy court battles until 
the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed. With drugs and vaccines, 
some national compensation system in which medical costs, lost pay, and so 
on are calculated on an appropriate statistical basis will need to be enacted. 
The law would of necessity exclude extra compensation for emotional 
trauma and the life-style to which the lawyer has become accustomed. Such 
a law could allow moderately priced vaccines to be produced with appropri-
ate compensation calculated into the price on an actuarial basis. Then we 
may be able to introduce into government the concept of a statistical 
morality as the foundation of a more rational approach toward all compen-
sation situations. The next hero may be the statistics advocate who has the 
courage to say, "The healthy can afford to help the sick, but we do not live 
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continued from page 15S7 
vaccines and accompanying host factors. Wyeth 
HDCV is a subunit vaccine, disrupted with tri-
(n)butyl phosphate and further inactivated with p-
propiolactone, while Merieux HDCV is a whole virus 
vaccine inactivated with 0-propiolactone. Other fac-
tors, including older age, receipt of mildly immuno-
suppressive medications and administration of the 
vaccine into the buttocks, may also have contributed 
to the lower responses. Injections in the gluteal region 
will almost always be delivered into fat6 It is not 
known whether there is a difference in absorption of 
the two types of HDCV when administered by this 
route. It has recently been recognized that adminis-
tration of hepatitis B vaccine in the gluteal area 
probably results in a poorer response than vaccina-
tion in the deltoid.7 It is recommended that all adult 
immunizations be administered in the deltoid 
region8,9; the deltoid area is the preferred site for 
HDCV vaccination. The gluteal area remains an 
acceptable site for large volumes of RIG. HDCV and 
RIG should never be administered in the same 
anatomic sites. 
One 1.0-mL intramuscular booster with Merieux 
HDCV in the deltoid area is recommended, based on 
review of available information, for all persons who 
have been potentially exposed to rabies since Oct 15, 
1984, and who have received postexposure prophylaxis 
with Wyeth HDCV (unless serum samples obtained 
after postexposure prophylaxis demonstrated an 
acceptable antibody titer). Merieux HDCV can be 
obtained by telephoning (800) 327-2842. Anyone cur-
rently receiving Wyeth vaccine should complete the 
course with Merieux vaccine and does not require an 
additional booster. Serologic testing is recommended 
if a systemic allergic reaction (serum sickness or 
urticaria) occurred during previous administration of 
postexposure prophylaxis. In that case, an acceptable 
serologic response obviates the need for a booster 
vaccine dose. Serum testing continues to be indicated 
if a patient who received postexposure prophylaxis 
with HDCV is immunosuppressed (by diseases or 
medications).1 State health departments can be con-
tacted for the addresses of laboratories where sero-
logic testing is available. 
The Wyeth vaccine administered preexposure and 
in the recommended 1.0-mL intramuscular doses 
(three injections) has been effective in inducing 
antibodies. Based on currently available information, 
persons so-vaccinated need neither serologic testing 
nor booster doses of HDCV, except for those select 
groups previously identified.1 In the event of future 
exposure to rabies, persons who have received preex-
posure prophylaxis with either type of HDCV should 
receive two 1.0-mL intramuscular booster doses of 
HDCV (one each on days 0 and 3), as is currently 
recommended.1 
•At present, the CDC considers a neutralizing antibody titer 
that produces complete inhibition in the rapid fluorescent 
focus inhibition test at 1:5 dilution or greater (1:11 or greater 
by the Reed-Muench method) an acceptable response to 
immunization.' The World Health Organization considers 0.5 
IU/mL or greater2 an acceptable response (approximately 
equivalent to 1:56 by the Reed-Muench method or complete 
inhibition at the 1:25 dilution). 
1540 JAMA, March 15. 1985—Vol 253, No. 11 
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Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis 
Vaccine Shortage 
On Feb 12,1985, the American Academy of Pediat-
rics hosted a meeting to discuss ways of dealing with 
the current shortage of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis 
(DTP) vaccine. The meeting was attended by repre-
sentatives of the American Medical Association; 
American Academy of Family Practice; the vaccine 
manufacturer; state, county, and city health officials; 
the US Department of Defense; and the US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. 
Available information indicates that, overall, state 
health departments have approximately 2.3 months' 
supply of DTP vaccine on hand, but this vaccine is not 
uniformly distributed, with 18 states having supplies 
on hand of one month or less. Because of close 
inventory monitoring and prudent use of DTP 
reserves held by the manufacturer, vaccine has 
remained available in the public sector to date. 
A survey conducted by eight different state health 
departments of 583 physicians indicated approximate-
ly one third had had difficulties in obtaining DTP 
vaccine, and approximately one half were following 
the current recommendations to defer the DTP doses 
for 18-month-old and 4- to 6-year-old children. In four 
states, where inventory estimates were made, physi-
cians' current inventories ranged from 1.9 to 2.9 
months' supply. 
Lederle Laboratories reported the release for distri-
bution of one DTP vaccine lot on Feb 12. This lot, 
about 35,000 vials (525,000 doses), has been divided 
among the company's five regional distribution cen-
ters located in Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chicago, Phila-
delphia, and Dallas. This vaccine is being distributed 
to health-care providers now. 
Because currently available supplies of DTP vaccine 
are limited, the manufacturer is carefully coordinat-
ing the distribution of vaccine to both public and 
private health-care providers. Following extensive 
discussions, the group reached the following conclu-
sions and recommendations: 
1. Current information indicates that adequate 
supplies of DTP vaccine should become available in 
mid- or late 1985. 
2. Until adequate supplies become available, it is 
important to continue the currently recommended 
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practice of deferring the DTP vaccine doses for 
18-month-old and 4- to 6-year-old children to assure 
that the initial three-dose immunization schedule for 
infants is met. 
3. Practitioners should not administer partial doses 
of DTP vaccine in an effort to make the vaccine go 
further, since the degree of protection afforded by 
such partial doses is not certain. 
4. Diphtheria-tetanus vaccine should not be substi-
tuted in the routine DTP vaccine schedule for 18-
month-old and 4- to 6-year-old children. 
5. It is important for practitioners to establish 
recall systems to ensure that children whose doses are 
deferred are recalled for the DTP vaccine they need 
once supplies become available. 
6. Because some children will have their 18-month 
or "preschool dose" of DTP vaccine deferred this 
spring and summer, it may be necessary for day-care 
centers or school systems to allow provisional enroll-
ment of such children until they can receive the 
needed doses. 
7. As soon as adequate supplies become available, 
the Academy of Pediatrics and the US Public Health 
Service will notify physicians so they can again 
Hemolytic-Uremic Syndrome Associated 
With Escherichia coli 0157:H7 Enteric 
Infections—United States, 1984 
During the first 11 months of 1984, seven cases of 
hemolytic-uremic syndrome (HUS) associated with 
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 gastroenteritis were identi-
fied in the United States. All patients had microan-
giopathic hemolytic anemia, thrombocytopenia, and 
evidence of renal disease; none had new onset of 
neurologic abnormalities to suggest thrombotic 
thrombocytopenic purpura. A diarrheal illness pre-
ceded onset of HUS in all seven patients. The cases 
occurred in Washington, Nebraska, and North Caroli-
na. 
Washington.—Three cases occurred between 
March and October. The first two patients (women 
ages 25 and 36) had a prodrome of hemorrhagic 
colitis; the third patient (a 3-year-old boy) had a 
prodrome of watery, nonbloody diarrhea. E coli 
0157:H7 was isolated from the stool of each patient 
No exposures common to all patients were identified. 
Nebraska.—During an outbreak in September of 
diarrheal illness caused by E coli 0157:H7 among 
residents of a nursing home, one of the patients with 
hemorrhagic colitis, a 63-year-old woman, subse-
quently developed HUS. 
North Carolina.—During an outbreak of gastroen-
teritis (both bloody and nonbloody diarrhea) in a 
day-care center in September and October, three 
children who had bloody diarrhea subsequently devel-
oped HUS; they were 11 months, 31 months, and 35 
months of age. E coli 0157:H7 was isolated from the 
stools of four ill children, including one with HUS. 
Reported by Washington Dept of Social and Health Svca; Div of 
JAMA, March 15, 1985—Vol 253, No. 11 
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Ansamycin LM427 
Since October 1983, the CDC's Division of Tuber-
culosis Control, Center for Prevention Services, 
has supplied the experimental drug, ansamycin 
LM427, under a "compassionate" investigational 
new drug permit to physicians treating patients 
with serious mycobacterial disease unresponsive to 
conventional therapy. Beginning Monday, Feb 18, 
1985, physicians requesting the drug for new 
patients should contact the CDC Drug Service at 
(404) 329-3670 during normal working hours. Ansa-
mycin LM427 is not released at night or during 
weekends. The Division of Tuberculosis Control 
([404] 329-2530) will continue to provide medical 
consultation on the treatment of mycobacterial 
diseases. 
resume the full DTP immunization schedule and 
recall those who need additional doses. 
Reported by US Public Health Service Interagency Group to Monitor 
Vaccine Development, Production, and Usage. 
Health, Nebraska State Dept of Human Resources; Div of Health 
Svcs, North Carolina Dept Human Resources; Enteric Diseases Br, 
Div of Bacterial Diseases, Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC. 
Editorial Note* E coli 0157:H7 was first recognized as 
an enteric pathogen during the investigation of two 
outbreaks of hemorrhagic colitis that occurred in 
Oregon and Michigan in 1982.J Since then, E coli 
0157.H7 has also been associated with sporadic cases 
of hemorrhagic colitis and HUS in the United States, 
Canada, and Great Britain.2"1 Isolation of this very 
rare E coli serotype from stools of patients with HUS 
suggests that this pathogen may be one important 
cause of HUS; however, further epidemiologic and 
laboratory studies are needed. 
Since E coli isolates from stool cultures are not 
routinely serotyped, the diagnosis of E coli 0157:H7 
infection cannot be made unless physicians consider it 
and arrange for serotyping. Stools from HUS patients 
who present with a diarrheal prodrome should be 
collected as soon after onset of illness as possible and 
held frozen at -70 °C (-94 °F). Arrangements for 
examination of the stools and/or E coli isolates from 
such stools at state laboratories or the CDC can be 
made through state laboratory directors. 
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Robert Windom announces a framework 
for industry and government collaboration on 
an AIDS vaccine. 
collaborative program. These include: pep-
tides isolated from or based on AIDS virus 
proteins that might be used in a potential 
vaccine, organisms such as vaccinia virus 
that can be genetically engineered to pro-
duce proteins normally made by the AIDS 
virus, methods for producing and dectecting 
the AIDS virus, isolation methods for pro-
teins made by the AIDS virus, and molecu-
lar dories of the AIDS virus. The United 
States government owns the rights to these 
patents. 
The PHS notice calls for collaborative 
plans from the private sector to be submit-
ted by October 21, sixty days from the date 
of the notice. Each plan will be considered 
on a case-by-case basis, and final selection 
will be made by the agencies of the PHS 
including the National Institutes of Health 
and the Centers for Disease Control. 
Harmison says that the concept for estab-
lishing a collaborative framework for AIDS 
vaccine development is not new. In 1984, 
the PHS issued an invitation for private 
industry to become involved in making test 
kits to detect AIDS virus antibodies in the 
blood (which were on the market by 1985), 
and the idea for vaccine development col-
laboration began then. 
An AIDS vaccine is not likely to be 
available for general use until well into the 
1990's. The primary reason for the expected 
delay in its development is the scientific 
complexity of the research problem, which 
necessitates large and equally complex re-
search collaborations. Why did the PHS 
release its new notice now? Because the 
stage of scientific research warrants such 
collaborations at this point, says Harmison, 
and perhaps because the time is ripe for 
exercising some control over who has access 
to patent licenses. • 
DEBORAH M. BARNES 
(A discussion of the different research strate-
gies now being used to develop an AIDS vaccine 
will appear in the 12 September issue.) 
5 SEPTEMBER I?86 
Bankrupt the Company 
That Makes It? 
In the present climate of richly rewarding 
lawsuits by individuals against manufactur-
ers for product liability, U.S. pharmaceutical 
companies may be less than eager to invest 
large amounts of money and effort into 
producing a vaccine for AIDS. But an ex-
perimental AIDS vaccine should be available 
for initial clinical testing within the next 
decade, and individual scientists as well as 
drug companies recognize the need for legis-
lation that will encourage rather than dis-
courage vaccine production. 
The important legal issue is pretty dear," 
says Brian Cunningham, vice president and 
general counsel for Genentech in South San 
Francisco. "As the law stands today, manu-
facturers are held liable for injuries caused 
by a vaccine even though they were not 
negligent in designing it. In these circum-
stances, in my opinion, the legal system has 
simply run amuck. And for a small company 
like Genentech, we simply cannot take the 
financial risk." Genentech is now in the 
research phase of developing a potential 
AIDS vaccine, but the company has not 
decided whether it would move into full-
scale vaccine development. 
Current])', drug companies are subject to 
stria product liability, a legal term meaning 
that the manufacturer is liable for any inju-
ries caused by the product, even though die 
product was made properly. 
California is leading the legislative effort 
to lessen a manufacturer's liability for an 
AIDS vaccine with a bill, which is expected 
to pass before 1 September. Governor 
George Deukmejian has formally endorsed 
the vaccine legislation (as of this writing). 
His office projects that Californians will pay 
about $3.5 billion in medical costs alone for 
AIDS patients in 1990, making the need for 
a vaccine a financial as well as a health care 
issue. 
Due in part to persistent lobbying efforts 
by Genentech and other pharmaceutical 
firms, the new bill would relieve drug com-
panies from strict product liability. Intro-
duced by assemblyman John VasconccDos, it 
is designed specifically to apply to an AIDS 
vaccine once it has been approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The 
bill offers not only protection from two 
classes of Lability claims, but also provides 
incentives for drug companies to make a 
vaccine for AIDS. 
The California bill has four essential fea-
tures. First, it leaves intact a person's right to 
su  because of injury due to manufacturing 
defects in an AIDS vaccine. At the same 
f^UJLM^iA^ 
, . . __.M...»w »uiwi piiAiuii iiapiury in a 
suit based on warning or design defects if 
the vaccine has been found to be "unavoid-
ably dangerous" (defined on the basis of a 
California appellate court decision as a prod-
uct with great public benefit that is unavail-
able in a less dangerous form). Second, it 
states that it is the intention of the state of 
California to purchase 750,000 doses of the 
vaccine for a maximum of $20 a dose, if this 
number is not sold in the 3-ycar period 
foUowing FDA approval of a vaccine. Third, 
it provides for $6 million in grant money to 
be given to drug companies that do clinical 
testing of potential vaccines. And fourth, the 
bill guarantees compensation to individuals 
injured by an AIDS vaccine by paying their 
medical expenses, lost income, and a capped 
amount for pain and suffering. The money 
for this compensation fund will come pri-
marily from a surcharge that the vaccine 
manufacturers will pay, with any future state 
appropriations to be decided later. 
The California bill may prove to be model 
legislation for other states or perhaps for the 
federal government. The House of Repre-
sentatives subcommittee on health and the 
environment has introduced bills that per-
tain to childhood vaccines. One of them, 
sponsored by subcommittee chairman Hen-
ry Waxman (D-CA), would protect phar-
maceutical companies that make childhood 
vaccines which are already FDA-approved 
against stria product liability. It would also 
offer compensation to children who are in-
jured by a properly made vaccine. 
But any forthcoming vaccine for AIDS is 
admittedly experimental and will not have 
FDA approval until it is shown to be both 
safe and effective. Whether protective legis-
lation will be introduced at the federal level 
for such an experimental vaccine is uncer-
tain. Public Health Service scientists and 
representatives from private industry have 
been discussing these issues with congressio-
nal staff, m DEBOKAH M. BAJLNES 
NASA Council Sees 
Continued Erosion off 
Space Program 
The advisory council of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) has expressed "great concern" 
about the agency's ability to fulfill its man-
date for national preeminence in space. 
In a blunt letter to agency administrator 
James C Fletcher, dated 14 August, council 
chairman Daniel ). Fink also says "that 
actions being taken by the U.S. to restore its 
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Foocf and Drug Administration because they are not considered drugs-
There is no solid information about the correct dosage that wight 
alleviate arthritic tenderness or to keep cholesterol and triglycerides 
at their correct levels. 
So what should the American public do when these wonderful fish 
oil omega-3 capsules are offered to them at a high price? It's still 
best to get fish oil from eating fish. 
The FDA should take a good hard look at all nutritional . ^  
supplements, including fish oils, and exert some authority over the* - ^ 
based on the claims being made. 
^. 
Q. jta one of your columns you described a pill that women could 
take to3|*rninate an early pregnancy. Can you tell me when this drug 
will be marketed in this country and what is holding it up? 
A. The name of the drug is Mifepristone and will stimulate a 
spontaneous abortion (miscarriage) in 90 percent of women when taken 
before the fifth week of pregnancy, studies say. 
I believe this drug will never be marketed in the United States. 
Although it will be opposed by the anti-abortion lobby, the nain reason 
probably will be the inability of any manufacturer to obtain product 
liability insurance. 
0. Do you think because Nancy Reagan has had breast cancer that 
there will be a faster development of a drug to cure it? 
A. Research into the causes of breast cancer is at an all-time 
high. There is no immediate expectation of a drug that will cure it, 
but advances in drugs that improve the immune system may hasten a cure 
for breast and other cancers. Mrs. Reagan's contribution, however, has 
been to alert women that they can prevent possible death from breast 
cancer by having a mammogram. What her husband can do is to see that 
all women, regardless of income, have access to a mammography. 
Q. I am a healthy person of 38. I have a little trouble sleeping 
now and then, but I take c^re of this with camomile tea. Lately, I seem 
to have spells of sneezing and watery eyes. I live in the city so I 
know it is not hay fewer, I was thinking of taking one of those 
products advertised to help colds, but I thought I would ask you if any 
other products would help. 
A. The only thing I can suggest is that you stop the camomile tea 
for a few weeks and see if your sneezing and watery eyes go away. 
Camomile comes from the same plant family as ragweed. 
Q. I have had a bout of running to the bathroom every 15 minutes 
and the doctor prescribed Gantanol DS. What kind of drug is it? 
A. Gantanol DS is a brand name for the sulfa drug, 
sulfamethoxazole, double strength. It is usually very effective in 
eliminating urinary infections such as cystitis. If you do not receive 
relief from your problem in a few days, be sure to call your doctor. 
**END OF STORY REACHED** 
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NEW YORK Fear, distrust and misinformation have created a crisis in 
contraception in the United States, slowing research and stopping 
introduction of new and safer birth-control methods, an internationally 
known women's health expert warns. i ^ 
"We're basically going to hell as far as contraceptives and ^ " ^ 
women's health is concerned," Dr. Elizabeth B. Connell, professor of Tu* 
gynecology and obstetrics at the Emory University School of Medicine iiT^-
Atlantar^said in a telephone interview. 
"American women are being forced to leave the country to obtain 
contraceptives," she said. "This is already happening with the IUD 
(intrauterine device). The Copper T Cu 360 A is now available in 
Canada, the United Kingdom and continental Europe. American women are 
traveling to these countries to obtain the device." 
Connell said population-control experts in those countries are 
increasingly perplexed at what is happening to birth-control efforts 
here: "They're just beginning to realize how crazy we are." 
Dr. Gerald Zatuchni, director of the Chicago-based national 
Program for Applied Research on Fertility Regulation and a professor in 
the department of obstetrics and gyneocology at Northwestern Memorial 
Hospital, says prospects are bleak. 
"I've been involved in all aspects of concept planning and 
development for 25 years, and I've never been as pessimistic as I have 
been the last year or so. I don't see any opportunities for any 
resurgence in interest in developing new methods of birth control over 
a minimum of 10, probably closer to £0 years. And it won't change just 
because there may be a new administration in Washington in 1989." 
Zatuchni cited a string of factors involved in the loss of 
interest in research. The magic of the term population explosion has 
vanished,, partly because of successful family planning programs in some 
developing countries, he said. Lessening population pressure in the 
United States and preferences for reduced families also are involved. 
"Also, we're in a legal situation with new and existing methods of 
birth control in terms of all the suits that have been filed and won in 
some instances. The IUD story particularly has been quite detrimental 
to companies willing to invest any sort of monies in developing new 
methods." 
The length of time and money at risk to develop an FDA-approved 
drug or device, he said, affect research and development. "From the 
cost accounting point of view, it just takes too long and too much 
money at risk for fairly small financial returns. 
^Fear of sexually transmitted disease is important. Today condom 
manufacturers are working three shifts to keep up with the demand, 
mostly because of the AIDS scare. It has, in general, indicated to 
those who are interested in contraceptive research and development that 
methods would have to be developed that would also be as effective as 
the condom and spermicides in thwarting infection as well as providing 
birth control. When you ask yourself what method should we develop, 
it's pretty obvious you come back to the method called condoms. •'*_.. >% 
"The religious/political factor, of course, is another point. I """ 
don't mean to lump them together, but they sometimes go hand in hand*/^ 
Just the other day the pope came down hard again against any method «f 
contraception other than the so-called natural one. 
"The present administration in Washington is not only 
anti-abortion but anti-family planning. This has affected the whole 
field in terms of interest to come up with improved methods of birth 
control." 
Other experts long involved with birth control echo concern about 
the field. l>r. Enayat Elahi, medical director of Planned Parenthood in 
New York City, said: "There is no liability insurance available for new 
m e t h o d s O f C O n t r a r e n - M n n i^hirtk * ~ ~ « i~_ . - t . . * - »- * - -• - • * 
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Sweden, is not available here." 
Dr. Richard Lincoln, senior vice president of the Alan Guttmacher 
Institute in Hew York City, warned during a recent birth-control 
association's meeting in Washington, D.C.: 
%If the 1960s ushered in a contraceptive revolution, then during 
the 1980s we're experiencing a contraceptive counter-revolution. The 
IUD has effectively disappeared from the American market. Spermicides -
meaning foams, jellies, creams and sponges - may be next. / 
"Methods that have already been developed and are available •'•'-*:*?% 
elsewhere are not available to Americans. Clinical research using human^ 
subjects "'to develop new methods has virtually been brought to a iK r^ 
standstill in this country." "**• 
Another population-control researcher, Laurie Liskin at Johns 
Hopkins University, said American women are being denied access to some 
of the safest, most effective and" convenient birth-control methods. 
In contrast to an American woman, Liskin said: "A woman in 
Indonesia can get one of several types of copper IUDs, which are not 
available - and never have been available - in this country. She can 
also get two different types of injectable contraceptives, one that 
lasts two months, another that lasts three months. Or she can get a 
contraceptive implant that lasts five years." 
In addition, women overseas have ready access to various versions 
of the contraceptive Pill, spermicidal tablets and ordinary condoms. 
In the United States, however, Liskin said, "There is a general 
lack of availability of reversible, easily accessible methods of birth 
control." 
The situation is particularly ironic, Connell said, because it was 
the United States that led the world in contraceptive research and 
development. 
"Americans have provided most of the basic scientific data, 
expertise and manufacturing capability for contraceptive technologies 
now in use around the world," she said. 
But now, she added, "The United States is losing its leadership 
role in this area - with potentially disastrous consequences for women 
and men in this country and elsewhere." 
Reasons for the dramatic decline in contraceptive research and 
development - and the unavailability of newer contraceptive methods -
include: 
Widespread public misunderstanding of the risks and benefits of 
various birth-control methods, such as newer, highly effective birth 
control pills and IUDs. 
"The public's fears far exceed the real dangers," Connell said. 
"This is particularly true of the Pill, whose risks have been grossly 
exaggerated in proportion to its benefits." 
The Reagan administration has decimated family-planning efforts 
because of the link to the ideologically explosive issue of abortion. 
"The current administration has refused to fund any international 
family-planning organizations that offer abortion counseling or 
referrals *long with other forms of birth control," Connell said. 
In 1984, for example, "the Reagan administration abruptly 
terminated 17 years of support for the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation because it would not renounce its members' rights to carry 
on abortion-related activities with their own funds. 
"The following year, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
cut $10 million from support for the United Nations fund for population 
activities because of its program with China." 
In mid-August, the agency again withheld funding from the UN 
program, despite strong objections from congressmen and senators,-and 
from within itself. 
In this country, Connell said, "Federal funding of basic research 
- both in government and university labs - has steadily declined over 
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been a member of the Planned Parenthood executive committee and has 
been an adviser to the U.S. Agency for International Development. 
Reliable birth control, other than condoms, became a reality in 
1960 when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved the first oral 
contraceptives. The Pill is almost 100 percent effective in blocking 
pregnancy, but initially the oral contraceptives made some women more 
susceptible to blood-clotting problems. 
After the chemical composition of the Pill was changedjto decrease 
the amount of estrogen, problems declined dramatically. For most women 
it is far safer to take the Pill than to continue a pregnancy to term. 
"Despite this track record," Connell said, "The use of oral 
contraceptives has declined. This is largely because the Pill's early 
risks received a disproportionate share of public attention." 
As for IUDs, she said, serious problems caused by the Dalkon 
Shield have caused their use to decline dramatically. And because of 
liability problems, the newest and best of the IUDs - the copper T Cu 
360 A - "may never be brought to the U.S. market" even though it 
already has been approved by the FDA. 
**END OF STORY REACHED** 
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Pit-bull attacks 
Neal Peirce 
ANIMALS; 
dogs; pit bull 
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES 
FINAL 
mustn't be tolerate/ 
A pit bull named Gadhafi goes berserk 
strains at its leash, bites its own tongue,/ 
the sight of another dog, 
>prays saliva and blood. 
Another pit bull is so keen to attack it tries to chew its way through 
a chain-link fe^ce* And a street dude named Eric tells about the litter 
of eight young pit bulls he's raising 
already -Jiterally - at each other 
When my photographer colleagu 
Baltimore's Liberty Hill neighbor 
decided this was one urban stor 
Only 8 weeks old, they're 
throats. 
Shepard Sherbell came back from 
bod with those reports recently, I 
I was happy to learn of secondhand. 
But what of the pit bulls'? Can this summer's wave of horror 
stories be passed off as medda hype? Hardly. Pit bulls have inflicted 
21 of the nation's 29 fata^ r canine attacks since 1983. Fourteen of the 
victims Jiave been children under 6 years of age. Each story of a 
mutilated youngster's bpdy, torn by the vice-like jaws that close with 
1,800 pounds of pressure, ripping off flesh with sure intent to killf 
is more appalling thim the last. And for each fatality, there are * '^  
dozens of other pitbull attacks that leave victims with lifetime 
id psychological. >? 
terror stalking American streets can only worsen. 
There's an explosion of pit-bull breeding in ghettoes and barrios where 
idle, embittered youth have chosen the animals as "macho" status 
symbols, t/o fight and wager on. In Philadelphia, the pit-bull count has 
soared f^ x>m 25 to 4,000 in five years. Time magazine reports the 
animals/are often fed gunpowder or hot sauces to make them mean, live 
kittens to sharpen their taste for blood. 
Dogfighting is a felony in 36 states. But the husky nif. hniic 
scars, physical 
This wave 
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hiding us to concentrate on expand-
ing our beauty, health care and direct 
mall businesses." 
At one time, Avon planned as many 
as 15 Tiffany stores around the coun-
try. But Deepak Raj, an analyst af 
1977, Tiffany had operating mar gins 
of a healthy 14 percent, last year they 
dropped to closer to 3 percent. . 
In trading on the New York Stock 
exchange yesterday, Avon stock rose 
62}£ cents, to $20,875. 
Kodak Microfilm 
ROCHESTER, June 19 (AP)-The 
Eastman Kodak Company introduced 
a high-speed microfilmer and a re-
trieval terminal capable ot finding 
one microfilm image from among 
10,000 or more in hwoods Kodak also 
introduced two packaged information 
systems— the high-volume KAR-4400 
and the low-volume KAR-2200 — 
which include the microfilm equip-
ment as well as printers, a computer 
and software. The company said the 
products are a step toward its goal of 
creating a system that would allow 
users to electronically scan images 
on microfilm and transmit them in 
the form of computer data. The new 
products include the R. hunt 2000 mi-
crofilmer, which Kodak said would 
cost about $19,000. 
Small Bank Closed 
JEFFERSON CITY, Mo., June 19 
(AP) — The Republic Bank of Kansas 
City has been closed because of poor 
lending practices and other problems 
that rei/dered it insolvent, Missouri's 
Commissioner of Finance, Kenneth 
Littlefield, said. An examination last 
month by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation indicated that the 
bank had suffered heavy loan losses 
and had violated banking laws, he 
said. The bank, which had two offices 
in Kansas City, reported abuut $38 
million in deposits and $41 minion in 
assets at the end of March 
Massey Layoffs 
PARIS, June 19 (Reuters) ~- Mas-
sey-Ferguson Ltd. said it planned to 
close its harvester plant in Marquette 
in northern France and lay off all of 
the plant's 1,430 employees for a least 
three months because of abnormally 
high stocks. Production at the plant is 
forecast to fall to 415 harvesters this 
year, from 620 in 1983. A spokesman __ 
*aid -an-annual-level-of ^ ^ ^ a s - ^ u ^ ^ j ^ ^ ^ Y t a t , 
needed to maintain the current work, 
force. 
cuntM's and Lxrhanpe Commission 
that tt is talking with the Amrep Cor-
poration about the repurchase of 
Amrep slock. The Unicorp group 
holds 823,337 Amrep shares, or 21.9 
percent of the total outstanding. 
Unicorp owns and manages real es-
tate investments. Amrep is engaged 
in land devlopment and residential 
construction, both are based in New 
York On the New York Slock Ex-
chanpe today, Amrep was the biggest 
percentuge loser, plunging $3.75, to 
$19.25. 
Sallie Mae Charter 
WASHINGTON, June 19 (Reuters) 
— The Student Loan Marketing As-
sociation, also known as Sallie Mae, 
said it had submitted an application 
to charier a bank in North Carolina. It 
said that First Capital Bank, to be 
based in Raleigh, would specialize-in 
investment and liability products re-
lated to education credit, but would 
also offer limited banking services to 
the community. Sallie Mae, a fed-
erally chartered, stockholder-owned 
corporation, Is a financial intermedi-
ary serving the education credit mar-
ket. By buying insured student loans 
and providing other financial serv-
ices to financial and educational insti-
tutions and state student loan agen-
cies, it replenishes local supplies of 
student credit. 
Wyeth Vaccine 
The American Home Products Cor-
poration said its Wyeth Laboratories 
Division had ceased production of 
pertussis vaccine, used to immunize 
children against whooping cough, be-
cause of possible liability problems 
associated with th/shots. A company' 
spokesman said the vaccine had been
 d 
withdrawn because of higher injur- ' 
ance costs and the risk of liability in 
lawsuits from users of the vaccine, as 
well as the cost of defending any law-
suits. Wyeth is estimated to have ac-
counted for 25 percent of the product 
in the domestic market. Lederle 
Laboratories is the other major pro-
Changesat I.B.M 
The International Business Ma-1 
chines Corporation said a variety of 
graphics capabilities previously 
available on its larger computers 
would be offered for its System/38. 
I.B.M. also said that terminals used 
with its intermediate and Jarge s y s -
tems could now he attached to 
System/38 by remote communica-
tions lines. 
Military Contracts 
WASHINGTON, June 19 (Reuters) 
—The Oshkosh Truck Corporation re- -
ceived a $133.4 million Army contract 
for. trucks, the Defense Department 
said. In addition, the Puerto Rico Sun-
Oil Company was given a $61.4 mil-
lion contract by the Defense Logistics 
. Agency tor fuel, and Sanders Associ-
ates Inc. received a $37.4 million Air 
Force contract for spare parts for 
countermeasures test equipment. 
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into the river In that aroa, Including raw sewage. 
Tbey also begin to acclimate themselves to the aalty ocean 
water in which they will live as adulu, and tome venture into the 
upper bay near the tip of Manhattan. 
They go back up river in the spring, and the pattern repeats 
v
 Continued on Page C4 
Vaccine 
Liability 
Threatens 
Supplies 
By PHILIP M.BOFFEY 
WASHINGTON 
IIIE nation's major drug compa-
•nies, some stung by large liabil" 
ity costs, have been dropping out 
of vaccine production for years 
and the trend is continuing, raising fears 
that future supplies may be jeopardized, 
important research wilt be neglected 
and the costs of vaccines may skyrocket. 
The latest dropout was Wyeth Labora-
tories, which announced June 13 that it 
rty ceased production of a vaccine used 
to immunize children against whooping 
cough after more than 30 years of 
producing it. Hie company cited "dra-
matic increases in the cost of participat-
ing in this market," chiefly due to liabil-
ity insurance and the costs of litigation. 
The whooping cough vaccine has the 
most serious side effects of any of the 
vaccines now adminstered to virtually 
all children in the country under state or 
Federal laws. 
The Wyeth defection continued a tr 
that has been under way for the past dec-
ade or two, according to Paul D. Park-
man, deputy director of the center for 
drugs and biologies at the Food and 
Drug Administration. During the 1960's,. 
Dr. Parkman said, there were eight 
manufacturers of the combined vaccine 
that is used to immunize children 
against diphtheria, whooping cough, and 
. tetanus; now, after Wyeth's withdrawal, 
Continued on R«geCJ3 
How a Soviet S 
Was Finally Pi 
By WILLIAM J. BROAD 
• • B BOUT three years ago a kind of obses-
f f l sion began to take hold of Dr. Mark 
M*jlL M Kuchment, a 48-year-old science 
• I B B histonan who emigrated to this coun-
try in 1975 from the Soviet Union. 
While interviewing Soviet emigres for a Har-
vard University research project, Dr Kuch-
ment kept hearing stones of an American engi-
neer who had aclueved dazzling success in the 
secret world of Soviet military research An 
American? How could that be? 
Dr. Kuchment, who was born in the Ukrain-
ian port city ot Odessa and educated in Russia, 
• TteNe* York Time*/Rick Fnetota 
Dr. Mark M. Kuchment, above, 
found that top Soviet researcher 
was Alfred Sarant, right. 
Sleuth lear 
scientist ai 
American 
set out to find the ai 
ultimately solve a 
ternational mtrigu 
and Federal agents 
The tale pieced u 
nally revealed that 
a high official in tl 
military research 
American engineei 
after the arrest of 
senberg in 1950, we 
Dr. Kuchment, i 
versay and is a fell 
Centet at Harvan 
' work in a recent ini 
shed little light on 
innocence of Julius 
were executed in II 
passing atomic be 
Union. 
But he believes 
about Soviet techno 
Soviet officials in a 
eigner and about tfi 
a defector who took 
"It's a strange a 
Dr. David Hollow* 
University on the 
Contii 
JAZZ: Various artists show talents at festival, page C15./ THEATER: Arctic'Anti 
BOOKS: The Only Problem1 by Muriel Spark, page C17./ TV: The making of'Jess 
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Vaccine 
Liability 
Continued From Page CI 
there are two, Lederle Laboratories 
of Wayne, N.>., and Connaught Labo-
imtoriee Inc. of Swiftwater, Pa. 
Four other vaccine* that are ad-
ministered to virtually ail children 
are now produced by a eingle domes-
tic manufacturer, according to Dr. 
Parkman. The live-virus measles 
vaccine, made by all companies In 
the 19Ws, and the German measles 
vaccine, made by three companies 
' then, are now manufactured only by 
Merck Sharpe * Dohme of West 
Point, Pa. So is the mumps vaccine, 
which Merck Sharpe has produced 
alone for two decades. 
The live-virus polio vaccine, which 
had three makers in the 1960s, is now 
made only by Lederle Laboratories. 
And the influenza vaccines, adminis-
tered on a voluntary basis to millions 
of adults and children, are produced 
by only three companies, down from 
aevealntheltfO't. 
High Casts of UabUlty 
The reasons for the shrinkage are 
complex and vary from company to 
company, according to industry 
sources and Government officials. 
Some companies concluded that the 
vaccine market was too small and 
profit margins too low. Others 
dropped out because competitors de-
veloped superior product*. Still 
others were squeezed out because the 
very success of vaccinations in reduc-
ing disease also reduced the demand 
for some vaccines. 
But increasingly manufacturers 
are blaming the high coat of protect-
ing themselves against liabiity 
claims by the small number of people 
who are inevitably harmed by severe 
adverse reactions to the vaccines. 
Even if a vaccine is produced with the 
utmost care in accord with the most 
stringent specifications, It is virtually 
certain to cause harm to a tiny frac-
tion of those who use it, or sometimes 
to those who come into dose contact 
with those who receive it. 
Some victims who suffer debilitat-
ing physical damage, or even death, 
receive little compensation for it. 
They are the unfortunate victims of 
programs designed to protect the 
public health. But other victims are 
successful in winning large liability 
awards that can eat into the profit* of 
the manufacturers, either through 
the awards themselves or through 
legal fees and higher insurance costa. 
A report submitted to a Congres-
sional committee this year died 11 
recent court awards or settlements in 
which victims won between 8150,000 
and $5.5 million. Sometimes the 
manufactureTi end up paying sub-
stantial awards even though they 
made their vaccines perfectly. 
. Federal totarvwitkw lough* 
The steady withdrawal of vaccine 
inamif|cturers has caused alarm 
among professional organizations 
and in Congress. The American Medi-
cal Association at its annual meeting 
last week approved a report calling 
for the Federal Government to as-
aume responsibility for compensating 
the victims of mandatory childhood 
immunization programs, relieving 
the nuinufacturers of liability risk un-
. leas they are negligent. 
• / " ^ GOING10UT 
Juhiiae. 
WHALING WALLS 
Long before men ran out West in 
search of gold and glory, they ran off 
to sea in search of whales and wealth. 
That era, 1£0 to 1*40, when whalers 
sailed from the Eastern Seaboard, 
brought with it, most incidentally, its 
works of art. 
The flavor of this period is on (he 
walls and floor of the Museum of 
American Polk Art, ensconced now in 
a new home, a building once occupied 
by John D. Rockefeller, at 125 west 
85th Street (Ml-2474). The show of 89 
objects is called "Cross Currents; 
Faces, Figureheads and Scrimshaw 
Fancies." 
In it are the works of three artists. 
not household names, who painted 
families prominent in shipping from 
Massachusetts to Long Island. laaac 
Sheffield worked in New York and 
Connecticut, painting portraits and 
miniatures of captains, their wives 
and children. Orlando Hand Bears of 
Sag Harbor did the same in the same 
area. The third is Frederick May-
hewm, whose "natve" portraits have 
been popping up for years in Martha's 
Vineyard and New Bedford. 
The ahow includes those essential 
art pieces of old-time shipping under 
sail, figureheads. There are also 
many examples of the carving art 
called acrimshaw, among them a 
whalebone piece engraved with a 
acene of New Bedford, canes inlaid 
with ivory, jagging wheels of whale 
ivory. 
Open Tuesdays from 10:30 A.M. to 8 
P.M., other nights (except Mondays), 
to 5:30 P.M. Admission: 82; students 
andover-85's, $1; uoder-13's, free. 
ALF1ESCO 
During summer, Al Fresco la New 
York's great impresario of music, as 
big as sll outdoors. Al fresco concerts 
fuT streets, parks and plazas. Soma 
concerts are formally programmed: 
others are not only al fresco, but ad 
hoc. 
One of the more popular outdoor 
concert locations is Bell Plaza, the 
block-through court of the New York 
Telephone building, on the Avenue of 
the Americas, between 41st and 43d 
Streets. Often, lata in the day, a first-
rate big band lets loose its jazz here in 
an unofficial gig. And during the sum-
mer, the telephone people sponsor 
outdoor event*, as they will do, start-
fog today, every Tuesday from noon 
tolP.M. 
This is the fifth annual Summer 
Arts Festival, and each week two dif-
ferent musical acts will hold the 
pavement. Today's stars are Neigh-
borhood Juke Box, a rockabilly band 
evoking the lttO's sound, and the 
raunchy lounge act that Louis Prima 
created In Las Vegas is being carried 
on with some degree of legitimacy by 
Uiyam Carol and Joe Barone. while 
their versatile three-man band keeps 
a shuffle rfayihm going behind them, 
one song flowa into another with a 
amoothness that belles the seeming 
anarchy of their performance." 
Through June 30. they appear daily, 
except Sundays, from 8 P.M. to 3 
A.M. There is an 88 cover and no 
minimum. Drinks, 84 up. 
s: 81110318. 
IEVTVAL 
Detail from Iftb-ecBtnry ail paint-
ing by Orlando Hand Bears, In-
cluded In display en the sea at the 
Museum of American Folk Art, 
Tomov Yugoslav Folk Ensemble. 
Admission Is free. Information: 
3*4357. 
JAZZ 
Joe Barone and Ulyann Carol and 
their trio have been going, if not 
eieady, at least occaaTonally, with 
Jimmy Weston's, the restaurant-club 
at 131 East Nth Street (838-8184). Mr. 
Barone plays saxophone and his wife, 
Miss Carol, is vocalist. Miss Carol 
was a featured vocalist in the early 
1840's with the Louis Prima Orches-
tra before Keely Smith entered the 
acene. Mr. Barone performed with 
Cab Calloway, Jerry Vale and Steve 
Lawrence. 
John S. Wilson visited them at an 
earlier Weston's engagement and 
wrote in The New York Times: "The 
kind of Intense, rhythmic and 
In January 1808, Samuel Beckett's 
second play, "Endgame," had Its 
American premiere at the Cherry 
Lane Theater, directed by the late 
Alan Schneider, and It has been a 
theater perennial ever since then, re-
ceiving prestigious and other revivals 
by companies large and small. Now It 
Is getting a special revival at Theater 
Row's Samuel Beckett Theater, 410 
West 43d Street, where the director It 
Alvln Epstein, who was in that first 
performance and appears also la this 
one, although in e different role. 
Brooks Atkinson, In a 1858 review in 
The New York Times, called it im-
pressive and wrote: "Mr. Beckett if 
wise in choosing the form of the myth 
in which io sound his tocsin on the 
condition Of human society. Since his 
theme is unearthly, the unearthly 
form becomes it." 
In this production, Mr. Epstein la 
joined onstage by Peter Evans, Alice 
Drummond and James Greene Tues-
days through Saturdays at 8 P.M., 
Also Saturdayi at 2:30 and Sundays at 
3 and 7. Admission today and tomor-
row, before opening on Thursday: 
$15; after that, 830 and 821 Reserve, 
lions: 8944836. 
• • • 
Tuesday Sports Is on page A22. 
Richard F. Shepard 
Entertainment Events 
Music 
B**UIH NATIONAL 0**BA, Vtrtfl % MftifOft«-
to," M*truek>4lt4n Ot-K «liovtt, I 
MUnaO^OtlTANOMlU IN TUB PABKI, VOT-
a t "antoni." GrMt L*wn, Central *orfc, S;*ty 
r»lr»d*U,Thur*kv. 
etiLika TIMS CO*CBBTS on TMB CBI ftON. wtth Adrian frit*. Tuny Uvtrt tnd Stil _ 
fttrorf tnd fit* A v w * , 7;» 
ftrtftn Bftow, 
BrvfertfTMfl CSi 
••ROC. PABKBB TBKTBT. ita, oroe* HCM. 
4M ttrott ftftO tftt Avon* oT*» AnWfcM, 
11 IS 
JOSS BNBIOUB AY ABBA JABttB. orf*nH4, 
Trinity Church, Bftwd»*v«1 W*li ltro»VYl:4», 
CALLSL/BTAOATfTBAUB, ti**»fc*i W &ftCf 
rrHAic Trinity Oturcfc eowrtyoni, Broodwiy m 
W*llftfrMt,t:». 
Dance 
NBW VOBK CttOAAL SOCIBTY SUMMSB BACHBL LAAU»BBT AMD DAMCBBi, B 
BINOvAmv JCtlior,conductor, C«M Holt/Ml ScfcorA^raThMtor.tltffafl itmttrwf,!. 
WMfl7n\ltrMt.7:io. TMB BOO B 5 D * B M OAttCfl 0&M& 
STSPMBM HAA4MBA. Bore** 
St. fowl's Church. 12) WMI TTif |tr««t, I 
AM* ft I GAM MB* MilllC COMftOftTIUM, 
mVH*Olit|tfit,ft. 
W.Y.U. Loot ttudont Conhr, Too of tnt •>**, 
ft* U Ou*dU Pi#«:Iloctr©*Acou»tlc Mt«fc 
From fht HvthorUndt. ft; Bdwor* UwU, * . . 
oot»r. i f * jtc* Krtltoimon. dor ln#tttt,7. 
B i l l Y JOBU rock nncorl, Motiaon t««r»Oor-
aUBSABBT LB*B TAN. plonttt, VftVtntv Mu-
•oum of AmorkAA An tt Philip MorrU B v & 
feo, tft A vonut ond 4M Itrwt. •. 
AN BVSNIM* WITH TUB ITABL AJUoftOt Sf 
Utto Ariuno ftecltty, lr»tttv* oflr*frn«ti«**t 
iductttorw S3* onrtpd Mtflam H A M , J. 
.._ „__ W d CO PAJfV, 
CKoMMonhotUn »UiA, Lfeorty or* I 
ilr**U;S9. 
Cabaret 
SWSSTWATSBL W Amttordom Avenue. Car* 
t!!SSuHpi^At^\ AWOJWB. onaoTi e*tt» 
SyrTI K C G w t itrott. UU ***,***, H. 
^ BITAJL 41 Fifth AvofMt, tt ttth Slrfft. John 
• Hoofcor, country. 
Bridge: High Wihdg in Vermont Get Pltyert Away Prom Tible 
lyALANTlUSCOTT 
High wtndi are a nuisance to ath* 
letes, golferi and tennis players, but 
they rarely affect bridge games. 
bJe when the diagramed deal oc-
curred at one table. North's negative 
double, suggesting some values out* 
irasT 
SKQ 
9AKQ83 
v 10114 
4K10 
NORTH 
• W 7 i 4 
v 7 3 2 
• A765J 
EAST * " 
4 A 1 0 I I S I 
9 J 10113 -
v -
4 B I 
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Fewarsi Intervention Seuairt 
The ataady withdrawal of vaccine 
manuficturen haa cauaad alarm 
among* professional organization* 
and in Congress. Tha American Medi-
cal Association at IU annuel meeting 
last week approved a report calling 
for tha Federal Government to as-
sume responsibility for compensating 
the victims of mandatory childhood" 
immunization programs, relieving 
tha rnanufacturers of liability risk un-
less they are negligent. 
"Of all of the armaments of medi-
cine, vaccines offer the greatest 
CntiaJ benefit to tha greatest nunv 
of persona/' tha A.MA, report 
aaid. 
As examples, tha report estimated 
that one in every 312,500 doses of 
whooping cough vaccine, and one hi 
every one million doses of measles 
vaccine would cause brain damage, 
and that one In every 3.2 million doses 
of polio vaccine would cause paraly-
sis, mostly in tmvacdnated adults 
who came into contact with vacci-
nated children. 
The Institute of Medicine of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences Is con-
ducting a study of the fsctors that are 
driving companies out of vaccine pro-
duction and interfering with the 
development of new vaccines. Roy 
Widdus, the itaff officer for the study, 
aaid it was motivated in large pari by 
indications that "the industry which 
was responsible for producing vac-
cines wis not healthy'1 and that "peo-
ple were dropping out" at the very 
time that advances in biotechnology 
ahowed "an enormous potential for 
developing new vaccines." 
Thus far the shrinking vaccine 
capability has caused no major sup-
ply problems. "We don't yet have a 
• crisis, but it may be that a crisis is 
waiting to happen," aaid Kenneth 
Bart, a vaccine authority at the Cen-
ts** for Disease Control in Atlanta, a 
Federal agency that purchases vac-
cines for many of the state childhood 
immunization programs. 
The chief worry is that in cases 
where there is only a single manuf ac-
turer of a vaccine, the supply could be 
disrupted by an unexpected manufac-
turing problem, a bad batch of vac-
cine, a strike by employees or a deci-
sion by the Last manufacturer to 
abandon the market. 
Another concern is that prices will 
rise as the number of competing com- -
panies dwindles and liability costs 
continue upward. The price of the 
combined diphtheria, whooping 
cough and tetanus vaccine has soared 
from an average of 11 cents a dose 18 
months ago to an average of 98 cents 
a dose • 
The final worry Is that reaearcn 
aimed at designing new vaccines will 
. diminish as the number of companies 
producing vaccines grows smaller. 
The Federal Government is trying 
to head off supply problems by build-
ing a stockpile, paid for by the Gov-
ernment and stored at the manuiac-
Turing sites. 
Meanwhile, Senator Paula Haw-
kins, Republican of Florida, and Rep-
resentative Henry A. Waxman, 
Democrat of California, have intro-
duced legislation that would establish 
a Federal mechanism for compensat-
ing victiins mjured by vaccines. ' 
Bridge: High Winds in Vermont Get Players Away From Table 
RyALANTRUSCOTT 
High winds are a nuisance to str-
iates, golfers and tennis players, but 
they rarely affect bridge games. 
They did so Sunday, however, at a re-
gional tournament in Jaffarsonville, 
A tree was blown down and severed 
a power line. The tennis bubble where 
tha Swiss Teams was being played 
was deprived of its primary electrical 
source and began to away. Rather 
than rely on tha backup system, tha 
management arranged to evacuate 
the area in tha middle of a match. . 
Tha evacuation was wall executed 
and entirely orderly, but there was 
considerable confusion about the 
tournament, and some players went 
A Problem far Officials 
Whan play resumed three hours 
later In crowded substitute playing 
apace, 88 teams had been reduced to 
68, and some teams were composed of 
fragments of original fleams. This set 
a rare problem for officials who have 
to determine the standings and allo-
cate master points. 
Tne Swiss play was atill In the bub-
ble when the disgramed deal oc-
curred at one table. North's negative 
double, suggesting some values out-
side hearts, was aggressive. 
It encouraged South to persevere In 
diamonds at the five-level, and East-
West went astray. West needed soma 
diamond strength, rather than a 
wealth of high cards, for a penalty 
double, and East ahould have retreat-
ed. 
Wast tod a top heart and shifted to 
apades. South ruffed tha second spade 
lead, ruffed his remaining heart In 
dummy, and drew trumps, The 
highly favorable club position al-
lowed him to take all tha remaining 
tricks for a score of 650. 
East and West were naturally un-
happy, and South tactfully refrained 
from adding to their gloom by point-
ing out that six hearts was unbeatable 
with North on lead. Indeed, ail IS 
tricks can be made If North fails to 
lead tha club ace. 
South was happily calculating that 
his team could win 18 International 
match points on the deal, and prob-
ably win a bundit of victory points In 
the match. But at that point his small 
WES I 
S K Q 
V A K Q 8 2 
0 10*84 
• K10 
NORTH 
4 J 7 6 4 
9 4 
0 7 8 2 
+ A 7 0 8 3 
EAST 
4 A 10 8 8 8 2 
9 J 10 8 8 8 
0 -
488 
SOUTH (D) 
4 8 
9 7 8 
v A K Q J O O 
4 Q J B 4 
East and Wast wan vulnerable. 
The bidding: 
Sooth Wast North East 
I v 19 DM. 4 9 
8 0 DM. Pass Pass 
Pass 
Wast lad tha heart king. 
bubbl* burst although tha large one 
remained Intact. 
The evacuation was announced, au-
tomatically voiding play In tha cur-
rant match. The opponents hurried 
away, eager to escape from two Im-
pending misfortunes, while South 
stood for a moment, looking mourn-
fully at the table. 
Chess: Karpov Captures First Place In Oslo Centenary Tburney 
By ROBERT BYRNE 
The Oslo Centenary Tournament in 
Norway, celebrating the founding of 
the city's chess federation in Febru-
ary 1884, was won by Anatoly Karpov 
of the $oviet Union. The world chain-
plod scored 6-3 to surpass by a half-
point his nearest rivals, the grand-
leiw Tony Miles of Britain and 
Ichev of the Soviet 
Injthe sixth round, Karpov and 
Miles reargued the aame Caro-Kann 
Defense variation they had struggled 
with In the BBC Tournament in Bath 
last year. Then Miles won. lids time 
Karpov got his revenge. 
In Bath, Karpov had played 8 
P-ON4?!, which loosened his position 
and thus gave Miles tha impetus for a 
sharp counterattack with 8 . . . P-
K4! Now he offered a positional gam-
bit with 8 B-Q31? 
Miles accepted the challenge with 
10 . . . QxNP but soon changed his 
mind and arranged to give back tha 
pawn to catch up in development with 
12 . . . N-NS and 13 . . . B-R3. How. 
^ * ^
; 
aver, In the even material position 
that arose after 18 RxP, Black's dou-
bled KBP'e would prove to be a posi-
tional liability. 
After 20 R-Q7, Miles could have 
played 20 . . . RxP; 21 OxR, OxR; 22 
QiP, but It Would not nave bean a 
panacea since White would still have 
been able to operate with the threat of 
P-Q5, which, would have a powerful 
disruptive effect on tha black posi-
tion. 
Just as Miles set his sights on a 
pawn with 22 . . . Q-NO (maybe tha 
defensive 22 . . . R-R2 was better), 
Karpov sacrificed another one with 23 
P-QM? Now, 23.. .BPXP; 24 
RjtKPI, QzP (34. . .P*R?; 23 
QsPmate); 25QaQ, RiQ; 26 R/6-K7, 
R-Q6; 27 N-R4 would give White win-
ning chances for the sacrificed pawn. 
Miles's alternative, 23 . . . KPiP; 
24 Q-B3, QxP also did not shake off the 
Sressure after 25 R/1-K7, threatening I N-K5I. 
Miles had indeed Insured his king 
by getting the queens off at move27, 
but In the mutual time-scramble that 
ensued, he tost one pawn after an-
other. 
Karpov'i 34 N-N3 gave the English-
man no time for 34 . . . R-QB?? in 
view of 35 R-Qech, B-Bl; 88 N-K6, 
winning a piece. » 
Since Karpov'i 38 N-B3 forced tha 
- ' • ' • _ - • ' • • , ' ; : \ ' & ' V \ . ' • _ . . ' - • • . ' • ; • ; > -
KARPOV/WHfTt S/M/S4 
Poeitloo after 22 . . . Q-N« 
win of Black's last pawn (38 . . . R-
K5?; 38 R-Q&eh, K-R2; 40 N-NOch 
picks up a rook), Miles gave up, 
CAR04LANN DEFENSE . 
12 KR-K1 
1) 8-87 
14 BIN 
II aaP 
II R/1.N1 
17 RiNP 
II P-Kl 
It K-N2 
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•MAKER OF VACCINE 
QUITS THE MARKET 
Immunity Shots for Whooping 
Couch Will Now Be Sold by 
Only One U.S. Company 
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG I 
WASHINGTON, Dec. 11 — Con-
naught Laboratories Inc. has stopped 
selling whooping cough vaccine, a com-
pany official said today. Health experts 
•aicf the move would worsen shortages 
of the vaccine, which is used to protect 
* nearly every infant in the country 
against the potentially fatal disease. 
The company, one of two remaining 
- American manufacturers of the vac-1 
dne, said it was withdrawing rather 
than pay sharply higher rates for liabil-
ity insurance. Earlier this year, Wyeth 
Laboratories halted production of 
whooping cough vaccine, citing high 
litigation costs. 
Lawsuits against manufacturers of 
all vaccines have risen sharply in re-
cent years. Severe reactions are rare, 
- but whooping cough vaccine has been 
more vulnerable because it causes a 
relatively higher rate of side effects, 
including brain damage and death. 
Douglas B. Reynolds, a vice presi-
dent for marketing and sales with 
Squibb/Connaught Inc., the toint ven-
ture company that distributed the vac-
cine for the Canadian-based Con-
naught, said the concern's insurers de-
manded higher premiums and deduct-
ibles, 'it just wasn't economically fea-
sible to continue production," he said. 
Stopped Taking Orders Inly 1 
Mr. Reynolds said the company 
•topped taking new orders for the vac-
cine July 1 but was still producing 
small quantities of the vaccine to fill a 
handful of contracts expiring early 
next year. Connaught notified doctors 
and health officials in a letter last 
month that its efforts to solve its insur-
ance problems had failed. 
Doctors with the American Academy 
of Pediatrics said that spot ahortages 
had already developed in supplies of 
the vaccine. The academy has recom-
. mended that doctors ration their sup-
plies to assure that the youngest chil-
dren, who face the worst risk, receive 
immunization. 
Connaught's withdrawal means that 
each vaccine for childhood diseases, 
those used to prevent polio, measles, 
. mumps, rubella, diphtheria, tetanus 
and whooping cough, is now produced 
by a single manufacturer. The develop-
ment is likely to stimulate a drive by 
parents' groups and the drug coxnpa-
tiles to set up a Federally sponsored 
system of compensation for children 
harmed by vaccines. 
Such a program, financed by a Mr-
charge on each dose of vaccine, could 
reduce the number of lswsuits, propo-
nents aay. A similar bill was intro-
.-.', duced in the last session on Congress. 
Connaught had held about 25 percent 
of the market in April 1963 when it 
raised its price tenfold, to 142 a 15-shot 
vial. It lost much of its business as a re-
sult. 
The other remaining producer of 
pooping cough vaccine, Lederie 
Laboratories of Wayne, N. J., raised its 
price in July to $42. It Is now expanding 
r:: + : . to produce the nation's entire supply, 
:~ said Martha Homma, • company 
spokesman. 
Lederie is also the sole manufacturer 
V of the oral polio immunixation. 
L t v > Dr. Martin Smith, a vie* president of t a - . v Academy of Pediatrics, said that'do-
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mumps, rubella, diphtheria, tetanus 
and whooping cough, It now produced 
by a tingle manufacturer. The develop-
ment U likely to atimulate a drive by 
parenu' groups and the drug compa-
nies to set up a Federally sponsored 
system of compensation for children 
harmed by vaccines. 
Such a program, financed by a sur-
charge on each dose of vaccine, could 
reduce the number of lawsuits, propo-
nent* say. A similar bill was intro-
duced in the last session on Congress. 
Connaught had held about 25 percent 
of the market in April 1983 when it 
raised its price tenfold, to $42 a lfrehot 
vial. It lost much of its business as a re-
sult. 
The other remaining producer of 
wHpoping cough vaccine, Lederle 
Laboratories of Wayne, N.J., raised its 
price in July to $42. It is now expanding 
to produce the nation's entire supply, 
said Martha Homma, a company 
spokesman. 
Lederle is also the sole manufacturer 
of the oral polio immunization. 
Dr. Martin Smith, a vice president of 
Academy of Pediatrics, said that de-
pendence on single companies would 
likely mean a continued rise In the 
price of all vaccines. 
Dr. Smith said reliance on a single 
manufacturer risked even greater 
abortages because "it gives us no cush-
ion of safety whatever" in case the 
plant has to shut for any reason or 
batches of vaccine are rejected by Fed-
eral regulators. 
Many of the lawsuits involving vac-
cine injuries have focused on whooping 
cough vaccine, which is made from the 
bacteria that causes the disease, also 
known as pertussis. It is estimated that 
SO to 100 children a year suffer severe 
reactions, although parent groups con-
tend this figure is understated. 
Medical expert* say that it is possi-
ble for a vaccine to cause a reaction in 
an otherwise healthy child, even if it is 
made according to Federal standards 
and properly administered by the doc-
tor. 
New Rules Accelerate 
Review of New Drugs 
WASHINGTON, Dec 11 (UPI) — 
Margtret M. Heckler, Secretary of 
Health end Human Services, an-
nounced new regulations today de-
signed to accelerate the review of new 
drugs and bolster safety monitoring of 
existing medications. 
Mrs. Heckler said the new regula-
tions would cut as much as six months 
from the time needed to get a new drug 
on the market, a process which now 
takes an average of two vears or more. 
The new rules will allow drugs to be 
approved based on foreign clinical 
studies as long as those findings can be 
substantiated; reduce paperwork up to 
70 percent; and allow simultaneous re-
views by various offices of the Food 
and Drug Administration, she said. 
Mrs. Heckler said the regulations 
would also strengthen requirements^) 
for reporting by manufscturers and 
distributors of adverse reactions to 
medications. Mrs. Heckler's agency 
oversees the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration.-
Dr. Sidney Wolfe, head of the Health 
Research Group, a group founded by 
Ralph Nader, said regulations to accel-
erate reviews of new drugs could back-
fire, by reducing the "guallty of some 
reviews" and slowing the drug review 
process in certain circumstances. 
The regulstions will be published in 
~the Federal Register this week. Most 
provisions become effective in three 
months, with a transition period of OjrT 
to a year for certain requirements, 
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r r r •y STEPHEN ENGEISERG •_ 
. Social to TW Nr» Yaift TUMi 
WASHINGTON. Dec 19 — A major' 
drug company offered today to provide 
•_ enough whooping cough vaccine to 
avert a shortage projected for early 
* next year, but only if the Government 
assumed liability for lawsuits. 
.'*" "'. Until this year, the company, Con-
"" naught Laboratories of Swifrwater, 
Pa., supplied about 25.percent of the 
nation's whooping cough vaccine. The 
company said earlier this month that 
since July 1 it had been filling fJhry ex-
isting contracts because of difficulties 
to obtaining liability insurance at area-
~ sonable price.—. :— 
But David J„ Williams, vice presi-
dent and genera] manager of Coo-
naught, told a bearing of the Bouse 
Subcommittee on Health and the Envi-
ronment today that his company had 
continued production and could deliver 
three million doses within 60 days If 
Congress was willing to indemnify it 
against suits brought by parents of chilJ 
dren who suffer adverse reactions. 
The chairman of the subcommittee. 
Representative Henry A. Waxman, 
Democrat of California, said It was un-
likely that Congress would approve 
such protection. In the Carter Adminis-
tration, he said, the Government as-
sumed liability for the production of 
swine flu vaccine and then faced more 
than $1 billion in claims. 
Mr. Williams said Consaught was 
still negotiating for its own insurance, 
but be added that it was unlikely to se-
cure new coverage soon. 
More Stockpiling Asked '- -
The Connaught offer underscored 
what Federal officials said at the bear-
ing was the ma)or reason for the short-
age of whooping cough vaccine: the in-
creasing number of lawsuits against 
manufacturers. 
At the same time, the head of the 
Federal Centers for Disease Control, 
James O. Mason, called for increased 
stockpiling of vaccine, particulariy for 
whooping cough* 
Dr. Mason testified that there were 
no stocks of whooping cough vaccine o& 
hand and only a three-month supply of 
the other ma)or taoculations ww avall-
- Dr. Alan Hinman of the disease cen-
ters toid the committee it would cost 
about S25 million to buy a six-month 
supply of whooping cough vaccine at to-
day's prices. He added that the 19© ap-
propriation to stockpile vaccine for all 
major childhood diseases was 14 mil-
lion. 
Specialists in pediatric medicine ac-
knowledge that no vaccine is com-
pletely safe or completely effective. In 
the case of whooping cough, an esti-
mated 40 to 50 of the 3.6 million chil-
dren annually who receive inoculations 
suffer brain damage. 
T-*The American Medical Association J 
and the manufacturers have called on 
Congress to set up a federally spon-
sored compensation system that would 
provide payments but keep the cases 
out of the courts. This proposal has 
been opposed by parents' groups. 
As a result of the shortage, the dis-
ease centers recommended last week 
that physicians postpone booster shots 
for infants. Federal officials said tins 
would cause no immediate health prob-
lems, buf other experts said increased 
incidence of whooping cough could re-
sult if the shots were puupuocd for a 
full year. 
Dr. Hirrman said that if production 
schedules were met, the cxjuntry would 
nave adequate suppbes of the vaccine 
by March or AprlL He said IS million 
doaea aryeaT wer 
from December to 
was likely to ouUt 
'JOOJOOO d o s e s . 
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A sale so exciting, Altmaris 
Fifth Avenue is onen tonight 
till 9, Come wrap up your 
shopping and remember, 
youll be saving an 
additional 25% on many 
already reduced items. 
MODERATECOATS 
JAttETSOHemd 
ALL RAINWEAR. 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETED PRICES. 
ALL DOWN QVILT COATS. 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETED PRICES. 
~ALl DOWN-FILLED NYLON COATS. 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETED PRICES 
ALL WOOL COATS. 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETED PRICES 
ALL WOOL JACKETS. 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETED PRICES 
ALL FAKE FUR JACKETS. 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETED PRICES 
ALL FAKE FUR-LINED 
STORMCOATS. 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETED PRICES. 
ALL PETITE WOOL COATS. ___ 
TAKE 25% OFF TtCKL 1 tD PRICES' 
BOOT BUYsmmmzM 
ALL B€>OTS INCLUDING 
BETTER AND 
DESIGNER^ 
FASHIONS O: 
ALL WINTER COATS AM 
INCLUDING FUR TRIMM 
LINED. ZIP-OUT RAINCC 
STORMCOATS. PERRY E 
ALBERT NIPON, HARVE 
J.C HOOK. SYCAMORE. 
MISS (GALLERY. IOND09 
BONNIE CASH IN DESIGN 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKET* 
ALL STUDIO III 
DESIGNER SPORTSWEA 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETE 
SELECTED CONTEMPOR 
DRESSES FROM 
YOUNG DESIGNERS. 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETE 
JSELECTEDMEAOOWRRi 
AMERICANA DRESSES. 
TAKE 25% OFF TICKETE 
ALL AMERICANA SHOP 
EVENING FASHIONS. 
TAKE 25% OFF T"- — 
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i Executed in Texas 
lodels-
netrou-
offidal 
•aid* 
*e. 
sted of 
too that 
aum for 
t having 
the dose 
wad; navulon, a muscle relaxant, and 
p^flifitfTi chloride, used for the pur* 
pose of halting the heartbeat. 
Tut problem in the execution, how-
ever, wu DOC In the choice of drugs, but 
the mechanic*! problem of finding a 
btoodvessd free of scars or other dam-
age into which to pass the deadly solu-
tion. Mr. Marin's long-term use of 
drugs had caused extensive damage to 
blood vessels. 
As the lethal injection flowed into bis 
veins, Mr. Morin took a deep breath 
and then uttered his final words, "Lord 
Jesus, 1 commit my soul to you." 
The State Attorney General, Jim 
Mattox, taid Mr. Morin "died very 
calmly." 
T prison spokesman, Charlie 
aid, "1 don't know if It was the 
Another
Brown, s l 
longest, but it was the toughest." In 
five previous executions by injection, 
the longest It took to insert a needle was 
10 minutes. - . 
Mr. brown said the difficulty In in-
serting the needles would probably 
prompt the Texas Department of Cor-
rections to review its procedures for 
administering the drugs when the con-
demned person has a history of drug 
Twenty capital punishment oppo-
hetd a vigil outside the death 
chamber and 30 others held a candle-
light vigil on the steps of the State Cap*. 
Mr. Morin admitted shooting Carrie 
Marie Scott, 21, outside a San Antonio 
restaurant on Dec. 11, 1961. 
The conviction was upheld by the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Mr. 
Morin never had a stay of execution 
and bis case was never reviewed by a 
Federal court. 
Ct» erase Bart 
Gov. Mark White, in a brief state-
ment iuat aher 9 P.M. Tuesday, said he 
would nut interfere in the case. District 
Judge David Berctieimann of San Anto-
nio refused earlier Tuesday to block the 
execution. 
Mr. Morin also faced death sentences 
for killing Janna Bruce. 21, ofjCorpus 
Christl, and Sheila Whalen, 23, whose 
body was found in the Denver area. 
Those two slayings and Miss Scott's oc-
curred within a five-week period In 
1861. He also was accused of killing two 
women whose bodies were found in a 
Utah desert after Jfteir abductions 
from Las Vegas, Nev. 
Mr. Morin was the second Texas in-
mate executed this year, the sixth since 
the stale resumed capital punishment 
in 1M2 and the «xh in the United States 
since the Supreme Court allowed ea-
rn resume in 1976. 
Beodectin Production Ends 
CINCINNATI. March IS (UPI) — 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 
which won a major liability suit involv-
ing the antinausea drug beodectin, 
said today that It bad abandoned pro-
duction or the product, which It halted 
temporarily In 1863. A Federal fury 
ruled Tuesday that Beodectin, taken by 
mors than 23 million pregnant women, 
was not responsible for birth detects. 
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Under square Mils on the fore and main masts and 
tier triangular sails on the mtuen and counter mluen 
ts, the crew and passengers ate biscuits, fatback and 
is seasoned heavily with garlic. They cooked in large cop-
kettles over fires kindled with vine shoots and fed with 
• wood Stowed below deck were tons of wheat, casks of 
• and olive oil, cheese, vinegar, salt pork and sardines. 
While other recent findings are reviving debate over 
re Columbus — Admiral Don ChristOval de Colon — first 
ed in the New World on Oct. 12, 1492, the discovery and 
ysis of shipping documents in the Archive of the Indies In 
tie are expected to contribute more to the understanding 
ase early voyages of exploration. How the ships were re-
ed and outfitted, how they were rigged, what cargoes they 
ed and how various contractual arrangements shaped 
y commerce with the New World are among the many fas-
ting details the documents contain. 
Of more immediate importance, the knowledge of Nina's 
ensions and rigging is expected to Influence the many rep-
> of Columbus's ships thai are being planned for the quln-
ennial celebration of the 1492 voyage to the New World, 
il now, as the historian Samuel Eliot Morison once wrote no 
realty knew what the Nina, Pint a and Santa Maria really 
ed like and every picture of them "Is about 50 percent 
yM 
Ihe most striking Insights, says Dr. Lyon, who is an ad-
4 professor of history at the University of Florida, relate to 
Continued on Poge C3 
mncks arc mircu in conirovcr*y. 
The main object of study so far has been Continued on Pogi* CS 
Source: Corners tor Otf ease Control 
Peaks represent dioxlns (D) and furans, a elass of related chemicals (F). Num-
bers Identify each chemical according to position of chlorine atoms on molecules. _ 
f 
Loss of Drug Relegates Many to Blindness Again 
By PHILIP M. BOFFEY 
ASHINGTON, Oct. 13 -
Thousands of patients 
with rare neuromuscular 
disorders are suffering 
renewed contortions of the eyes, face, 
neck and other parts of the body be-
cause their supply of experimental 
medicine was cut off when its only 
manufacturer was unable to obtain li-
ability insurance. 
Many who had been faring well are 
now reverting to functional blindness, 
unable to read, work, drive or venture 
outdoors. Others can no longer 
speak; some suffer debilitating mus-
cle spasms that contort their faces or 
necks. 
r
 Desperate patients are traveling to 
* Canada or England to obtain the ex-
- perimcnt'al drug, made of botulinum -
^-4oxtnT-l4~4s-the-only-med»cthe-that-
gfves'them satisfactory leliefrArfew 
are already resorting to risky, disfig-
uring surgery as the only alternative 
to the missing medicine. 
At the urging of doctors and patient 
advocacy groups, roughly 2,000 of the 
patients have written heart-rending 
appeals to the Food and Drug Admin-
istration and, to Congress. 
Their problem stems from the fact 
that there is only one small manufac-
turer and distributor of the medicine 
in the United States: Dr. Alan B. 
Scott, an ophthalmologist who is as-
sociate director of the Smith-Kettle-
well Eye Research Foundation in San 
Francisco. In January, Dr. Scott in-
,,r*r«tti> AiUinf aaiinray 
Injection of botulism toxin Impairs transmission of impulses from 
facial nerves to eye muscles. ' 
formed some 250 doctors who were 
administering the toxin in clinical 
trials involving more than 7,000 pa-
tients that he could no longer ship the 
drug "because of inability to obtain 
product liability insurance." 
The drug continues to be available 
In several foreign countries and in a^  
specialized research project at Dr. 
Scott's laboratory, which can accept 
only a restricted number of patients. 
The researchers testing the drug 
said they were unaware of other 
cases in which patients were suffer-
ing because a drug had been with-
drawn from use as a result of insur-
ance problems. 
Over the last six to nine months, as 
supplies of the drug were gradually 
used up in this country and as the ef-
fects of the last doses wore off in indi-
vidual patients, the level of despera-
tion has been rising .>_—~-— 
—"We're in~~a"majdP^lnff'in the 
United States right now," said Dr.. 
Continued on Poge C10 
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Loss of Drug Relegates Many to Blindness Again 
Continued From Page CI 
Itai^i^Burodlc', a" ncurc^ophthmalo-" 
gist at the Harvard Medical School, 
who was using the drug to treat 
•cores of patients suffering from in-
voluntary muscle spasms in the eye-
lids and face. "All my patients are 
getting worse and worse." 
"Tlte patients are Just desperate," 
said Mottle Lou Kocter, president of 
an organization that helps victims of 
blepharospasm, a disorder in which 
the eyelids clamp shut involuntarily 
for periods lasting from a few sec-
onds to several minutes. 
—The drug, distributed under the 
name Ocuiinum, is mode from botull-
hum A toxin, the same deadly sub=~ 
stance that poisons improperly 
canned food. Dr. Scott was a pioneer 
in developing a therapeutic form of 
the toxin and supervising its testing 
in human clinical trials. 
The drug is produced in twovtages. 
First, Dr. Edward Scharitt, of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, cultivates bac-
teria In the laboratory and extracts 
the toxin produced by the bacteria. 
He sends the purified toxin on to Dr. 
Scott, who uses it to make the drug,, 
which contains only a very tiny 
amount of the toxin, 
blinder Dr. Scott's supervision, the 
-drug has been used to treatmore than-
2,300 victims of blepharospasm and 
more than 3,300 victims of strabis-
mus, or crossed eyes, it has also been 
used to treat hundreds of other pa-
tients suffering from muscle spasms 
in the neck, which cause the head to 
twist and pull sideways; in the vocal 
.cords, which hinders or prevents 
speech, or in the face, Jaw, fingers or 
limbs. -
•Safe* and 41 elpfur 
- The greatest success has come in 
treating blepharospasm. The drug is 
typically injected into the lid and 
brow, where it paralyzes muscles 
that cause the eyelids to close. The ef-
fect generally lasts a few months, 
after which a new injection is re-
quired. In a paper published last 
year, Dr. Scott described the treat-
ment as "safe, simple, repeatable, 
and symptomatically. helpful." Nei-
ther the toxin nor any other current 
treatment Is directed at the cause of 
blepharospasm, which Is unknown. 
Although some eye surgeons say 
surgery is the most effective treat-
ment for blepharospasm, doctors 
using the toxin believe the drug is far 
superior for most patients. Dr. 
Borodic said 90 to 95 percent of the 
130 patients he and colleagues had 
treated were helped by the drug. 
Dr. Jack Wise, assistant professor 
of ophthalmology at McGill Univer-
sity in Montreal, said he and his col-
leagues had treated more than 100 
blepharospasm patients and roughly 
150 strabismus patients with the toxin . 
over the last two years. ''Conven-
tional drugs don't work," he said, 
"and while surgery works, It's muti-
lating The surgeons remove muscles 
from your fucc or cut nerves. Com-
pare that to an injection that takes 30 
' seconds and lasts three or four 
months." 
' The chief aide effects of treatment 
with the toxin are a drooping of the 
eyelids, an overflowing of tears and 
double vision, hut all the side dfrctw 
art transient and minor, Dr. Scott 
aald. In some blepharospasm pa-
tients, the drug also interferes a bit 
with normal blinking of the eves, forc-
ing the patient to use eye drops. 
The disruption of supplies of the 
toxin has been devastating. 
•Back to the Same Condition' 
_ "Al lmy patients have gotten 
worse, ana some huve major prob-
lems," said Dr. Joseph Jankovlc, as-
sociate professor of medicine at the 
Baylor College of Medicine in Hous-
ton, who is chairman of the medical 
advisory board of the organization 
• for blepharospasm patients, the Be-
nign Essential Blepharospasm Re-
search Foundation. He has treated 28 
patients for muscle spasms of the 
eyelids, neck and vocal cords. 
"All were very disabled before 
treatment and now all are back in the 
same condition," he said. '-Many are 
unable to chew or swallow and two 
cannot talk." 
— Mary Sousa, a blepharospasm p a -
tient from Somervllle, Mass., is bewil-
dered by the problem. "There's fight-
ing about the Insurance and other 
things 1 don't understand," said Mrs. 
Sousa,' who is 76 years old. She said 
she used to get five injections of the 
toxin around each eye every few 
months, which would allow her to 
"open my eyes" .and "do anything." 
The only side effect, she said, was 
that her eyes were black and blue 
after the injections. 
But now, because her last injec-
tions In February have long since 
worn off, "I cannot read anything," 
she said. "I cannot concentrate on 
anything. I can't see because my eyes 
close every second." On bad days, 
Mrs. Sousa said, she can no longer 
sew, cook or do housework. "I get 
mad cooking because it's so hard," 
she said. "My eyelids are closing 
down every second. 1 shake my head 
to try to get them open." 
Some desperate patients are flying 
to London or Canada to get the drug. 
Dr. Wise said he and a colleague had 
treated about 20 Americans In Cana-
da. But Dr. Wise said he did not have 
enough toxin to'treat hundreds or 
even thousands of Americans who 
need the medicine, and he added that 
Dr. Scott had asked the Canadian doc-
tors not to treat vast numbers of 
Americans, largely because of the II-. 
ability problems. 
"If it's just a few desperate people, 
that's O.K.," he said. "But not by the 
busloads. We have no trouble getting 
the toxin from Scott as long as we do 
it within reason." 
Dr. Scott said his foundation de-
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elded to keep sending the toxin to for-
eign doctors on the assumption that 
there was less risk of a large damage 
suit abroad. Hut he laid he was dis-
couraging foreign doctors from treat-
ing large numtwrs of Americans, 
partly because that might increase-
the liability risk and parti* because_ 
the foreign doctors' would have diffi-
culty following the progress of Amer-
ican pat tents for research purposes. 
Dr. Scott said there had been no 
suits or damage claims Involving the 
drug. 
•We Stumbled Along* 
. Many patients and doctors say they 
arc unsure whether the insurance In-
dusjry is at fault or whether Dr. Scott 
has somehow failed to solve business 
As supplies of the 
drug in this country 
were used up in 
recent months, the 
level of desperation 
rose. 
problems efficiently or whether the 
F.D.A. has somehow failed to act ex-
peditiously on Dr. Scott's request for 
a drug license. All know is that they 
are unable to get the medication, and 
no solution appears yet in sight. 
Dr. Scott said in a telephone inter-
view that his insurance problems 
began when his research project, 
which is supported by a grant from 
the National Institutes of Health, 
moved from the jurisdiction of one 
small research institution, the Medi-
cal Research Institute of San Fran-
cisco, to another, the Smith-Kettle* 
well Eye Research Foundation, as 
part of a larger reorganization. In the 
process, he said, the insurance that 
previously covered the project was 
no longer applicable, ana he was un-
able to find another insurance carri-
er. 
"We stumbled along for a month or 
two," Dr. Scott said, but then Smith-
Kettlewell ordered him to stop send-
ing out thousands of vials of toxin be-
cause the foundation was unwilling to 
lake the liability risk and feared that 
continuation of the project would 
cause its other insurance coverage to 
be canceled as well. Shipments-to 
other countries were allowed because 
large damage claims were deemed 
less likely abroad. 
•Bad Name' From Bftuiism Usk 
'Dr. Scott>£f forts to find insurance 
have thtntfar been fruitless. He has 
set up a small company, Ocuiinum, 
Inc., to make and distribute the drug 
in what he describes as a "small-
time" operation. "We've tried a large 
number of insurance brokers and lots 
of different avenues to Insurance 
companies directly, but nobody is 
willing to write a policy on it," he 
•*id. 
One company offered to provide a 
maximum of $300,000 in coverage, far 
too little to pay off a targe damage 
claim, for a relatively high premium 
of $75,000 a year. "That's not much 
help for a small company/1-Dr, Scott 
s a i d . . - . - . . . . •-. ;•• 
He noted that the drug, which would 
have a "relatively small market," 
had "a relatively bad name and ap-
parent high riskM*tnvihe minds of 
tome people because of its associa-
tion with botulism. 
Carole Kimball, an account execu-
tive with Alexander and Alexander, a-
large Insurance brokerage In San' 
Francisco that has tried to rind cover-
age for Dr. Scott, said his plight was 
J'Bh example of the liability crisis" in 
which both insurance companies and 
those needing Insurance are "looking 
very very curefully" at ways to re-
duce their exposure to potent la tly 
high claims. 7~~ 
Dr. Scott aald he was continuing to 
aeek insurance coverage and had also 
asked the F.D.A. to allow him to 
charge tor the drug so that he could 
pay for insurance premiums. Ordi-
narily, the F.D.A. does not allow pa* 
tients to be charged for experimental^ 
drugs whose value has not been 
firmly proved, but some exceptions 
have been made. 
Dr. Scott's prime goal Is to get the 
drug licensed for regular therapeutic 
use, a step he said he felt would im-
prove his chances of obtaining insur-
ance. The drug has been in an Investi-
gational status for roughly a decade, 
but Dr. Scott applied for full licensure 
in April 1985; the F D A is reviewing 
his data and Is expected to Issue a li-
cense when the review is complete. 
"This has been the most frustrating 
thing I ever wonted on," said Abbey 
Meyers, executive director of the Na-
-ttonal Organization tor~Rare-Dtsoiy-
ders, a Connecticut-based group. "We 
want the drug to get to patients," the 
said. "We don't want to see patients 
suffering like this." 
•A Difficult Subject*, 
Ms. Meyers, said she believed that 
the F.D.A. was "proceeding wisely 
and as quickly as possible." The 
agency "finds it a difficult subject 
and just wtli not be pressured politi-
cally," she said. "Their safety con-
cerns are very Valid. It is, after all, a 
toxin that people die from." 
F.D.A. officials declined to com-
ment on the case because of secrecy 
laws surrounding the handling of 
drugs under investigation. In a form 
letter to patients, the agency said: 
"Although we sympathize with those, 
individuals whose therapy has been 
interrupted by this occurrence, the 
Food and Drug Administration does 
not have the authority to regulate the 
availability of insurance lo cover the 
use of investigational drugs. We re-
main willing to work with Dr. Scott 
regarding the problem of interrupted 
distribution." Ihe agency also said no 
license could be issued until Dr. Scott 
provided proof, as all manufacturers 
must, that he would be able to make, 
repeatedly and reliably, a safe and ef-
fective product. 
Meanwhile, the Medical Research 
Institute, where Dr. Scott's project 
was originally based, lost Its own li-
ability coverage. Mary Woolley, the 
executive director, said the institute , 
had been covered for 11 years by the 
same company and had never sub-
mitted a claim or failed to pay a pre-. 
mium, only to be abruptly dropped on 
Aug. I. Tne institute has talked to 
some 30 insurance underwriters and 
. appealed for help to the California In-
surance administrator, she said, but 
the only company that responded set 
the premium so high that "it was a 
we-don't-want-your-business quote." 
The Institute's board ultimately de-
cided to keep all research projects 
going even without insurance. 
, "I'm very disturbed about this 
problem because of its implications 
for research," Ms. Woolley said. 
< "Some wonderful, really qualified 
people like Alan Scott are going to 
;giveup.".. .Nv <&-^&••>&;* *. 
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THE WALL ITIUtrr KPJtNAL, sfOHTMY. AffUL 1L lv*0 
anagers 
Journal 
hnhoHci 
fh» p*»ff f*v»rtl y*ari, Students Of 
*v» r»~n bemoaning the declining 
[Mty of th* American worker and 
r~*x\r\f *mphasto on fsmiry and W-
T U I U . 
w»Jt a minute. Even today. there 
opt* out there-worxaholics-who 
line to do ffitie Hat In their lives but 
kahohes. H't t word that's handled 
re*ii*Jly-!t was first sawd In IfTl 
t Inn* ?*{• ttnn in this very new* 
i«J In » book by a profeaaoi and 
or But exactly who ait wortahoi-
what makes thern Bet? 
wing aom* fight to Marttys htach-
a raff peyejrtoglst for Nfw Ywt 
furu^e Co , who has Just written 
5uW be the Ant formaJ tttidy of th# 
t: "WofUnoflea: Uvtng with Them, 
t with Thern." Uddaton-Watffy, tt* 
cloth Sit Jl* paper MJSJ 
Tuidn't have come at a mora spoor* 
me. Paradoxically, schntarx suspect 
# number of wortahoties to on the 
C. As society changes and people be» 
kta tort of the* roiexjnjt^uere/ 
>re turn to their wort for FPfuge, ejK 
Jay Rohrtlch. a New Yort-btW 
atrtit who treats wortahollcs. Addle-
work "to the new narcanBem," at 
'You're creating products that aw 
Her* to a lot of T to wort." 
Ph 
it# n{ the I^ vtrrvwi tnstnute, a Bel-
Mass., consulting firm that worts 
. caJ effort la this 
from the beginning. 
Me*Ikroe*oo«nic 
By U s ! 
"he author i$ a member « / the 
m a l l Beaton tmrtau. 
>iT*nixettone. adds that aa parents 
[ more of efeUdren. "each gins ration 
do- morv. be more, become more** is 
to fWI satisfied. 
I all peopte who wort hard art 
iwotfru »^Prom bar hrterviewn with 
iss people. Ktoa MachJowtta IdeuCr 
ilrw characteristics of wortahoties. 
nake up perhaps no more than i% of 
ipuJatioo. She says, tor example, that 
Lhoitcs tend to mix wort and leisure, 
far lev 
nothtnf. 
definition, they coiistanfJy wort long 
. far pii.it normal business noun, 
work weekends. And they brtnf wort 
on •vacationa,* X they bother la 
them at all. A former Nader's Ratter 
worts 13 houro a day. seven days a 
. A pregnant publicist feettng labor 
; rushes back to work from her obste-
is'a offlct. altar beta* told that de0> 
• hours away. Aa attorney 
9rt tn a burning office 
C*tert fordWy e)ect MHL 
I i*orc w n^oihoTTrs ifjiiyly cant wuv 
3nf. Vita Machiowtti txpiiin* that 
are addicted to wort per at. rather 
to their specific Jobs, and that thotr 
etian to aa aaact a cjArartertoOc at 
Medical Costs and the Drug Industry 
By HASST lorwAsn 
»>^nt devHopmemi m this country 
auff*-it thai medicine and money are be* 
corninaj more toterTwineQ than eeer berore. 
The moat spectacular example to the rao> 
eaJ ehanft of eoursa by the American Can-
cer Society with regard tn the frequency of 
cancer detection examinations and the 
af*i at which they should be talen. The 
ACS to now recofTtmenoinf fewer anch 
teats to be taJten at wider mterrato hecanse 
1t jodra that the benefits Its termer policy 
achlered to terms of tires tared, especially 
the nres of yoonrer adults, did not justify 
the costs of afl those muttons of freqnent 
the Msatarhosetts Oeneral 
Hospftai has decided tfUnat fotnf Into the 
hexn trtnaptant bustneat. The reaaon: a 
heart transplant requires about etfht Qmea 
the financial and other resources needed 
for coii • entJonaJ sjpea heart avrpjery, owt 
the probabtttty of pafienta benefitinsj fror.i 
coronary bypasa operatjona and other such 
now routine open heart procedures to far 
greater than the probabtllry of a patient 
benefittflf from a heart transplant. 
nHnvmonetary conssoerttkina atsn aeem 
to ptay a suft role hi medartne, of eaajrta. 
When Aflnrd brwenatetn's sndlet-fiddled 
body reached a MsTthsttan hoapttaJ emer* 
fency room after hto ahootlnf some weeks' 
afo^Vtejfe ouffacai learn automatically * 
be fan a he rote hut ftnafry asiaraillif efJort 
\JQ sare has 1st. AppaienOy there was no 
^ _ T to caicuUie whether ttt 
ptrtfefy benefits of keeptnf htm afire Indefl* 
altery^beneftu ftfured perhaps In terms 
of the future Income taxes he might pay-
were worth the hours of determined sursjr 
can Cancer Society policy shaft that groat 
pi lasure ejojstj ID anu eooauensc trtssrla as 
determining medical actions. p*ur years 
now Americans hare been exhorted to real-
toe there to no Infinite store of as sources lo 
free erer^ody all the medacal care he or 
she might want We shall hart to decide 
we hare 
told, and eren some Confresarnen 
been heard crtticistof the federal program 
that pays tor attney dufysto and trana-
pUjrtj because tt heneflta all 
fardlees of age. 
anight expect thai the snout dost ffJocfieo 
harm of medacai Qarrawy now araUaoie 
woujo rocerew apeLm nrrDrrasrn. TSUH 
torrn, of course* to t 
Just the other day. for example, a our* 
feon reported aubtldy about the recent 
uharp decline hi stomach and related gae-
afgery. iwt ressviUj, K turns 
Is thai i sew drug. Tagamet tdrnett-
to so ttfecore agatoet uJeeri that 
many patients who would hare been apee* 
ated on to rarnore those uicen Is the past 
aw now abequatety taken can»af by;Tifr 
anet areurrtpOona. The sartng. of count, 
can he reckoned In lent* of pass and as* 
prsfunssoa aroaded aa wtfi as ofdofiars. 
saved ft hoepttal and aurgicaJ btfla. ^ _ 
A generation ago frequent polio epldem* 
tes allied thoussoads and paralyatdedan 
Qasunujida, anany of whom could nerer be 
ecTjwenicsny aadipiudaat and some of 
even though their respiratory systems had 
been pnralyxed. Todav thc\r^*t majority 
of AfnericanHratned tiStfto under 40 hare 
nerer aeen a polio case and Iron lungs 
hare been relegated to museums of medl*, 
cal tecJtnology. We enjoy the fruits of the 
fantastic effectiveness of the Satk and Sa-
bin polio racemes, but simply take them 
tor granted. 
So atmilarty do we now take for granted 
the human and monetary sanngs of effec-
tive antibiotics which hare routed most In-
fectious diseases, of the phenothlaxlnea 
which hare revolutionised the treatment of 
awychotics and permitted many of them to 
To introduce a new drug 
in the United States and 
meet all the Food and Drug 
Administration requirements 
now takes on the average 
about ten years and costs 
anywhere from $50 million 
to $60 million. . 
return to the world of wort or of L-dopa 
which has created a new era In the treat-
me* and Uvea of many rictams of Partia-
oon's utosaai. 
Yet one need not do much research to 
anscorer how adversarial government reta* 
Oons these days are with the pharmaceuti-
cal aadustry. and how tittle connection ex-
ists between the enormous cost effect! vs* 
noes of many drugs and the treatment the 
-Jenders In siiarTnarretrral rertnrrh 
awveiopment receive from Washington, 
The adversary relationships have many 
facets. Perhaps the moat Important to the 
tact that to Introduce anew drug to the 
United States and meet ait the Pood and 
t>uf Administration requirements now 
takes on the seerage about u»n years and 
•costs anywhere from ISO mUUon to 100 mil* 
Don. Conditions for developing and letting 
new drugs here are ao unpropftious that aa 
sacreaatng amount of pharmaceutic ai iu* 
aaarrh to being trassferred abroad. . 
Much of the aeubtom arises from the 
changes In the food and drug isws adopted 
to the early Itoss tn the wake of the than> 
*
o m
*
d t
 ^**T5l T h * t d^aaster focused t' 
amtion property on peobteme oT 
safety, hut the legal changes that reauhsd 
. tooassd on tightawiaf the requlrenaeats lor 
.aVug efficacy. 
At another Irrel the adreraary retatton* 
Slaps arise from the ajtxiety of government 
"^aawciwnae the coat of drugs while eacfud* 
tog conssderatton of the tonnes caused else-
where by thai "cheap to better" poficy. 
There can be ao doubt of govemmenfi 
burning seal to promote generic drugs st 
the coot of brand name drugs, and to Intro-
since price cetfings for generic drugs sjssd 
Si foferntrjent medxal programs. 
But apparently lew. If any, people to* 
eofeed la this seaious effort ever bother to 
ask tbemrfrat what the toog run Implicav 
ttons aft fur pharmaceutical tenoration. 
Why should drug eornnejues Isfreat huge 
sutna to drug tuuearch af government pol-
icy to so determined to fRutimtse the prof* 
aa from thf au«eatfaf ventum" wtjCe is>^ 
noring the ananas from the many uiauc-
ceasful ventures which -art tnerruble to 
such probing af the research frontierst 
Ptoairy. of course, there Is the whole la-
may be and are assessed against drug 
firms when, as to Inevitable even under the 
best of drcumsuncet, some people are In-
•jhred by* drug aide effects. Moreover, not 
all of these side effects can be predicted 
even after the intensive and substantia! 
testing thai takes place before a drug can 
be marketed. Additional»y, some American 
courts are showing a tendency to award 
damages eren when there to considerable 
doubt that a particular drug or a particular 
drug company to responsible for the dam-
age at Issue. 
Thus a Florida jury last March SI 
awarded S30.000 to a couple who claimed 
that their sons birth defects were caused 
by the morning-sickness drug Bendectln 
Dendectin was thus convicted even though 
It has been taken by SO million pregnant 
women, Including fire million In this coun 
try. without any previous serious evidence 
that tt to harmhil. 
The SmithJUtne Corporation recently re-
ported that there have been 34 deaths and 
SS3 cases of liver damage among thf 
hundreds of thousands of Americans whe 
have taken Seiacryn. an antl high Moot 
prisaurt drug that has been taken off the 
marttt. There to apparently no conftrmet 
proof f9i that Sefhcryn caused either the 
deaths or the liver damage, but SmlthKltne 
has already felt It prudent to announce that 
lawsuits may be filed against It, and that 
the punitive damages asked tor to thost 
suits may ant be covered by the corpora 
tloit's Insurance Yet Seiacryn has beet 
used widely In other countries without any 
evideree of (he organic damage now said 
to be urxurring hers* 
DCS 
. The case of dlethylsttlbeeterol fDSS) 
i the most fear among pharmaceu 
IflalHlfSCUlfefl Tt how Spptlrl OS! 
about one In a thousand daughters of moth 
ers who took DBS SB to » years ago ma> 
have developed vaginal cancer. Not sur 
nrlstngty damage suHs art being filed, sue 
Is some cases awards are being handet 
down, tn one case, s pharmaceutical com 
perry was ordered to pay a plaintiff ever 
though there was ao evidence that com 
puny had produced the DBS taxes by tt* 
pUiatifTs mother. It was enough for thr 
court that the company had produced DBS 
But af drug manufacturers can be suet 
Bfiytort > the results following safts 
tfon of their drugs M or M years ago 
shouldn't all drugs be lasted tor M to!* 
"Jrl yean or loader torruu^aure they are sah 
,*™t IstlMilongrunuweUaflnthe short run? 
By such reasoning tt would be assy It 
—-mahe a bureaucratic case for aamsryftfuj 
tag to tot any sew. drugs be marketed tr 
thto country until well tote the Slat Can 
turr. Yet there to no doubt that drugs are 
and srlD continue to he. the moat cost ettec tire therapy we hare available, 
many sick people seed better 
sad bettor drags tor their ailments, 
is It beyond the wit of the Americai 
;- people is aroducej better aet ef arrange 
Batnts lor ascouraging the sevetopvnast! 
ssd saafteting of needed druaw-parties 
torry.agtinet the most serious Utomm 
' such as cai*cer*whito reaching an asjrsee 
haiance between risk ssto benefit? ABE! 
ntaauhta • a sovernmenf as oanjosrSjad awotji 
the hagh costs of medical ease take another 
^ook at sto srrjeAces and erocosttepttooj 
About the pnaraaceuticaJ toduatry srhase 
y make 
Mr. Odmwu k s rrtmnker a/TNasied 
'J* mm 0* Drpmlmni tf Butfrrw & c*m-
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Mmm^^LiriGAnoN AND INSURANCE 
0*^':\ WHEN PRODUCTS TURN INTO LIABILITIES 
W^^:J:::. :'.•:•' MICHAEL BRODY 
¥!-:'• X.*:*" 
- ?: 
*
%
 •.?. Mr.Brodyisan § / for the more than two million American women who use intrauterine contraceptive device*, 
v ~ * associate editorof M ^ c d^Jon h ^ l 0 havc been a shocker. Taking a tack manufacturers in other industries inuy Fortune* From 
• "When Products increasingly be forced to follow, CD. Scarlc & Co. announced on January 31 that it would stop sell-
. . . .T*frnIP!° ing its Copper 7 and Tatum T intrauterine devices in the U.S., a decision that severely limits a mode 
'• Liabilities, by 
' -
r
 *>' Michael Brody, of birth control preferred by many women. The reason for Searle's move: product liability lawsuits. 
• v Fortune, March 3, Not that Searle's products were generally considered unsafe. Approved by the U.S. Food and 
\;r : A * P°*cs . jfryg Administration in 1974, the Copper 7 was more frequently prescribed by doctors than the 
1
 / \ ] Y . Tatum T, A plastic device shaped like the numeral and partly wrapped with copi>cr wire, the Cop 
.»-* - '
 ;
 per 7 had gained a reputation as "the safest of the IUDS on the market," according to Dr. Louise 
.">..-. Tyrer of Planned Parenthood, the nonprofit organization that counsels people on birth control. 
.'
 :-*"' v Searle had successfully defended the devices in eight lawsuits, three brought against the company 
?y^ ,/m >*'* by the same attorney. But the lawsuits kept coming, inspired partly by stories of women allegedly 
£ i ; V - *i". • -j ;; rendered sterile by the badly designed DaJkon Shield, an IUD produced by A.H. Robins Co. In two 
¥**&*!'#.r---v :i '* v cases in which Searle had argued that its products were not at fault, juries decided against the com-
?4'j*ty&i''^h%<*\$ •• V pany. Some 300 suits remain outstanding. At the end of 1985, Searle, recently acquired by Monsanto, 
^^\»^;^ ^.^:V/f \'] l ' discovered it could no longer get insurance to cover its potential liability on the products. 
W$$&isj>^-: C v ; W t h ' u U ^* ***** o f ^ c CoPP^ 7 a n d Tatum T amounting to only SI 1 million in 1985, and its 
g ^ ^ v V ^ ^ ^- i f ^ k p l c o s t $ to tuccessfully defend four lawsuits reaching $1.5 million, Searle decided to get out of 
ItfV5•';?'^.%y'^^S:{lfr^business. That leaves only Alza Corp., a small company that sells about 50,000 IUDs in the 
r ^ ^ A frustrated O. B. Parrish, president of the Searle pharmaceutical division, sums 
»^*^-
:vV'-"~-V* '»•:,'..up tfie result: "We have removed one important option from birth control in the U.S." 
$% ^^^H':';^~\'*yk -;•' While good statistics are hard to come by, virtually all the experts say the number of product lia-
. ^ ^ ^ " ^ S ^ ^ been climbing sharply, along with the total dollars paid out in damage awards and 
1$ !^^£: \&£ ^x^f^^t<ouTi settlements. Figures compiled by Jury Verdict Research Inc. of Solon, Ohio, show 
&2*:*&[$-;^ '"*:3v#?£ :%-v that the number of million-dollar jury awards have almost quadrupled over the last five years. The 
K&^ f:^^U^:'^''^'-.v."titmeiidous values some juries have put on victims' lives have helped inflate the awards. Faced 
h^l^^•!'£• '^^^'Jitth t**c possibility of costly suits and the certainty of soaring insurance premiums, what arc a com-
/pany's managers to do? ; A •
 :-. 
the choice Searle did—abandoning cer-
CXher companies, finding that their smaller 
insurance, have tried to raise prices to cover 1 
they still find themselves up against tough price
 v •>• ' \ 
advantages include lower insurance bOb/On-**,,4 •' -V 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CU * * t N T J V L Y / A (/ O U S 7 / V * 6 
- f - 3 A » " ' <•. 
v^ 
V 
"
:3U 
;v, 
• -^ .
 v
 . 
* 
^warning against tvery conceivable misuse. 
They are aUo exploring new wayi to settle 
product liability claim* without litigation and 
pushing for state laws to HmlOa wards, and for 
federal legislation to revamp product liability 
law entirely. The chances for success on Capi-
tol Hill are better than ever. 
Decisions to file for bankruptcy In recent 
years by A H . Robins and Manvllle Corp., 
Which was hit by billions of dollars In asbestos 
claims, represent the most drastic managerial 
responses to product liability claims. However 
effective bankruptcy ultimately proves as a 
defense, the extent of the companies* trouble* 
has punched home a sobering lesson. David 
Hoi brook, an executive vice president of 
Marsh ft McLennan, the world's largest insur-
ance brokerage* observes: "Managers through-
out the U.S. industry now know that legal Nu-
bilities for potentially hazardous products may 
exceed not only a corporation's insurance but 
Us total assets/' 
'; While getting out of a risky line of business 
tnay be the right move for a company, how 
about everybody else? Decisions to ball out 
have begun to endanger the continued supply 
Of important vaccines, drugs, and medical 
equipment in the U.S. Consider the example of 
Bendectin, the only prescription drug available 
to help pregnant women suffering from severe 
nausea. In courtroom after courtroom, Ben-
dectin has been found not guilty of causing 
birthWects; its maker, Merrell Dow Pharma-
N
 ceuticals, never lost a suit. But publicity given 
to allegations that the drug was dangerous, 
together with the specter of the thalidomide 
' disaster of the sixties, kept suits coming by the 
score. In 1983/ confronted with legal bills and 
insurance premiums that threatened to exceed 
the product's $13 million a year in revenues— 
and with devastating potential liabilities if the 
company lost—Merrell Dow stopped making 
:,-**; V^ut'^^xthc'drug* •;• 
^^t^:^^:^r ^ ^ Bendectin was pulled off the market 
^^^Vi '^-^-^wWwl^. -Searte wilt continue to sell the Cop-
^£&& '-Vs.£/!; P * 7 overseas. Ooverned by different legal sys-
ty^i^&^^&y*™, **& regu!adons,*otJ^er countries permit 
;!j&£^^ l 0 a w u m c rob** risk in the U.S< and 
j ^ £ i ^ \ ^ ^ *9 M»uint leas* Yet even 
1 & ' ^ to jack consistency '^ While ;'% 
m^m^^J £ ; ^ o j m « ^ y no longfer opt for 'ah iyb; npllis.^ I 
^ ^ ^ i ^ | % ^ - £ * W $ £ ***& * cigarette manufacturerHitbte
 : 
3 |? j j^^ by smokers, thd}igh;iHc; 
ti.>%1:^T$V^ tissue;!* still being hotly contested/ V &•?'U7 
tors left the field. The Lederle laboratories 
division of American Cyanamid mid Con-
naught Laboratories are the only companies 
that sell diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis 
(DTP) vaccine; and Ixdcilc is the only maker 
of oral polio vaccine. Lcdcrlc's DTP vaccine 
has gone from S2.K0 a dose to S4.2V in the last 
year, partly to cover increased legal and in-
surance costs. Wyeth I .aboratoiles ceased sell-
ing DTP vaccine In l')K4, citing litigation and 
insurance costs. At least two companies have 
stopped making polio vaccine. 
Vaccine manufacturing is a marginal busi V'AiXINl 
ncss, even without the threat of lawsuits: the MANUI ACIUHlNd 
market is small and profits are low. With the 
baby boom well l>eyond vaccination age, only 
three million to four million doses 11! the MMK 
vaccine, for example, are sold a year, not 
enough to support many competitors. Ilie 
prospect of puying out huge judgments is all X 
companies need to lip the balance against stay-
ing in the business. If those that remain were to 
raise prices enough to cover potential liabili-
ties, the vaccines they make could become pro-
hibitively expensive. In assessing his company's \ 
situation, William H. Ireilich, Merck's coun-
sel, makes an astonishing statement for a cor-
porate executive. "A good businessman would 
not be in this business/' he says. "The poten-
tial liability risk is too high. But Merck is com-
mitted to manufactui ing vaccines from a social 
responsibility standpoint." 
SKYROCKETING PREMIUMS 
Other companies are not willing to shoulder 
the risk, or can't afford to. Puritan-Bennett of 
Overland Park, Kansas, a leading U.S. manu-
facturer of hospital equipment, stopped mak-
ing anesthesia gas machines in 1984, leaving to 
two foreign-owned manufacturers a market 
once shared by half a dozen companies. Even 
after abandoning the product, C.E.O. Burton 
A. Dole Jr. says, "Our product liability insur-
ance went up 750 percent this year. We got fpu* 
less coverage and higher deductibles, so it ac-
tually went up 1,500 percent." 
In Virginia, William Perry, an engineer, set 
up a company to design and build hand and 
foot controls for cars and vans. Perry's son 
had been crippled in a motorcycle accident, \ 
and the father was appalled when he saw the ' ^ • *• -
devices available to handicapped drivers. His . -
'iqpmpany has never been sued * but he recently • ••* ' . 
;stopped selling his products nonetheless: his '•'•'** * <:' ;«•. M-; 
Uabtliiy insurance premiums went up
 t over* 
[ £ j ^ in «••ye«f/>Sa^.-Pw/c-11!*-•'• 
would have continued, this business even~at>a \ 
>tbs* If l could tiavtgot a decent premium/1 '-*, 
. Big companies can pay big insurance premi-
ums to stay to a business. More than half -a' • 
•dozen companies have given up making'foot-
it. 
'•Yin* 
%*' 
» .
% %
 . 1 . 
I/-.^ .;.^ ;/'' \:i> 
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ball helmets in the last ten yean. Two names 
bow dominate: Bike Athletic Co., owned by 
Coigat^PalmoIive. and Ridddl, part of Mac-
Grtfor Sporting Ooods. Thdr cost of insur-
ance may exceed manufacturing costs. Sayi an 
attorney who defends heimet makers: "The 
bigger the parent, the better the chances of ob-
taining insurance. Bike on its own would be 
•virtually uninsurable.0 
' Their staying powermight seem to give large 
companies an opportunity to raise prices once 
competitors have quit. Not necessarily. In in-
dustries as diverse as light aircraft, truck wheel 
rims, machine tools, and industrial machinery 
•—businesses with long-lived products—U.S. 
product liability law has given foreign manu-
facturers the advantage. American manufac-
turers remain liable for thdr products as long 
as they are in use. Having recently entered the 
US. market, foreigners typically do not carry 
this burden. Piper Aircraft Corp.'s insurance 
• * v bills, which reflect the risk of lawsuits over any 
Piper aircraft still flying, amount to $75,000 
for every new plane built—more than the cost 
of manufacturing Piper's smaller planes. 
Nor do foreigners carry heavy insurance 
burdens at home. A recent study by the Ameri-
,. . can Textile Machinery Association found that 
•v * / foreign manufacturers of machine tools and 
" * ; other hardware used in the workplace pay only 
1 percent to 5 percent as much for liability in-
;\ .surance in their home markets. In Europe and 
,*•;**'_; Japan, employees rdy on workers' compensa-
- ; :" tkm payments for workplace injuries rather 
-' ••' than on suing. 
CRISIS IN "The crisis in liability insurance has made 
LIABILITY risk management a oudn concern for top cor-
^ • N 
•INSURANCE porate decisio -makers," says Robert H. 
Malott, chairman of FMC Corp. Malott heads 
the Business Roundtable's task force on prod-
uct liability. Like other sophisticated corpora-
tions, FMC uses "preventive law" programs to 
reduce the company's exposure to suits. Such 
programs can include a so-called legal audit of 
corporation's businesses, Identifying prod-
cervices, or manufacturing operations 
could trigger lawsuii, and either cleaning 
them up or scrapping them. The programs also 
3 provide tor safeguarding product-development 
documents that could 'become .evidence in a 
suit. In one jase Plpa was directed xo supply 
^Ut^iffiV lawyers wkh stacks, of product-
ucvciopcncsi xiecocus*? wnen IDS company 
" t*bt jtod several key papers, the judge 
Analysis Associates of Palo Alto, California, a 
large engineering firm with a huge database on 
the frequency, severity, and cost of accidents. 
After identifying the features of a product that 
have occasioned the most lawsuits, manufac-
turers can try to improve the product or edu-
cate consumers in its proper use. Several years 
ago manufacturers were hit by a wave of law-
suits over multipiece truck wheel rims, which 
can explode when huge high-pressure tires are 
mounted on them. Failure Analysis did statisti-
cal and engineering studies that showed the 
multipiece rims had accident rates no higher 
than singlepiece rims, and that the real culprit 
was the procedure that mechanics were using 
to inflate and mount the tires. The findings led 
to industry-wide training standards that cut in-
jury rates by 80 percent. 
But preventive law can do only so much. No 
matter how carefully decisions on product de-
sign have been documented and justified, it 
is virtually impossible to prove to a court 
equipped with 20/20 hindsight that a design 
could not have been improved upon. Riddell, 
whose football helmets protect the pros, was 
recently slapped with a $12-million judgment 
in the case of a high school football player who 
broke his neck in a scrimmage. The jury de-
cided the helmet should have carried a sticker 
warning players of the danger of butting op-
ponents with it. Riddell has appealed the case. 
NEW PROCEDURES 
The risk and expense inherent in litigation 
have led a handful of companies to experiment 
with procedures to try to settle claims before 
lawsuits are filed. While Union Carbide's ef-
forts in this respect have been overshadowed 
by the Ahopal disaster, the company's chief 
litigation counsel, Robert A. Butler, says it has 
experimented with so-called mini-trials, presid-
ed over by a company executive, in product 
liability cases involving workmen injured by 
accidental exposure to toxic chemicals. The 
Center for Public Resources, a New York non-
profit
 voperation financed by over ISO major 
corporations, has also developed some alter-
natives to litigation. The center helped set op, 
for example, the Asbestos Claims Facility, a 
forum for settling disputes among insurers, 
manufacturers, and plaintiffs over the payouts 
on asbestos lawsuits. So fart more than 25,000 
." claims have been Bled;'. 
• In the eyes of corporate managers, the chief 
introducing any other {<#ppeal of private dispute resolution b the pros-; 
the case for 
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.football players ancj other student athletes. It 
has been adopted by two-thirds of the nation's 
school districts, at a cost to the schools of 
$1.40 per athlete per year. Under it, if a stu-
dent is severely injured, the school district of-
fers the family the option of accepting a settle-
ment thai will pay all his medical and rehabili-
tation expenses, and compensate him for his 
estimated lifetime earnings loss. Ii\ exchange 
the family agrees not to sue. The offer has 
been accepted by the families of all 24 young 
athletes seriously injured since the program 
took effect in 1981. The families may. still sue 
, equipment manufacturers, who have not joined 
• the program but are thinking about doing so. 
What makes the system work, CVConnell ar-
gues, is that families of plaintiffs with truly ap-
palling injuries face enormous expenses and 
terrifying uncertainty about the future. Be-
cause claims against mass-market products— 
.cars, say, or power toob—could swamp the 
system, it would seem to have the best chance 
of working for industries whose products are 
blamed for relatively rare but severe accidents 
—sports equipment, medical equipment, drugs. 
By limiting claims to severe injuries and by 
barring recipients of compensation from also 
suing manufacturers, the system might avoid 
the loopholes that have made insurance so ex-
pensive in states with no-fault auto plans. 
For now, however, most companies have 
contented themselves with trying to change ex-
isting product liability laws at both the state 
and federal levels. Lawsuits against corporate 
defendants with deep pockets, Malott argues, 
"have turned the courts, in effect, into an er-
ratic, backdoor system of nationalized health 
and accident insurance, financed by corporate 
insurance premiums." It's time to get a better 
system, but until one comes along, companies 
arc mostly stuck with hard choices. 
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Statements 
Yale Brozen 
In considering a research agenda for evaluating public policy toward 
pharmaceuticals, one fact should be kept stage center: drugs are our 
most cost-effective input in supplying the demand for health. A ten-
dollar prescription is frequently a substitute for $2,000 worth of hospital 
services—a substitute that produces a positive outcome with much higher 
frequency than hospital care. 
There is, at present, a long list of ailments that still require costly 
and frequently ineffective treatments and for which there is no low-cost 
drug substitute. Our progress in the past in producing drug substitutes 
for such procedures and the developments on the horizon indicate that 
pharmaceutical innovations could contain the cost explosion in the 
health industry. If we arc serious about minimizing costs, our best bet 
is to increase the number of drug innovations. "It should be clearly 
recognized that existing drugs are inadequate to deal with most of the 
diseases we face."11 would suggest, then, that the foremost item on any 
agenda is to learn as much as wc can about what factors affect the size 
and productivity of the pharmaceutical research effort. There is much 
that can and should be done to increase research productivity, partic-
ularly in view of its marked decline since 1962.* 
Because drugs arc cost-effective in producing health. I tend to lose 
patience when I see so much effort devoted to finding a monopoly 
explanation for pricing in the drug industry. It has been demonstrated 
that what some investigators blame on monopoly is usually a disequi-
librium phenomenon in a competitive market3 or a consequence of ar-
1
 William M. Wardcll. Regulation und Drug Dcwlapmem (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute* 1975), p. 144. 
AHenry Grabowski, Drug Regulation and Innovation (Washington, D.C.: American En-
terprise Institute, 1976), pp. 36, 54. Apparently, productivity of pharmaceutical research 
is now about one-sixth of what it was before 1962. 
*Y*le Brozen, "The Antitrust Task Force Deooncetitration Recommendation/' Journal 
of Law and Economics, vol. 13, no. 2 (October 1970), pp. 279-92. 
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WHAT RESEARCH AGENDA? 
J)itrary or governmcntally required accounting conventions4 If we want 
to investigate pricing, let us find out why the prices of drugs are so low 
relative to their value when that value is measured relative to nondrug 
alternatives. Why is it that drug pi ices have consistently fallen relative 
to the consumer price index? 
A high-priority item for the research agenda is a measurement of 
the benefits of drugs. If they arc a great bargain, as the evidence so far 
suggests, we need to make that obvious. We need to revive memories 
of the day when drugs were referred to as miracle drugs. Apparently, 
the drug industry has fallen to the state of the senator who, after re-
minding his constituents of die projects he had obtained for hi* state 
ten years before, was asked, "So what have you done for us lately?'1 
The importance of measuring explicitly the value of the medical 
innovations produced by the drug industry should not be underesti-
mated. My reason for believing this is that attitudes in the making of 
policy are colored by notions of "mc-too" chemical entities, as if re-
search efforts were and are being devoted to reruns that serve no useful 
purpose. The me-too propaganda has been exposed,5 hut its influence 
lingers. Policy-making and regulatory attitudes are also colored by no-
tions that the industry can promote any chemicals, no matter how lacking 
in efficacy, into multimillion-dollar moneymakers by bribing physicians 
with samples and prizes.0 It is this sort of attitude that leads some Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) officers to demand such absurdities 
as comparative efficacy studies and to demand repeated efficacy studies 
to replicate what the efficacy studies have already proved. 
Attitudes are also colored by the belief that the drug industry makes 
so much money that we might as well "stick it to them" by demanding 
costly efforts, no matter how little the value of duplicative efforts or 
how much delay is suffered in drug introductions. Commissioner Ken-
nedy, testifying in the 1979 House drug innovation hearings, argued that 
drug firms are doing magnificently in financial terms and that they can 
afford to pay for whatever nonsense is demanded by the FDA without 
stinting on their research effort.7 It is time that the Kennedys were told 
4
 Kenneth W. Clarkson, Intangible Capital and Ruttn of Return (Wishingon, D.C.; 
American Enterprise institute. 1977): Robert Ayanian, "The Profit Rates and Economic 
Performance of Drug Firms;' and i. R. Stauffcr. "Profitability Measure* in the Phar-
maceutical Industry,** in Robert B. Helms, cd.. Drug Development and Marketing (Wash-
ington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute. 197,5). 
•Larry L. Dcutsch, uR«$*arch Performance in the F.thical Drug Industry." Marquette 
Business Review, vol. 17 (Fan 1973), pp. 129-43. 
•S.1075 contains a provision piohibitmg promotional gifts to phy&icitint whose value 
exceeds ten dollars. 
* U.S. Congress, House, Drug Innovation Hearings, 96th Congress* 1st session, June 21, 
1079, transcript, p 46. Cited in American Enterprise Institute Legislative Analysis* Pro-
posals to Reform Drug Regulation Laws (Washington, DC. . 1979), p. 37. 
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YALE BROZEN 
that real resources are being consumed in FDA-demanded boondog-
gles—resources that could be producing lifesaving innovations that are 
not being produced. 
We need to demonstrate just how competitive the drug industry is. 
A showing of how low drugs arc priced relative to their value would 
help in that endeavor. We also need to demonstrate just how profitable 
research is—apparently it is no longer very profitable1*—to end the de-
mand for boondoggles. 
Some of the research needed is conceptual rather than empirical. 
It seems to many economists that drug prices are high relative to mar-
ginal cost—which means to them that the industry is not competitive— 
but their notion of the relationship of price to marginal cost is based on 
a primitive conception of marginal cost. Professor Tclser has demon-
strated that marginal cost is a bit more complicated than the usual 
economist's notion of this concept.9 His work needs extension and elab-
oration in language and examples from the pharmaceutical industry that 
can be comprehended by minds less subtle than his. 
While we are clarifying some of the primitive notions we use when 
introducing innocent students to economics in order to make these no-
tions into operational concepts appropriate for research use, we should 
also remove some of the obfuscation resulting from the use of the struc-
ture-conduct-pcrformance paradigm. Perhaps the boxes are useful, but 
the arrows from structure to performance point in the wrong direction.1" 
Instead of automatically accepting the notion that structure determines 
conduct, which determines performance, we should recognize that it is 
performance and conduct that determine structure.11 The efficient and 
innovative firm that behaves competitively wins the market. A concen-
trated structure and a variety of products result from such good per-
formance. Concentration and product variety are a proof of competitive 
conduct and good performance,12 not a cause of bad conduct and poor 
performance. 
I would suggest that we apply an upended structure-conduct-per-
•Meir Statman, Returns on Pharmaceutical Research and the Competitive Equilibrium 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming); David Schwartzman, 
The Expected Return from Pharmaceutical Research: Sources of New Drugs and the Prof-
itability of R&D Investment (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975). 
• Lester G. Tcbct, "The Market for Research and Development; Physician Demand and 
Drug Company Supply/* herein. 
* Yale Brozen, Industrial Concentration and Public Policy (New York: MacmilUn, fuiih* 
coming). 
» AJmarin Phillips, "Structure, Conduct, and Performance—and Performance. Conduct, 
mnd Structure?" in i. W Mirkham and G. F. Papanck* rth.% Industrial Organization and 
Economic Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
u
 George J. Stiglcr, appendix to "A Theory of Oligopoly," Juurnal of Political Economy, 
vol. 72, no. t (February 1964), pp. 44-61. Reprinted in Stiglcr, The Organization of 
Industry (Humewood, III.: Richard D. Irwin, 1966), pp. 60-62. 
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WHAT RESEARCH AGENDA? 
formance paradigm to an analysis of the history of innovation and in-
dusirial structure in each of the various therapeutic categories. We need 
to analyze the benefits of innovations as they appear and the benefits 
of new product varieties. I believe we would find that we should be 
praising concentration and product variety, then, as evidence of good 
performance and competitive conduct. Product "differentiation" is a 
virtue, not a sin. 
On our research agenda, we should also be looking into what proof 
of efficacy there is of the investigational new drug (IND) requirement 
and of the proposed monitoring of animal studies. The IND requirement 
presumably was installed to make sure that animal toxicology studies 
were adequate and that no harm would be done in human trials. Has 
the harm done to patients in clinical studies been reduced by the IND 
requirement? Since practically zero harm was done in clinical studies 
before the IND requirement was installed, I believe that the efficacy of 
the requirement is nonexistent. Let us apply the same standards of 
efficacy to such requirements as the FDA applies to new chemical ent-
ities. If the efficacy of the IND requirement cannot be demonstrated, 
then there are grounds for discarding it—for removing it from the reg-
ulation panoply. 
Let us also examine the efficacy of the efficacy requirement. There 
is some evidence indicating that it is not effective.1 * Let us apply the 
efficacy requirement standard to efficacy demonstration requirements. 
I think a double-blind test here will demonstrate that there is not even 
a placebo effect. 
The whole regulatory mechanism may be a gigantic sham with 
enormous costs and no benefits. If it is a charade, we should go about 
the task of unmasking the charade. If it is not, let us prove it is not. If 
some parts are valuable and some are not, let us sort them out. It is 
time to get on with this task, above alt others. 
William S. Comanor 
There are really two literatures on the economics of the pharmaceutical 
industry. These two literatures focus on different positions and come 
to different conclusions for public policy. In this comment, I briefly 
examine both these literatures and how they relate to each other, for 
it appears that they frequently pass as ships in the night and do not 
really confront each other on the relevant issues. 
The first literature is perhaps the more conventional. It follows the 
" Sam Pcltzroan, Regulation of Pharmaceutical Innovation: The 1962 Amendments (Wash-
ington, DC.: American Enterprise Institute* 1974). 
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Kennedy, Edward. "[Keynote] Address.** Press release of speech before the 
Tulane Medical Symposium on Principles and Techniques of Human 
Research and Therapeutics, New Orleans, November 2, 1975. Mimeo-
graphed. 
Rutstein, David P. Statement in U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small 
Business, Subcommittee on Monopoly, February 6, 1973. Mimeo-
graphed. 
Schmidt, Alexander.. The Commissioner's Report of Investigation of 
Charges. October 24, 1975. Mimeographed. 
. "Communication as the Basis of Regulation.'" Food and Drug Law 
Institute/FDA, December IJ, 1973. Mimeographed. 
. "Dimensions of Change in the FDA.** Speech before the Pharmaceu-
tical Advertising Seminar, Chicago, September 3,1973. Mimeographed. 
. T h e FDA Today: Critics, Congress, and Consumerism.*" Speech 
before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C, October 29, 1974. 
. "The FDA in I985." Speech before the Tulane Medical Symposium 
on Principles and Techniques of Human Research and Therapeutics, 
New Orleans, November 5, 1975. Mimeographed. 
. Statement in U.S. Senate, Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on 
Separation of Powers, July 21, 1975. Mimeographed. 
. Statement in U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 
Subcommittee on Health, August 16, 1974. Mimeographed. 
[Schultz, Harold.] "Risk-Benefit Considerations in Food Safety.** Attach-
ment A to minutes of November ]4-15, 1974, joint meeting of National 
Advisory Food Committee and National Advisory Veterinary Medicine 
Committee, November J974. Mimeographed. 
Seidman, David. "Protection and Overprotection, the Politics and Econom-
ics of Pharmaceutical Regulation." Paper given at Midwest Political 
Science Association conference, April 29-May I, 1976. Mimeographed. 
Simmons, Henry. Statement in U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small 
Business, Subcommittee on Monopoly, February 5, 1973. Also five 
addenda (A-E), and exhibits 4*18; and "Status Report on a Number of 
60 
Commissioner Schmidt's testimony dated August 16, 1974 stated: 
In sum, it is clear that the rate of drug introduction into the United 
States has slowed since the I950*s. This slowdown is worldwide, but is 
somewhat greater in this country than in other advanced countries. 
There appear to be some doigs unavailable in this country that represent 
modest but real therapeutic gains. We are concerned about this and 
want to be very sure that useful drugs are not held back unnecessarily. It 
also appears that drug research has moved abroad to some extent. We 
are also concerned about this, because of its negative impact on the 
development of good clinical investigation in therapeutics and because 
it will further delay the availability of useful drugs.73 * 
And on October 29, 1974, Commissioner Schmidt, in what might be consid-
ered a plea for a positive rather than a negative legislative mandate to the 
FDA, spoke at the National Press Club as follows: 
A What I see as a seriously unbalanced and deleterious pressure can be 
remedied only by Congressional and public recognition that the failure 
to approve an important new drug can be as detrimental to the public 
health as the approval of a potentially bad drug. If soften forgotten— 
and sometimes conveniently so—that our responsibility to get good new 
drugs into medical*practice is at least as important as our responsibility 
to keep worthless or dangerous drugs off the market.74 
Meanwhile, an improvement in FD.Vs approvals of NDAs had occurred 
between 1971 and 1976. In September 1974, Dr. William Wardell, their most 
effective critic because his criticism was based on primary scientific data and 
was reported in terms which FDA staff could more easily understand than 
criticism by economists, had stated before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Health: 
Over the past 214 years, a marked improvement has occurred in the rate 
of FDA approvals of medically useful new drugs, with resulting benefits 
for the American patient. . . .Large anachronisms still remain—e.g., in 
the cardiovascular area. . . .Nevertheless, in general the FDA has come 
to be more in touch with up-to-date standards of medical practice, and 
has done much to regain the confidence of the scientific and medical 
communities. • . .T5 
73. Ibid., p. 2S. Although dated August 16, 1974, w*s referred to September 25, 1974, several 
limes but not actually orally presented during the hearings. 
(?4-) Alexander Schmidt. *"The FDA Today: Critics, Congress, and Consumerism," speech before 
trte National Press Club, mimeo. p. 12. 
75. U.S. Senate, Joint Hearings, op. cit., September 27, 1974, p. 507. 
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Florida Tort, Insurance 'Reform9 
INSURERS APPEALING COURT DECISION 
UPHOLDING MOST PROVISIONS OF NEW LAW 
TALLAHASSEE, Fla. — A cir-
cuit court ruling upholding all but 
one of the major provisions of Flor-
ida s Tort and Insurance Reform 
Act of 1986 is being appealed by 
insurers seeking to take their case to 
the state Supreme Court. 
Leon County Circuit Court Judge 
Charles E. Miner Jr. ruled Oct. 24 in 
favor of the state's Department of 
Insurance, along with fellow defen-
dants Florida Power and Light Co., 
the Florida Medical Association, and 
the Florida Railroad Association. A 
group of 23 insurance companies, 
three industry groups, and the 
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers 
challenged the law in July, charging 
that it violates both the state and 
Self Insurance 
federal constitutions {LIB, July 28, 
P. i). 
But Miner rejected those claims, 
throwing out only one aspect of the 
comprehensive legislation: the re-
fund of premiums on commercial 
liability policies in force prior to 
July 1, 1986, the effective date of 
the law. Such rebates, he said, "sub-
stantially impair . . . contracts and 
violate due process rights." The law 
required rebates on all commercial 
liability policies in effect between 
Oct. 1, 1986, and Dec. 31, 1986, no 
matter when they were written. In-
surers testified the provision would 
have cost them $140 million. 
On Oct. 29, the First District 
(Continued on p. 2) 
AMENDMENTS ON RISK RETENTION 
SIGNED INTO LAW BY 
Legislation that will ease restric-
tions for businesses, professional 
groups, and others seeking to create 
self insurance pools or buy liability 
coverage was signed Oct. 27 by 
President Reagan. 
The legislation (S 2129) amends 
the Product Liability Risk Retention 
Act of 1981 by expanding coverage 
to include general liability insur-
ance. It permits self-insurance 
groups which meet the financial re-
quirements in their chartering states 
to operate in all 50 states. 
The bill also includes language 
that would permit non-chartering 
PRESIDENT REAGAN 
states to require such groups to 
demonstrate financial responsibility. 
It provides that a state's authority to 
impose or apply financial responsi-
bility requirements is subject to stat-
utory prohibition that a state cannot 
impose any discriminatory require-
ments on a risk retention group. 
Sen. John Danforth (R-Mo) one of 
the Senate bill's original sponsors, 
said the measure is not a "complete 
solution" to the unavailability of in-
surance, but by creating new alter-
natives for liability coverage, "it re-
presents an important step toward 
alleviating the problem." • 
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Florida, from p. 1 
Court of Appeals in Tallahassee ex-
tended to the insurance industry 
most of the injunctive relief pre-
viously granted by the lower court, 
including a delay of rate filings re-
quired by the law and a stay on the 
payment of special credit refunds. 
The new extension expires Nov 7. 
Under the injunction issued by 
Miner some months ago, the insur-
ance companies were ordered to pay 
the special credits into an escrow 
account. Under the appeals court's 
extension, however, no payments 
must be made. Also under the exten-
sion, the insurers are not required to 
pay $500 to establish the joint 
underwriting association called for 
under the new law, although the 
administrative process for creating 
the body will continue. 
The appeals court also passed the 
matter directly to the Florida Su-
preme Court for review. "We ex-
pect that the industry is going to ask 
the Supreme Court to extend injunc-
tions to prevent implementation of 
the law," Sandra Fish, a public in-
D&O Coverage 
Small- and mid-size companies 
faced with steep increases in liabil-
ity insurance premiums are drop-
ping directors' and officers' cover-
age, according to results of a 
nationwide survey of 41,000 compa-
nies released Oct. 28. 
The cost of D&O insurance for 
small- and mid-size firms rose an 
average of 242 percent in 1986, ac-
cording to Growth Resources Inc., a 
Massachusetts consulting firm that 
conducted the survey. 
One third of the 41,000 firms sur-
veyed reported that they did not 
renew their coverage. The remain-
ing two-thirds said the coverage 
they purchased increased on aver-
age more than 400 percent. (The 
overall average increase therefore 
fell to 242 percent because no pre-
mium increase was reported for the 
formation specialist in the Florida 
Department of Insurance, told LIB. 
"We're going to vigorously oppose 
any efforts to keep us from moving 
along with this law." 
The major provisions of the new 
law were upheld under Miner's rul-
ing, including the requirement, 
cited as most onerous by insurers, to 
roll back commercial liability insur-
ance premiums and freeze rates and 
increases until Jan. 1, 1987. 
In other "insurance reform" pro-
visions, the law gives the Depart-
ment of Insurance greater authority 
to review and approve property and 
casualty rates, restricts cancellation 
of policies, creates a joint underwrit-
ing association, creates an excess 
profits law for property and casualty 
insurance, and requires insurers to 
return excess profits to policyholders 
who comply with risk management 
guidelines. It also provides for the 
formation of professional and com-
mercial self-insurance funds and 
permits banks to own and control 
reinsurance companies. 
Among the "tort reforms" in the 
act are provisions to replace joint 
one-third of firms that dropped 
their coverage.) 
The average liability insurance 
premium per director in 1986 
neared $2,700, up from $1,100 in 
1985, Growth Resources reported. 
The average amount of liability cov-
erage purchased was $3.5 million. 
While 41 percent of the smaller 
companies' boards provided D&O 
coverage in 1985, only 31 percent 
provided it in 1986, according to the 
survey. "The removal of liability in-
surance coverage could put a crimp 
on the progress that has been made 
by so many small companies in at-
tracting outside directors," said 
Richard Bronstein, president of 
Growth Resources. 
"Some companies are getting 
around the problem of attracting 
qualified outsiders who may balk at 
and several liability with propor-
tional liability, limit noneconomic 
damages to $450,000, and limit pu-
nitive damages to three times eco-
nomic damages unless there is clear 
evidence that is not sufficient. Only 
40 percent of punitive damages will 
go to the plaintiff, with the remain-
der going to the state. 
Frederick B. Karl, lead attorney 
for the insurers, said he is pleased 
that the "tort reform" provisions 
were upheld and that a portion of 
the premium rebate section was 
struck down. "That is one of the 
sections that was most offensive to 
insurers," he said. 
Insurance Commissioner Bill 
Gunter called the ruling "a tremen-
dous victory for Florida business 
and professional insurance consum-
ers." "The Florida law was more 
comprehensive than that of any oth-
er state, and yet it stood the test of 
an all-out legal challenge," he said. 
{American Insurance Association et 
ai v. State of Florida, Dept. of 
Insurance, and Bill Gunter, Insur-
ance Commissioner, CirCt Leon 
Cty, No. 86-2262) D 
serving as directors without liability 
insurance coverage by establishing 
advisory boards," Bronstein said. 
"While an advisory board cannot 
substitute for a board of directors, it 
can perform many valuable adviso-
ry functions and receive compensa-
tion without carrying the legal re-
sponsibilities of a board of 
directors," he said. 
Growth Resources Inc. surveyed 
manufacturing, technology, and ser-
vice companies with sales ranging 
from $250,000 to $60 million for the 
report. These firms' boards of direc-
tors had an average of five members 
each. 
Copies of the Seventh Edition 
1986/87 Officer Compensation Re-
port are available for $425 from 
Growth Resources Inc., One New-
bury St., Peabody, Mass. 01960. • 
SMALL COMPANIES DROP COVERAGE AS PREMIUMS RISE 
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Damage Awards 
$1 MILLION VERDICTS REDUCED BY HALF, ATLA REPORTS 
Plaintiffs who won jury verdicts 
of $1 million or more in 1984 and 
1985 actually received less than half 
the total amount of the money 
awarded, the Association of Trial 
Lawyers of America (ATLA) said in 
a report released Oct. 27. 
While 198 verdicts examined to-
talled $790.6 million, the amount 
actually paid to plaintiffs was 
$339.2 million, an aggregate reduc-
tion of 57 percent, the report said. 
The larger the original verdict, 
the larger the percentage reduction. 
While $1 million verdicts were re-
duced by 21 percent on average, 
$10 million verdicts were reduced 
by nearly 57 percent, it said. 
The verdicts were examined by 
Dr. Ivy Broder, of the American 
University. Her findings were based 
on 198 cases out of a sample of 472 
verdicts for $1 million or more pro-
vided by Jury Verdict Research Inc. 
She said the remaining 274 cases 
were still on appeal or were unusa-
ble because of confidentiality or 
other constraints. 
The most severely injured re-
ceived the highest verdicts and the 
highest settlements, Broder conclud-
ed. Her survey found that: 
• The 22 paralysis victims re-
ceived average verdicts of $4.1 mil-
lion and settlements of $2.7 million; 
• The 37 brain-damaged plaintiffs 
averaged $3.7 million in verdicts 
and $2.3 million in settlements; and 
• The nine amputation cases had 
average verdicts of $3.5 million and 
average settlements of $2 million. 
The less severely injured received 
the lowest average original verdicts 
and settlements, as well as the larger 
percentage reductions. 
The wide variation in original 
verdicts is reduced through settle-
ments, Broder said, suggesting that 
the settlement process provides a 
more consistent pattern of final 
awards. "Focusing on verdicts is 
quite misleading. A full picture of 
the way our judicial system actually 
compensates victims must include 
the actual settlement process as well 
as the results of jury deliberations." 
The report, An Analysis of Mil-
lion Dollar Verdicts, is available 
from ATLA, 1050 31st St. NW, 
Washington, DC 20007. • 
Product Liability 
PRESIDENT REAGAN URGED TO SIGN HEALTH LEGISLATION 
Backers of the Omnibus Health 
Package passed in the final days of 
the 99th Congress are urging Presi-
dent Reagan to resist Justice Depart-
ment officials' recommendations to 
veto the entire bill because of its 
provisions to create a vaccine injury 
compensation fund. 
At a press conference Oct. 28 and 
in ads in the New York Times and 
the Washington Times Oct. 27, the 
supporters disputed the officials' ar-
guments that the need for a no-fault 
compensation program for victims 
of vaccine-related injuries has not 
been proven. 
The bill (S 1744), unanimously 
approved by the Senate Oct. 18 
(LIB, Oct. 27, p. 3), is a comprehen-
sive measure designed to promote 
exports of prescription drugs and 
compensate children injured by vac-
cines. It would also strengthen 
medical peer review and establish a 
national network to provide infor-
mation on individual physicians' 
records. 
"The potential for lawsuits has 
caused the price of the DPT vaccine 
to rise from $4.00 to $11.40 per dose 
in the last year alone," said Sen. 
Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), a cospon-
sor of the bill. "Insurers are reluc-
tant to underwrite the liability, and, 
when they do the rates are high." 
Hatch said the bill would make 
tort changes to reduce the unpre-
dictability of damage awards 
against manufacturers and protect 
them if they meet government stan-
dards and requirements. "Most im-
portantly, it will foster the develop-
ment of safer vaccines," he said. 
Even if signed by Reagan, the 
vaccine compensation program 
would not take effect until Congress 
approves a funding mechanism. • 
Environmental Liability Coverage 
EPA TO STUDY ASBESTOS HAZARD INSURANCE 
Legislation requiring identification and abatement of asbestos hazards in some 
31,000 public schools, signed by President Reagan Oct. 22, calls on the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to study the availability of liability insurance for school 
boards and contractors doing the abatement work. 
The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986 provides for the establish-
ment of federal requirements for inspection for asbestos-containing material and 
implementation of "appropriate response actions." 
Sec. 210 of the law (PL 99-519) requires EPA to make a preliminary report on 
the availability of liability insurance for school agencies and contractors by April 1, 
1988, and a final report by Oct. 1, 1990. It also authorizes the formation of 
insurance pools to cover injuries arising from the release of asbestos into the 
atmosphere during the abatement process. 
The asbestos legislation specifically permits states to establish or modify liability 
standards for contractors or local education associations. • 
Liability & Insurance Bulletin 
0889-44 69/86/S0+. 50 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 LIABILITY & INSURANCE BULLETIN 
Automobile Coverage 
TWO INSURERS SEEK TO WITHDRAW FROM NEW JERSEY JUA 
TRENTON, NJ — Firemen's 
Fund and Keystone Insurance Co. 
are seeking to withdraw as insur-
ance carriers under the New Jersey 
Joint Underwriters Association 
(JUA) program, a state insurance 
department spokesman said Oct. 29. 
A decision on the request will be 
announced "shortly/* said spokes-
man Thomas Hooper, adding, "We 
have to approve it." The depart-
ment has not yet received a formal 
application from Keystone, he said. 
Citing a prospective $500 million 
deficit by 1988 in the JUA, Fire-
men's fund criticized the legislature 
for failing to enact proposed re-
PACKAGE OF 12 BILLS 
TRENTON, NJ — A 12-bill 
package of tort and insurance " re-
forms" was introduced in the New 
Jersey legislature Oct. 6. 
The bills would give judges power 
to reduce jury verdicts, cap awards, 
and limit joint and several liability, 
as well as imposing financial disclo-
sure, notification, and other require-
ments on insurers. 
The package of bills is pending in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and 
the Assembly Insurance Committee, 
a spokesman for Sen. Raymond Les-
niak (D) told LIB Oct. 29. "We 
don't know when there will be 
action/' 
Lesniak's "tort reform" bill (S 
2644) would allow judges to reduce 
or increase civil damage awards for 
personal injury if they find the 
awards "unreasonable" or the result 
of "mistake, prejudice or passion." 
A $500,000 cap would apply to all 
noneconomic damage awards except 
those involving "catastrophic" in-
jury such as permanent, severe dis-
ability or disfigurement. The cap 
would not apply to medical costs. 
The legislative package would 
forms. Hooper said the insurers 
"have no obligation to fund any 
deficit. That's what they're afraid 
of, but there is no danger of that." 
The JUA, which covers nearly 
half of New Jersey's 3.8 million in-
sured autos, contracts with individ-
ual insurers to cover those who are 
rejected in the voluntary market. Its 
rates are set at the same level as the 
voluntary market, Hooper said. 
"That's one of the problems." 
Under state law, the companies 
must remain as part of the adminis-
trative structure of the JUA but are 
not required to serve as carriers, 
Hooper said. He said he does not 
amend joint and several liability 
provisions, which now permit a 
plaintiff to collect the total amount 
of an award from any defendant 
found 30 percent or more at fault if 
other defendants are unable to pay. 
The changes would eliminate joint 
and several liability for government 
agencies except in environmental 
torts. It would provide that defen-
dants found 20 percent to 60 per-
cent liable would pay only their 
share of noneconomic damages, 
while a defendant found more than 
60 percent liable could be held re-
sponsible for all damages. 
Other provisions in the bills 
would: 
• Provide for structured payment 
of damage awards exceeding 
$200,000; 
• Deduct collateral payments 
from damage awards; 
• Permit stockholders to limit or 
eliminate liability for corporate di-
rectors and officers; 
• Require arbitration of non-auto 
damage claims of $20,000 or less; 
• Impose penalties of up to $2,500 
for filing frivolous suits; and 
think the withdrawal "will have any 
effect." The JUA has 15 carriers for 
1.8 million cars, and loss of the two 
companies would affect only about 
60,000 cars, he said. 
Recommendations to increase the 
JUA's revenues, issued Sept. 16 by 
the Senate Special Committee on 
Automobile Insurance Reform, in-
clude: more efficient collection of 
surcharges on fines for accidents 
and violations; a second-tier rate for 
drivers with excess points for acci-
dents and violations; stiffer fines for 
failure to maintain insurance, and a 
relaxation of the non-renewal law to 
"assist in depopulating" the JUA. • 
• Limit dram shop and social host 
liability. 
Among the insurance provisions 
in the legislative package are mea-
sures that would require financial 
disclosure by insurance companies, 
require a company to submit a plan 
if it intends to withdraw from a 
certain line of coverage "so the mar-
ket won't be disrupted," and pro-
vide capital and surplus require-
ments for captive insurers, said Dale 
Davis, an Assembly Insurance Com-
mittee aide. 
Lesniak's spokesman said the in-
surance provisions would also cover 
rate reductions and risk retention. 
Davis told LIB the legislature is 
considering the "tort reform" mea-
sures first and probably will not take 
up the "insurance reform" bills until 
November or December. 
The only insurance bill released 
for consideration by the legislature 
so far is S2318/A2404 on reporting 
requirements. Davis said the 12 
bills, originally interlocked so that 
all or none would have to be en-
acted, have been "unhooked" for 
separate consideration. • 
New Jersey Tort, Insurance Reform 
INTRODUCED IN LEGISLATURE 
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Reinsurance 
100 FIRMS FORCED OUT OF MARKET 
NEW YORK — Some 100 com-
peting reinsurers have pulled out of 
the U.S. casualty business in the last 
two years, "mostly because they are 
bankrupt or will be," attorney Don-
ald J. Greene told the Insurance In-
formation Institute (III) Oct. 29. 
Greene, senior partner of the 
New York firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, 
Leiby & McRae, told the Ills 11th 
annual research seminar that those 
firms were "losing their shirts" be-
cause of the "crisis" in the reinsur-
ance business. "This was not a xeno-
phobic decision or an intellectual 
exercise," he said. 
"In the last two years, they used 
up all the premium, all the invest-
ment income on the surplus, all in-
vestment income on premium they 
were holding in reserve and all their 
loss reserves, so they had to pay out 
from their basic capital," he said. 
Greene, who is U.S. counsel for 
Lloyd's of London, said Lloyd's has 
picked up some of the business left 
by bankrupt firms, but, when 100 
Product Liability 
markets disappear, "there is bound 
to be an economic dislocation." 
Changes in the U.S. tort system 
could improve the situation, he said. 
"Right now [the system's] lack of 
predictability is such that insurers 
and reinsurers would rather devote 
their capital and risk taking know-
how to other lines of insurance in 
other parts of the world," he said. 
Greene said the industry should 
fight any attempt by the federal 
government to regulate the reinsur-
ance business, saying it is already 
adequately monitored by the states. 
"It's inevitable that the federal gov-
ernment will inquire into reinsur-
ance," he said, but the additional 
red tape created would only aggra-
vate problems by raising costs. 
Enactment of the new legislation 
amending the Risk Retention Act 
(See related story, this issue.) "will 
have a big impact on the business," 
Greene predicted. "People who 
can't afford commercial insurance 
will consider this alternative." • 
INSURANCE COSTS DETER AIDS VACCINE 
High liability insurance costs are 
partly responsible for delaying the 
development of a vaccine against 
AIDS, the cochairman of a National 
Academy of Sciences panel on the 
disease said Oct. 29. 
"Even if the scientific obstacles 
were surmounted, legal, social, and 
ethical factors could delay or limit 
the availability of an AIDS vac-
cine," Dr. David Baltimore, director 
of the Whitehead Institute for Bio-
medical Research and professor of 
biology at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, said at a press 
conference at NAS. 
Roy Widdus, project director for 
the NAS report Confronting AIDS 
— Directions for Public Health, 
Health Care, and Research, said 
several recent academy studies have 
found that court awards to persons 
claiming injuries from vaccines have 
a chilling effect on the development 
of new vaccines. "This general cli-
mate of uncertainty is something 
that deters many pharmaceutical 
companies from being involved in 
AIDS vaccine research," he said. 
Many pharmaceutical firms self-
insure for liability up to certain lim-
its but have trouble finding compa-
nies that will provide coverage 
beyond those limits, Widdus said. 
"So, if they can't insure, they don't 
develop the vaccine." 
Firms also hesitate to develop 
AIDS vaccines because the market is 
not large enough to justify potential 
liability losses, Widdus said. • 
Medical Malpractice 
18 PERCENT HIKE 
PASSED IN GEORGIA 
ATLANTA — Georgia Insurance 
Commissioner Warren D. Evans has 
accepted a consent order permitting 
an 18 percent hike in physician's 
malpractice insurance by the St. 
Paul Companies in return for the 
elimination of the insurer's 8.5 per-
cent surcharge plan. 
Evans announced his decision 
Oct. 27, following a public hearing 
on Oct. 15 (LIB, Oct. 20, p. 3). 
"After I ordered the hearing, the 
St. Paul Companies provided the In-
surance Department with consider-
ably more documentation than they 
did in their original rate filing," 
Evans said. "This additional data, 
plus St. Paul's offer to drop their 8.5 
percent surcharge, were the decid-
ing factors." 
Evans had favored the surcharge 
plan because in theory it would 
mean higher premiums for doctors 
who have had malpractice claims 
filed against them. He said he 
changed his mind following protests 
from the medical community. 
St. Paul instituted the surcharge 
plan following the department's de-
nial of an average 62.3 increase in 
medical malpractice rates. An 
across-the-board 38 percent increase 
was later granted, but St. Paul said 
that rate hike was not enough. The 
company insures some 5,200 of the 
state's 9,000 doctors. 
St. Paul subsequently said it 
planned to proceed with an addi-
tional 18 percent rate hike as well as 
the surcharge plan. Although Evans 
approved the surcharge, he denied 
the 18 percent increase. When St. 
Paul forged ahead with the increase 
anyway, Evans called for the public 
hearing to clear up the dispute. 
"I hope the challenging of this 
rate filing will make it clear to all 
companies that any proposed rate 
increases must be supported by a 
well-documented need for such an 
increase," Evans said. • 
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Governmental Immunity 
FIRE FIGHTERS SHIELDED, COURT RULES 
Directors' Liability 
TAKEOVERS SAID 
TO INCREASE SUITS 
LOS ANGELES — Directors who 
worry about their exposure to liabil-
ity from shareholder suits can help 
themselves by remembering that 
they represent the interests of share-
holders, not management, an attor-
ney told the National Association of 
Corporate Directors Oct. 21. 
Lowell E. Sachnoff, of Chicago's 
Sachnoff, Weaver & Rubinstein, 
said the wave of corporate takeovers 
has generated the growth in suits 
against directors. "The courts have 
recognized that takeover situations 
necessarily involve the possibility of 
conflict of interest and implicate 
possible entrenchment motives and 
so are applying different rules to 
defensive actions." 
The business judgment rule, 
which once extended almost com-
plete protection to the business deci-
sions of directors, no longer auto-
matically applies in takeover 
situations. To find shelter under the 
rule, Sachnoff said, directors now 
have an "enhanced duty" to show 
good faith and lack of entrenchment 
motive during a hostile bid. The 
initial burden of proof in showing 
the reasonableness of defensive tac-
tics, in relation to the threat posed, 
also lies with directors, he said. 
The view that corporations should 
never be subject to a hostile tender 
offer and should resist at all times 
has been rejected by the courts, 
Sachnoff said, adding that courts 
condone certain defensive tactics. 
Directors who want to keep them-
selves and their pocketbooks intact 
during hostile bids for the company 
should be prepared with an in-house 
defense team in advance of any 
such bid, Sachnoff said. The direc-
tors* and officers' insurance policy 
should be reviewed for complete 
coverage, he said. Outside experts 
(such as counsel, investment bank-
ers, and proxy solicitors) should be 
retained only as needed, he said. • 
Volunteer fire companies are en-
titled to governmental immunity 
from suits over damage caused by 
chemical agents used to extinguish 
fires, the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania ruled Oct. 16. 
The appeals court upheld a trial 
court's ruling that volunteer fire 
companies are "local agencies" as 
defined under Pennsylvania law, 
holding that volunteer fire compa-
nies act on behalf of local govern-
ment units. 
In this case, the Dravosburg Vol-
unteer Fire Dept. No. 1 and the 
Dravosburg Volunteer Co. No. 2 
were summoned in April 1983 to 
clean up a diesel fuel spill on a 
highway adjacent to the lakes on 
which Beverly Wilson maintained a 
fishing operation. The fire compa-
nies applied a liquid chemical to the 
highway to disperse the fuel. Wilson 
filed a complaint of trespass in Alle-
gheny County Common Pleas 
Self Insurance 
LONDON — Lead underwriters 
will soon be approached to provide 
reinsurance for a new oil industry 
captive, a spokesman for the broker 
arranging the transaction told LIB 
Oct. 15. 
The captive, Oil Casualty Insur-
ance Ltd. (OCIL), was launched 
from Bermuda in June by 24 lead-
ing energy groups. Reinsurance for 
the captive will be arranged by bro-
ker Alexander & Alexander, a 
source in the London subsidiary 
Alexander Howden Group said. 
The founders of OCIL are all 
members of the 35-member Oil In-
surance Ltd. (OIL), one of the big-
gest mutual underwriters in the in-
dustry. Despite the parallel 
membership of the two companies, 
OCIL is not a subsidiary of OIL, 
and the two will run separately. 
Court, alleging that this procedure 
polluted nearby lakes, thus causing 
the destruction of various fish and 
other aquatic life. 
The trial court sustained prelimi-
nary objections filed by the fire 
companies arguing that the com-
plaint should be dismissed as it in-
volved them because they are enti-
tled to immunity under 
Pennsylvania's 1980 Immunity Act. 
In performing public fire fighting 
duties, volunteer fire companies act 
on behalf of local government units, 
the court held. This conclusion is 
supported by the historical and 
structural relationship between vol-
unteer fire companies and the local 
municipalities and citizenry they 
serve, it said, affirming the order of 
the Allegheny County Common 
Pleas Court. (Wilson v. Dravosburg 
Volunteer Fire Dept. No. I, Pa 
CmmwlthCt , No. 2813 CD 
1984). D 
"OIL was formed to provide 
seepage and other pollution cover, 
while OCIL has been formed due to 
great difficulty obtaining umbrella 
liability coverage," the source at 
Alexander Howden said. Some com-
panies that were able to get cover-
age found it inadequate and will use 
OCIL for "topping up," he said. 
Most of the companies that have 
joined OCIL are North American 
firms, including Standard Oil of 
Ohio, Sun Co., and Phillips. Some of 
them might have "gone bare" be-
fore the formation of OCIL, he said. 
OCIL will write $100 million ex-
cess above $20 million on general, or 
umbrella, liability risks. It will cover 
up to $50 million excess above $20 
million on directors' and officers' 
business but has an absolute exclu-
sion on seepage and pollution. D 
REINSURER SOUGHT FOR NEW OIL CAPTIVE 
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Medical Malpractice 
RISK MANAGERS TOLD TO STRENGTHEN REVIEW OF DOCTORS 
Congress is more likely to pass 
legislation aimed at disciplining in-
competent doctors than at changing 
the tort system, Edmund Rice, di-
rector of federal relations for the 
American Hospital Association 
(AHA), said Oct. 25. 
Rice told the AHA's annual meet-
ing for hospital risk managers that 
broad-based "tort reform" at the 
federal level is "highly unlikely," 
but he predicted some 20 states 
would pass such "reforms" in 1987. 
The Omnibus Health Package (S 
1744), passed on the final day of the 
99th Congress reflects legislators' 
desire to deal with the medical mal-
practice "crisis" by strengthening 
peer review processes rather than 
shielding physicians and hospitals 
from liability, Rice said. (See related 
story, this issue.) He said AHA sup-
ports the bill because the alternative 
is more "onerous." 
The legislation, not yet signed by 
President Reagan, would provide le-
gal immunity for physicians partici-
pating in peer review and would 
create a national information net-
work to monitor physicians' records. 
It would require hospitals to report 
whenever a physician is disciplined. 
Others also urged the risk manag-
ers to strengthen credentialing and 
review procedures for doctors as a 
protection against liability for hospi-
tals in medical malpractice cases. 
"The plaintiffs' bar is hauling 
hospitals into lawsuits on the theory 
of negligent credentialing," said 
Patti G. Zimmerman, an attorney 
with Baltimore's Smith, Somerville 
& Case. "Thus 'reasonable' or 'ordi-
nary care' is going to mean hospitals 
must investigate all of the informa-
tion they receive on a physician's 
application." 
Zimmerman, who has defended 
hospitals in malpractice suits, said 
each hospital must adopt a creden-
tialing policy and follow it religious-
ly when reviewing applications. "Set 
a policy that requires a detailed in-
vestigation of the information pro-
vided and then follow it to the let-
ter," she said. "The policy must be 
applied in exactly the same way to 
physicians who are seeking a renew-
al of the privileges," she said. 
Hospitals must establish an annual 
evaluation for practicing physicians 
as well, Zimmerman said. 
State statutes will not protect an 
application or a risk manager's in-
vestigation of the application from 
discovery proceedings, so the file 
should be prepared "as if a plain-
tiff's lawyer is going to see it," Zim-
merman said. Hospitals should in-
clude as many issues as possible 
Self Insurance 
under the definition of medical re-
view, she said, because medical re-
view and quality assurance records 
are protected by state laws. 
The Risk Retention Amendments 
of 1986, signed by Reagan Oct. 27, 
should be seen as a "step forward" 
because hospitals that participate in 
risk retention groups will be able to 
negotiate better rates with insurers, 
Rice told the group. "Hospitals can't 
be jacked back and forth with this 
legislation," he said. 
Rice urged hospital risk managers 
to plan participation in risk reten-
tion groups soon, saying he expects 
the legislation to go into effect by 
mid-summer. • 
CONNECTICUT HOSPITALS BYPASS MARKET 
HARTFORD, Conn. — Ten small, non-profit Connecticut hospitals have 
formed their own insurance company, Connmed, to bypass the commercial 
market for general and professional liability claims. 
"We seemed to be at the mercy of the marketplace, and we all felt we 
ought to gain some control over our destiny," said Alfred Lerz, president of 
Johnson Memorial Hospital in Stafford Springs, Conn. 
Connmed began operation Oct. 1, and Lerz said he is pleased so far with 
the results. The annual premium for his 78-bed hospital dropped from 
$500,000 last year to $330,000, he said. Some of that apparent savings won't 
be realized, he said, because the new system shifts from an "occurrence" to 
a "claims made" basis. 
"In the first couple of years, we'll probably keep the premiums up to 
build up a kitty," said Robert Boardman, director of Rockville General. 
The hospitals will benefit by being able to control their investment 
money until claims are actually made, said Albert May, spokesman for the 
Connecticut Hospital Association. The association is managing the new 
company, which offers its members coverage of up to $3 million. A 
commercial firm, Trenwick America Reinsurance Corp., of Westport, 
Conn., handles umbrella coverage over that amount. 
Lerz, whose premiums rose 400 percent last year, said reinsurance has 
not been as big a problem for hospitals as primary coverage. The other 
hospitals now involved with the new company are: Bradley Memorial, 
Rockville General, Windham Community Memorial, Winsted Memorial, 
Griffin, Milford, New Milford, Sharon, and Park City. 
Hospital officials said Connmed is the first such company in New 
England for small institutions, although some of the major non-profit 
hospitals have been taking steps toward at least partial self-insurance to 
avoid the commercial market. Lerz said some small hospitals in New 
Hampshire have expressed interest in joining Connmed when it accepts 
new members next fall. • 
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VERDICTS & SETTLEMENTS 
• Manville Corp. has reached a $62.1 million settlement with a 
group of syndicates at Lloyds of London and other firms participating 
with its underwriters. Manville sued Lloyd's and 26 other carriers 
seeking a determination of their obligations to pay for losses arising 
out of asbestos-related and other claims. The settlement will be paid in 
three installments. (Johns-Manville v. Home Insurance, et al., Calif 
SuperCt (San Francisco), No. 765226, 10/24/86) 
• A Los Angeles Superior Court judge has upheld a $23.7 million 
award to Nichole Fortman, a 9-year-old whose fall out of a jeep in 
1981 left her paralyzed and brain-damaged. Hemco Inc., which 
produced the mold for the vehicle s fiberglass doors, must pay Nichole 
$6 million for pain and suffering and $17.7 million for medical 
expenses and lost earnings. No punitive damages were awarded. 
Hemco's mold was allegedly defective because the doors were rear-
hinged. A separate settlement was reached with Jeep Corp. (Fortman 
v. Hemco Inc., LA SuperCt, NWC 86375, 10/15/86) 
m A New York Supreme Court jury has found tennis star Martina 
Navratilova not liable for damages suffered by photographer Arthur 
Seitz during a scuffle following her loss in a 1982 tournament, 
although it awarded Seitz $50 for exposed film. Seitz sued Navratilova 
for $2 million, charging that she struck him and caused him to 
develop a calcium deposit on his arm that required surgery. Navrati-
lova countersued for $4.5 million, alleging that the incident caused her 
"psychological damage." The jury foreman said the panel did not 
condone Navratilova's conduct but found Seitz too "pushy." (Seitz v. 
Navratilova, NY SupCt, Suffolk Cty, No. 024672/84, 10/9/86) 
• The Montana Supreme Court has ordered George Ellinghouse to 
either accept $1 million in place of a jury's $5.2 million award against 
an insurer or submit to a new trial. Ellinghouse, who provided 
consulting services for a golf-course sprinkler system in 1974, was sued 
when a man was electrocuted while digging near the system's under-
ground wires. Safeco initially accepted coverage and defense of the 
case but pulled out two months before the trial. While the evidence is 
sufficient to sustain a verdict against Safeco, the court ruled, it does 
not show a vindictiveness or ill will so extreme as to warrant the 
"exorbitant sum " awarded by the jury. (Safeco Insurance Co. v. 
Ellinghouse, Montana SupCt, No. 85-257, 9/17/86) 
Municipal Coverage 
WEST VIRGINIA 
PLAN ENROLLS 115 
CHARLESTON, WVa. — More 
than 115 local governments have 
joined West Virginia's new state-run 
insurance program for liability cov-
erage, according to Robert Corey, 
director of the state's Board of Risk 
& Insurance Management. 
The government units and non-
profit organizations will pay $6 mil-
lion in annual premiums, Corey 
said, adding that he is now confi-
dent the state can successfully run 
the insurance program. 
Jim Mahurin, a consultant who 
negotiated the policy for the Ra-
leigh County Commission, said offi-
cials there expect to save $39,144 in 
premiums the first year and receive 
greater coverage as well. "But the 
state needs to exercise extreme cau-
tion because it could be an extreme 
money-loser," he said. 
West Virginia has operated a pool 
since 1971 for its state agencies, and 
county school boards were allowed 
to join in 1980, Corey said. The 
plan, which covers 89,000 employ-
ees, could cover an additional 
25,000, he said. 
The state's new program will cov-
er all claims, Corey said. If total 
claims prove higher than premiums, 
the state can always raise its rates or 
impose deductibles, he said. 
The program was required by an 
executive order issued this year by 
Gov. Arch A. Moore Jr. (R). • 
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MEDICINE... 
OESI6NEO FOR H E A L T H . . . 
P R O D U C E D WITH C A R E 
THE UPJOHN COMPANY 
KALAMAZOO. MICHIGAN *©OOl 
T E L E P H O N E (©16) 382-*000 
PHARMACEUTICAL R E S E A R C H 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
FDA LIAISON 
Officio/ 
O. J . MASON, PH.D. 
September 10, 1970 
Office of Scientific Evaluation 
Bureau of Drugs 
Food and Drug Administration 
Rockville, Maryland 20852 
Reference: 
Gentlemen: 
IND for Compressed Tablets U-33,030 (Original Submission) 
We are submitting, under the provisions of section 505(i) of the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act and section 130.3 of Title 21 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, three copies of a Claim for Investigational Exemption for 
Compressed Tablets U-33,030. 
This filing is intended to cover Phase 1 studies of U-33,030 as an anti-
anxiety agent. 
Sincerely yours, 
THE UPJOHN COMPANY 
D. J. Mason, Ph.D. 
DJM/mak 
o 
© 
07 
CI 
8 
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THE UPJOHN COMPANY 
KALAMAZOO. MICHIGAN *OOOt 
TELEPHONE (016) 3 6 2 - 4 0 0 0 
DRUG REGULATORY AFFAIRS 
Pharmocwricoi Aescarch ond Dev«Jopm«nr 
Ottictof 
C L. SCHUMANN. PM.D. 
Oirtaor 
May 4 , 1976 
Bureau of Drugs 
Food and Drug Administration 
5600 Fishers Lane 
Rockville, Maryland 20852 
Reference: New Drug Application for Compressed Tablets Halcion (triazolam) 
(Original Submission! 
Gentlemen: 
We are submitting under the provisions of section 314.1 of Title 21, Code 
of Federal Regulations, a New Drug Application for Compressed Tablets 
Halcion (triazolam). This drug is a benzodiazepine type compound intended 
for the treatment of insomnia. 
There are 147 volumes in this application; they are submitted as follows: 
Three copies of the following: 
Volume 1.1 - Part 1, Contents 
Part 2, Optional Expanded Summary 
Volumes 1.2 through 1.17 - Expanded Summary (continued from Volume 1.1) 
Volume 1.18 - Summary of Dependence Liability Studies 
(Note: In addition to the three review copies, 15 
additional copies of Volume 1.18 are included for 
your Drug Abuse Staff.) 
./ Volume 1.19 - Part 4, Labeling 
'*.%":" Part 5, Statement 
Part 6, List of Articles 
Part 7, Composition of Drug 
Part 8, Methods and Controls<^
 w 
Part 9, Drug Samples; Descry65a^>f Referef5te*$tandard 
Volumes 1.20 through 1.23 - Part 10, Pre 
;
*&^})1 
l«SA 
Studies \ . 
^ / S ^ T * 
& 
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NDA for C.T. Halcion (triazolam) 
Page Two May 4, 1976 
Volume 1.24 - Part 11, List of Investigators 
Part 12, Clinical Studies 
Part 13, Statement 
Part 14, Environmental Impact Analysis Report 
Two copies of the following: 
Volumes 1.25 (RRl) through 1.28 (RR4) - Drug Experience Reports (FD-1639's) 
One copy of the following; 
Volumes 1.29 (CI) through 1.129 (C101) - Patient Case Record 
Volumes 1.130 (PSl) through 1.147 (PS18) - Computer Generated 
Patient Summaries 
Under separate cover, the following samples are submitted with this application: 
Hew Drug Substance (Bulk Drug): . 
Lot 8257-CH-141, 1 bottle, 1 gram 
Lot 11324-TGS-33, 1 bottle, 1 gram 
Lot 11324-TGS-87, 1 bottle, 1 gram 
Finished Product: • 
C. T. triazolam 0.25 mg -
Lot 17,543-2 4 bottles 150 each 
Lot 17,543-5 4 bottles 150 each 
Lot INV 2494 4 bottles 150 each 
C. T. triazolam 0.5 mg -
Lot 17,544-2 4 bottles 150 each 
Lot 17,544-5 4 bottles 150 each 
Lot INV 2495 4 bottles 150 each 
C. T. triazolam 1 mg -
Lot 17,545-1 4 bottles 150 each 
Lot 17,545-2 4 bottles 150 each 
Lot INV 2496 4 bottles 150 each 
Control Reference Standard Issue A 
Lot 8257-CH-86 10 vials 250 mg each 
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NDA for C. T. Halcion (triazolam) 
Page Three
 May 4, 1976 
The studies described in this NDA were conducted under IND-7231, C. T. U-33,030; 
that IND may be referred to 1n the review of this submission. 
Sincerely yours, 
THE UPJOHN COMPANY 
E. L. Schumann, Ph.D. 
ELS/ekj 
Attachments 
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES Public Health Servica 
Food and Drug Administrate 
Rockville MD 20857 
NDA 17-892 
?W I 5 1982 
The Upjohn Company 
Attention: E.L. Schumann, Ph.D. 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49001 
Gentlemen: 
Please refer to your nev drug application dated Hay 4, 1976 submitted pursuant 
to section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for Compressed 
Tablets Ealcion (triazolam), 0.25 mg and 0.5 mg, NDA 17-892. 
We also refer to our letters dated February 26, 1982 and October 25, 1982, and 
to your additional communication of October 28, 1982. 
We have completed the review of this application as amended and have concluded 
that the drug is safe and effective for use as recommended in the submitted 
labeling. Accordingly, the application is approved. 
As detailed in our February 26, 1982 letter, and reaffirmed in our letter of 
October 25, 1982, it is required that you perform a Phase IV dose 
proportionality study in healthy volunteers as a condition of approval. 
Also, it is understood that approval of this NDA is conditional upon the 
announcement of the final scheduling decision in the Federal Register by the 
Drug Enforcement Administration. 
The enclosures summarize the remaining conditions relating to the approval of 
this application. 
Please submit one market package of the drug when available. 
Sincerely yours, 
(Z&4 
Robert Temple, M.D. 
Acting Director 
Office of Nev Drug Evaluation 
National Center for Drugs and Biologies 
Enclosures: Records and Reports Requirement (Reg. 310.300) 
Conditions of Approval of an NDA 
:!0;; i 
0416406 :....,-
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^ 
venting Reagan from being Reagan. The Administra-
tion was caving in on a tax hike. Violations of SALT 
II were being ignored. Policy regarding Poland was an 
enigma. Drift. 
Well, Baker, Deaver, and Darman Are gone. Donald 
Regan a)id even Pat Buchanan are in place. And here 
we are, dismantling a Poseidon to conform with SALT 
II. Not a thing was done about the murder of Major 
Nicholson. Not a thing has been done about the mur-
der of Robert Stethem by the hijackers. It's business 
as usual in the terrorist, camps of the Bekaa Valley. 
(Francois Mitterrand was tougher: The French bombed 
the Bekaa and their nationals have since been let 
•lone.) The Administration was strangely passive dur-
ing the appropriations fight over Star Wars, funding 
was reduced, and rumors circulate that George Shultz 
and Robert McFarlane are going to sell out on Star 
Wars in exchange for a' cosmetic reduction in Sovi-
et warheads. The forthcoming summit meeting with 
Gorbachev appears to be politically stacked in his 
favor. He at least has an agenda: ending Star Wars. 
Our agenda appears to consist only of a vague de-' 
sire fori "peace.'* I ' , 
The Pentagon issues ridiculous pronunciamentos ex-
plaining why it cannot ,use force here, there—any-
where? It seems to have a George McClellan complex. 
Which brings us to Secretary of State George Shultz. 
Now,. George Shultz has never been in danger of be-
ing mistaken for Julius Caesar. But Shultz has now 
given a tough speech at Helsinki, and he was one of 
the 'hard-liners within the Administration on the re-, 
cent hostage affair. Shultz wants to hit back. So does 
Secretary of Education WilliamK Bennett. Reflect on 
that, The Secretary of Education took a tougher po-
sition than the Pentagon.! Shultz is entirely absorbed 
by the State Department apparatus, but he is not the 
source of. the trouble. | 
Someone is supposed to be in charge down there. 
Liability Nightmare j 
1 1 TEM: A mkn sticks his two-year-old son's head 
I between tW running blades of a ceiling fan-Mmd 
then sues the manufacturer for failing to warn him the 
child might be injured. | • | . 
'item: A company that had ipahufactured textile 
. machinery* for 136 years goes out of business because 
•of the costs of liability j lawsuits over equipment it 
had manufactured decades earlier, j -
'item: A'fter deciding that a drug a woman had 
. taken during pregnancy was. not responsible for her 
child's birth defects, a jury awarded her damages any-
way—to help defray medical costs of the child's fu-
ture care." * . j .' ! j . 
&•., These horror stories, culled by a Heritage Founda-
tion researcher, show why;product-liability law has/ 
come a pienace to more than just the Manvilles/and 
Union Carbides of the world. Even without a single 
obvious disaster, the case-by-case costs of litigation 
can drive small companies to the wall. Heritage ana-
lyst Milton Copulos says 20 ,per cenf of the cost of 
an ordinary stepladder is traceable to past, present, 
and future liability. J 
Skd to say, the horror stories are not mere flukes; 
each one illustrates «a principle of law. The ceiling-fan 
case is Just one example of how courts are disallow-
ing the traditional defense of contributory negligence. 
Another1 such case involved a man who strapped a re-
frigerator to his back and ran a stunt footrace! One 
of the straps failed, and he collected SI million from 
the strap manufacturer. ' 
The textile-machinery case shows how a company 
can be jttsessed damages for injuries caused by long-
forgotten, impossible-to-track-down products. The drug ' 
case typifies the new doctrine of generic liability, uri-
der which a consumer who suffers side-effects after 
taking a pill and cannot remember which prand he 
took can successfully sue all the makers of the com-
pound in question. j 
The tyg winners—did you havt any' doubt?—art 
the lawyers. A Rand study found that a typical court 
case cost $380,000, of which SI25,000 went to the de-
fense lawyers, SI 14,000 to the plaintiff's lawyers, and 
$141,000 in net compensation to the plaintiff. 
One of the ironies of the liability spiral is that in 
some areas it is making life more risky as well as 
more expensive. Sears was sued by a heart-attack vic-
tim who claimed that its lawnmbwer starter cord was] 
too hard to pull; but rectifying this "defect" would j 
make it easier for children to endanger themselves by 
activating the machines. Edmund Kitch, writing in a! 
recent | issue of Regulation, tells bow liability for rare 
side-effects is driving many manufacturers out of the 
vaccine matket, even in case? where united medical 
opinion agrees that the vaccines do more good than 
harm overall. j : 
The diphtheria-tetanus-whooping-cough vaccine for 
children now costs $2.80 a dose and rising, up from 
ten cents a while back. Worse Jyet is the problem of 
"orphan vaccines.*' Although medical research contin-
ues to progress toward the hope of vaccines against 
AIDS and herpes, Kitch says (that "testing and ot* 
taining regulatory clearance for such vaccines is not 
currently of interest to any potential producer. Thosfc 
invisible non-litigants Who would benefit from new 
vaccines are probably the most dramatic victims of the 
threat of product-liabilijy law.** 
Smeal Time 
•HE STRUGGLE for the presidency of the National j 
Organization for wjomen pitted Eleanor Smeal, a 
the incumbent, Judy Gofd-
I smith, a former Smeal Iprot6g6e. It turned oh degrees 
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REMARKS OF 
DOUGLAS A. RIGGS 
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
ON THE CAUSES OF THE INSURANCE 
AND PRODUCT LIAEILITY CRISIS 
PRESENTED BEFORE: 
MAIN HURDMAN, CPA 
ANNUAL PARTNER'S MEETIKC 
MIAMI, FLORIDA 
JUNE 26, 1986 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF HEATING, REFRIGERATING, 
AND AIR-CONDITIONING ENGINEERS, INC. 
ANNUAL MEETING 
PORTLAND, OREGON . 
JUNE 23, 1986 
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It is a pleasure to be here with you this morning to discuss a 
topic which many Americans, especially in the business community, 
consider the number one economic issue facing America today: 
namely, the need for tort reform, particularly of our product 
liability laws. 
Some of you in this audience may not believe tort reform concerns 
you. If so, well, you are wrong. As certified public 
accountants, you are directly affected by professional liability 
costs. Moreover, many if not most of your clients are affected by 
numerous tort issues. Finally, each of you is a consumer, and 
consumers as a group ultimately pay the costs associated with tort 
losses. 
For all these reasons, you should be concerned about -- and 
involved in ~ the current public debate over tort reform. 
I know that there is a tort crisis because in -the last few months, 
1 have responded to literally hundreds of letters and spoken to 
thousands in business and civic groups on this issue. All across 
the country, people are unable to obtain liability insurance at 
affordable rates and, in some cases, to obtain insurance at all. 
Unlike a few years ego, when this problem affected only a few 
small groups in our society ~ like doctors — today's crisis has 
no bounds. 
Manufacturers and sellers of virtually every product or service, 
professionals, such as lawyers, engineers and ^- yes — 
accountants, and municipalities of every size are encountering 
serious problems arising from premium increases, policy 
cancellations and refusals to underwrite certain activities. 
While a number of causes have been suggested for these problems, I 
believe the excesses that have crept into our legal system are the 
single most important factor contributing to the liability 
insurance crisis, particularly in the area of product liability. 
The costs associated with tort awards, including the cost of 
liability insurance, are passed along to consumers in the form of 
higher prices, and in many cases result in the loss of socially 
beneficial products and of jobs. So, our legal excesses have 
clear and detrimental effects on our domestic economy and our 
international competitiveness. 
But before I go further into that side of the problem, let me take 
a moment to explain how our insurance system affects and' is 
affected by our legal system. 
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Though severe injuries and losses rarely occur, they can be 
devastating. For this reason, most people are willing to take on 
a minimal, but certain, financial obligation in return for 
protection against the unlikely, but potentially overwhelming, 
one. That is why insurance exists. You all know this. You all 
have bought insurance to protect against uncommon risks, be they 
from natural disaster, theft, or a civil wrong. 
Product liability insurance exists for the same reason. Some 
companies will, despite quality control efforts, occasionally 
produce a defective product which severely hurts a user. In many 
cases, even such unintentional behavior will constitute the breach 
of a legal duty, something we lawyers call a "tort." The cost of 
compensating such tort victims can be many times company earnings, 
especially in the case of small businesses. Such a result would, 
be devastating to any company whether it is large or small. 
By spreading this cost among all producers, product liability 
coverage makes it possible for companies to manufacture and sell 
despite the risk of liability for a defective product and the 
costs associated with a lawsuit. This is why product liability 
insurance is called "a linchpin in the operation of our economy." 
Without it, the wheels of production would grind to a halt. 
It is a system in which the onus to insure falls on the potential 
tortfeasors and defendants rather than on the potential victims 
and plaintiffs. Through our civil justice and insurance systems, 
the cost of product harm is transferred from users to producers. 
In this way, overall prices come to reflect the "social costs" 
associated with the manufacture, use and sale of products, and 
producers have a direct incentive to reduce the likelihood of 
product-caused accidents. 
Traditionally, insurance companies invest premiums until they must 
be applied against claims. During the late 19709s, soaring 
interest rates made it feasible for insurance companies to 
undercharge for coverage in order to attract more cash for 
investment. A price war raged for several years, with insurance 
companies offering more and more coverage for less and less money# 
You probably have all heard of this practice — It is commonly 
referred to as "cash flow underwriting." 
Y7hile this may have been a reasonable response to the short-term 
incentives of the investment market, it disrupted the accident-
reducing function of product liability insurance. Not only were 
potential injury claims spread among more producers, but the true 
costs of those injuries were masked by the interest rate subsidy. 
Unintentionally, perhaps, the insurance companies were sending the 
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wrong signal to manufacturers and to the American public• From 
the prices charged for premiums, it appeared that injury claims 
and the amounts awarded were declining when, in fact, they were 
going up significantly. 
This increase in claims and awards was fueled in no email part by 
the fact that the common law of tort was undergoing radical 
change. . Although the basis of tort law is fault, there is another 
important theory — somewhat more recent ~ called "strict 
liability." This theory holds that in certain cases, a party 
should be liable for the consequences of his acts regardless of 
fault. 
Initially, this concept was subject to substantial legal 
limitations. Strict liability was seen as an exception to the 
rule, and therefore used sparingly. Beginning in the 1960fs, 
however, legal scholars and judges expanded upon the notion of 
strict liability and developed new theories of recovery, creating 
new legal duties and additional categories of damages. Strict 
liability began to be applied without regard to its original 
limitations. In some jurisdictions, strict liability bordered on 
absolute liability. 
In part, these new interpretations drew upon the new dangers of 
advanced technology and our growing ability to trace disease and 
injury to chemical and other sources. In part, they reflected 
confidence in our prosperity as a naticn and the view that we 
could afford to compensate for every harm. And in part, I must 
admit, they stemmed from the pressure generated by record numbers 
of attorneys seeking to earn a living and exercise their creative 
talents. 
But more important, and to no small extent, these efforts 
reflected a desire to achieve a particular ideological goal ~ a 
risk-free society, or at the very least, a society in which no one 
would have to bear, without compensation, what Shakespeare called 
the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune." This was to be 
part of the "great society:" every person entitled to be made 
whole, regardless of the circumstances of his injury. 
This legal policy was nothing short of an off-budget mechanism for 
redistributing wealth in the United States. This policy 
reflected, if not promoted, the belief that whenever there are 
personal injuries, the people — "us" — are owed something by 
institutions -- "them" .-- particularly by America's businesses and 
governmental bodies. Regardless of the degree of fault 
attributable to the injured or to third parties, those with the 
deepest pockets are "expected" to fork over compensation. 
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Furthermore our technological advances and new insights into 
causes and effects make us more aware o£ the risks in daily life. 
This awareness, coupled with subtle but real attitude changes in 
our society, have made us less willing to assume many of those 
risks. Where Alexander Woollcott could once quip, "all the things 
I really like are either illegal, immoral or fattening,* today we 
might say, without much humor, "everything we enjoy is either 
infectious, carcinogenic or promotes hardening of the arteries" 
— but we can sue! 
This propensity to sue, coupled with the expansion of tort 
doctrine and the willingness of juries and judges to award 
spectacular damages, made the 970'& (and '80's) a time for 
exploding tort liability. The inflation and interest rates which-
lowered the cost of insurance, raised the amount of tort damages 
and paved the way for the multi-million dollar verdicts which have 
become almost commonplace. 
The proverbial chickens have flocked home to roost since 1963 when 
inflation and interest rates started their drop to the lowest 
levels in over a decade under the leadership of President Reagan. 
Of course, we can all be grateful for that. But a side effect has 
been a precipitous decline in insurance company revenues. Thus, 
as'tort suits and judgments have skyrocketed, insurance companies 
have suffered staggering underwriting losses paying out record 
claims. 
Insurance companies have responded to this squeeze by tremendously 
raising product liability premiums and reducing or eliminating 
many forms of coverage. We have received reports of up to 1000% 
increases! Though it is impossible to recoup past losses, those 
companies appear to have decided not to make the same mistake 
twice. This time they are pricing policies on the basis of the 
costs of the tort system, rather than on the interest rate index. 
Whereas their earlier undercharges masked the true costs of 
coverage, today's insurance (including in some instances the lack 
thereof) reflects the reality of the costs associated with the 
tort system. As a result, the consumer and the manufacturer have 
had to come to grips with the true price of the risk-free society. 
We must remember that insurance is a consensual, commercial 
arrangement which comes about as a result of needs. Coverage will 
be available only as long as those who need it are willing to pay 
premiums sufficient to pay for it — that is, to cover their 
losses and allow a reasonable profit for those providing the 
insurance. 
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In some cases, however, realistically priced insurance will be so 
expensive that manufacturers will not be able to afford to 
produce. In theory, I suppose, that's not a bad thing: if your 
product turns out to be harmful to the public, you should stop 
making it. That's how fault-based liability increases consumer 
safety. 
But that's not always the way it works. Tremendous judgments are 
being awarded even when products are not unreasonably dangerous, 
even when the manufacturer or seller is not at fault, but simply 
because he has a deep pocket. The result is that products which 
are not unsafe, which consumers want and need, are pulled from the 
shelves. And there are dozens cf foreign-made products waiting to 
replace them. 
A recent example of this phenomenon was the massive swine flu 
immunization program. After e series of lawsuits, the 
manufacturers announced that they could no longer afford to 
produce the vaccine. Although it was clear that, on balance, the 
risk of adverse reactions was small compared to the benefits, the 
few harmed by the vaccine collected awards large enough to 
endanger the entire program. 
The government, including Congress, believed the vaccine was 
essential to public health, and used taxpayer dollars to 
underwrite the pharmaceutical companies so that production could 
continue. But we can't afford to do that every time: moreover, 
it goes against our grain to have Uncle Sam do so. 
However, if our tort system continues in this direction, we will 
find ourselves in situations like this more and more. As coverage 
becomes increasingly unaffordable and even unavailable, 
manufacturers and businesses will shut down: and the first to go 
will be the small ones, the entrepreneurs whc constitute the vital 
lifeblood of our economy. 
It is utter nonsense to assert that the crisis will be cured by 
government regulation of the insurance industry rather than reform 
of tort law. Shall we require that industry to operate some of 
its lines of coverage at a loss in order to subsidize the tort 
system? I don't think so. Moreover, even to contemplate such a 
result is to turn our free enterprise system on its head; but 
someone has to pay the piper if we want to compensate all victims 
generously. 
Many people remark that Britain, France and Japan have less 
litigious societies than America,' and that manufacturers in those 
countries have far fewer problems with the availability and 
affcrdability of product liability insurance. The key difference 
is that the governments cf those countries undertake as a public 
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function the underwriting of health care and other social costs 
for their citizens ~ action that the United States has undertaken 
only in exceptional situations, such as the swine flu case. 
Those countries' governments underwrite the risks of modern life 
by heavily taxing their people. Fortunately, we in America have 
rejected the socialist notion that the central government knows 
best and provides best, choosing instead the risks — but 
potential gains — of free enterprise. 
Of course in all countries, including the United States, consumers 
as a group ultimately pay the costs associated with the suits of 
the injured few. But there are two distinguishing features 
between our policy and that of those other countries. 
First, victims recover far less in those countries for their 
injuries. And second, — and I believe it to be a very important 
distinction — the incentive structures are different. With costs 
spread through the tax system in the other countries, there is no 
particular pressure applied to those in the best position to 
produce safer products. But if a manufacturer in the United 
States knows he will be sued if he produces harmful products, the 
profit incentive motivates him to make his products safer. He may 
spend a bit more on production, but he111 come out ahead in the 
long run. Only in America is there this kind of direct feedback 
to -fiianufacturers and product sellers. 
However, when the system goes berserk and rewards and punishes 
indiscriminately — as I believe our system now does — 
manufacturers have less incentive to be careful . If 
manufacturers know they are likely to land in court even if 
they're not at fault, the system breaks down. The erosion of the 
fault-based liability doctrine has blurred the distinction between 
a safe and an unsafe manufacturer and thereby destroyed the 
deterrence pillar of the tort law. 
Our judicial system is largely responsible for this result. 
Activist judges have ignored the common law of tort, choosing 
instead to engage in a systematic re-interpretation of tort 
doctrine. They have steadily expanded legal duties in line with 
their own social/philosophical beliefs. 
The American people should remind their judges that public policy 
should be debated and established in our legislatures — not in 
our court rooms. Moreover, both judges and juries must come to 
understand that the tremendous sums they frequently award are not 
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paid out of some secret corporate fund. Rather, the money they 
hand out comes from all of us, as consumers, stockholders and 
taxpayers. 
Until we curb the excesses in tort litigation, costs will continue 
to rise. This cannot go on. And it will not. A more rational, 
predictable tort system is required. It is time we realized that 
while there may be individual winners and losers in our present 
system, the total costs are borne by society as a whole. 
Recently, a number of states have begun to take steps to address 
the excesses in their tort laws. Maryland has put a cap on 
non-economic damages. Florida has capped damages (at a different 
level) and has also modified its rule on joint and several 
liability. California voters recently approved Proposition 51 
which re-establishes the traditional connection between a 
defendant's responsiblity for an injury and his obligation to pay 
non-economic damages. These are important steps and should be 
encouraged. 
But each state addresses these problems in different ways. This 
reflects, among other things, the historical fact that the common 
law of tort has developed independently in each state. Because cf 
this, the states are well suited to address most concerns in the 
tort law, such as those associated with medical malpractice, 
professional liability and municipal liability. These are issues 
where local views can and must be primary. 
The product liability issue, however, poses a different problem. 
Because todayfs stream of commerce is apt to carry every product 
beyond the state in which it was made, questions of product 
liability inevitably raise interstate commerce concerns. Though 
the recent tort reform efforts undertaken by the individual states 
axe certainly welcome and necessary, and reflect a recognition of 
the seriousness of the problem, we dc not expect the states, each 
working independently, to produce a consistent product liability 
system. Interstate problems call for interstate solutions. 
Among the responsibilities our Constitution explicitly delegates 
to the central government is the duty to regulate interstate 
commerce for the good of the whole. That is why we have proposed 
federal product liability legislation — to provide a predictable 
set of standards upon which businesses and consumers alike can 
rely. The Federal government cannot abdicate its responsibility 
in this area and must take a leadership role •- which is precisely 
what this Administration intends to do. 
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In April, the President sent to Congress a bill which, as he 
described it, "would set an example of simple good sense for the 
rest of the Nation to follow." It will protect the free flow of 
goods in interstate commerce by placing reasonable limitations on 
the excesses of product liability law and returning it to a 
fault-based system. And it will not preempt all state action: 
the states would be free to adopt more stringent standards. 
The bill would ensure that product liability law operates to 
compensate injuries caused by the wrongdoing of others. At the 
same time, it would reduce the unacceptably high transaction costs 
associated with litigation and would limit excessive awards. 
In addition to requiring that liability be based on fault, the 
bill will limit the application of joint and several liability to 
situations where persons have acted in concert to cause an injury. 
The bill also reduces awards in cases where a plaintiff is 
eligible for certain collateral sources of compensation, 6uch as 
Social Security Disability Benefits, workers1 compensation or 
employer financed health care benefits. 
In the area of damages, the bill will place a dollar cap on 
non-economic damages, including punitive damages. This cap will, 
of course, have no effect on the award of economic damages, such 
as medical care, rehabilitation costs or lost earnings. Awards of 
future economic damages vhich are greater than $100,OCC will be 
paid periodically rather than in a single lump-sum. Courts will 
have the discretion to fix the level and schedule of payments at . 
the time of judgment. 
The bill also will help alleviate the enormous transaction costs 
associated with litigation by establishing a "sliding scale91 for 
attorney contingency fees that decreases as the amount of an award 
increases. 
The rising costs associated with product liability suits cause 
negative effects which ripple throughout our society. They have a 
detrimental effect on our country's productivity and competi-
tiveness, and ultimately are reflected in the expenses of every 
consumer. 
Already we have seen the effect of this run-away system: dozens 
of firms producing items ranging from health equipment to child 
car seats are discontinuing the manufacture of their products. 
This causes the loss of American jobs and hands our foreign 
competitors — who are, by the way, far more difficult to sue ~ 
yet another opportunity to profit at our expense. 
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Legislative action is needed — and needed now -- to deal 
effectively with the situation. 
The problems facing us today in our product liability system have 
developed over years and have many different roots. There is no 
quick fix. We must all work together, at the state and Federal 
level, using all three branches of government in close cooperation 
with business, consumer and labor interests to correct these 
problems. 
Your contribution to this effort is needed and appreciated. 
c-
Thank you. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A rapid rise in the cost of medical services has placed the task of 
financing and controlling medical costs near the top of the nation's 
social policy agenda for the 1970s. Hospital insurance programs, 
Medicare, and Medicaid have increased the use and the prices of 
medical services, and enactment of a national health insurance 
scheme could be expected to worsen the problem. The total cost of 
medical care is approaching $100 billion and continues to rise. 
The federal government supports and funds programs intended 
to produce better medical care at more reasonable prices—programs 
especially including health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Ad-
vocates of HMOs argue that greater use of such groups, which inte-
grate health insurance with health care and reduce the fee for the 
service component of medical costs, will limit the pressure for 
overprescription of medical services. Overprescription tends to 
cause overuse and increased prices. 
Besides possible overprescription, an important reason for the 
higher cost of medical care has been the development of new and 
costly medical technology. Kidney dialysis, open heart surgery, and 
coronary bypass implantation have added considerably to the burden 
of medical costs. Ethical drugs, on the other hand, help to relieve 
suffering at relatively small cost and, when they provide an alterna-
tive to expensive kinds of therapy, greatly decrease medical bills. 
This study focuses on the cost of drugs—not out of a desire to 
diminish their human benefits, but rather because the high costs of 
* I would like to acknowledge the help of Merlon J. Peck, John McGowan, 
John Owen, Solomon Fabrlcant, J. Fred Weslon, and Yale Brozen who saw earlier 
drafts of the manuscript. The views expressed and any errors which might 
remain are of course my responsibility. 
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medical care are a matter of urgent concern and the costs of drugs 
are part of the costs of medical care. 
The Role of Drugs 
Since ethical drugs are a relatively inexpensive mode of therapy, 
it would seem clear that pharmaceutical industry R&D should be 
encouraged in order to increase the production of new ethical drugs. 
Paradoxically, the importance of the ethical drug industry in provid-
ing therapy has been neglected. Public attention has tended to be 
fixed, instead, on the profits and selling costs of the ethical drug 
manufacturers, even though profits and costs constitute a small 
fraction of the nation's total medical expenditures. Currently, U.S. 
sales of ethical drugs account for only $6 billion of total medical 
expenditures of over $90 billion, and total selling costs and profits 
account for very much less. 
The opportunities for savings to be realized by a lowering of 
the prices of drugs are much less than the opportunities for savings 
to be realized in other components of the medical care industry. Any 
apparent savings from the cutting of drug prices would be more 
than counterbalanced if these savings had the effect of reducing the 
number of drug innovations, and so raising the total cost of medical 
care. In other words, when policy makers concentrate on correcting 
the presumed inequity of high prices of the drug industry, they are 
stressing a secondary problem, the remedies for which could well 
undercut attempts to solve the much more important problem of 
improving the quality and reducing the costs of medical care. Poli-
cies designed to decrease drug prices might produce some savings 
for consumers in the form of lower immediate expenditures for drugs 
but would risk the loss of much larger potential savings—both direct 
and indirect—that might flow from the development of new drugs. 
An emphasis on correcting high prices distorts any general economic 
analysis of the functions and performance of the industry: it places 
too much emphasis on the alleged monopoly problem, when other 
problems including that of encouraging innovation are more im-
portant. 
Better understanding of drug industry performance is aided by 
viewing drug therapy as a relatively low-cost medical technology 
that may displace other more expensive technologies. For example, 
recent advances in drug research have promised drug therapies as a 
low-cost substitute for surgery for treating gallstones. Although the 
range of choice of technology may be limited for some diseases, 
this is not always the case: different technologies (surgery, radiology, 
intensive care, hospital care) may be used simultaneously or in 
sequence. 
In fact, medical practitioners are not accustomed to a cost-benefit 
analysis of choices among alternative therapeutic methods. Their 
stated objective is to provide patients with the best available therapy 
regardless of cost. This approach has some moral advantages: a 
doctor need not restrict expensive but effective therapeutic programs 
to rich patients. But costs arc relevant to medical decisions, and 
doctors should certainly choose an economical form of therapy when 
it is as safe as other forms. 
When we compare medical technologies, it is immediately evi-
dent that drug therapy is more widely applicable than some other 
forms of treatment. More diseases can be treated by drugs than by 
surgery and radiology. The use of drugs thus permits larger reduc-
tions in morbidity and mortality rales than are permitted by alterna-
tive forms of treatment and, as a result, can bring larger reductions 
in the cost of disease.1 
Alternative forms of therapy are much more costly than drugs 
because they rely on the employment of professional skills, costly 
equipment, or a large labor input per patient. Surgery, radiology, 
and intensive care require substantial outlays for both professional 
skills and equipment, and psychiatry, physical therapy, and hospital 
care demand large inputs of man-hours, whether professional or 
unskilled. The care of coronary disease, for example, employs teams 
of professional personnel and expensive equipment. The most 
dramatic current example of this is the heart transplant, and consid-
erable research is currently directed to the development of an 
artificial heart. But expense prevents the use of heart transplants 
for a large number of patients. The development of costly (though 
successful) medical technology has contributed to the catastrophic 
costs of certain illnesses for individual families and thus (among 
other things) to current proposals for national health insurance.2 
Not only is treatment by drug therapy intrinsically more desir-
able, but also it is more economical than alternative treatment. First, 
it is more economical because patients can usually take drugs with-
out any assistance. In order to make self-administration easy, drugs 
should be made up in oral dosage forms rather than those that 
require injection; even though the development of an oral dosage form 
may not represent an important medical advance over a parenteral 
form, it may still be of economic importance. Second, it is more eco-
nomical because most drugs are mass-produced rather than made up 
as required for each patient. The fact that drugs are mass-produced in 
appropriate dosage forms should not be taken for granted and is, 
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indeed, a relatively recent development. Before the 1940s, pharma-
cists did their own compounding for each prescription. The phar-
maceutical manufacturers took over the manufacture of final dosage 
drugs in the 1940s and 1950s after the introduction of the sulfa drugs 
and the antibiotics. This development has greatly reduced the cost 
of operating a pharmacy and, to the extent that pharmaceutical retail-
ing is competitive, has reduced the cost of prescriptions. 
The introduction of mass production methods of drug manufac-
ture represented a large increase in productivity. The new methods 
displaced what was virtually a handicraft technology—one that, with 
the increases in wages, had become quite expensive. The shift in 
production methods reflected the same economic forces as the shift to 
self-service groceries and the displacement of custom-made apparel 
and shoes by mass-produced ready-to-wear clothing.*1 The growth of 
the pharmaceutical manufacturing industry reflects two different 
types of substitution: the displacement of compounding in the retail 
establishment by a mass-production technology and the substitution 
of low-cost drug therapy for more costly types of therapy. 
Usually the growth of pharmaceutical manufacturing in the 
1940s and 1950s is attributed to the introduction of the new sulfa 
drugs and antibiotics since these were more difficult to manufacture 
than many older drugs. While the new products did in fact contribute 
to the change, the influence of general economic forces should not 
be dismissed. The pharmaceutical manufacturers also took over the 
production of dosage forms of virtually all the old drugs. Today, 
the retail pharmacist does virtually no compounding at all. 
The substitution of drug therapy for other medical technologies 
has achieved significant economies, and the economics available 
from the greater use of drugs have grown as a result of recent large 
increases in the prices of other medical services. By contrast, the 
prices of drugs have remained stable. Their relative prices compared 
to those of other forms of therapy have declined, and it is the relative 
prices that arc relevant in assessing the available economies. The 
increase in the use of medical services has also increased the poten-
tial savings from the substitution of drugs for medical services. But 
the development of drug therapy requires the discovery and develop-
ment of new drugs. 
The Need for New Drugs 
Despite the medical contributions of the "wonder" drugs of the last 
three decades, new drugs are needed for the treatment, prevention, 
and cure of major diseases. A look at just a few cagetories of 
illnesses reveals the need for additional pharmaceutical research and 
the large potential contribution that can be made. 
Infectious Diseases. Although the greatest pharmaceutical triumphs 
have been in the field of infectious diseases, much remains to be 
done. Antibiotics have greatly reduced mortality from pneumonia, 
meningitis, tuberculosis and septicemia, among other diseases. Never-
theless, infectious diseases taken together still account for 7 percent 
of all deaths 4 and a significant amount of severe disability. Further-
more, certain infectious diseases, once effectively treated with drugs, 
have reappeared in recent years. For example, in 1970 venereal 
disease was the most prevalent reported infectious disease, with over 
2.8 million active cases. In part the problem has reappeared because 
the bacteria have become resistant to penicillin, which is now effec-
tive against gonorrhea only in very large doses. A more important 
factor, which is social rather than medical or bacteriological, is the 
permissive contemporary attitudes toward sex/1 
Some currently important bacterial diseases are the paradoxical 
by-products of our therapeutic successes. For example, hospital gram-
negative infections have now become a relatively common terminal 
disease for patients who are alive because of our success in treating 
their cancers or the injuries and burns they received in major 
accidents. The incidence of these infections has also increased as a 
result of the increase in the number of older people. The bacteria in 
question usually do not affect humans but do cause disease in these 
weakened patients. Unfortunately, the ability to treat gram-negative 
infections is still modest. New drugs not yet known are required. 
Mental Illness. Recent statistics on mental illness show that major 
therapeutic advances have been made. New tranquilizers and anti-
depressants helped reduce the number of patients in mental hospitals 
from 55B.000 in 1955 to 339,000 in 1970. During those years the 
average hospital stay for mental illness dropped from eight years to 
one and a third years.0 Tranquilizers and anti-depressants had the 
effect of decreasing the American mental hospital population by half 
compared to what it would otherwise have been. Mental illness, 
nevertheless, remains a serious burden. One estimate is that the total 
cost to the U.S. economy of alcoholism alone is $15 billion per year, 
consisting of $10 billion in lost work time, $2 billion in health and 
welfare services, and $3 billion in property damage and medical 
expenses. This estimate does not include losses from reduced life 
expectancy, traffic fatalities, and arrests.7 New drugs are needed to 
help reduce this burden. 
R 
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Cardiovascular Disease. Cardiovascular diseases are the leading 
cause of death in the United States, accounting for 53 percent of all 
deaths in I960.8 Part of the reason for this is the increase in the 
number of those over forty-five years of age—the most susceptible 
portion of the population. 
Despite the rise in the proportion of older persons in the popula-
tion, the annual death rate from cardiovascular disorders fell from 
515.1 to 494.0 per 100,000 between 1960 and 1970.° Drugs doubtless 
were a factor in this decline. The major drugs now in use against 
this disease were first introduced in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
but few have been introduced since. 
The reduction in the annual death rate from hypertensive heart 
disease and hypertension has even more dramatic; from 44.1 to 
11.0 per 100,000 between 1958 and 1967. The great improvement is 
largely due to the use of anti-hypertensive drugs. Recently there 
has been a growing use of drug therapy to regulate abnormalities of 
lipid metabolism, and significant attention is now being given to 
the identification of the causes of atherosclerosis. 
Arthritis. About 50 million persons suffer from arthritis to some 
degree. Approximately 17 million require medical care and 3.4 mil-
lion are disabled.10 Except for gout, the causes of arthritic diseases 
are unknown, and current treatment provides only symptomatic 
relief. The available drugs include steroid hormones and non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory compounds such as phenylbutazone and 
indomethacin. 
Cancer. New drugs are needed for cancer. With federal support, 
medical research has concentrated heavily on cancer and has suc-
ceeded in developing new drugs that have contributed to an in-
crease in survival rates of patients with certain types of cancer. 
In 1967, less than one-fifth of all patients survived for five years 
after beginning treatment; by 1970 the five-year survival rate had 
risen to one-third. Drugs, however, cannot claim all of the credit; 
early cancer diagnosis and advances in surgery and radiology prob-
ably have been more important factors than drugs in the decline. 
Viral Infections. Anti-viral drugs, although not of practical thera-
peutic use today, are clearly a promising field. The potential eco-
nomic benefits arising from effective treatment of the common cold 
alone are enormous. Interferon, which is a natural substance in-
duced in mammalian cells by exposure to a virus, inhibits the 
growth of the virus in the infected cells and prevents its appearance 
R 
in neighboring cells. But formidable difficulties stand in the way 
of putting this knowledge to use in the development of a drug. 
Interferon is difficult to extract and appears to be effective only in 
the species from which it is obtained. Current efforts are directed 
toward seeking a drug that stimulates the production of interferon 
within the infected cells, rather than a method of extraction. 
Can R&D Add to the Armamentarium? 
Frequently the suggestion is made that additional R&D efforts are 
unlikely to be productive because the major discoveries of the 1940s 
and 1950s have exhausted the available opportunities. New dis-
coveries, it is said, must await a major breakthrough of the magni-
tude of penicillin, and the prospect for a breakthrough of this 
magnitude is dim. On the contrary, many new drugs introduced 
since 1960 have proven to be therapeutically significant. Ampicillin 
has a wider antibacterial range than either penicillin G or penicillin V 
and destroys such penicillin-resistant, gram-negative organisms as 
Salmonella, Shigella, Haemophilus influenzae, and some species of 
Proteus. It is especially effective against urinary tract infections 
which generally involve gram-negative organisms. Cephalosporins, 
a family of relatively new wide-spectrum antibiotics, work against 
penicillinase-producing staphylococci and streptococci that resist 
older penicillins. Doxycycline, a new broad-spectrum antibiotic can 
be safely used by patients suffering from renal insufficiency, who 
risk serious side effects from the use of other tetracyclines. Other 
important new antibiotics include gentamicin and carbenicillin which 
are effective against severe infections caused by gram-negative orga-
nisms resistant to most other antibiotics. 
In the cardiovascular field, the diuretic anti-hypertensive agent, 
chlorothiazide, which was introduced in the late 1950s, was a major 
therapeutic innovation, and a number of other anti-hypertensive 
drugs have been introduced. More recently, innovation has been 
slow, in part because the long-term use required of drugs such as 
these increases the risk of toxicity, which in turn has made FDA 
licensing especially restrictive. The importance of these new drugs 
is demonstrated by the fact that physicians have shifted to them 
rapidly and academic experts have endorsed them. 
7 
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Over the past two decades, pharmaceutical companies have been 
withdrawing from vaccine manufacturing and marketing, increasingly, 
the liability situation and its consequences (i.e., litigation costs 
or difficulty in obtaining insurance coverage) have been cited as 
major factors in the decision to withdraw. These decisions seem to 
indicate that present or anticipated vaccine-related injury liability 
expenses are seen as an unreasonable burden (or an unacceptably risky 
gamble) in relation to the costs of product development and the income 
from sales. 
Manufacturers are apprehensive that without some means of 
compensation for unavoidable vaccine injury and temporally related 
conditions, the present unclear state of the law will continue to 
allow them to be held liable for such conditions and penalized 
financially. 
The future behavior of the courts and the responses of the manu-
facturers cannot be predicted with certainty, but the committee is 
concerned that the apprehensions themselves might have a negative 
effect. Earlier withdrawals from the market have created a situation 
in which the United States is almost totally reliant on one manu-
facturer for polio and DTP vaccines (Lederle), and on another for 
measles, mumps, and rubella vaccines (Merck Sharp & Dohme). if 
apprehensions about the current unclear state of the law caused these 
manufacturers to withdraw, the vaccine supply and immunization 
programs could be jeopardized, leading to possible resurgence of these 
diseases. Also, the apprehensions discussed above are a disincentive 
to investment in the development of new (or improved) immunizing 
agents and to competition from new or foreign firms. 
Proposals to remedy the compensation and liability problems 
connected with vaccine injury are discussed below. 
A NATIONAL VACCINE COMMISSION 
The lack of a formal mechanism to promote cooperation in the 
innovation, production, and use of vaccines limits the benefits 
obtainable from existing immunization programs and hampers the 
development of new programs. The problems associated with the absence 
of such a mechanism are primarily those of omission rather than 
commission: they include delay or inefficiency in achieving desired 
outcomes and failure to tackle problems for which no existing group 
has direct responsibility. 
To overcome these difficulties, the committee recommends the 
establishment of a national vaccine commission. This commission would 
monitor all aspects of immunization efforts in the United States. One 
of its primary responsibilities would be early identification of 
potential problems affecting vaccine supply, it also would help to 
educate and inform the public, physicians, and government decision 
makers about the effects of various immunization actions and 
policies, when necessary, the commission would become an impartial 
broker to promote the availability of needed vaccines and to 
coordinate collaborative activities for which no suitable mechanism 
exists. 
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